

Report of the Meeting of WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission

Original: English (EN)

4 to 14 February 2025
Paris

Introduction and Members contribution

This report presents the work of the WOAHS Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (hereinafter 'the Code Commission' or 'the Commission') which met in Paris, France from 4 to 14 February 2025.

The Code Commission wished to thank the following Members for providing written comments for the WOAHS *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* (hereinafter 'the *Terrestrial Code*'): Australia, Canada, Chile, China (People's Republic of), Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Japan, Korea (Republic of), Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA), the African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR) and the Member States of the European Union (EU). The Commission also wished to thank the following organisations for providing comments: the International Coalition for Animal Welfare (ICFAW), International Poultry Council (IPC), World Renderers Organizations (WRO), and to acknowledge the valuable advice and contributions from numerous experts of the WOAHS scientific network.

The Code Commission reviewed all comments that were submitted prior to the deadline and were supported by a rationale. The Commission thanked Members that submitted their comments following the [Guide for WOAHS Members and International Organisations on submitting comments during the process for the elaboration of WOAHS International Standards](#) ('Guide'). The Commission reserves the right to neither consider nor publish comments received that are not in line with the instructions and formatting provided in this Guide. Comments obviously out of the Guide will not be presented to the Commission. The Commission made amendments to draft texts, where relevant, in the usual manner by 'double underline' and 'strikethrough'. In relevant Annexes, amendments proposed at this meeting are highlighted in yellow to distinguish them from those made previously.

As originally communicated in the Commission's September 2023 report, the Director General agreed to progressively implement improved transparency of the WOAHS process for the elaboration of Standards, for better documentation and traceability.

The first step in this process was the publication on the Delegates' website of comments submitted by WOAHS Members and partners that were considered by the Commission at its February 2024 meeting. This step was implemented in April 2024 when comments were uploaded onto the Delegates' website at the same time as the publication of the Commission's report.

The second step in this process was the publication on the Delegates' and public WOAHS websites of comments considered by the Commission with the Commission's responses in October 2024. These were published as part of the Commission's September 2024 report in a specific annex (Annex 3) for information only. The Commission's responses were presented in English, French or Spanish according to the language of the report and comments were presented in the language in which they were submitted. Comments and the Commission's responses were embedded in the English version of the text that was circulated for comment in September 2024, irrespective of the language version due to resource constraints. As a consequence of presenting all the Commission's responses to comments



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considered in Annex 3, the text of the body of the Commission's September 2024 report focused on providing a short background summary and key points discussed and agreed for each agenda item.

The Director General has agreed to implement the final step of this process in March 2026 which is to also add publication of the name of the Member or partner who submitted the comment in the Commission's report published on both the WOAHS public and the Delegates' website.

The Director General hopes that these new processes to improve transparency, together with the Guide for submitting comments and a more concise and user-friendly report will encourage more Members to engage in the process for the elaboration of WOAHS Standards.

Status of annexes

Annex 3 presents the comments considered and the Commission's responses. It is not presented for comments.

Texts in **Part A** (**Annexes 5 to 14**) are presented for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025. Texts in **Part B** (**Annexes 4 and 15 to 28**) are presented for comments.

How to submit comments

The Code Commission strongly encourages WOAHS Members and Organisations with a WOAHS Cooperative Agreement to participate in the development of WOAHS International Standards by submitting comments on topics and relevant annexes of this report.

Engagement of the Members and these Organisations in the standard-setting process through the submission of comments is critical to ensure that standards are based on the latest scientific and technical data, take into consideration the different contexts among Members and stakeholders and can be implemented. To ensure that comments are considered, they should be submitted by the deadline and in the format described in the [Guide](#) and the [Standard Operating Procedure for WOAHS Members and International Organisations to submit comments during the process for the elaboration of WOAHS International Standards](#) (SOP) available on the Delegates' website and the WOAHS public website.

Members are again reminded that comments that are not correctly formatted as described in the [Guide](#) and [SOP](#), may not be considered by the Commission. Any questions on the requirements for formatting and submission of comments should be sent to TCC.Secretariat@woah.org

The Commission's report also references those instances where the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (the Scientific Commission), the Biological Standards Commission, a Working Group or an *ad hoc* Group have addressed specific comments or questions and proposed answers or amendments. In such cases, the rationale is described in the respective reports of the relevant entity and Members are encouraged to review these reports together with the report of the Code Commission. These reports are available on the dedicated webpages on the WOAHS website, e.g., for *ad hoc* Group reports:

<https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/standards/standards-setting-process/ad-hoc-groups/>

Deadline for comments

Comments on relevant texts in this report (Part B) must be received by **4 July 2025** to be considered by the Code Commission.

Where to send comments

All comments should be sent to TCC.Secretariat@woah.org

Date of the next meeting

The Code Commission noted that the dates for its next meeting are **9 to 18 September 2025**.

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- Annex 8. Chapter 8.13. Infestation with *Cochliomyia hominivorax* (New World screwworm) and Infestation with *Chrysomya bezziana* (Old World screwworm)
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- Annex 12. Chapter 12.1. Infection with African horse sickness virus
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- Annex 22. Chapter 5.7. Border inspection posts and quarantine centres
- Annex 23. Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. Animal welfare during slaughter
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- Annex 25. Chapter 8.10. Infection with Japanese encephalitis virus (Japanese encephalitis)
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- Annex 27. Chapter 8.X. Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
- Annex 28. Chapter 10.X. Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens)

1. Welcome

1.1. Director General

Dr Emmanuelle Soubeyran, the WOAHA Director General, met the Code Commission on 12 February 2025 and thanked its members for their support and commitment to achieving WOAHA's objectives.

Dr Soubeyran informed the Commission of key WOAHA strategic initiatives for this year, namely the development of the WOAHA eighth Strategic Plan, the revision of its Organisation chart, and the revision of the Organisation's governance, and discussed relevant considerations with the Commission.

Dr Soubeyran highlighted the important role WOAHA plays in gathering and disseminating animal health information and stressed the necessity to develop agile mechanisms to respond to the current need for fast communication in a constantly changing environment. The Commission stressed the value of transparent, official notification through WAHIS to allow Members to take appropriate actions to prevent the international spread of diseases and the importance of WOAHA Standards in providing a clear framework for Members' obligations in that regard, notably through the selection and definitions of WOAHA listed diseases based on criteria adopted by WOAHA Members. The Commission also highlighted that the *Terrestrial Code* also required an obligation to notify emerging diseases. It also provided alternatives for Members to share other important animal health information voluntarily.

The Commission emphasised the importance of promoting the adequate implementation of WOAHA Standards by all Members, and while the lack of implementation is sometimes due to inadequate resources, for others it is due to a lack of understanding. The Commission members expressed their interest and availability to contribute to other WOAHA activities with this objective and proposed that WOAHA consider the establishment of WOAHA National Focal points on WOAHA Standards, which could support each Delegate in following the process for the development of Standards, be trained in their content and their practical implementation for the improvement of animal health, animal welfare and veterinary public health worldwide, and to guarantee safe international trade. Both the Director General and the Commission agreed on the usefulness of the discussions that took place on this matter and the Commission work plan during the WOAHA Regional Commissions' Conferences in Europe and the Americas.

It was highlighted that the Observatory should play a critical role in raising awareness on the implementation of WOAHA Standards and noting that one of the main objectives of WOAHA Standards is to prevent the international spread of diseases, the Commission suggested that future Observatory studies could analyse concrete disease outbreak information as per WAHIS notifications and other epidemiological reports, to identify potential causes for their spread, including demonstrated risk pathways, that could be linked to WOAHA Standards and their implementation.

The Commission and the Director General also discussed the content of the *Terrestrial Code* and its progressive expansion over time and shared views on the needs which are being raised, such as the inclusion of more detailed recommendations for the development of disease-specific prevention and control programmes within corresponding chapters.

Commission members thanked Dr Soubeyran and acknowledged the important work of the Secretariats in support of their work.

1.2. Deputy Director General-International Standards and Science

Dr Montserrat Arroyo, WOAHA Deputy Director General for International Standards and Science (DDG-ISS) met with the Code Commission on 4 February 2025 and thanked the Commission members for their ongoing contributions to this important area of WOAHA work.

Dr Arroyo informed the Commission about changes to the WOAHA Organisation chart. She indicated that these changes would rebalance the WOAHA Directorate functions but would not have an impact on Commission work. Further, Dr Arroyo updated the Commission on the development of the WOAHA eighth Strategic Plan that was underway with further information to be shared as the plan was developed.

Dr Arroyo informed the Commission that the Animal Health Forum and the 92nd WOAHA General Session will have the theme 'Policy to Action: Vaccines and vaccination'. Reflections for change'. The forum will create a platform to generate dialogue between WOAHA Delegates, subject matter experts, civil society and the private sector on the barriers impeding the development and use of vaccines for disease prevention and control.

The Commission thanked Dr Arroyo for the continued support in enhancing its work and recognized the Secretariat's significant progress, which has improved efficiency despite a growing workload. It also acknowledged better coordination among Specialist Commissions and fully endorsed greater transparency in the standards-setting process. Committed to improving communication with Members, the Commission pledged to provide clearer information on decision-making and the prioritization of the *Terrestrial Code's* development and revision. It highlighted the latest developments including a dedicated panel discussion at the recent Conferences of WOAHA Regional Commissions.

2. Adoption of the agenda

The proposed agenda was discussed and adopted, taking into consideration the priorities of the work programme and time availability. The agenda and the list of participants are presented in [Annexes 1 and 2](#), respectively.

3. Cooperation with Other Specialist Commissions

3.1. Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases

The Secretariat of the Scientific Commission updated the Code Commission on relevant activities of the Scientific Commission. The Code Commission responded, where relevant, as noted below.

The Code Commission thanked the Scientific Commission for its collaborative work in providing opinions to support the consideration of relevant comments received and for the input provided on some work items, including listed disease case definitions. The Code Commission's consideration of the Scientific Commission's contributions is noted under the relevant agenda items of this report and Members are encouraged where relevant to read this report together with [the reports of the Scientific Commission](#).

Assessments of pathogenic agents against the listing criteria in Chapter 1.2. 'Criteria for the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the WOAHA list'

The Code Commission considered the conclusions of the Scientific Commission at its September 2024 meeting on listing assessments forwarded to the Code Commission. The Commission agreed with the Scientific Commission that Nairobi sheep disease does not meet the listing criteria in Chapter 1.2. Consequently, the Code Commission agreed to propose the deletion of Nairobi sheep disease from Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAHA' (see item 6.2. of this report).

Assessments to determine whether diseases should be considered as 'emerging diseases'

The Code Commission was informed that no assessment of new potential emerging diseases had been conducted by the Scientific Commission at their last meeting of September 2024, and that the Scientific Commission was assessing the infection of bovines by avian influenza viruses in the USA as an emerging disease.

The Commission considered the conclusions of the Scientific Commission at its September 2024 meeting on the annual reassessment of emerging diseases. The Commission noted that the Scientific Commission considered that sufficient evidence existed on the epidemiology of Infection

with SARS-CoV-2 in animals, that it should no longer be considered an 'emerging disease' and recommended subjecting the disease to an assessment against the listing criteria of *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 1.2. The Commission was informed that the assessment was to be discussed by the Scientific Commission at its February 2025 meeting.

The Code Commission requested to be updated on this work at its September 2025 meeting.

Meeting of the Bureaux of the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission

The Bureaux (i.e. the President and two Vice-Presidents) of the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission held a meeting chaired by Dr Arroyo, DDG-ISS. The purpose of the meeting was to provide updates on relevant standing items, to agree on how to address any points that may impact standards that will be proposed for adoption, and to agree on the plans to undertake work of common interest.

The Bureaux were updated on ongoing works based on the SOPs for listing decisions for pathogenic agents and assessments of whether diseases assessed should be considered as emerging. The Bureaux discussed and agreed to the categorisation of the infection of bovines with avian influenza virus of high pathogenicity as an emerging disease. They also agreed on the next tranche of case definitions to be developed for WOAHA listed diseases.

The Bureaux discussed the following *Terrestrial Code* chapters that will be proposed for adoption in May 2025:

- Chapter 8.Y. 'Infection with Nipah virus' (see item 5.5 of this report);
- Chapters 11.5. 'Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides subsp. mycoides* SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)' and 12.1. 'Infection with African horse sickness virus' (see items 5.6 and 5.8 of this report);
- Chapter 12.3. 'Infection with *Trypanosoma equiperdum* (dourine)' (see item 5.9 of this report);
- Chapter 8.13. 'Infestation with *Cochliomyia hominivorax* (New world screwworm) and Infestation with *Chrysomya bezziana* (Old world screwworm)' (see item 5.4 of this report).

The Bureaux also discussed plans for the following items which require coordination between the two Commissions:

- Chapter 1.1. 'Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information' (see item 4.1.3 of this report);
- Removal of questionnaire chapters (Chapter 1.7. to 1.12.) (see item 4.1.15 of this report);
- Chapter 4.4. 'Zoning and compartmentalisation' (see item 4.1.4 of this report);

The Bureaux also considered a general framework for assessing the impact of wildlife diseases on the international trade of domestic animals developed by the Working Group on Wildlife, which was annexed to its April 2024 report for opinion. The Commissions referred to the related work done by the joint taskforce comprising members from both Commissions on animal hosts, to develop a clear and consistent approach to defining how different animal hosts for a listed disease, infection or infestation would be included in WOAHA international standards in each disease-specific chapter, which had also been shared with the Working Group on Wildlife for input.

The Bureaux also agreed that the *Terrestrial Code* chapter for a given disease includes the specific provisions that, together with the relevant horizontal chapters, define the animal health status of a country, zone, compartment or herd, as relevant, and the necessary considerations for safe international trade, particularly for those diseases for which WOAHA grants official recognition of status. The Bureaux did not propose any specific changes to the framework but to refer to the existing relevant standards to ensure safe international trade in domestic animals when the disease is present in wildlife.

3.2. Biological Standards Commission

The Biological Standards Commission Secretariat updated the Code Commission on its relevant activities, including the chapters in the *Terrestrial Manual* that will be updated during the 2025/2026 review cycle.

At the September 2022 meeting of the Bureaux of the Code Commission and Biological Standards Commissions, it was agreed that the experts reviewing a *Terrestrial Manual* chapter should advise the Biological Standards Commission as to whether any proposed revisions could have an impact on the corresponding *Terrestrial Code* chapter.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Code Commission considered the advice and the possible implications of revisions to the following *Terrestrial Manual* chapters, which will be proposed for adoption in the General Session in 2025:

- Chapter 3.1.2. 'Aujeszky's disease (infection with Aujeszky's disease virus)'
- Chapter 3.1.21. 'Rinderpest (infection with rinderpest virus)'
- Chapter 3.3.1. 'Avian chlamydiosis'
- Chapter 3.3.4. 'Avian influenza (including infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses)'
- Chapter 3.4.14. 'Trichomonosis'
- Chapter 3.6.5. 'Equine infectious anaemia'
- Chapter 3.8.2. 'Caprine arthritis/encephalitis and Maedi-visna'
- Chapter 3.9.1. 'African swine fever (infection with African swine fever virus)'

The Code Commission agreed to update the taxonomy of the pathogenic agent in Chapters 8.2. 'Infection with Aujeszky's disease virus' and 14.1. 'Caprine arthritis/encephalitis' and 14.5. 'Maedi-visna' to align with the corresponding chapters in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

The Code Commission did not agree with the advice to include non-avian host species in Chapter 10.4. 'Infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses' of the *Terrestrial Code* and agreed to reconsider this once the revised Chapter 3.3.4. 'Avian influenza (including infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses)' of the *Terrestrial Manual* chapter has been adopted.

The Code Commission noted the advice to consider the pathogenic agent and animal hosts together in Chapter 10.1. 'Avian chlamydiosis' and requested the Secretariat ensure a consistent approach is applied when developing new or revised case definitions.

The Code Commission acknowledged the advice concerning Chapter 11.11. 'Trichomonosis' of the *Terrestrial Code*, particularly regarding new diagnostic techniques.

The Code Commission acknowledged that the Biological Standards Commission did not consider the testing of genetic resistance to scrapie as relevant for the *Terrestrial Manual* and that there was to date no valid recognised test for scrapie on live animals (see item 4.1.12 of this report).

The Code Commission reminded Members that the *Terrestrial Manual* chapters are regularly updated to reflect scientific and technical developments. It emphasised the importance for Members to follow revisions of chapters in both the *Terrestrial Code* and *Terrestrial Manual* to ensure consistency between corresponding standards. Members were encouraged to refer to the [Biological Standards Commission's report](#) for specific details.

3.3. Aquatic Animal Health Standards Commission

The Secretariat of the Aquatic Animal Health Standards Commission (Aquatic Animals Commission) updated the Code Commission on relevant activities of common interest, as noted below.

The Code Commission was informed that the Aquatic Animals Commission will propose new Chapters 4.X. 'Emergency disease preparedness' and 4.Y. 'Disease outbreak management' for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

The Code Commission was informed that the Aquatic Animals Commission will commence work to review Section 7. 'Welfare of farmed fish' and Chapter 6.2. 'Principles for responsible and prudent use of antimicrobial agents in aquatic animals' of the *Aquatic Code*.

The Code Commission requested that the revision of Chapter 1.1. 'Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information' be included on the agenda of the September 2025 Bureaux meeting and the Aquatic Animals Commission and Code Commission to avoid inconsistencies with the corresponding chapter in the *Aquatic Code*, as relevant (see item 4.1.3 of this report).

4. Work Programme and Priorities

The Code Commission discussed ongoing priority topics of its work programme, outstanding issues with recently adopted chapters, and considered comments and new requests received. Specific discussions are captured in the relevant item of the report.

Comments received

Comments on the work programme were received from Chinese Taipei, Costa Rica, Switzerland, EU and WRO.

Comments to propose new work are addressed in item 4.3. of this report; comments on ongoing work items discussed in this meeting are addressed in the corresponding item.

The Commission acknowledged comments expressing support for the work programme and the Commission's priorities.

The Commission noted a comment proposing to assess the need to develop provisions for a swifter recovery of free status when imported cases result in no further spread, factoring in epidemiological investigations, surveillance, and control measures, and agreed to consider this in future work.

The Commission acknowledged a comment about Bluetongue virus (BTV), noting that according to the current *Terrestrial Code* Chapter, semen collection centres need to perform regular tests on donor animals, and querying if it would be possible to consider vaccination against BTV with inactivated vaccines as a risk mitigation measure which would alleviate the testing regime. The Commission reminded that this issue is among the ones being under discussion within the revision of Chapter 4.7. 'Collection and processing of bovine, small ruminants and porcine semen', and requested the Secretariat to seek experts' advice before considering including this in its work programme.

The Commission acknowledged a comment proposing to expand the ongoing revision of Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with Foot and mouth disease virus' (see item 4.1.10 of this report), to add the inclusion of 'rendered fats' as a safe commodity in Article 8.8.2. It agreed to defer its discussion for the next meeting in September 2025, when more detailed scientific data is available.

The Commission agreed with a comment on Chapter 10.9. 'Infection with Newcastle disease virus', requesting the modification of the period for recovery of free status of a country, zone or compartment from six months to 42 days. The Commission included this in the relevant work item already in the Commission's work programme and agreed to increase the prioritisation of this item.

The Commission thanked the WRO for the proposal to support different work items if needed.

The Commission reminded Members that the work programme outlines the current and planned work to be undertaken to develop *Terrestrial Code* standards. The Commission commended the increased interest shown by Members in discussions of the work programme and strongly encouraged Members to continue to provide feedback on potential new topics, whether they agree with the topics being proposed, as well as their level of prioritisation.

4.1. Ongoing priority topics (other than texts circulated for comments)

The Code Commission discussed the progress of a number of ongoing priority topics for which no new or revised text is circulated in this report.

4.1.1. Wildlife health

Background

The Code Commission discussed the proposal from the WOAAH Working Group on Wildlife (Working Group) for a new chapter on wildlife disease surveillance in September 2021, providing feedback and requesting further consideration. By February 2022, the Working Group had made progress on related topics, leading the Commission to continue discussions on including wildlife health issues in its work programme. In September 2022, recognizing progress under the WOAAH Wildlife Health Framework, the Commission formally added an item to review how the *Terrestrial Code* addresses wildlife health.

In February 2023, the Commission and the Working Group Chair agreed to strengthen collaboration for early identification of cooperative work on standards development. Since September 2023, the Working Group has actively contributed comments on relevant chapters, with the Secretariat facilitating collaboration to ensure its input is integrated early in the process.

Discussion

The Secretariat updated the Commission on the positive progress of the collaboration with the Working Group and praised its active contributions to reviewing and developing the *Terrestrial Code*.

The Commission recognised the Working Group's valuable input on various topics and addressed its comments in different agenda items. Reaffirming its commitment to this cooperative effort, the Commission looks forward to continuing its work to enhance how the *Terrestrial Code* addresses wildlife health.

4.1.2. New chapter on emergency management

Background

At the 89th General Session, in 2022, Resolution No. 28 on emergency management recommended that WOAAH International Standards address emergency management. At its September 2023 meeting, the Code Commission agreed with the proposal from WOAAH Headquarters to develop standards on emergency management for the *Terrestrial Code*.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission agreed with the draft Terms of Reference for an *ad hoc* Group to develop a standard on emergency management for the *Terrestrial Code*. The *ad hoc* Group on emergency management met in April 2024 to initiate its work.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed the [ad hoc Group's report](#) and agreed with the *ad hoc* Group's recommendation to develop a chapter on emergency management and requested that the *ad hoc* Group consider relevant work of the *ad hoc* Groups working on the chapters on biosecurity and animal welfare at the time of killing, as well as with potential future work on disinfection and disposal of dead animals.

The *ad hoc* Group on emergency management met for a second time in December 2024 to develop a draft chapter.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered [the report of the ad hoc Group \(December 2024\)](#) and the draft chapter developed by the *ad hoc* Group based on the structure developed at its first

meeting. The Commission provided some advice for the consideration of the *ad hoc* Group when it next meets, including the need for consistency of terminology used throughout the chapter, and to define some terms where it will promote a better understanding of the chapter.

The Code Commission agreed that this chapter is best placed in Section 3 of the *Terrestrial Code* given that it addresses best practices for Veterinary Services to be able to respond to veterinary emergencies, although the *ad hoc* Group may propose updates to the Glossary and various other horizontal chapters.

The Code Commission requested to be updated on this work at its September 2025 meeting.

4.1.3. Chapter 1.1. Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information

Background

At its September 2023 meeting, following the work to develop the Framework for *Terrestrial Code* Standards and the ongoing work in collaboration with the Scientific Commission to update listed-disease case definitions, the Code Commission discussed the need to better define which animal hosts should be included in a disease-specific chapter of the *Terrestrial Code*, taking into account their epidemiological significance for the respective disease, and how this would be addressed in the corresponding chapter of the *Terrestrial Manual*.

In February 2024, the Code Commission, the Scientific Commission and the Biological Standards Commission agreed to develop a clearer and more consistent approach to defining how animal hosts for a listed disease are included in the *Code* and *Manual*, clarifying the purpose and implications of their inclusion. A dedicated “taskforce” between the three Commissions was established to progress this work. This taskforce worked remotely between February and April 2024 to produce a report for the consideration of the three Specialist Commissions. At its September 2024 meeting, the Commissions reviewed the task force report and agreed with the proposed approach to streamline the coverage and categorisation of animal hosts for listed diseases in WOAHS Terrestrial Standards. They also supported adding more details in the *Terrestrial Manual* on disease epidemiology and host susceptibility while emphasizing the importance of the listing criteria (Chapter 1.2) to define which hosts are relevant for inclusion in the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission highlighted the importance of this approach to be applied consistently to ensure a shared understanding of the host implications for notification, animal health status, trade and surveillance.

Also in September 2024, the Code Commission noted that this discussion, as well as the recently developed “Framework for *Terrestrial Code* Standards”, had brought clarity to some issues previously observed around the interpretation of the provisions in Chapter 1.1. on animal disease notification, and agreed to include the revision of Chapter 1.1. in its work programme to be discussed jointly with the Scientific Commission in February 2025.

Discussion

The Commission reviewed the content of Chapter 1.1. and noted the different associated SOPs that had been developed by WOAHS, such as the [SOP for listing decisions for pathogenic agents of terrestrial animals](#) and the [SOP for determining whether a disease should be considered as emerging](#).

The Commission discussed with representatives of the WOAHS Animal Health Information and Analysis Department several aspects of the current text which could be considered unclear or ambiguous, considering recent and historic issues associated with Members’ notifications, particularly concerning the references to ‘unusual’ host species and ‘new’ strain, as well as to the ‘stability’ of events.

The Commission stressed that the objective of notification provisions in the *Terrestrial Code*, as defined in Article 1.2.1., is to provide information to support Members to take appropriate action. The Commission also summarized some critical principles of the *Terrestrial Code* in this regard:

- Each 'listed disease' is defined as an infection or infestation by one or more pathogenic agent(s) of one or more specific animal host(s). These are precisely detailed in the definition of the disease in the first article of each disease-specific chapter. It is not unexpected that other strains or variants of the pathogenic agent(s), or other susceptible animals exist and are not included because they are not epidemiologically significant.
- The inclusion of a disease, infection or infestation in the WOAHA List is based on the criteria in Chapter 1.2. It is also these criteria that provide the basis for defining the significance of possible different pathogenic agents and susceptible animals for the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*.
- Chapter 1.1. provides the framework for notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information; Article 1.1.3. is limited to the notification of WOAHA listed diseases (i.e. as per their definition); Article 1.1.4 refers to the notification of emerging diseases (according to the respective glossary definition); and Article 1.1.5 encourages Members to share other important animal health information.

The Code Commission recognised the importance of monitoring as much information as possible on all significant animal health incidents, promoting their investigation, as well as promoting transparent information sharing that would allow better research and analysis to inform potential further decision-making and measures. Nevertheless, the Commission emphasised the difference between on the one hand the necessary timely exchange of structured data on known threats through an internationally agreed mechanism, such as for WOAHA listed diseases that have been assessed and adopted by all WOAHA Members or emerging diseases assessed and recognized as such, and on the other hand the monitoring of other animal health events that may become significant and need to be shared for awareness and possible future assessment. The Commission noted that the former was a pillar of WOAHA mandate and of its Members' Veterinary Authorities, and should remain as the major component of WAHIS, while other more dynamic mechanisms could be considered for other types of information, such as those that may relate to potential emerging diseases.

The Code Commission noted that the title of the SOP for listing decisions was not consistent with the principles listed above (i.e. criteria are for listing a disease, not for listing a pathogenic agent) and requested the Secretariat to correct it to avoid possible further misunderstandings.

The Commission agreed on the need to review some wording in Chapter 1.1. to improve clarity and included it in its work programme, while noting that this should be discussed in parallel with the Aquatic Animals Commission to ensure consistency with the *Aquatic Code*. The Commission requested the Secretariat to discuss this jointly with the Aquatic Animals Commission at the next meeting in September 2025.

4.1.4. Revision of Chapter 4.4. Zoning and compartmentalisation

Background

At its September 2021 meeting, the Code Commission discussed specific issues raised in the 88th General Session on several texts that were adopted at that General Session. Among these topics, the Commission agreed to a comment to consider amending Article 4.4.7. to clarify whether a time limit should be defined for a containment zone.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Code Commission considered the proposed revised Article 4.4.7. and some relevant comments that highlighted differences in Members' understanding of critical aspects of the implementation of zoning. The Commission noted that a thematic study was being undertaken by the WOAHA Observatory on this topic and agreed not to proceed with its review of the revised Article 4.4.7., but rather to expand the scope of this work item to clarify critical concepts in Chapter 4.4. 'Zoning and compartmentalisation' and the development of a new chapter on the implementation of zoning.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Commission requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to develop a new Chapter 4.X. 'Implementation of zoning' for the *Terrestrial Code* and to also review relevant points in Chapter 4.4. 'Zoning and compartmentalisation' to ensure consistency and complementarity between the two chapters. The Code Commission requested the Secretariat to draft the Terms of Reference for an *ad hoc* Group to undertake this work for consideration by the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission at their respective September 2024 meetings.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission discussed the draft Terms of Reference for an *ad hoc* Group on zoning provided by the Secretariat and agreed that given the complexity of this work, before convening an *ad hoc* Group, a taskforce would be established composed of selected members of the Scientific Commission and the Code Commission to better define the *ad hoc* Group Terms of Reference.

Discussion

The Code Commission discussed the minutes of the Zoning taskforce that had met twice since September 2024. The Commission noted the taskforce's recommendation to have two chapters in the *Terrestrial Code*, one for zoning and the other for compartmentalisation and the need for new or revised definitions for 'animal health status', 'zone', and 'territory'.

The Code Commission agreed with the taskforce's recommendation to include text in the revised chapter to address active management of zones as the Veterinary Authority must ensure that there is containment of a disease by controlling movements between zones and ensuring adequate surveillance.

In addition, the Code Commission discussed the taskforce recommendation that the Terms of Reference should not address bilateral recognition of zones at this time, currently found in Article 4.4.8 of Chapter 4.4. The Commission agreed to continue the discussion of this point and noted that it may be best to address it in Section 5 (potentially Chapter 5.3.) of the *Terrestrial Code* rather than the zoning chapter.

The Code Commission updated the draft Terms of Reference of the *ad hoc* Group on zoning based on this discussion.

4.1.5. Revision of Chapter 4.7. Collection and processing of bovine, small ruminant and porcine semen

Background

At its September 2019 meeting, the Code Commission requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to revise Chapter 4.6. and Chapter 4.7., as well as provisions in relevant disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* and the *Terrestrial Manual*. The revised Chapter 4.6. 'Semen collection, processing and storage' was adopted at the 91st General Session, in May 2024.

In September 2023, the Commission highlighted that the current Chapter 4.7. should be revised, aiming for a full new text providing recommendations for all species covered in the new Chapter 4.6. (i.e. bovids, equids, small ruminants, suids and cervids) and should only address WOAHP listed diseases. The Commission noted that, after having a draft text, the relevant provisions in the disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* will also have to be reviewed for consistency. Following an electronic consultation with subject matter experts, an *ad hoc* Group was convened and met virtually in July 2024 to initiate the revision of Chapter 4.7.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed the *ad hoc* Group's report and draft Articles, acknowledging the challenges in drafting the new chapter focused on risk mitigation measures for the trade of semen. The Commission emphasized that Chapter 4.7. should simplify certification by defining a high-health-status donor subpopulation, reducing redundant testing, as well as avoiding duplications or inconsistencies in relation to disease-

specific chapters while ensuring safety. It stressed the need for risk-based provisions aligned with disease-specific chapters and tailored to different animal health statuses. The Commission agreed on the diseases of bovines proposed for consideration and the Secretariat to report back at the next meeting.

Discussion

The Code Commission discussed the challenges of achieving the proposed objectives, notably to develop a new approach which could differ from current practices, and may be perceived as disruptive or confounding to known risk-based requirements by some operators. The Commission noted the difficulty in aligning disease-specific provisions in a horizontal chapter with all disease-specific chapters, and to avoid potential duplications or inconsistencies in relation to disease-specific chapters, and overlapping or confusion with other horizontal provisions such as compartmentalisation.

The Commission agreed to continue the discussion at the next meeting.

4.1.6. Revision of Chapter 4.14. General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection

Background

At its September 2021 meeting, the Code Commission agreed that in addition to the ongoing work to revise Chapters 4.6. 'Semen collection, processing and storage' and 4.7. 'Collection and processing of bovine, small ruminant and porcine semen', high priority should also be given to the revision of Chapter 4.13. 'Disposal of dead animals' and Chapter 4.14. 'General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection' as well as to the development of a new Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity'.

At its February 2022 meeting, the Code Commission agreed that priority should be given to the development of a new chapter on biosecurity and noted that the broad nature of this topic would likely impact the revisions of Chapters 4.13. and 4.14.

At the request of the Code Commission, the Biosecurity *ad hoc* Group that met in March 2024 on the draft chapter on biosecurity also reviewed the current Chapter 4.14. 'General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection' and provided recommendations as to how to proceed.

Discussion

The Code Commission discussed the Biosecurity *ad hoc* Group recommendation that the topic of 'disinsection' should be removed from Chapter 4.14. but, given the number and importance of arthropod vector-borne diseases and of their control in the management of outbreaks, concurred that both disinfection and disinsection should be addressed in the same chapter. The Commission agreed that the focus of the revised chapter should be on disease prevention and control, and how disinfection and disinsection are properly used to prevent the spread of disease, a focus of Section 4 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission agreed with the need for a Glossary definition for the term 'disinsection' and proposed a definition (see item 6.1 of this report). The Commission requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to revise Chapter 4.14. and asked the Secretariat to prepare the draft Terms of Reference for its review at the Commission's next meeting of September 2025.

4.1.7. Development of an introductory chapter of Section 5

Background

In February 2024, the Code Commission discussed the possible development of an introductory chapter to Section 5. 'Trade measures, import/export procedures and veterinary certification', similar to introductory chapters for some other sections of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission agreed that this could provide background and clarity on the objective and

content of the chapters in this Section. The Code Commission requested the *ad hoc* Group on Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. to provide advice on this proposal. At its April 2024 meeting, the *ad hoc* Group agreed with this proposal and drafted suggested topics to include in an introductory chapter.

Concurrently, at its September 2024 meeting, the Aquatic Animals Commission agreed on the need for an introductory chapter to the corresponding Section 5 of the *Aquatic Code*.

During the Bureaux meeting of these two Commissions, in September 2024, they agreed that this work should be developed in collaboration given the similarities between Sections 5 of the *Aquatic Code* and the *Terrestrial Code*.

Discussion

The Code Commission agreed with the Secretariat's proposal to establish a taskforce consisting of two members from each of the two Commissions to draft the introductory chapter to Section 5. The Code Commission requested that the Secretariat report back on progress at its September meeting.

The Code Commission increased the priority of this work from three to two.

4.1.8. Revision of chapters on certification procedures, model certificates and model passport for the international movement of animals (Chapters 5.1., 5.2. and 5.10. to 5.13.)

Background

The Secretariat proposed at its meeting of September 2022, that the Commission consider developing similar guidance to that of Codex to ensure alignment of standards for e-certification. The Code Commission agreed to revise Chapter 5.2. 'Certification procedures', of the *Terrestrial Code* to address e-certification in more detail, and to align, as relevant, with the Codex Guidelines. The Commission was informed that WOAHA would also develop reference data models for the WOAHA model certificates for international trade in animals and animal products, to align with reference data models for food products that are included in the Codex Guidelines. The Code Commission agreed to include the revision of Chapter 5.2. in its work programme, and to undertake this work in collaboration with the Aquatic Animals Commission, to address jointly the corresponding Chapter 5.2. in the *Aquatic Code*.

In June 2024, the Secretariat convened an expert consultation group to create data models and standards for the model health certificates in place in the *Terrestrial Code* and the *Aquatic Code*, as well as a guidance document on how to use these standards. This project was completed in December 2024.

In parallel, at its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed the draft Terms of Reference for an *ad hoc* Group to update several chapters of the *Terrestrial* and *Aquatic Codes* regarding certification and related procedures. The Code Commission clarified that the *ad hoc* Group should be convened to update Chapter 5.1. 'General obligations related to certification' and Chapter 5.2. 'Certification procedures' of both *Terrestrial* and *Aquatic Codes* as appropriate to incorporate electronic certification, including references to the newly developed electronic data models and standards. The *ad hoc* Group should also consider the Codex 'Guidelines for design, production, issuance and use of generic official certificates' (CXG 38-2001) and propose appropriate updates to the Codes to avoid inconsistencies. The Commission also requested that the *ad hoc* Group review model health certificates in Chapters 5.10. and 5.11. respectively of both Codes to determine if updates need to be made to those documents. The *ad hoc* Group should also review existing Glossary definitions of both Codes and propose new or revised definitions, if relevant. The Commission proposed modifications to the draft Terms of Reference to reflect these priorities.

At the same meeting, the Code Commission also considered that Chapter 5.12. 'Model passport for international movement of competition horses' of the *Terrestrial Code* is outdated because updates have been made to various equine disease-specific chapters and current industry practices have not been taken into account.

The Code Commission noted that many of the activities related to the issuance of passports and harmonisation of international veterinary certificates are focused on 'high health high performance horses' (HHP) and indicated that Chapter 5.12. updates should be applicable to all competition horses. The Commission also noted that Chapter 5.12. should not reiterate information included in disease-specific chapters but rather refer to the appropriate disease-specific chapters. The Commission requested the Secretariat to draft Terms of Reference for the revision of Chapter 5.12., and to consider if the work of this *ad hoc* Group should be combined with the proposed revisions of certification chapters and model health certificates (Chapters 5.1., 5.2., and 5.10.)

Discussion

The Secretariat reported that electronic data models and data standards corresponding to the model health certificates listed in Chapters 5.10. and 5.13. were completed in December 2024 and published on the WOAHA website (see item 7.4 of this report). In addition, the Secretariat noted updates that had been made to the draft Terms of Reference of the *ad hoc* Group on certification to include suggestions from the Code Commission, Aquatic Animals Commission and the *ad hoc* Group reviewing Chapters 5.4. to 5.7.

The Code Commission noted that Chapters 5.10. to 5.13. have not been updated for over 10 years, and with increasing reliance on electronic certification and digital passports, this information on model passports and certificates could possibly be maintained outside of the *Terrestrial Code*. It instructed the Secretariat to consult with industry and experts to determine the need to update these chapters and whether the information should remain in the *Terrestrial Code* or at another location as reference information. It requested the Secretariat to update the draft Terms of Reference accordingly.

The Commission requested the Secretariat to report back at its next meeting.

4.1.9. Revision of Chapter 6.8. Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes

Background

Chapter 6.8. 'Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes' was last updated in 2018. In 2024, a mapping exercise identified that the chapter does not include considerations on surveillance needs for antimicrobial resistance (AMR) of companion animals and for integrated surveillance across relevant sectors (animals and animal-derived food products, humans, plants and the environment).

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered a proposal from the Working Group on Antimicrobial Resistance (Working Group) to amend Chapter 6.8. to include considerations for surveillance programmes for companion animals and integrated surveillance. The Commission agreed to include this work in its work programme as a priority 2 and requested that the Working Group provide a draft Terms of reference for the *ad hoc* Group that will conduct the revision.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered the Terms of reference proposed by the Working Group for the *ad hoc* Group to amend Chapter 6.8. and provided comments, as relevant.

The Code Commission highlighted that, given the limited resource settings in many countries, a sensible prioritisation of surveillance activity is required to optimise benefits. The Commission requested that with the addition of surveillance in non-food producing or

companion animals and in the environment through this chapter, care should be taken to ensure that surveillance priorities and needs of Members with different resource contexts are adequately reflected in the revised draft.

The Code Commission requested an update on the *ad hoc* Group's progress at its next meeting.

4.1.10. Infection with foot and mouth disease virus. New article on recommendations for international trade of fetal bovine serum (Article 8.8.33bis of Chapter 8.8.)

Comments were received from Australia, Korea (Republic of) and the EU.

Background

In September 2022, when revising Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with foot and mouth disease virus', the Code Commission considered a comment to include 'gamma irradiated foetal bovine serum' in the list of safe commodities in Article 8.8.2. and requested the Secretariat to consult relevant industry organisations to see if this commodity is produced using standardised protocols.

At its February 2023 meeting, the Code Commission was informed that the industry had indicated that 'gamma irradiation' is not a standard step in the manufacturing process for this commodity but rather an additional treatment to address potential risks of transmission of FMDV and other pathogenic agents. After considering the information provided by the industry, the Commission agreed not to include this commodity as a safe commodity in Article 8.8.2. but to draft a new Article 8.8.33bis. 'Recommendations for importation of fetal bovine serum from countries or zones infected with FMDV' and requested the Secretariat, in consultation with experts, to prepare a draft article.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed the new Article 8.8.33bis. 'Recommendations for importation of fetal bovine serum from countries or zones infected with FMDV' and agreed to circulate this new article for comments.

Discussion

The Code Commission reviewed comments received on its September 2024 meeting report.

Acknowledging concerns that risk mitigation measures in the draft article are inadequate, the Code Commission requested that the Secretariat amend the draft article, in consultation with industry, and include risk mitigation measures in addition to gamma irradiation.

In response to the request for supporting data to support the current proposal, the Code Commission encourages Members to refer to two supporting documents provided by the industry: a published article (BioProcessing Journal, Summer 2016, vol15/No.2) and the [Guideline on production and quality control of animal immunoglobulins and immunosera for human use](#).

The Code Commission agreed to reconsider the comments together with the revised article prepared by the Secretariat at its September 2025 meeting.

4.1.11. Revision of Chapter 14.7. Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus

Background

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered a draft article for the importation of susceptible animals from an infected country or zone for direct slaughter proposed by the Scientific Commission and provided feedback to the Secretariat on certain points for amendment. The Commission also highlighted the need to review Article 14.7.19. and Article 14.7.25., which included references to articles of Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with foot-and-mouth disease virus', to resolve inconsistencies due to the recent revision of Chapter 8.8.

The Code Commission agreed to undertake a broader revision of Chapter 14.7. to address all the pending issues including further investigation of scientific evidence suggesting that suids may be a possible source of spread for pesti des petits ruminants (PPR). The Commission requested the Secretariat to seek expert advice and the opinion of the Scientific Commission and to report back at a future meeting.

The *ad hoc* Group on PPR which met in November 2024 addressed the requested items.

Discussion

The Secretariat reported that the *ad hoc* Group on PPR, which met in November 2024, had addressed the requests from the Code Commission and that the Group's considerations regarding the animal hosts for the disease were being discussed by the Scientific Commission at this February 2025 meeting.

The Commission will consider the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group and the opinion of the Scientific Commission at its next meeting of September 2025.

4.1.12. Revision of Chapter 14.8. Scrapie

Background

At its February 2023 meeting, in response to comments to prioritise the work to review Chapter 14.8. Scrapie, the Code Commission agreed to progress this work.

In September 2023, the Code Commission acknowledged that a range of requests to revise Chapter 14.8. had been submitted by Members over recent years and requested that the Secretariat develop a plan to revise the chapter. The Commission noted that some Members requested that live animal testing and testing for genetic resistance to scrapie be included as valid methods for ensuring the safe trade of sheep and goats and highlighted that there was no precedent in the *Terrestrial Code* for providing such recommendations.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Commission reviewed the draft Terms of Reference for the *ad hoc* Group.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission considered [the report of the *ad hoc* Group](#), including a draft revised chapter, and the opinion of the Scientific Commission and the Biological Standards Commission from their September 2024 meetings. The Commission agreed with both Commissions on the need to seek further clarification from experts on several aspects of the work and agreed not to circulate the draft text proposed by the *ad hoc* Group.

Discussion

The Commission was informed by the Secretariat of the outcomes of an electronic consultation with WOAHP Reference Laboratories for scrapie on the main points raised by the Code Commission, the Scientific Commission, and the Biological Standards Commission on the previous *ad hoc* Group report.

The Commission was informed of the expert's opinion on the concept of genetic resistance, on ante-mortem testing, on the application of the concept of negligible risk and on the exclusion of non-classical scrapie from the *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 14.8. 'Scrapie', and provided feedback to the Secretariat to progress this work.

The Commission was informed that the experts affirmed there is scientific consensus on resistant genotypes and consider that there are standardized methods to ascertain polymorphisms at the codons of interest, though they disagreed that a description of these methods should be in the *Terrestrial Manual* chapter and that this position was supported by the Biological Standards Commission. The Commission noted this opinion but stressed that, for a test such as for resistance or diagnostic in live animals to be referred to in the *Terrestrial Code*, there has to be a standard methodology to use as a reference. The Commission requested to discuss this jointly with the Biological Standards Commission at its next Bureaux meeting in September 2025.

4.1.13. Revision of Chapter 14.9. Sheep pox and goat pox

Background

At its February 2023 meeting, the Code Commission, in response to a request, agreed to include the revision of Chapter 14.9. 'Sheep pox and goat pox', in its work programme. Further comments supporting this revision were reviewed by the Code Commission at its September 2023 meeting.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission agreed to prioritise this work since there had been reports of incursions of the disease into new areas, apparent under-reporting of cases, and difficulties in diagnosis because of recombination between lumpy skin disease virus and sheep pox and goat pox virus.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed the Terms of Reference for an *ad hoc* Group to undertake the revision of Chapter 14.9. 'Sheep pox and goat pox' and agreed to request that the *ad hoc* Group consider including in the revised chapter, in addition to the usual content of disease-specific chapters, recommendations on disease prevention and control, including vaccination, as this would benefit Members in guiding control of the disease. In response to a request from WOAHA Headquarters, the Commission agreed to also request the advice of the *ad hoc* Group on the potential need to revise Chapter 11.9. 'Infection with lumpy skin disease virus', (also part of the Capripox virus genus) as well as the general aspects that could be taken into consideration in a future revision.

The Code Commission was informed that the *ad hoc* Group met in November 2024 to revise Chapter 14.9. 'Sheep pox and goat pox'.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered the report of the *ad hoc* Group on Sheep pox and goat pox, including the draft revised Chapter 14.9. 'Sheep pox and goat pox', as well as the opinion of the Scientific Commission from its February 2025 meeting.

The Code Commission noted that, in agreement with the opinion of the Scientific Commission, further clarification was needed, including addressing discrepancies in risk mitigation measures between animals and animal products in the articles on recommendations for safe trade, and ensuring they are based on scientific evidence and are proportional to risk.

The Code Commission agreed not to circulate the draft text proposed by the *ad hoc* Group and requested that the Secretariat work with the *ad hoc* Group to address the concerns identified. The Code Commission also suggested that a member of the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission may participate as observers in the next meeting of the *ad hoc* Group to provide guidance, as relevant to the requested work.

The Code Commission also reviewed the preliminary suggestions from the *ad hoc* Group on Sheep pox and goat pox for the revision of Chapter 11.9. 'Infection with Lumpy skin disease virus', but noted that this revision should only be considered after further progress has been made on the revision of Chapter 14.9. 'Sheep pox and goat pox'. The Code Commission agreed that at this point, it was not yet appropriate for the *ad hoc* Group to have extended or detailed considerations on diseases beyond sheep and goat pox.

The Code Commission requested that the Secretariat provide an update at its next meeting.

4.1.14. Glossary definition for 'poultry'

Comments were received from the UK and AU-IBAR.

Background

In May 2023, at the 90th General Session, some Members requested that the revision of the definition of 'poultry' be included in the Commission's work programme to ensure it provided Members with greater flexibility and to resolve issues for non-poultry birds or birds that do not play a significant epidemiological role in the spread of high pathogenicity avian influenza through international trade.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Code Commission considered the request as well as comments received to review the Glossary definition of 'poultry' and agreed to add the revision of the definition of 'poultry' to its work programme as priority four, noting that this work should be addressed as part of its future work to review Section 10 Aves of the *Terrestrial Code*.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered requests from some Members to increase the priority level for this work. The Commission agreed to increase the priority of this item to level two and requested the Secretariat to consult with experts and relevant partner international organisations, to better define the issues and potential amendments to the definition for 'poultry'.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed the inputs provided by the experts and organisations together with all comments received since 2022 (last adoption). The Code Commission agreed to increase the priority level to one and requested the Secretariat develop a proposal taking into consideration expert opinion and comments for its review at its next meeting that would be applicable to contexts of all Members and relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*.

Discussion

The Code Commission noted new comments received regarding the work programme and the request to update the definition of poultry. The Commission also noted that the poultry definition applies to multiple disease-specific chapters, while the current trade concerns revolve around Chapter 10.4. 'Infection with high pathogenic avian influenza viruses'.

The Code Commission reviewed the proposal presented by the Secretariat, considering the possibility of a simple, clearer definition of poultry, while noting that for some listed diseases such as high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) and Newcastle disease, all types of birds were included for the purpose of notification while some birds are excluded from the definition of free status of a country or zone. The Commission discussed that a simplified definition of poultry should focus on a positive description of what types of birds are poultry, without including a list of types of birds that are not considered as poultry.

The Commission agreed that the exemption of some types of birds from target populations, e.g. to determine the animal health status of a country or zone, should be addressed in disease-specific chapters, especially Chapter 10.4. The Commission considered that if the new definition of poultry was to be adopted, Articles 10.4.1. and 10.4.3. of Chapter 10.4. could be amended to indicate which types or populations of birds would be concerned by the free status of a country or zone.

The Code Commission agreed that this topic would remain priority one on the work programme and requested that the Secretariat work with some members of the Commission to continue to develop a simplified poultry definition based on animal hosts that would be used to determine when the occurrence of disease would need to be notified to WOA (refer to item 4.1.3 of this report). The Commission also requested that they develop proposed revisions for Chapter 10.4. to determine which specific populations, excluding the exemptions referred to above, would be concerned by the free status for HPAI. The Commission requested that these proposals be discussed at its next meeting in September 2025.

4.1.15. Removal of questionnaire chapters (Chapters 1.7. to 1.12.) from the Terrestrial Code

The Code Commission considered comments expressing concerns on the proposal to remove the questionnaires from the *Terrestrial Code* and relocate them to the WOA website, which was discussed by the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission and included in their September 2024 reports. Comments emphasized that these chapters provide clarity and

transparency to the process of determining official animal health status. Some Members raised concerns that transferring them to the website could limit Members' ability to provide input on future modifications and reduce oversight if changes could potentially be made without formal consultation or prior approval. Some comments stressed the need for a clear demonstration of how these chapters would be presented and possibly updated online before any decision is made, as well as further information on the process for their removal from the Code.

The Code Commission noted that while the use of the questionnaires for the application of official recognition of animal health status and endorsement of official control programmes by WOAHA remains mandatory through the reference in Chapter 1.6. and through WOAHA's Standard Operating Procedures on official status recognition, the questionnaires are not standards *per se*, and do not contain recommendations.

The Code Commission considered that inclusion in the *Terrestrial Code* was not the only mechanism to ensure transparency in case of modifications and urged WOAHA Headquarters and the Scientific Commissions to explore alternatives to address Members' concerns and to provide a clear approach for the future revision process of the questionnaires if moved from the *Terrestrial Code* to the WOAHA website. The Commission, in agreement with the Scientific Commission, agreed to progress this discussion after the adoption of Chapters 11.5. and 12.1. and before proposing the removal of questionnaires for adoption.

4.2. Items under consideration for inclusion in the work programme

The Code Commission discussed several topics for which a request from WOAHA Members and International Organisations for inclusion in the Commission's work programme had been previously considered, but a decision had not yet been made pending the provision of more data or information. The Commission reviewed whether new information was available and the progress of the different preliminary works and noted that there was no new element to grant their inclusion in the work programme at this stage.

4.3. New proposals and requests for inclusion in the work programme

The Code Commission considered the following proposals or requests for developments or revisions of standards in the *Terrestrial Code*.

4.3.1. New requests from Members and International Organisations

4.3.1.1. Revision of texts related to the management of international catering waste from air transport

Discussion

The Code Commission considered a comment from a partner organisation requesting the amendment of texts related to international catering waste in point 6.d.ii. of Article 1.9.1. (Chapter 1.9. 'Application for official recognition by WOAHA of free status for classical swine fever') and of Article 1.11.1. (Chapter 1.11. 'Application for official recognition by WOAHA of free status for foot and mouth disease') as they believed that some countries have misinterpreted the intention of this text, for example, that specialised treatment is required for any type of international catering waste.

The Commission agreed that this comment could be considered as part of the work item to address Chapters 1.7. to 1.12. (Status questionnaires), to be conducted in collaboration with the Scientific Commission and requested the Secretariat to forward the comment to the Scientific Commission for its consideration.

The Commission reminded Members that the revised Chapter 5.6. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the importation of commodities' includes a new Article 5.6.7. 'General principles applicable to the disposal of international catering waste'. The Commission agreed to amend the texts of the draft article to clarify the type of international catering waste (i.e. those containing or likely to contain animal products) which should be considered in the importation procedures. (see Item 6.5 of this report)

4.3.1.2. Development of new recommendations on the import of commodities in Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with foot and mouth disease virus'

The Code Commission considered a request to revise Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with foot and mouth disease virus' to allow imports of commodities from a non-affected territory prior to the country's regaining official FMD free status from WOAHA after emergency vaccination.

The Commission did not agree to amend the text and wished to highlight that the Code does not forbid this importation and the questionnaire for official FMD status recognition allows for a country to import from a country or zone that has not yet received WOAHA officially recognised status if a risk analysis had been performed, in accordance with Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis', to demonstrate that import measures provide an appropriate level of protection. The Commission also encouraged Members to refer to the relevant discussions on Article 11.5.3 in this report (see item 5.6).

4.3.1.3. Development of new Glossary definitions for 'iatrogenic' and 'disinsection'

The Code Commission discussed a new request to create new Glossary definitions for 'iatrogenic' and 'disinsection'.

The Commission reviewed the use of the term 'iatrogenic' throughout the *Terrestrial Code* and found it was rarely used and agreed that the dictionary definition of 'iatrogenic' is sufficient and therefore agreed not to add this to its work programme.

The Code Commission noted the term "disinsection" is used in the User's guide section B.6) and in the title of Chapter 4.14. but is not defined in the Glossary, unlike "disinfection" and "disinfestation". The Commission also noted that the use of the term was also being discussed in the context of the revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. and in the new chapter on 'Biosecurity', and while it acknowledged that this would be further clarified as a part of work on the revision of Chapter 4.14. 'General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection' (see item 4.1.6 of this report), it agreed to include the development of a new definition for 'disinsection' in its work programme.

4.3.2. Other requests

4.3.2.1. Revision of Chapters 14.1. 'Caprine arthritis/encephalitis' and 14.5. 'Maedi-visna'.

The Code Commission considered a proposal from the Scientific Commission to amend Chapters 14.1. 'Caprine arthritis/encephalitis' and 14.5. 'Maedi-visna', particularly to merge both chapters and incorporate a new case definition for 'infection with small ruminant lentiviruses (maedi-visna and caprine arthritis encephalitis)'.

The Code Commission reviewed the conclusion of the Scientific Commission provided in its September 2024 report and the draft case definition. The Commission agreed with the Scientific Commission's proposal to combine Chapters 14.1. and 14.5. into a single chapter titled 'small ruminant lentiviruses (maedi-visna and caprine arthritis encephalitis)' noting that this is in alignment with the corresponding chapter in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

The Commission acknowledged a comment received on this topic and explained that several disease-specific chapters in the *Terrestrial Code* include multiple pathogenic agents related in terms of taxonomy, animal hosts, diagnosis, epidemiological factors and control measures.

The Commission agreed to include the revision of these chapters in its work programme and proposed as a first step to replace the disease names in Article 1.3.7. from 'Caprine arthritis/encephalitis' and 'Maedi-visna' into a single entity 'infection with small ruminant lentiviruses (maedi-visna and caprine arthritis encephalitis)'.

The Commission noted that these chapters had not been updated for a long time, and a careful, thorough review of the whole chapters should be conducted in consultation with experts, if necessary, before proposing changes to avoid doing just partial amendments.

4.4. Feedback from Conferences of the WOA Regional Commissions

Dr Etienne Bonbon and Dr Gaston Funes, who attended the conferences of the WOA Regional Commission for Europe and the Americas, respectively, representing the Code Commission, informed the Commission on discussions held at those meetings on the Code Commission work programme and priorities.

Both reported strong positive feedback from Members on the opportunity to have a dedicated session to provide input on important Code matters, on the improved transparency and presentation of the Commission's work programme and associated discussions in the Commission's report, as well as on a deeper understanding of the WOA Standard setting process for better participation of such process

Dr Bonbon reported support expressed by some Members of the WOA Europe Region for the ongoing work to address topics with a One Health approach.

Dr Funes reported strong support expressed by some Members of the Americas region to the ongoing work on the implementation of zoning and highlighted the discussions on the ongoing critical situation in central America with the re-emergence of New world Screwworm, which was the focus of one of the technical items of the conference. This included recommendations stressing the need for updated standards.

The Code Commission appreciated this improved connection with this critical WOA governance structure and reiterated their interest and availability to ensure that at least one member of the Commission attends these Conferences.

4.5. Prioritisation of items on the work programme

Taking into consideration the progress of the different items since its last meeting, relevant topics addressed during this meeting and comments submitted, the Code Commission discussed the prioritisation of ongoing and future work programme items and agreed to amendments as presented below.

New items added included:

- Glossary definition for 'disinsection'
- Glossary definition for 'seroconversion'
- Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA'
- Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. 'Animal welfare during slaughter'
- Chapter 14.1 'Caprine arthritis/encephalitis'
- Chapter 14.5. 'Maedi-visna'

The Code Commission reminded Members that the order of prioritisation used in the work programme reflected the level of priority agreed upon by the Commission taking into account an assessment of each item in terms of its importance, impact, resources available and Member comments. Members are always encouraged to provide individual or collective inputs on the prioritisation of topics or new topics at any time in the Code Commission's work cycle.

The Code Commission highlighted that the inclusion of an item in the work programme means there is an agreement amongst the Code Commission on the need to undertake work, but that the decision as to when to commence each work item depends on the overall consideration of priorities, the progress of ongoing work and the resources and evidence available. The order of prioritisation aims to provide a transparent guide to openly plan and organise the work of the Commission and the Secretariat, encouraging Members' inputs on priorities, as well as ensuring Members' awareness of the progress of the different items. The Commission highlighted that the order of prioritisation used in its work programme is not always aligned with the actual progress of each work item, as this will depend on the complexity of each item, including expert consultations and discussions between different WOAHA Specialist Commissions.

The Code Commission reminded Members that, although it reviews its work programme at each meeting and reconsiders the prioritisation of items according to changes in necessity and urgency, to ensure continuity it generally aims not to modify significantly the order of prioritisation.

The Code Commission thanked Members and partners who submitted comments on work items at an early stage and encouraged Members and partners to also review work items in the Commission's work programme that have not yet started or are in preparation (prioritisations 3 and 4). Members and partners are invited to submit comments for specific items, as well as available information, evidence, or data, including implementation approaches that could be taken into consideration once work commences.

The updated work programme is presented in [Annex 4](#), for comments.

5. Texts circulated to be proposed for adoption in May 2025

The Code Commission discussed the following new or revised texts which were circulated for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

5.1. User's Guide

Comments were received from Canada, Chile, the UK, the USA and the EU.

Background

Following a discussion during the 90th General Session in May 2023, the Code Commission, at its September 2023 meeting, agreed to revise the *Terrestrial Code* User's Guide. The Commission proposed several amendments to part B '*Terrestrial Code* content' to incorporate a more detailed explanation of the disease-specific chapters, in line with the newly developed '*Framework for Terrestrial Code* standards', and to develop a new point to explain the use of terms referring to animals (hosts) used in the *Terrestrial Code*.

At its February and September 2024 meetings, the Code Commission considered all comments received, amended the text, and circulated the revised text for comments.

The revised User's Guide has been circulated three times for comments.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered comments on the revised 'User's Guide' that was circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to comments considered are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The revised User's Guide is presented as [Annex 5](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

5.2. Articles 1.3.1., 1.3.5. and 1.3.8. of Chapter 1.3. ‘Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA’

Background

The Code Commission had proposed amendments to Chapter 1.3. ‘Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA’ which were adopted at the 91st General Session in May 2024. These amendments included a re-order of the articles to align with the order used in Sections 8 to 16 of Volume II, alignment of the animal categories noted in the first paragraph of each article with titles of relevant sections of Volume II, re-ordering diseases in each article in alphabetical order, and amending disease names to align with the title of the corresponding disease-specific chapter, as relevant.

These amendments will be considered once the adoption of the development of a new disease-specific chapter or the revision of the current disease-specific chapter is closer.

Discussion

The Code Commission noted that the disease name and title of some disease-specific chapters have been proposed for amendment including: a new Chapter 8.Y. ‘Infection with Nipah virus’ and revised Chapters 8.13. ‘Infestation with *Cochliomyia hominivorax* (New world screwworm) and infestation with *Chrysomya bezziana* (Old world screwworm)’, 12.3. ‘Infection with *Trypanosoma equiperdum* (dourine)’ and 12.4. ‘Infection with eastern equine encephalitis virus (eastern equine encephalomyelitis) and infection with western equine encephalitis virus (western equine encephalomyelitis)’ (see Items 5.5, 5.4, 5.9, and 5.10 of this report, respectively).

Given these amendments, the Code Commission agreed to amend the name of these diseases in Chapter 1.3. to align with the title of the disease-specific chapter. The Commission also agreed to change the animal categories of Nipah virus encephalitis from Article 1.3.8. (suidae) to Article 1.3.1. (multiple species) and eastern equine encephalomyelitis from Article 1.3.1. (multiple species) to Article 1.3.5. (Equidae) to align with the general provisions defined in the new Chapter 8.Y. and revised Chapter 12.4., respectively.

The revised Articles 1.3.1., 1.3.5. and 1.3.8. of Chapter 1.3. ‘Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA’ is presented as **Annex 6** and will be proposed for adoption at 92nd General Session in May 2025.

5.3. Introduction to the recommendations for animal welfare (Chapter 7.1.)

Comments were received from Australia, Canada, Chile, China (People's Republic of), Colombia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the Republic of Korea, the UK, AU-IBAR, the EU and ICFAW.

Background

In February 2022, the Code Commission agreed to consider a comment to include the ‘five domains’ concept in Chapter 7.7. ‘Dog population management’ and requested that the Secretariat in collaboration with the WOA Animal Welfare Collaborating Centres (AWCC) prepare a background document for its consideration.

In September 2022, the Code Commission reviewed the background document and noted that the ‘five domains’ as an animal welfare concept is recognised internationally and that it would therefore be more relevant to include it in Chapter 7.1. ‘Introduction to the recommendations for animal welfare’ than in Chapter 7.7. The Commission requested the Secretariat prepare a draft text for inclusion in Chapter 7.1. in collaboration with the AWCCs.

At its September 2023, February 2024 and September 2024 meetings, the Code Commission considered comments received, proposed amendments and circulated the revised Chapter for 7.1. for comments.

The revised Chapter 7.1. has been circulated three times for comment.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered comments received on the revised Chapter 7.1. 'Introduction to the recommendations for animal welfare' that was circulated in its September 2024 meeting report and amended the text, as relevant.

The Commission's responses to comments received are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The revised Chapter 7.1. 'Introduction to the recommendations for animal welfare' is presented as [Annex 7](#) for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

5.4. New Article 8.13.1bis. of Chapter 8.13. 'Infestation with *Cochliomyia hominivorax* (New World screwworm) and Infestation with *Chrysomya bezziana* (Old World screwworm)'

Comments were received from the UK, the USA, the EU and the WOAHP Working Group on Wildlife.

Background

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered a proposal from the Scientific Commission to amend Chapter 8.13. 'New World screwworm (*Cochliomyia hominivorax*) and Old World screwworm (*Chrysomya bezziana*)' to incorporate a case definition for New World screwworm and Old World screwworm that had been developed by subject-matter experts and endorsed by the Scientific Commission at its September 2023 meeting. The Code Commission considered the draft case definition and agreed to include this item in its work programme and requested that the Scientific Commission clarify some points on the epidemiological significance of animal hosts, notably birds, and provide its opinion on whether to develop separate disease-specific chapters, before progressing this work.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the opinion of the Scientific Commission and agreed to draft a new Article 8.13.1bis. on general provisions, including the case definition of the disease and its occurrence, and to maintain a single chapter to address both New and Old World screwworms.

The Code Commission, in agreement with the Scientific Commission, agreed to include 'birds' as animal hosts. The Commission highlighted that this would mean that cases in birds would have to be notified to WOAHP and clarified that no changes are needed in recommendations for the current Article 8.13.1, which remains for domestic and wild mammals.

The Code Commission agreed to amend the name of the listed diseases in Chapter 1.3. from 'New World screwworm (*Cochliomyia hominivorax*)' to 'Infestation with *Cochliomyia hominivorax* (New World screwworm)', and from 'Old World screwworm (*Chrysomya bezziana*)' to 'Infestation with *Chrysomya bezziana* (Old World screwworm)' and to amend the title of Chapter 8.13. accordingly. The Commission agreed to propose these amendments to Chapter 1.3. closer to the proposed adoption of the new Article 8.13.1bis.

The new Article 8.13.1bis. of Chapter 8.13. has been circulated once for comment.

Discussion

The Code Commission reviewed comments on Chapter 8.13. 'New World screwworm (*Cochliomyia hominivorax*) and Old World screwworm (*Chrysomya bezziana*)' that was circulated in its September 2024 meeting report. The Commission's responses to the comments reviewed are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The Code Commission highlighted no comments objecting to the proposed case definition were received on the circulated text, noted the rapidly evolving epidemiological situation of this listed disease in Central America, and acknowledged the recommendations of the Regional Commission from the Americas (See item 4.4 of this report). Considering that and the urgent importance for Members reliant on updated standards for this disease, the Commission agreed to propose the revised chapter for adoption after only one round of comments.

The Commission agreed to also revise the listed disease in Chapter 1.3. for harmonisation with the disease name in the revised Chapter 8.13.

The revised Chapter 8.13. 'New World screwworm (*Cochliomyia hominivorax*) and Old World screwworm (*Chrysomya bezziana*)' and revised Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAHA' are presented as [Annex 8](#) and [Annex 6](#), respectively, and will be proposed for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

5.5. Infection with Nipah virus (new Chapter 8.Y.)

Comments were received from Australia, Canada, Korea (Republic of), New Zealand, the USA and the EU.

Background

At its February 2022 meeting, the Code Commission was informed that the Scientific Commission, at its September 2021 meeting, had endorsed the draft case definition developed by subject matter experts for Nipah virus encephalitis. The Code Commission reviewed the Scientific Commission's opinion and found that the rationale provided for the case definition was not sufficient to support work to develop a single-article chapter and requested that the Scientific Commission reconsider the draft case definition to address its concerns.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed the revised draft case definition provided by the Scientific Commission and agreed to draft a new Chapter 8.Y. 'Infection with Nipah virus', consisting of a single article on general provisions, including the draft case definition for the disease and its occurrence. The Code Commission also agreed to include an option for seroconversion only (i.e., without any further conditions) in point 3 of Article 8.Y.1., based on the opinions of the Scientific Commission and the Biological Standards Commission. The new Chapter 8.Y. was circulated for comment.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered comments and noted that pigs and horses are the species playing a significant role in the epidemiology and impact of the disease, which aligned with the *Terrestrial Manual*. Consequently, the Commission added text to clarify that although Nipah virus can infect a wide range of species including bats as a reservoir, pigs and horses are the only species that play a significant role in the epidemiology and impact of the disease. The new Chapter 8.Y. was circulated for comment.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered comments and amended text, as relevant, and aligned the text with conventions of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission also agreed to add a new definition for seroconversion in the Glossary of the *Terrestrial Code* to align with the *Terrestrial Manual* and requested the Secretariat to prepare a draft definition for its consideration in consultation with the Biological Standards Commission. The new Chapter 8.Y. was circulated for comment.

The new Chapter 8.Y. has been circulated three times for comment.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered comments received on Chapter 8.Y. 'Infection with Nipah virus' that was circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to the comments reviewed are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The Commission agreed to revise the listed disease in Chapter 1.3. for harmonisation with the disease name in the new Chapter 8.Y. The Commission also agreed to move 'infection with Nipah virus' from Article 1.3.8. (suidae) to Article 1.3.1. (multiple species) since the animal hosts for this disease include pigs and horses.

The revised Chapter 8.Y. 'Infection with Nipah virus' and revised Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAHP' are presented as [Annex 9](#) and [Annex 6](#), respectively, and will be proposed for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

5.6. Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia) (Chapter 11.5.)

Comments were received from Australia, China (People's Republic of), Korea (Republic of), New Zealand, Norway, Thailand, AU-IBAR and the EU.

Background

At its September 2018 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to review Chapter 11.5. 'Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)' to harmonise the provisions for official recognition and maintenance of free status, and endorsement and maintenance of official control programmes with other disease-specific chapters with official recognition of status and endorsement of control programmes.

At its September 2022 meeting, the Code Commission considered the amendments proposed by the Secretariat for harmonisation, as well as other changes proposed by the *ad hoc* Group on Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP) in October 2015, and subsequently considered by the Scientific Commission at its February 2016 meeting. The Code Commission reviewed the draft text and circulated the revised chapter for comments.

In February 2024, acknowledging a request from WOAHP Headquarters and the Scientific Commission regarding the impact that the potential adoption of the revised Chapter 11.5. would have on the procedure for annual reconfirmation for maintenance of the officially recognised status of CBPP of Members and the related administrative work for both Members and WOAHP, the Code Commission agreed not to propose the chapter for adoption at the 91st General Session but rather to consider this chapter at its September 2024 meeting. The chapter was circulated again for comments in September 2024.

The revised Chapter 11.5. has been circulated four times for comment.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered comments received on Chapter 11.5. 'Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)' that was circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

Article 11.5.3.

The Code Commission, in agreement with the Scientific Commission, highlighted that countries or zones not officially recognised by WOAHP as free from CBPP should not be considered 'infected' by default. Countries or zones officially recognised 'free from CBPP' importing from countries or zones that are not officially recognised free but have not reported the occurrence of infection should provide a risk analysis demonstrating that sanitary measures for such imports are equivalent for risk mitigation to those of the importation of commodities from a country or zone officially recognised as free by WOAHP as described in the relevant article of the chapter. The Commission stressed that the import risk analysis should be conducted in accordance with Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis' and in consideration of Chapter 5.3. 'WOAHP procedures relevant to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the World Trade Organization'. The Commission amended Article 11.5.3. to reflect this.

The Code Commission agreed to apply the same amendments to the relevant article of Chapter 12.1. 'Infection with African horse sickness virus' which is being circulated, and to include in its work programme the modification of the corresponding articles of chapters that pertain to official recognition of free status by WOAHP (other than Bovine spongiform encephalopathy), i.e. Chapter 15.2. 'Infection with classical swine fever virus', Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with foot and mouth disease virus', and Chapter 14.7. 'Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus'. The Commission requested the Secretariat address this at its next meeting, after the adoption of the revised Chapters 12.1 and 11.5.

The Commission's other responses to comments received are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The revised Chapter 11.5. 'Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)' is presented as [Annex 10](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

5.7. Infection with bovine pestiviruses (bovine viral diarrhoea) (new Chapter 11.X.)

Comments were received from AU-IBAR and the EU.

Background

At its September 2022 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to add the development of a new Chapter 11.X. 'Infection with bovine pestiviruses (bovine viral diarrhoea)' to its work programme and circulated a proposed new chapter, consisting of a single article for general provisions, including the definition of the disease and of its occurrence, based on a proposed 'case definition' endorsed by the Scientific Commission.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to amend the disease name in Article 1.3.2. of Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAHP' from 'Bovine viral diarrhoea' to 'Infection with bovine pestiviruses (Bovine viral diarrhoea)' and to circulate the amended article for comment.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission agreed not to propose this chapter for adoption at the 91st General Session but rather to wait until after the revised chapter of the *Terrestrial Manual* has been adopted.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission was informed that the revised Chapter 3.4.7. 'Bovine viral diarrhoea' of the *Terrestrial Manual* was adopted at the 91st General Session in May 2024 and proceeded with its planned review of relevant text in Article 11.X.1.

The new Chapter 11.X. has been circulated five times for comment.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered comments received for the new Chapter 11.X. 'Infection with bovine pestiviruses (Bovine viral diarrhoea)' that was circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to comments received are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The new Chapter 11.X. 'Infection with bovine pestiviruses (Bovine viral diarrhoea)' is presented as [Annex 11](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

5.8. Infection with African horse sickness virus (Chapter 12.1.)

Comments were received from China (People's Republic of), Korea (Republic of), Mexico, New Zealand, the USA, and AU-IBAR.

Background

At its February 2021 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to review Chapter 12.1. 'Infection with African horse sickness virus', to harmonise the provisions for official recognition and maintenance of free status, and endorsement and maintenance of official control programmes with other disease-specific chapters with official recognition of status.

At its September 2022 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed the amendments proposed by the Secretariat for harmonisation, as well as other changes that had been proposed by the *ad hoc* Group in December 2016 and considered by the Scientific Commission in February 2021, and amended the draft chapter, as relevant, and circulated the revised text for comments.

At its February 2024 meeting, acknowledging the agreement between the Bureaux of the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission regarding the impact that the potential adoption of the revised Chapter 12.1. would have on the procedure of annual reconfirmation for maintenance of the officially recognised status of African horse sickness of Members and the related administrative work for both Members and WOA, the Code Commission agreed not to propose the chapter for adoption at the 91st General Session but rather to consider this chapter at its September 2024 meeting.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the Scientific Commission's advice that the methods of sterilisation and filtration of 'sterile filtered horse serum' needed to be specified due to the lack of standardised processes (e.g. variations in pore size) across the world and agreed not to add 'sterile filtered horse serum' to the list of safe commodities. The Code Commission also considered the comments received as well as the opinion of the Scientific Commission on animal hosts to be targeted for this disease, and amended the draft texts, as appropriate.

The revised Chapter 12.1. was circulated four times for comment.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered comments received on the revised Chapter 12.1. 'Infection with African horse sickness virus' that was circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to the comments reviewed are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

Some identical comments received in Chapter 11.5. 'Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* SC (contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)' have been addressed in that chapter, in particular as regards the definition of infected country or zone (see item 5.6 of this report).

The revised Chapter 12.1. 'Infection with African horse sickness virus' is presented as [Annex 12](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

5.9. Infection with *Trypanosoma equiperdum* (dourine) (Chapter 12.3.)

Comments were received from China (People's Republic of), Korea (Republic of), New Zealand, the USA and the EU.

Background

The Code Commission and the Scientific Commission had agreed that three separate chapters on animal trypanosomes with different coverage of trypanosome species and animal hosts should be developed.

Between 2015 and 2018, a draft new Chapter 8.Z. 'Infection with *Trypanosoma evansi* (Surra)' and a revised Chapter 12.3. 'Dourine' were developed, circulated for comments and extensively discussed, but due to the need to clarify the scope of these chapters in terms of host species and pathogenic agents, in February 2018 both Commissions agreed to put Chapters 8.Z. and 12.3. on hold and to progress work on the new draft Chapter 8.19. 'Infection with *Trypanosoma brucei*, *T. congolense*, *T. simiae* and *T. vivax*', which was adopted in May 2021. Both Commissions had also agreed that, notwithstanding diagnostic issues, the scope of the new Chapter 8.Z. should address surra of multiple species including horses and that the scope of Chapter 12.3. should remain as dourine of equids. The Commissions agreed that work on these two chapters should recommence after the adoption of the new Chapter 8.19.

An *ad hoc* Group was convened in July 2023 to draft a revised Chapter 12.3, in line with the approach used for the new Chapter 8.Z. 'Infection with *Trypanosoma evansi* (Surra)'.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the *ad hoc* Group's report and the advice of the Scientific Commission together with the revised draft Chapter 12.3. 'Infection with *Trypanosoma equiperdum* (dourine)' and made amendments, as relevant, and circulated the revised chapter for comment.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the comments received as well as the opinion of the Scientific Commission on animal hosts to be targeted for this disease, amended the draft texts, as appropriate, and circulated the revised chapter for comment.

The revised Chapter 12.3. has been circulated twice for comments.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered comments received on the revised Chapter 12.3. 'Infection with *Trypanosoma equiperdum* (dourine)'.

The Commission did not agree with comments to change the incubation period from 90 days to six months and noted that current scientific evidence does not specify a precise incubation period for this disease. The Commission also noted that the corresponding Chapter 3.6.3. in the *Terrestrial Manual* does not provide a precise incubation period. Based on that, the Commission did agree to delete the sentence referring to an incubation period from Article 12.3.1. 'General provisions'. The periods used in the chapter are then not based on the incubation period but on risk mitigating residency or timing of testing procedures.

The Commission agreed to revise the listed disease in Chapter 1.3. for harmonisation with the disease name in the revised Chapter 12.3.

The Commission's other responses to comments received are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The draft revised Chapter 12.3. 'Infection with *Trypanosoma equiperdum* (dourine)' and revised Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA' are presented as [Annex 13](#) and [Annex 6](#), respectively, and will be proposed for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

5.10. Chapter 12.4. 'Infection with eastern equine encephalitis virus (eastern equine encephalomyelitis) and Infection with western equine encephalitis virus (western equine encephalomyelitis)'

Comments were received from Chile, Korea (Republic of), Mexico, New Zealand, Thailand, the USA, the EU and the WOA Wildlife Working Group.

Background

In September 2022, the Code Commission agreed to include a revision of Chapter 8.10. 'Japanese encephalitis' on its work programme following requests from Members (see Item 6.8 of this report) and noted that the revision of Chapter 12.4. 'Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western)' and Chapter 12.11. 'Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis' had been included in its work programme in February 2020, but that work had not yet started. Considering the similarities of these diseases, the Commission agreed to revise the three disease-specific chapters together, to ensure a consistent approach.

Before commencing this work, the Code Commission requested that an assessment of these four diseases against the criteria for the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the WOA list of notifiable terrestrial animal diseases in accordance with Chapter 1.2. of the *Terrestrial Code* should be undertaken.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the conclusions of [the Scientific Commission provided in its September 2023 report](#) on the listing assessment of Japanese encephalitis (JE), Eastern (EEE) and Western equine encephalomyelitis (WEE), and Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE), and agreed that they all meet the listing criteria.

The Code Commission requested the Secretariat convene an *ad hoc* Group to revise chapters on equine encephalitides of the *Terrestrial Code* and to report back at its September 2024 meeting.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered [the report of the June 2024 meeting of the *ad hoc* Group on the Revision of chapters on equine encephalitides of the Terrestrial Code](#). The Commission reviewed the proposed draft Chapter 12.4. 'Infection with Eastern equine encephalitis virus (Eastern equine encephalomyelitis) and Infection with Western equine encephalitis virus (Western equine encephalomyelitis)' and amended text, as relevant and circulated the revised chapter for comment.

Discussion

The Code Commission reviewed comments for Chapter 12.4. 'Infection with Eastern equine encephalitis virus (Eastern equine encephalomyelitis) and Infection with Western equine encephalitis virus (Western equine encephalomyelitis)' that was circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

Considering that the comments received were supportive of the revised chapter and most of the comments were editorial, the Commission agreed to propose this revised chapter for adoption in the upcoming General Session.

In addition, the Commission agreed to revise the listed disease in Chapter 1.3. for harmonisation with the disease name in the revised Chapter 12.4. The Commission also agreed to move 'infection with Eastern equine encephalitis virus (Eastern equine encephalomyelitis)' from Article 1.3.1. (multiple species) to Article 1.3.5. (Equidae) since the animal host of this disease is limited to equids.

The Commission's responses to the comments reviewed are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The revised Chapter 12.4. 'Infection with Eastern equine encephalitis virus (Eastern equine encephalomyelitis) and Infection with Western equine encephalitis virus (Western equine encephalomyelitis)' and revised Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAHP' are presented as [Annex 14](#) and [Annex 6](#), respectively, and will be proposed for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

6. Texts circulated for comments

The Code Commission discussed the following new or revised texts and circulated them for comments.

6.1. Glossary

'Border post', 'Container', 'Point of entry', 'Point of exit', 'Quarantine station', 'Transit country' and 'Vehicle/vessel'

Comments were received from Australia, Korea (Republic of), New Zealand, South Africa, the USA, the EU and the IPC.

Background

At its September 2021 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to revise Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. and an *ad hoc* Group was convened to develop the draft revised Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. The *ad hoc* Group also proposed the development of a new Glossary definition for 'point of exit' and the revision of existing Glossary definitions for 'border post', 'quarantine station', 'container' and 'vehicle/vessel'.

In September 2023, the Code Commission reviewed the new and revised definitions proposed by the *ad hoc* Group and circulated them for comments. The Commission considered comments received and addressed in its February 2024 meeting, and the Group also addressed them at its April 2024 meeting.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed [the April 2024 report of the *ad hoc* Group](#) and considered the revised Glossary definitions for 'border post', 'container', 'point of exit', 'point of entry', 'quarantine station', and 'transit country' developed in connection with the ongoing

revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. The Commission made amendments for clarification. In addition, the Commission agreed with the revised Glossary definitions for 'vehicle/vessel' proposed by the *ad hoc* Group to address its use in chapters on animal welfare during transport. These new and revised Glossary definitions were circulated for comments.

Discussion

The Code Commission reviewed comments received on Glossary definitions for 'border post', 'container', 'point of exit', 'point of entry', 'quarantine station', 'transit country' and 'vehicle/vessel' that were circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to the comments reviewed are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The revised Glossary definitions for 'border post', 'container', 'point of exit', 'point of entry', 'quarantine station', 'transit country' and 'vehicle/vessel' are presented as part of [Annex 15](#) for comments.

'biosecurity', 'biosecurity plan' and 'swill'

Comments were received from Chile, China (People's Republic of), New Zealand, the USA and the EU.

Background

In September 2022, the Code Commission requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to develop a new chapter on biosecurity. As part of this work, the Commission agreed to review the Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity' and 'biosecurity plan' and to develop a new definition for 'swill'.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Code Commission considered the definitions prepared by the *ad hoc* Group and circulated them for comment. Comments received were addressed by the Code Commission at its February 2024 meeting and by the *ad hoc* Group on Biosecurity in March 2024.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed [the March 2024 report of the *ad hoc* Group](#) and considered the Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity', 'biosecurity plan', and 'swill', in connection with the new chapter on Biosecurity. These revised definitions were circulated for comment.

Discussion

The Code Commission reviewed comments received on Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity', 'biosecurity plan' and 'swill' that were circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to the comments reviewed are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The revised Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity' and 'biosecurity plan' and the new Glossary definition for 'swill' are presented as part of [Annex 15](#) for comments.

'Disinfection' and 'pathogenic agent'

Background

At its September 2023 meeting, the Commission agreed to include the revision of the Glossary definition for 'disinfection' in its work programme, in response to comments on the new Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity'.

In addition, the Code Commission considered the comment received on the new Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity' to replace 'pathogenic agents' with 'hazards'. The Commission noted that the term 'hazard' is defined, but it is not appropriate as a replacement because it also includes chemical and physical agents which are not in the scope of the term 'biosecurity'. The Commission agreed to add to its work programme the consideration for the development of a definition for 'pathogenic agent'.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the proposed Glossary definitions for 'disinfection' and 'pathogenic agent' drafted by [the *ad hoc* Group on Biosecurity](#) and agreed with the proposals. The draft definitions were circulated for comments.

Discussion

The Code Commission reviewed comments received on Glossary definitions for 'disinfection' and 'pathogenic agent' that were circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to the comments reviewed are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The Glossary definitions for 'Disinfection' and 'Pathogenic agent' are presented as part of [Annex 15](#) for comments.

'Disinsection'

Background

At this meeting, the Code Commission agreed to a request to develop a new Glossary definition for 'disinsection' (See 4.3.1. of this report).

Discussion

The Commission considered the use of the term in the Code and developed a new glossary definition, in line with the draft revised definition for 'disinfection'.

The Glossary definition for 'Disinsection' is presented as part of [Annex 15](#) for comments.

'Isolation'

Background

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to add the development of a Glossary definition for 'isolation' in its work programme, in response to a proposal from the *ad hoc* Group undertaking the revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. The Commission requested the *ad hoc* Group on the Revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. and the *ad hoc* Group on Biosecurity work together to draft a new Glossary definition for 'isolation'.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the proposed new Glossary definition for 'isolation' and made minor amendments to the proposed new definition for clarity. The draft definition was circulated for comment.

Discussion

The Code Commission reviewed comments received on the Glossary definition for 'isolation' that were circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to the comments reviewed are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The Glossary definition for 'Isolation' is presented as part of [Annex 15](#) for comments.

'Seroconversion'

Background

At its September 2024 meeting, in response to comments received on the new Chapter 8.Y. 'Infection with Nipah virus', the Code Commission agreed to add a new definition of 'seroconversion' in the Glossary of the *Terrestrial Code*, in line with the one in the *Terrestrial Manual* and requested the Secretariat to prepare a draft definition for consideration at its next meeting, in consultation with the Biological Standards Commission.

Discussion

The Code Commission reviewed a draft Glossary definition proposed by the Secretariat and reviewed by the Biological Standards Commission at its February 2025 meeting. The Commission amended the text and agreed to circulate the proposed new definition for comments.

The Glossary definition for 'Seroconversion' is presented as part of [Annex 15](#) for comments.

6.2. Chapter 1.3. Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA (Article 1.3.7.)

The Code Commission considered the conclusions of the Scientific Commission provided in its September 2024 report, along with the opinions of experts on the assessment of Nairobi sheep disease against listing criteria in Chapter 1.2. 'Criteria for the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the WOA list'.

The Code Commission agreed that the disease does not meet the listing criteria and proposed removing Nairobi sheep disease from the WOA list and proposed the corresponding amendments to Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA'.

The revised Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA' is presented as [Annex 16](#) for comments.

6.3. Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOA (Chapter 1.6.)

Comments were received from Australia, Chile, Japan, New Zealand and the EU.

Background

At its September 2022 meeting, the Code Commission considered a request from a Member to amend Chapter 5.8. 'International transfer and laboratory containment of animal pathogenic agents', and to improve clarity as to whether Members can hold pathogenic agents in laboratories without affecting their animal health status. The Code Commission agreed that this specific request should be addressed in the context of official status recognition by amending Chapter 1.6.

At its February 2023 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to develop a new Article 1.6.4. to clarify that holding a pathogenic agent in an approved laboratory with an appropriate level of containment and biosecurity in accordance with the *Terrestrial Manual* for diagnostic reference and other purposes such as vaccine or antigen banks will not impact the animal health status of a free country or zone. The Commission also agreed to cover in the same article other similar provisions currently included in other horizontal chapters and requested the opinion of the Scientific Commission on this proposal.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission noted that this new article was closely linked with the revised Chapters 5.4 to 5.7. and the new Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity', and requested the opinion of the respective *ad hoc* Groups on this proposal before progressing further.

The Code Commission considered the opinions of the two relevant *ad hoc* Groups and further amended the draft new Article 1.6.4., including the use of the term 'quarantine centre' instead of 'quarantine station' given that there is an ongoing proposal to revise the Glossary term from 'quarantine station' to 'quarantine centre'.

The Commission also noted the need to progress the work on the definition for 'laboratory' and requested the Secretariat to progress this work in coordination with the Biological Standards Commission, as appropriate.

The revised Chapter 1.6. has been circulated once for comments.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered comments received on Chapter 1.6. 'Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOAAH' that was circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

The Code Commission agreed with a comment to include a provision where the presence of a pathogenic agent is found at a border inspection post. The Commission noted that the identification of a pathogenic agent in a commodity at a border inspection post before quarantine clearance should not affect the animal health status, given the detection has occurred outside of the country's territory, and the pathogenic agent had not spread to an animal population. The Commission reminded Members that finding only the pathogenic agent is not considered as a case and that for the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, a 'case means an individual animal infected by a pathogenic agent, with or without clinical signs'. Considering this, the Commission added a new provision in terms of presence at a border inspection post for clarity.

The Commission's other responses to the comments reviewed are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The revised Chapter 1.6. 'Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOAAH' is presented as [Annex 17](#) for comments.

6.4. Biosecurity (new Chapter 4.X.)

Comments were received from Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Korea (Republic of), New Zealand, South Africa, the UK, the USA, AU-IBAR, and the EU.

Background

At its September 2022 meeting, the Code Commission requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to develop a chapter structure on biosecurity, to describe the content of each article and to revise the associated Glossary definitions for the consideration of the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission.

At its February 2023 meeting, after considering the *ad hoc* Group's report and feedback from the Scientific Commission, the Code Commission agreed that the proposed structure of the new Chapter 4.X., and the overall content were appropriate and requested that the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to draft the chapter and to revise current Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity' and 'biosecurity plan', and to propose a new definition for 'swill'.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Code Commission considered the [ad hoc Group's report](#) and reviewed the draft new Chapter 4.X., the proposed revised Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity' and 'biosecurity plan', and a new definition for 'swill', together with input from the Scientific Commission. The Code Commission circulated the draft new Chapter 4.X. and the revised and new Glossary definitions for comment.

In February 2024, the Code Commission acknowledged the many comments received and requested that the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to revise the text in response to the comments. The *ad hoc* Group met in March 2024 and addressed the comments as requested by the Commission.

In September 2024, the Code Commission reviewed [the report of the ad hoc Group](#) and considered the updated draft Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity' and made amendments, where relevant, to ensure consistency with conventions of the *Terrestrial Code*. The revised Chapter 4.X. was circulated for comment.

Discussion

The Code Commission noted that this is the second time the proposed new Chapter 4.X. and associated definitions have been circulated for comments and acknowledged the many comments received.

The Code Commission considered the comments and made amendments to the new Chapter 4.X., where relevant, to ensure conformity with the conventions of the *Terrestrial Code*.

The Code Commission's responses to comments on the new chapter are presented in [Annex 3](#).

As indicated in [Annex 3](#), the Commission has provided some more detailed responses below.

The Code Commission did not agree with a comment that recommended a separate guidance document on biosecurity rather than a chapter in the *Terrestrial Code* or alternatively, that the chapter should only consider 'domestic biosecurity'. The Commission noted that Members had been supportive of the development of this new chapter when included in the Commission's work programme. The Commission also highlighted that the *Terrestrial Code* includes standards of a general nature. The Commission did not agree with the comment to limit it to 'domestic biosecurity' given that the scope of the chapter is to address biosecurity at many levels.

The Code Commission did not agree with a comment to add 'terrestrial' in front of 'animals' as the term 'animals' was defined in the Glossary and the chapter is to be included in the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission did agree to add 'the environment' to capture all aspects of risks and pathways, in particular, the role vectors play in diseases and how biosecurity should address that.

The Code Commission did not agree with a comment that the chapter should be modified to address specifically the use of biosecurity measures in international trade. The Commission highlighted that this is a new horizontal chapter on disease prevention and control and does not replace any of the chapters in Section 5. 'Trade measures, import/export procedures and veterinary certification'. It highlighted that 'biosecurity' is used to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents in any situation and is distinct from 'sanitary measures' that are specifically used to protect importing countries from entry of pathogenic agents.

Point 6 of Article 4.X.4. 6 was edited by the Code Commission based on an earlier comment to better capture the role of private industry in the implementation of biosecurity.

In its September 2024 report, the Commission requested a better explanation of the relationship between the transmission pathways in Article 4.X.6, and the components of biosecurity listed in Article 4.X.7. The Code Commission added a new sentence at the end of Article 4.X.6. and amended first paragraph of Article 4.X.7., based on feedback from the *ad hoc* Group on Biosecurity.

In response to proposed changes to the first paragraph of Article 4.X.7., the Code Commission did not agree to substitute 'managing' for 'reducing' because the likelihood of transmission of pathogenic agents is reduced with the implementation of good biosecurity. The Commission did agree to substitute 'likelihood' for 'risk' of transmission. The Commission did not agree to delete 'as well as unexpected risk events and may vary according to the population' because the paragraph needs to address the importance of adapting biosecurity to changes in the situation.

The Code Commission did not agree to make the proposed amendments to paragraphs 1a, 1b, 1d, 1e, 1g, and 1h of Article 4.X.7. The rationale for the proposed amendments was that the text as written did not apply to biosecurity measures during international trade. As explained above, the Commission noted that animal health concerns related to international trade would be addressed by 'sanitary measures' covered in the disease-specific chapters and in Chapters 5.4. Animal health measures applicable before and at departure, Chapter 5.5. Animal health measures applicable during transit from the place of departure in the exporting country to arrival in the importing country, Chapter 5.6. Border posts and quarantine stations in the importing country, and Chapter 5.7. Animal health measures applicable on arrival.

The Code Commission did not agree with a comment to add biosecurity recommendations for feed in paragraph 1i of Article 4.X.7. as the Commission considered that relevant measures are already included in Chapter 6.4. The control of hazards of animal health and public health importance in animal feed. This chapter is general and not intended to address specific issues, such as the biosecurity of feed production. The Commission did agree to amend paragraph 1, point i) to make a cross-reference to Chapter 6.4. The Commission did not agree to include a specific reference to 'toxins' in point i) of paragraph 1, as the proposed definition of 'pathogenic agent' includes 'toxins'.

In response to a comment to add a 'fallow period' in point l) of paragraph 1 of Article 4.X.7., the Code Commission responded that 'fallow period' had been mentioned in this section previously, and was intentionally deleted because the concept is not universally understood. The Commission decided not to reinsert this term.

In response to comments, the Code Commission agreed to add 'as appropriate' in point b) of paragraph 2 of Article 4.X.7. However, the Commission did not agree to add 'air' before 'space' as this term had been deleted from a previous version of the draft chapter because it confused the concept of 'all-in-all-out management'. The Commission clarified that management does not always have to apply to the entire shared air space and depends on the nature of the pathogenic agent of concern.

In response to the change proposed to paragraph 2e of Article 4.X.7., the Code Commission agreed with the rationale of the need for care to avoid iatrogenic transmission of disease but made a change to paragraph 2a to address the concern. The Commission did not agree with the change proposed in paragraph 2g about stocking densities as the change did not provide added clarity. The request to rephrase paragraph 2b to better define 'space', was addressed previously by the Commission. The Code Commission agreed with the proposed change to paragraph 2d to clarify 'characteristics' and inserted some language to address it.

In response to comments to amend some text in paragraph e) of Article 4.X.8., the Code Commission agreed to add a reference to the need for early detection. The Commission did not agree that disease monitoring would replace the need for surveillance as the Commission considered that surveillance is needed to facilitate early detection and that the existing reference to Chapter 1.4 addressed the other suggested amendments.

Considering the volume of comments received, the Commission agreed not to propose the chapter for adoption at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

The revised Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity' is presented as **Annex 18** for comments. All of the amendments presented in this annex were made during the February 2025 Code Commission meeting. The September 2024 Code Commission meeting report contained the previous amendments to the chapter as well as a clean version to facilitate reading the chapter.

6.5. Measures and procedures applicable during 'exportation', 'transit' and 'importation' (Chapters 5.4. to 5.7.)

Comments were received from Australia, Canada, Chile, China (People's Republic of), Japan, Korea (Republic of), Mexico, New Zealand, Thailand, the UK, the USA, the AU-IBAR, the EU and the International Poultry Council.

Background

At its September 2017 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to include a review of Section 5. 'Trade measures, import/export procedures and veterinary certification', on its work programme to better support Members in managing the risks associated with the introduction of diseases through the importation of commodities. At its September 2021 meeting, the Commission reviewed the current chapters of Section 5 and agreed that the revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. should be given priority.

At its February 2022 meeting, the Code Commission requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to progress this work and discussed several points that it considered important to include in the draft Terms of Reference for the *ad hoc* Group and encouraged Members to submit comments on these points. At its September 2022 meeting, the Code Commission considered the comments received and finalised the Terms of Reference for the *ad hoc* Group and requested that the *ad hoc* Group be convened prior to its next meeting.

At its February 2023 meeting, the Code Commission considered the *ad hoc* Group report (November 2022) and agreed with the proposal to replace the four current chapters (Chapters 5.4., 5.5., 5.6. and 5.7.) with three new chapters that will provide recommendations on measures and procedures that are applicable during 'exportation', 'transit' and 'importation', respectively. The Commission also agreed with the proposal to develop a fourth chapter to address key facilities (e.g., border control/inspection posts and quarantine facilities). The Commission requested that the *ad hoc* Group be convened to commence drafting the revised chapters.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Code Commission considered the *ad hoc* Group's report (June 2023) and the draft new Chapter 5.4. 'Measures and procedures applicable in the exportation of commodities', Chapter 5.6. 'Measures and procedures applicable in the importation of commodities', and associated Glossary definitions. The Code Commission circulated the draft new Chapters 5.4. and 5.6. and revised new Glossary definitions for comments and requested that the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to continue drafting the remaining texts.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the comments received and the report of the meeting of the *ad hoc* Group (November 2023), together with the proposed draft revised Chapters 5.5. and 5.7. prepared by the *ad hoc* Group. The Commission requested that the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to undertake further revision of the texts in response to the comments received and provided guidance on some key areas for the *ad hoc* Group to address.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the report of the [April 2024 meeting of the *ad hoc* Group on Revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7.](#) The Commission made additional amendments to address the comments received in its previous meeting report and circulated four revised chapters as well as associated Glossary definitions for comments.

The revised Chapter 5.4. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the exportation of commodities' and 5.6. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the importation of commodities' have been circulated twice, and the proposed new draft Chapter 5.5. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the transit of commodities' and 5.7. 'Border inspection posts and quarantine centres' have been circulated once for comment.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered comments received on Chapter 5.4 'Measures and procedures applicable to the exportation of commodities', Chapter 5.5. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the transit of commodities', Chapter 5.6. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the importation of commodities' and Chapter 5.7. 'Border inspection posts and quarantine centres' that were circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

Regarding comments proposing to use 'exporter' or 'importer' instead of 'operator' in these chapters, the Code Commission reminded Members that in response to comments considered at its February 2024 meeting, the Commission had requested the *ad hoc* Group to clarify how the terms 'business operator', 'exporter' and 'importer' are used in these chapters. The *ad hoc* Group (April 2024) had proposed that 'operator' be used throughout the chapters for consistency and to define the term 'operator' to mean 'any natural or legal entity or person responsible for export, transit or import of commodities subject to the provisions of the respective chapter.' The Commission noted that using different terms such as 'operator', 'exporter' and 'importer' in these chapters may be confusing as the use of such terms meant different things in different contexts and agreed to define the single, more flexible term 'operator' for the purposes of Chapters 5.4. to 5.6., respectively as proposed by the *ad hoc* Group. The Commission encouraged Members to refer to its September 2024 report for details.

The Code Commission considered comments requesting clarification of the difference between the 'illegal' and 'informal' movement used in Chapters 5.5. and 5.6. The Commission agreed that 'illegal' movement refers to the international movement of commodities done in a way that expressly (and possibly intentionally) avoids official controls or disrespects clearly established regulations. The Commission highlighted that some other cross-border movements may occur without following all regulatory procedures that may not be known or consistently implemented, such as when commodities are moved locally between communities across land borders in cross-border pastoralist areas. Considering these differences, the Commission agreed to use both 'illegal' and 'informal'.

The Commission's other responses to the comments reviewed are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The revised Chapter 5.4. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the exportation of commodities', Chapter 5.6. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the importation of commodities', Chapter 5.5. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the transit of commodities' and Chapter 5.7. 'Border inspection posts and quarantine centres' are presented as [Annex 19](#), [Annex 20](#), [Annex 21](#) and [Annex 22](#), respectively, for comments.

6.6. Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. 'Animal welfare during slaughter'

Background

A revised Chapter 7.5. 'Animal welfare during slaughter' was adopted at the 91st General Session in May 2024. However, during discussions regarding the proposed text for adoption Thailand and China (People's Republic of) made interventions that did not support the proposed text in point 4. of Article 7.5.30. In response to these interventions, the President of the Code Commission proposed to place this point 'under study' and indicated that the Code Commission would review this point at its September 2024 meeting. In addition, the President requested these Members to submit any scientific evidence that would support a modification of the proposed recommendations.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed the supporting data submitted by China (People's Republic of) regarding point 4 of Article 7.5.30., and requested the Secretariat to share these comments with the *ad hoc* Group that revised Chapter 7.5. and provide an opinion for the Commission to consider at its February 2025 meeting.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered the opinion of the *ad hoc* Group that the supporting information submitted did not provide sufficient scientific evidence to support a modification to the text 'under study' in point 4 of Article 7.5.30. The *ad hoc* Group noted that the information provided corresponded to electrical parameters used for multiple-bird water bath stunning under slaughterhouse conditions, which were targeted to meat quality improvements, rather than animal welfare considerations. The *ad hoc* Group agreed that the literature submitted did not provide sufficient scientific evidence about a guaranteed induction to sufficient levels of unconsciousness with frequencies of 1000Hz. The *ad hoc* Group also agreed that the recommendation to use 1000 Hz would also be linked to the different currents applied.

Based on the advice of the *ad hoc* Group and the EFSA scientific opinion on 'Slaughter of animals: poultry' (EFSA Journal 2019;17(11):5849, 91 pp), the Code Commission did not agree to change the parameters in the text under study in point 4. of Article 7.5.30. but did propose some editorial amendments to improve the readability and clarity of the recommendations. Consequently, the Commission agreed to delete '[under study]' in the two recommendations in point 4. of Article 7.5.30.

The revised Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. 'Animal welfare during slaughter' is presented as [Annex 23](#) for comments.

6.7. Revision of Chapter 7.6. 'Killing for disease control purposes'

Comments were received from Argentina, Australia, Canada, China (People's Republic of), Mexico, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, New Caledonia, South Africa, Switzerland, the UK, the USA, the IEC, ICAFW, the EU and the WOAHP Working Group on Wildlife.

Background

At its February 2018 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to revise Chapter 7.5. 'Slaughter of animals' and Chapter 7.6. 'Killing of animals for disease control purposes' and requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to undertake this work, as well as the revision of related Glossary definitions.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Code Commission considered the *ad hoc* Group report (June 2023) including the draft revised Chapter 7.6. The Commission provided feedback on the proposed text and requested that the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to continue working on the revised text.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the *ad hoc* Group report (June 2023) including the revised draft Chapter 7.6. and agreed to circulate the first eight articles for comments and requested the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to finalise the text for the remaining articles.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed comments submitted on the first eight articles received and made some recommendations for the *ad hoc* Group to consider at its next meeting.

At its September 2024 meeting the *ad hoc* Group considered some of the comments requested by the Code Commission and finalised the remaining articles.

The first eight articles of Chapter 7.6. have been circulated once for comments.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered the outstanding comments on the first eight articles submitted at its September 2024 meeting.

The Commission's responses to comments received are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The Code Commission agreed with the *ad hoc* Group regarding the need to differentiate the recommendations in this chapter from the recommendations in Chapter 7.5. 'Animal welfare during slaughter', and therefore only included recommendations related to killing processes not linked with slaughter. The scope of the chapter was confirmed to cover the killing of all mammal and bird species, in any numbers from individual to large scale killing, and for any purpose other than slaughter.

The Commission amended the text to improve clarity regarding the responsibilities, competencies and training of those involved during large-scale killing operations. The Code Commission reviewed the new Articles 7.6.9 to 7.6.32. and agreed to structure these articles according to the number of animals killed. Articles 7.6.11 to 7.6.21. pertain to individual animals killed manually when a human operator or operators are involved. Articles 7.6.22. to 7.6.32. pertain to automated large-scale killing methods which involve automated procedures for large-scale killing of many animals either sequentially or simultaneously.

The Code Commission reminded Members that the revised Chapter 7.6 includes Articles 7.6.1 to 7.6.8. (that have been circulated for comment previously) and the new Articles 7.6.9 to 7.6.32. (circulated for the first time).

The revised Chapter 7.6. 'Animal welfare at the time of killing for purposes other than slaughter' is presented as [Annex 24](#) for comments.

6.8. Japanese encephalitis (Chapter 8.10.)

Background

In September 2022, the Code Commission agreed to include a revision of Chapter 8.10. 'Japanese encephalitis' on its work programme following requests from Members. The Commission also noted that the revision of Chapter 12.4. 'Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western)' and Chapter 12.11. 'Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis' had been included in its work programme in February 2020. Considering the similarities of these diseases, the Commission agreed to revise these three disease-specific chapters to ensure a consistent approach. The Commission also agreed that Chapter 8.21. 'West Nile fever' should also be taken into consideration in the same manner.

Before commencing this work, the Code Commission requested that an assessment of these four diseases against the criteria for the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the WOAHP list of notifiable terrestrial animal diseases in accordance with Chapter 1.2. of the *Terrestrial Code* should be undertaken.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the conclusions of [the Scientific Commission provided in its September 2023 report](#) on the listing assessment of Japanese encephalitis (JE), Eastern (EEE) and Western equine encephalomyelitis (WEE), and Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE), and agreed that they all meet the listing criteria.

The Code Commission noted that the assessment reports did not provide sufficient information on the role of the different animal hosts and their significance in the epidemiology of the disease and considered this information to be necessary for the revision of these chapters.

The Code Commission agreed to revise *Terrestrial Code* chapters on equine encephalitides and requested that the *ad hoc* Group consider all chapters that address the five encephalitides i.e., EEE, WEE, JE, West Nile fever and VEE; assess whether EEE and WEE should be covered in separate chapters; define the animal hosts to be targeted for each disease, and whether the names of diseases containing specific country names should be re-considered, taking into account the relevant WHO guidelines.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered [the *ad hoc* Group report on the Revision of Chapter 8.10. 'Japanese encephalitis' \(November 2024\)](#) together with the opinion of the Scientific Commission, and the proposed draft revised Chapter 8.10. 'Infection with Japanese encephalitis virus (Japanese encephalitis)'.

The Code Commission agreed with the *ad hoc* Group proposal to propose a completely new revised Chapter 8.10. that would replace the current one, due to the extensive update needed. The Commission reviewed and amended the text for clarity and consistency.

The Code Commission considered the potential animal hosts for this infection and agreed with the *ad hoc* Group to consider the epidemiological significance of 'equids' as dead-end hosts acting as sentinel animals; 'suids' as amplifying hosts; and 'wild birds' as the primary reservoir and amplifying hosts. Therefore, these three groups of species can be considered as animal hosts requiring notification for the purposes of this chapter of the *Terrestrial Code*.

Regarding the occurrence of the disease, the Code Commission did not agree with the proposal of the *ad hoc* Group to not include 'giving suspicion of previous association or contact with JEV' as supporting evidence of disease occurrence as the Commission agreed that the inclusion of this consideration provided flexibility regarding the possibility of contact with the vectors. In addition, although evidence of Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) findings in other species such as bats, dogs, cattle, alpacas, etc. have been documented, infection of such animals, which are not 'animal hosts', with JEV cannot be a "case" by definition in this chapter, thus the inclusion of the phrase 'giving suspicion of previous association or contact with JEV' is necessary to cover the possible association with infection of those animals.

The Code Commission noted that although this chapter defines three groups of species as animal host, the presence of Japanese encephalitis in equids (as dead-end hosts) and wild birds (as an asymptomatic wild reservoir) does not affect the status of Japanese encephalitis. The Commission made relevant amendments to indicate that only infection in suids affects Japanese encephalitis status.

The Code Commission agreed with the *ad hoc* Group on the list of safe commodities.

The Code Commission reviewed the provisions in terms of protecting suids from culicine mosquito bites and agreed to include these provisions in the articles on the importation of suids and on compartments free from infection with JEV in suids.

The Commission explained that the name of the listed disease in Chapter 1.3. will be amended to harmonise with this chapter, but this will be proposed closer to the adoption of the revised Chapter 8.10.

Due to the extensive changes proposed, the Commission agreed to circulate the proposed text as clean text.

The revised Chapter 8.10. 'Infection with Japanese encephalitis virus (Japanese encephalitis)' is presented as [Annex 25](#) for comments.

6.9. Tularemia (Chapter 8.20.)

Background

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered a proposal from the Scientific Commission to amend Chapter 8.20. 'Tularemia' to incorporate a case definition developed by experts and endorsed by the Scientific Commission at its February 2024 meeting.

The Code Commission noted that the current Chapter 8.20. only includes general provisions, provisions for free country and for infected zone, and general recommendations for the importation of live hares from infected countries. The Commission also noted that as the current chapter was developed in 1982 and last updated in 2014, the articles did not follow the 'Framework for *Terrestrial Code* standards'. The Commission highlighted that the Scientific Commission had recommended that the animal hosts for the chapter be defined as 'animals in the order Lagomorpha and Rodentia', but the current chapter targets only hares, genus *Lepus*.

Based on the above considerations, the Code Commission agreed to include the revision of Chapter 8.20. to include the new case definition in its work programme. The Commission requested the Secretariat to prepare a draft revised Chapter 8.20. 'Tularemia' to include the new case definition and to align the text with the 'Framework for *Terrestrial Code* standards' for the Commission to consider at a future meeting.

Discussion

The Code Commission reviewed the revised Chapter 8.20. 'Tularemia' prepared by the Secretariat and reminded Members that the revised chapters included the new case definition, and amendments to align the text with the 'Framework for *Terrestrial Code* standards'. The Commission noted that the revision chapter does not include any additional new content.

The Code Commission agreed with the opinions of the Scientific Commission and Biological Standards Commission regarding which pathogenic agents and animal hosts comprised the disease and case definitions. However, the Code Commission considered that indicating the specific name of subtypes of the pathogenic agents was adequate and agreed not to include 'type A' and 'type B'. Regarding amendments to the name of the disease in Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA' to align with proposed changes in Chapter 8.20., the Commission indicated that amendments to Chapter 1.3 would be proposed closer to the adoption of the revised Chapter 8.20.

The Code Commission considered the opinion of the Scientific Commission and Biological Standards Commission regarding the inclusion of a criterion to confirm a case with the detection of nucleic acid or antigen, if accompanied by the detection of antibodies but agreed not to include this wording because it can be addressed by the options to confirm a case with the detection of either nucleic acid or antigen, or antibodies, specific to *Francisella tularensis* given the other conditions are met. The Commission also considered the opinion of the Scientific Commission regarding an option for seroconversion and agreed to include an option for seroconversion but without additional conditions.

The Code Commission agreed to add a provision on recovery for free status as a new article because the current chapter includes the articles to define both free and infected country or zones.

The revised text is presented as [Annex 26](#) for comments.

6.10. Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (new Chapter 8.X.)

Comments were received from Australia, Chile, Korea (Republic of), New Zealand, the USA, the EU and the WOAHP Working Group on Wildlife.

Background

In February 2016 and again in 2022, in response to a comment to develop a new chapter for Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever given this is a high-priority zoonotic disease in Asia and Africa, the Code Commission agreed to initiate this work once a case definition was developed by the Scientific Commission and considered this to be a priority work item.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission was informed that the Scientific Commission, at its September 2023 meeting, had approved a draft case definition for infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus which had been posted on the WOAHP website to facilitate Members notification, in the absence of a *Terrestrial Code* chapter.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission was informed that a revised Chapter 3.1.5. 'Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever' of the *Terrestrial Manual* had been adopted at the 91st General Session in May 2024 and therefore agreed to develop a new Chapter 8.X. 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus', consisting of a single article on general provisions, including definitions of the listed disease and of its occurrence. The Commission highlighted that the objective of this chapter was to support notification by Members due to the public health risks associated with this disease.

The Commission agreed to amend the name of the listed disease in Chapter 1.3. to 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus', and to propose these amendments to Chapter 1.3. closer to the adoption of the new Chapter 8.X.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered comments for Chapter 8.X. 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus' that were circulated in its September 2024 meeting report. The Commission's responses to the comments reviewed are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The new Chapter 8.X. 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus' is presented as [Annex 27](#) for comments.

6.11. Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens) (new Chapter 10.X.)

Comments were received from Canada, Korea (Republic of), New Zealand, the USA, the EU and the IPC.

Background

At its February 2023 meeting, the Code Commission was informed that the Scientific Commission had endorsed a draft case definition for turkey rhinotracheitis that had been developed by subject-matter experts. The Commission considered the draft case definition and requested that the Scientific Commission clarify some points, notably on the epidemiologically significant animal hosts.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the amended draft case definition endorsed by the Scientific Commission which also considered opinions of the Biological Standards Commission and experts. The Code Commission agreed to change the priority order to 'priority 2' and drafted a new Chapter 10.X. consisting of a single article including the definitions of the disease and of its occurrence and other general provisions.

The Code Commission also agreed to use 'Infection with avian metapneumovirus (turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens)' as the title for the new chapter and to revise the name of the listed disease in Article 1.3.3. accordingly, but not to circulate the revised Article 1.3.3. until after considering the comments on the proposed new chapter.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered comments received on Chapter 10.X. 'Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens)' that had been circulated in its September 2024 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to the comments reviewed are presented as part of [Annex 3](#).

The revised new Chapter 10.X. 'Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens)' is presented as [Annex 28](#) for comments.

7. Updates on WOAHP initiatives relevant to the Code Commission

7.1. WOAHP Global Animal Welfare Strategy

As part of the ongoing implementation of the WOAHP Global Animal Welfare Strategy (GAWS), a two-year work plan has been developed that includes activities that address the four pillars of the Strategy: 'Development of animal welfare standards', 'Capacity building activities', 'Implementation of animal welfare standards and policies' and 'Communication with governments and the public'.

The Secretariat provided an update of relevant activities of the GAWS work plan, specifically the ones related to the pillar on 'Communication with governments and the public'. The Secretariat informed the Commission about the Global Animal Welfare Forum 'Exploring how WOAHP Animal Welfare Collaborating Centres can support Members in improving animal welfare' which was held in Merida, Mexico from 28 – 29 October 2024. Twenty-eight participants attended including representatives from WOAHP Members, WOAHP Collaborating Centres for Animal Welfare and some WOAHP partners.

The Forum focused on strengthening the relationship between Members and WOAHP Collaborating Centres for Animal Welfare, to strengthen collaboration and encourage research to improve animal welfare. The Forum provided an opportunity to finalise the creation of a network of WOAHP Collaborating Centres for Animal Welfare, finalise their Terms of Reference and begin the development of a work plan.

Discussion

The Code Commission noted the information provided by the Secretariat and requested to be kept informed on the Collaborating Centres Network activities.

7.2. Terrestrial Code content standardisation

7.2.1. Animal hosts to be targeted by WOAHP Standards for a listed disease

Background

At its September 2023 meeting, building on the development of the 'Framework for *Terrestrial Code* Standards' and ongoing collaboration with the Scientific Commission to update listed-disease case definitions, the Code Commission agreed on the need to clearly define which and how animal hosts should be included in a disease-specific chapter of the *Terrestrial Code* and the correspondence with the relevant chapter of the *Terrestrial Manual*.

In February 2024, the Code Commission, the Scientific Commission, and the Biological Standards Commission agreed to establish a standardised approach for guiding the inclusion of animal hosts in the *Terrestrial Code* and the *Terrestrial Manual*, clarifying its purpose and implications. A dedicated task force was created, working remotely between February and April 2024 to prepare a report for the three Specialist Commissions.

At the September 2024 meetings, the Commissions reviewed the report and endorsed the proposed approach to streamline the coverage of animal hosts for listed diseases in the WOAHP Terrestrial Standards. They agreed on the importance of the listing criteria (Chapter

1.2.) in determining relevant hosts for inclusion in the *Terrestrial Code* and supported including in the *Terrestrial Manual* additional details on disease epidemiology and wider associated animal susceptibility.

The Commission stressed the need for a consistent application of this approach to ensure a shared understanding of its implications for notification, status, trade and surveillance.

Discussion

The Commission revisited the report of the task force in light of the recent *ad hoc* Groups work, the texts currently being circulated, and notably the discussions on the interpretation of Chapter 1.1 (See item 4.1.3 of this report).

The Commission reiterated its agreement with the proposed approach and provided feedback to the Secretariat on the presentation and description of the relevance of the different animal species or groups depending on their role in the epidemiology or impact of the disease.

The Commission requested that the results of this work be incorporated into the 'Framework for *Terrestrial Code* standards' and to ensure that it is used as a continuous reference for the Commissions and other experts, when drafting standards, to have a common understanding of the different purposes and implications (i.e. for notification, animal health status, trade, or surveillance purposes) of the inclusion of specific animal hosts in the disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*.

7.3. Transparency of the WOA process for the elaboration of Standards

As originally communicated in the Commission's September 2023 report, the Director General agreed to progressively implement a process to improve the transparency of the WOA process for the elaboration of Standards for better documentation and traceability.

The first step in this process was the publication on the Delegates' website of comments submitted by WOA Members and partners that were considered by the Commission at its February 2024 meeting. This step was implemented in April 2024 when comments were uploaded onto the Delegates' website at the same time as the publication of the Commission's report.

The second step in this process was the publication on the Delegates' and public WOA websites of comments considered by the Commission with the Commission's responses in October 2024. These were published as part of the Commission's September 2024 report in a specific annex (Annex 3) for information only. The Commission's responses were presented in English, French or Spanish according to the language of the report and comments were presented in the language in which they were submitted. Comments and the Commission's responses were embedded in the English version of the text that was circulated for comment in September 2024, irrespective of the language version due to resource constraints. As a consequence of presenting all the Commission's responses to comments considered in Annex 3, the text of the body of the Commission's September 2024 report focused on providing a short background summary for each agenda item as well as key points discussed and agreed upon by the Commission.

The Director General has agreed to implement the final step of this process in March 2026 which is to publish the name of the Member or partner who submitted the comment in the Commission's report published on both the public and the Delegate's website.

The Director General hopes that these new processes to improve transparency, together with the Guidance documents for submitting comments and a more user-friendly report will encourage more Members to engage in the process for the elaboration of WOA Standards.

7.4. E-cert data model

The Secretariat provided an update to the Code Commission on the work of the WOAHP expert consultation Group convened in 2024 to develop electronic data models and data standards to facilitate international trade. The Group developed used model certificates from Chapter 5.10. 'Model veterinary certificates for international trade in live animals, hatching eggs and products of animal origin' and Chapter 5.13. 'Model veterinary certificates for international trade in laboratory animals' of the *Terrestrial Code* as reference documents for developing these data models. Chapter 5.11. 'Model health certificates for international trade in live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products' of the *Aquatic Code* was also used as a reference.

The data models and standards follow UN/CEFACT SPS standardised language (global international standard) and are consistent with the work already done by Codex Alimentarius. These outputs will facilitate paperless certification between Competent Authorities where export/import certification is required to facilitate entry of a commodity.

The final documents produced include a guidance document in English, Spanish and French, an Excel spreadsheet detailing the data models and standards in XML language, and a visual reference e-certification models that details how the WOAHP model veterinary certificates are organised and how data elements relate to one another.

This work was completed in December 2024 and WOAHP has posted the data models and standards on the WOAHP website at:

[Electronic veterinary certification - WOAHP - World Organisation for Animal Health](#)

7.5. WOAHP Observatory

Representatives from the WOAHP Observatory team informed the Code Commission of their ongoing activities, including the development of a new edition of the WOAHP Observatory Monitoring report which will present an overview of the implementation of a selection of WOAHP Standards at the global level. The new edition will focus on Trade and sanitary measures, Self-declaration and official status, Movement control, Zoning and Compartmentalisation, AMU/AMR and One Health.

The Code Commission acknowledged the role of the findings of the Observatory Thematic studies to inform revisions of *Terrestrial Code* chapters on zoning and animal welfare standards. The Observatory representative highlighted that recommendations of Observatory Thematic studies and the Monitoring report serve to better support Members, provide a source of information regarding capacity building needs and advocate for donor funds.

The Code Commission was informed that the Observatory will launch a call, in March 2025, for proposals to select the topics for the next Thematic study. The proposed topics will be prioritised depending on defined criteria and the Observatory Steering Committee will be responsible for making the final decision regarding the selected topic. The Commission is invited to submit proposals through the WOAHP Secretariat.

The Observatory representative also informed the Commission of its collaboration with the International Phytosanitary Convention (IPPC) and the Codex Alimentarius who are also monitoring the use of their respective international standards. The 'three sisters' authored an article to explain their respective approaches and challenges: [the Use and implementation of Codex, IPPC and WOAHP standards: How do the three sisters monitor the impact of their work?](#).

7.6. World Animal Health Information System

The Commission was informed of key updates on the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS). The WAHIS platform is currently undergoing stabilisation and maintenance following the implementation of its main updated functions in June 2024, with minimal bugs reported. In early 2025, WAHIS will assess user needs for future enhancements. Progress has been

made in integrating ADIS-WAHIS for early warning reporting, with five European Member States now interconnected and more countries expected to join in the first half of 2025. Additionally, from January 2025, ASEAN countries will use WAHIS for one-portal reporting of outbreaks and events previously recorded in ARAHIS.

The Commission was also updated on annual revisions to WAHIS reference tables and spatial administrative boundaries. These included the addition of a newly listed disease of aquatic animals, the modification of several disease names to align with ongoing harmonisation efforts in the *Terrestrial Code*, and the update of two causal agent names for consistency with WOAHA *Manuals*. Animal host species were revised for multiple diseases, reflecting updated case definitions, and eight new WOAHA reference laboratories were designated. Additionally, spatial administrative boundaries for some Members were adjusted based on National Delegate's requests, with all updates effective from 1 January 2025 in WAHIS reporting and analytical dashboards.

7.7. WOAHA Governance Review Committee

Dr François Caya, WOAHA DDG for Institutional Affairs & Regional Activities, updated the Commission on the work of the Governance Review Committee (GRC), which was established in December 2024 following a nomination process led by the five Regional Commissions. The objective of the GRC is to analyse and evaluate WOAHA's legal framework, institutional, regional, technical and financial governance for improvement following the findings from an independent assessment that was presented at the WOAHA 91st General Session. The GRC comprises representatives from 16 Members and is an anticipated three-year project that will conclude at the General Session in 2027. Dr Caya highlighted key issues to be reviewed by the GRC including formalising WOAHA's standard-setting procedures and streamlining other technical decision-making processes, transparency in statutory contributions from Members, and improving institutional and regional consultation processes.

.../Annexes

Annex 1. Adopted Agenda

MEETING OF THE WOAHP TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

Paris, 4 to 14 February 2025

1. Welcome

1.1. Deputy Director General

1.2. Director General

2. Adoption of agenda

3. Cooperation with other Specialist Commissions

3.1. Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases

3.1.1. SOP for listing decision for diseases, infections and infestations

3.1.2. SOP for determining whether a disease should be considered as emerging

3.1.3. Case definition

3.1.4. Removal of questionnaire chapters (Chapters 1.7. to 1.12.)

3.2. Biological Standards Commission

3.2.1. Biological Standards Commission's recommendations to the *Terrestrial Code*

3.3. Aquatic Animals Commission

4. Code Commission's work programme not including texts proposed for comments or adoption

4.1. Ongoing work items (not in order of priority)

4.1.1. Glossary definition

4.1.2. Wildlife health

4.1.3. New chapter on emergency management

4.1.4. Chapter 1.1. Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information

4.1.5. Revision of Chapter 4.4. Zoning and compartmentalisation and new chapter on implementation of zoning

4.1.6. Revision of Chapter 4.7. Collection and processing of bovine, small ruminant and porcine semen

4.1.7. Revision of Chapter 4.14. General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection

4.1.8. Development of introductory chapter of Section 5

4.1.9. Revision of chapters on certification procedures (Chapters 5.2. and 5.10.)

4.1.10. Chapter 5.12. Model passport for international movement of competition horses

4.1.11. Revision of Chapter 6.8. Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes

4.1.12. Revision of Chapters 8.10. Japanese encephalitis

- 4.1.13. Revision of Chapter 8.20. Tularemia
- 4.1.14. Revision of Chapter 14.7. Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus
- 4.1.15. Revision of Chapter 14.8. Scrapie
- 4.1.16. Revision of Chapter 14.9. Sheep pox and goat pox
- 4.1.17. Revision of Glossary definition for 'poultry'
- 4.2. **Items under consideration for inclusion in work programme**
 - 4.2.1. Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. Animal welfare during slaughter
 - 4.2.2. Chapter 11.9. Infection with lumpy skin disease virus
- 4.3. **New proposals and requests for inclusion in work programme**
 - 4.3.1. New requests from Members and International Organisations
 - 4.3.1.1. Request international catering waste (garbage from air)
 - 4.3.1.2. Request on Chapter 8.8. FMD
 - 4.3.1.3. Request on new Glossary definitions
- 4.4. **Prioritisation of items in work programme**
 - 4.4.1. Feedback from regional commissions
- 5. **Texts proposed for adoption in May 2025**
 - 5.1. User's Guide
 - 5.2. New Chapter 4.X. Biosecurity and associated Glossary definitions
 - 5.3. Chapter 7.1. Introduction to the recommendations for animal welfare
 - 5.4. New Chapter 8.Y. Infection with Nipah virus
 - 5.5. Chapter 11.5. Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *Mycoides* SC (contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)
 - 5.6. New Chapter 11.X. Infection with bovine pestiviruses (bovine viral diarrhoea)
 - 5.7. Chapter 12.1. Infection with African horse sickness virus
 - 5.8. Chapter 12.3. Infection with *Trypanosoma equiperdum* (dourine)
- 6. **Texts circulated for comments**
 - 6.1. **In September 2024 meeting report**
 - 6.1.1. Chapter 1.6. Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOA
 - 6.1.2. Chapter 5.4. Measures and procedures applicable to the exportation of commodities
 - 6.1.3. Chapter 5.5. Measures and procedures applicable to the transit of commodities
 - 6.1.4. Chapter 5.6. Measures and procedures applicable to the importation of commodities
 - 6.1.5. Chapter 5.7. Border inspection post and quarantine centre
 - 6.1.6. Chapter 8.8. Infection with foot and mouth disease virus (fetal bovine serum)

- 6.1.7. Chapter 8.13. New world screwworm and old world screwworm
- 6.1.8. New Chapter 8.X. Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
- 6.1.9. New Chapter 10.X. Infection with avian metapneumovirus
- 6.1.10. Chapter 12.4. Infection with eastern equine encephalitis virus and infection with western equine encephalitis virus

6.2. Previously circulated

- 6.2.1. Revision of Chapter 7.6. Killing of animals for disease control purposes

7. Updates on WOAHP initiatives relevant to the Code Commission

- 7.1. WOAHP Global Animal welfare strategy (Forum)
- 7.2. *Terrestrial Code* data standardisation
 - 7.2.1. Animal hosts
- 7.3. WOAHP Standards Online Navigation Tool
- 7.4. Transparency of the WOAHP process for the elaboration of Standards
- 7.5. E-cert data model
- 7.6. WOAHP Observatory
- 7.7. WAHIAD activities and WAHIS platform update
- 7.8. Animal Health Forum on vaccines and vaccination
- 7.9. WOAHP Governance Review Committee

8. Meeting review

9. Date of next meeting

Annex 2. List of Participants

MEETING OF THE WOAHP TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

Paris, 4 to 14 February 2025

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

Dr Etienne Bonbon
(President)
Seconded National Expert
European Commission
Brussels
BELGIUM

Dr Gaston Maria Funes
(Vice-President)
Counsellor for Agricultural
Affairs,
Embassy of Argentina to the
European Commission
Brussels,
BELGIUM

Dr Kiyokazu Murai
(Vice-President)
Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries
Tokyo,
JAPAN

Dr Caroline Dubé
(member)
National Manager,
Animal Health Risk Assessment
and Intelligence Section,
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
CANADA

Dr Salah Hammami
(member)
Epidemiologist and virologist,
Full professor
National School of Veterinary
Medicine
Sidi Thabet
TUNISIA

Dr John Stratton
(member)
Director,
Animal Biosecurity Branch,
Biosecurity Animal Division,
Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry
AUSTRALIA

WOAH HEADQUARTERS

Dr Gillian Mylrea
Head
Standards Department

Dr Francisco D'Alessio
Deputy Head
Standards Department

Dr Joyce Bowling-Heyward
Chargée de Mission
Standards Department

Dr Akinobu Kawamura
Chargée de mission
Standards Department

Dr Su Youn Park
Chargée de mission
Standards Department

Dr Leopoldo Stuardo
Scientific Coordinator
Standards Department

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
1	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member in general supports these revised definitions, provided the comments below are considered.	Noted

GLOSSARY

BORDER INSPECTION POST

means any airport, or any port, railway station or road check point international point of entry for commodities open to international trade of commodities, and associated facilities, where import veterinary official inspections can be is performed by Veterinary Services.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
2	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: <u>BORDER INSPECTION POST</u> means any airport, or any port, railway station or road check point <u>international point of entry for commodities open to international trade of commodities</u>, and associated facilities, where import <u>veterinary official</u> inspections can be is performed <u>by the Veterinary Authority Services or other Competent Authorities</u>. Rationale: Minor amendment suggested to align with terminology used in Chapter 5.6.	Did not agree as here this is related to the organisations or people that perform the activities to implement the standards of the Terrestrial Code. (refer to Glossary definition for 'Veterinary Services')
3	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: means any airport, or any port, railway station or road check point <u>international international point of entry for commodities open to international trade of commodities</u>, and associated facilities, where import <u>veterinary official</u> inspections can be is performed <u>by Veterinary Services</u>. Rationale: The international context should be maintained or the definition becomes too broad and not effective. A core role of WOAHS is the development of international standards to support the safe international trade in animals and their products. Accordingly, the WTO SPS Agreement recognises the WOAHS Standards as the international reference standards. It is important that the standards are robust for this purpose.	Did not agree as the current text and corresponding new Glossary definition are clear enough to reflect the intention of the international trade.

CONTAINER

means a non-self-propelled receptacle or other rigid structure for holding animals to **carry hold commodities** during transportation a journey by one or several means of transport.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4	Category: general Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: In the definition of “container”, the text refers to “commodities”. The poultry meat industry deals with both animals and their products, so the word “commodities” might not be always appropriate to cover all that variety of products and animals. An organisation suggest to find a definition which consider live animals as well, e.g. "live cargo and its products" or “live animals and their products”.	Did not agree as Glossary definition for ‘commodity’ covers both animal and animal products.

POINT OF ENTRY

means any point at which commodities enter the territory of a country.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5	Category: Change Proposed amended text: <u>means any point location at which commodities enter the territory of a country.</u> Rationale: Clarity, entry is at geographical location. ‘Point’ could also be interpreted to be temporal i.e. time at which.	Agreed and apply the proposed texts in 6 below.
6	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): <u>means any point specific location at which commodities enter the territory of a country.</u> Rationale: Rationale: definition should not include a word that is part of what is being defined	Agreed

POINT OF EXIT

means any point from where commodities leave the territory of **a country-the exporting country**.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: <u>means any point location from where commodities leave the territory of a country-the exporting country.</u> Rationale: Clarity	Comment addressed above (6)

8	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): <u>means any ~~point~~ specific location from where commodities leave the territory of a country ~~the exporting country~~.</u> Rationale: Rationale: definition should not include a word that is part of what is being defined	Comment addressed above (6)

QUARANTINE-STATION CENTRE

means an *establishment* under the control of the *Veterinary Authority* where *animals* are maintained in isolation for observation, and if appropriate testing and treatment, during a specified length of time under biosecurity to prevent with no direct or indirect ensure no contact with other animals and vectors when relevant, to ensure so that there is no transmission entry of specified pathogenic agents outside into nor escape out of the establishment while the animals are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and, if appropriate, testing or treatment.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
9	Category: (editorial) Proposed amended text: means an <i>establishment</i> under the control of the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> where <i>animals</i> are maintained in isolation for observation, and if appropriate testing and treatment, during a specified length of time under biosecurity, to prevent with no direct or indirect ensure no contact with other animals and vectors when relevant, to ensure so that there is no transmission entry of specified pathogenic agents outside from entry into nor escape out of the establishment while the animals are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and, if appropriate, testing or treatment. Rationale: Semantic/grammar proposal Supporting evidence: not relevant	Agreed, but amended differently for clarity.
10	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): means an <i>establishment</i> under the control of the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> where <i>animals</i> are maintained in isolation isolation for observation, and if appropriate testing and treatment, during a specified length of time under biosecurity to prevent with no direct or indirect ensure no contact with other animals and vectors when relevant, to ensure so that there is no transmission entry of specified pathogenic agents outside into nor escape out of the establishment while the animals are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and, if appropriate, testing or treatment. Rationale: Added italics as the word isolation is defined in the Glossary	Did not agree as the draft Glossary definition is still undergoing. Once the Glossary is adopted, it will be italicised.

11	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: “means an <i>establishment</i> under the control of the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> where <i>animals</i> are maintained in isolation for observation, and if appropriate testing and treatment, during a specified length of time under <u>appropriate</u> biosecurity to prevent ...” Rationale: The word “appropriate” is necessary to qualify the biosecurity, and would be in line with the proposed definition of isolation above.	Agreed

TRANSIT COUNTRY

means a country through which *commodities* destined for another country ~~an importing country~~ are transported or in which they make a stopover ~~is made at a border post~~.

VEHICLE/VESSEL/MEANS OF TRANSPORT

means ~~any means of conveyance including a~~ train, truck, trailer, aircraft or ship/vessel that is used for ~~carrying~~transporting ~~animals~~ commodities.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12	Category: deletion Proposed amended text: MEANS OF TRANSPORT means train, truck, <u>trailer</u>, aircraft or vessel that is used for transporting commodities Rationale: The general definition of a “trailer” is a device without its own power, designed to be towed by another vehicle and therefore can be considered to be similar to a “container”, which would not be considered to be a transport.	Agreed, text amended differently for clarity (see 13 below)
13	Category: deletion Proposed amended text: Alternatively: means <u>any means of conveyance including a vehicle (such as a train, truck, <u>trailer</u>, <u>car</u>, <u>motorbike</u>, and <u>bicycle</u>), aircraft or <u>ship vessel</u></u> that is used for ~~carrying~~<u>transporting</u> ~~animals~~ <u>commodities</u>. Rationale: i) Provides an effective term to group land-based conveyance. ii) Including important vehicles for land borders.	Did not agree, but amended for clarity and to avoid misunderstanding.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
1	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member supports this revised Glossary provided the comment below is considered.	Noted

GLOSSARY

BIOSECURITY

means a set of management, behavioural and physical measures designed to reduce the likelihood risk of entry of pathogenic agents into a given population and the exposure of animals to these pathogenic agents introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents animal diseases, infections or infestations in order to avoid their establishment and spread within and from and within an animal that population.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
2	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: It's recommended to distinguish the difference between the definitions of biosafety and biosecurity. At present, the Terrestrial Codex has both biosafety and biosecurity in several chapters such as certification of non-disease, foot-and-mouth disease, etc., which are easily confused and not conducive to the implementation of the standard. It is recommended that WOAHP should clarify the meaning of both words and add biosafety and biosecurity into the terminology together.	Did not agree. This was addressed in the September 2024 meeting of the Bureaux of TAHSC and BSC. The Bureaux agreed to maintain the different definitions as they currently are in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> and <i>Terrestrial Manual</i> as the terms have different meanings in the two different contexts
3	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): means a set of management, <u>behavioural</u> and physical measures designed to reduce the <u>likelihood risk</u> of <u>entry</u> of pathogenic agents into a given <u>population</u> and the exposure of <u>animals</u> to these pathogenic agents <u>introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents</u> <u>animal diseases, infections or infestations</u> in order to avoid their establishment and spread <u>of the pathogenic agents</u> within and from and within an animal <u>that population</u> . Rationale: Grammar edit for clarity on whose establishment and what is spread.	Did not agree due to no added clarity.

BIOSECURITY PLAN

means a ~~plan~~ document or series of documents that identifies potential sources and pathways ~~and factors~~ for entry of pathogenic agents into a given *population*, and the exposure of animals and factors for the transmission of these pathogenic agents ~~the introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents disease in a zone or compartment~~, and describes the corresponding *biosecurity measures* to be implemented and the mechanisms to evaluate its performance and to update it ~~which are being or will be applied to mitigate the disease risks, if applicable, in accordance with the recommendations in the Terrestrial Code.~~

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): means a ~~plan~~ document or series of documents that identifies potential sources and pathways ~~and factors~~ for entry of pathogenic agents into a given <i>population</i>, and the exposure of animals and factors for the transmission of these pathogenic agents. ~~the introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents disease in a zone or compartment~~. <u>The document or series of documents and describes the corresponding <i>biosecurity measures</i> to be implemented and the mechanisms to evaluate its the performance and conduct updates. and to update it</u> which are being or will be applied to mitigate the disease risks, if applicable, in accordance with the recommendations in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>. Rationale: Grammar edit for clarity.	Did not agree due to no added clarity.
5	Category: (deletion) Proposed amended text: “[...] and describes the corresponding biosecurity to be implemented and the mechanisms to evaluate its <u>performance</u> and to update it.” Rationale: Assessing the “performance” of the biosecurity plan can be challenging; while it remains important to assess the biosecurity plan. In addition, several details on how a biosecurity plan should be handled should be delegated to the chapter itself.	Agreed

SWILL

means food scraps or food waste, that contain or have been in contact with *animal products*, ~~and which may be used as feed.~~

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

6	Categoría: editorial. (translated) Texto modificado propuesto (o supresión sugerida): <u>DESPERDICIOS</u> <u>designa restos de comida o residuos alimenticios, que contienen o no productos animales o que han estado en contacto con ~~éstos productos animales~~, y que podrían usarse como pienso (o alimento para animales)</u> Justificación: Tengan o no productos animales, siguen siendo desperdicios. Además, debe desincentivarse la alimentación de los animales con desperdicios, sean de origen animal o vegetal, hasta por un tema de bienestar animal. Está claro que hay mayor riesgo si tienen productos animales.	Did not agree due to no added value.
7	Category: change Proposed amended text: Swill: means food scraps or food waste, that contain or have been in contact with animal products, and may be <u>directly</u> used as feed. Rationale: The direct use of food scraps or food waste as feed carries a risk of disease transmission, but the risk can be effectively reduced by heating or processing. Therefore, from the perspective of controlling the risk and reducing the regulatory burden on the Government, food scraps or food waste directly used as feed are defined as swill and subject to enhanced regulation, while those heated or processed are not swill. Supporting evidence: not relevant	Did not agree due to no added value.
8	Category: Addition Proposed : <u>means human food scraps or human food waste, that contain or have been in contact with animal products, and which may be used as feed.</u> Rationale: The definition should clearly indicate that swill is foodstuffs that were intended for human consumption.	Did not agree, as the intention for human consumption is not relevant in this definition.

9	Category: Editorial Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): means food scraps or food waste, that <u>may</u> contain or <u>may</u> have been in contact with <i>animal products</i>, and ~~which may be~~ <u>is</u> used as <i>feed</i>. Rationale: Recommend adding "may" earlier in definition. If swill has the potential to be a hazard for animal health and disease spread, the definition should be more inclusive to this risk and include food that potentially contains or came into contact with animal products when its history is unknown. Recommend removing "may" later in definition for better clarity. Food scraps or food waste does not become "swill" until it used as feed. Supporting evidence: For reference the definition of "garbage" correlates to the Swine Health Protection Act from 9 CFR 166: Garbage. That definition states that all waste material derived in whole or in part from the meat of any animal (including fish and poultry) or other animal material, and other refuse of any character whatsoever that has been associated with any such material, resulting from the handling, preparation, cooking or consumption of food, except that such term shall not include waste from ordinary household operations which is fed directly to swine on the same premises where such household is located.	Did not agree, as clear language is essential in a definition.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
10	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member in general supports these revised definitions, provided the comments below are considered.	Noted

GLOSSARY

DISINFECTION

means an action the application, after thorough cleansing, of procedures intended to inactivate or destroy pathogenic agents on potentially contaminated objects, the infectious or parasitic agents of animal diseases, including zoonoses; this applies to premises, vehicles and different objects which may have been directly or indirectly contaminated.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: means <u>an action the application, after thorough cleansing, of procedures intended to inactivate or destroy pathogenic agents on potentially contaminated objects, including means of transport, and premises, the infectious or parasitic agents of animal diseases, including zoonoses; this applies to premises, vehicles and different objects which may have been directly or indirectly contaminated.</u> Rationale: Clarity. The use of the word 'object' on its own is being used in the context of anything non-living, but can be read in a narrower context of something someone can hold or move. It should be clear that this text is also referring to disinfection of means of transport, containers, and premises.	Did not agree, as 'object' is a general term that can cover e.g. means of transport, and no specific examples need to be included in the definition.
12	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): means <u>an action the application, after thorough cleansing, of procedures intended to inactivate, significantly reduce or destroy pathogenic agents on potentially contaminated objects, the infectious or parasitic agents of animal diseases, including zoonoses; this applies to premises, vehicles and different objects which may have been directly or indirectly contaminated.</u> Rationale: Only sterilization can completely destroy or eliminate all forms of microbial life, including spores. NVAP Reference Guide: Cleaning and Disinfection Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service	Did not agree, as the current text is adequate.

ISOLATION

means the placement of an *animal* or a group of *animals* separated from other animals under appropriate biosecurity.

13	Category: general Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: The definition of “isolation” does not cover hatching eggs, and animal products. International organisation encourages the Commission to look if a definition for “Animal”, including therein hatching eggs is needed. The issue of segregation comes up often on international movements of hatching eggs so that seems appropriate. Same comment applies for the following definition of “quarantine”.	The Commission did not agree that this definition should pertain to hatching eggs, which are considered . Isolation is meant to be used for live animals.

PATHOGENIC AGENT

means a biological agent that causes, or contributes to, the development of a disease in *animals*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
14	Category: Deletion Proposed amended text: <u>PATHOGENIC AGENT</u> <u>means a biological agent that causes, or contributes to, the development of a disease in animals.</u> Rationale: We question the necessity of this definition, and suggest the Commission considers removing the definition. i) The term is well recognised to describe an infectious microorganism or agent, such as a virus, bacterium, protozoan, prion, or fungus. The root of the term from ‘patho’ also makes it clear that is referring to a disease-causing agent which is correct for the context of the Terrestrial Standards. ii) The new definition creates uncertainty with the introduction of a new much broader term ‘biological agent’ i.e. what does ‘biological’ mean? iii) Could cause confusion, as ‘Biological agent’ is terminology used for pathogens that are weapons. Supporting evidence: https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/42611/9241546158.pdf?sequence=1 https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/BWC-text-English.pdf	Did not agree. A definition was considered necessary to specify a hazard of a biological origin. The term biological agent is used in a wide variety of situation. The proposed definition explains how a biological agent can be pathogenic.
15	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member queries if this definition should include subclinical infections. The word disease does not seem to address this point, which could be important for animal infections that can have zoonotic impact.	The Commission considered that the definition can apply to subclinical infections as it makes reference to

		'the development of a disease'.

NOT FOR COMMENT

Comment	TAHSC response
Categoría: General. Texto modificado propuesto No aplica. Justificación: Miembro respalda los cambios propuestos al capítulo, los que resultan necesarios. Evidencia documentada: No corresponde.	Noted.
Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member in general supports this revised User's Guide provided the comments below are considered. The clarification on the meaning of terms often used in the Code is very welcome (e.g. 'ruminants', 'bovids', 'Bovidae', 'bovines').	Noted.

USER'S GUIDE

A. Introduction

- 1) The WOA *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* (hereafter referred to as the *Terrestrial Code*) establishes standards for the improvement of terrestrial animal health and welfare and veterinary public health worldwide. The purpose of this guide is to advise the Veterinary Authorities of WOA Member Countries on how to use the *Terrestrial Code*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
A_1	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): The WOA <i>Terrestrial Animal Health Code</i> (hereafter referred to as the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>) establishes standards for the improvement of terrestrial animal health and welfare and veterinary public health worldwide. The purpose of this guide is to advise the <u>Veterinary Authorities</u> <u>Veterinary Authorities</u> of WOA Member Countries on how to use the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>. Rationale: The words "Veterinary Authorities" is in the Glossary, hence the term has been italicized.	Agreed. Contrary to past usage, as the User's Guide is a full Standard of the Terrestrial Code, the Commission proposed to italicize the terms that are defined in the Glossary, throughout the User's Guide.

- 2) Veterinary Authorities should use the standards in the *Terrestrial Code* notably to set up measures providing for early detection, internal reporting, notification, control or eradication of pathogenic agents, including zoonotic ones, in terrestrial animals (mammals, birds, reptiles and bees) and preventing their spread via international trade in animals and animal products, while avoiding unjustified sanitary barriers to trade. These measures may include the establishment and recognition of animal health status applied to countries, zones, compartments or herds/flocks.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

A_2	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Veterinary Authorities should use the standards in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> <u>notably</u> to set up measures providing for early detection, internal reporting, notification, control or eradication of pathogenic agents, including zoonotic ones, in terrestrial animals (mammals, birds, reptiles and bees) and preventing their spread via international trade in animals and animal products, while avoiding unjustified sanitary barriers to trade. <u>These measures should be adapted to the sanitary characteristic of the area, and may include the establishment and recognition of animal health status applied to countries, zones, compartments or herds/flocks.</u> Rationale: Any reference to adaptation to regional condition should also reflect the language from the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). In particular, Article 6 of the SPS Agreement ("<i>Adaptation to Regional Conditions, Including Pest — or Disease — Free Areas and Areas of Low Pest or Disease Prevalence</i>").	Did not agree as this kind of recommendation is not relevant in the User's Guide, which is explanatory; recommendations are covered in other chapters of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>.
A_3	Category: Editorial Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): Veterinary Authorities should use the standards in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> <u>notably</u> to set up measures providing for early detection, internal reporting, notification, control or eradication of pathogenic agents, including zoonotic ones, in terrestrial animals (mammals, birds, reptiles and bees) and preventing their spread via international trade in animals and animal products, while avoiding unjustified sanitary barriers to trade. <u>These measures may include the establishment and recognition of animal health status—animal health status— applied to countries, zones, compartments or herds/flocks.</u> Rationale: "Animal health status" is defined in the WOAHS Code Glossary. Recommend italicizing "animal health status" wherever it appears in this Chapter, including B.3), B.10), C.6). Supporting evidence: Not applicable.	Agreed, comment addressed above (A_1)

- 3) WOAHS standards are based on the most recent scientific and technical information. Correctly applied, they protect animal health and welfare and veterinary public health during production of and trade in animals and animal products/commodities, and in the use of animals.
- 4) The absence of chapters, articles or recommendations on particular pathogenic agents, surveillance strategies, animal health status or trade in commodities does not preclude the application of appropriate sanitary measures by the Veterinary Authorities, provided they are based on risk analyses conducted in accordance with the *Terrestrial Code*.
- 5) The year that a chapter was first adopted and the year of its last revision are noted at the end of each chapter.
- 6) The complete text of the *Terrestrial Code* is available on WOAHS Web site and individual chapters may be downloaded from: <https://www.woah.org/>.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
A_4	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): The complete text of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> is available on the WOAH Web site and individual chapters may be downloaded from: https://www.woah.org/. Rationale: Grammar edit: WOAH is description of website. Added the to refer to the specific website.	Agreed.
A_5	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member welcomes that WOAH maintains also earlier versions of its international standards online. This is essential whenever external specific references are made to those standards for any given year. Some of these references have legal implications which makes this service essential.	Noted.

B. Terrestrial Code content

- 1) Key terms and expressions that are used in more than one chapter in the *Terrestrial Code* and require precise interpretation for the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code* are defined in the Glossary, in the case where common dictionary definitions are not deemed to be adequate. The reader should be aware of the definitions given in the Glossary when reading and using the *Terrestrial Code*. Defined terms appear in italics. In the on-line version of the *Terrestrial Code*, a hyperlink leads to the relevant definition.
- 2) The term “(under study)” is found in some rare instances, with reference to an article or part of an article. This means that this part of the text has not been adopted by the World Assembly of Delegates and the particular provisions are thus not part of the *Terrestrial Code*, while they continue to be the subject of specific work, until they are amended or deleted.
- 3) The standards in the chapters of Section 1 are designed for the implementation of measures for the diagnosis, surveillance and notification of diseases, infections and infestations. The standards include procedures for notification to WOAH and procedures for the recognition of the animal health status of a country, zone or compartment.
- 4) The standards in Section 2 are designed to guide the importing country in conducting import risk analysis in the absence of WOAH recommendations on particular pathogenic agents or commodities. The importing country should also use these standards to justify import measures which are more stringent than existing WOAH standards.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
B_1	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): The standards in the chapters of Section 2 are designed to guide the importing country in conducting import risk analysis in the absence of WOAH recommendations on particular pathogenic agents or commodities. The importing country should also use these standards to justify import measures which are more stringent than existing WOAH standards.	Agreed.

	Rationale: Added for consistency with rest of points in this section.	

- 5) The standards in the chapters of Section 3 are designed for the establishment, maintenance and evaluation of Veterinary Services, including veterinary legislation and communication. These standards are intended to assist the Veterinary Services and Veterinary Authority of Member Countries to meet their objectives of improving terrestrial animal health and welfare and veterinary public health, as well as to establish and maintain confidence in their international veterinary certificates.
- 6) The standards in the chapters of Section 4 are designed for the implementation of measures for the prevention and control of pathogenic agents. Measures in this section include animal identification, traceability, zoning, compartmentalisation, disposal of dead animals, disinfection, disinsection and general hygiene precautions. Some chapters address the specific sanitary measures to be applied for the collection and processing of semen and embryos of animals.
- 7) The standards in the chapters of Section 5 are designed for the implementation of general sanitary measures for trade. They address veterinary certification and the measures applicable by the exporting, transit and importing countries. A range of model veterinary certificates is provided to facilitate consistent documentation in international trade.
- 8) The standards in the chapters of Section 6 are designed for the implementation of preventive measures in animal production systems. These measures are intended to assist Member Countries in meeting their veterinary public health objectives. They include ante- and post-mortem inspection, control of hazards in feed, biosecurity at the animal production level, and the control of antimicrobial resistance in animals.
- 9) The standards in the chapters of Section 7 are designed for the implementation of animal welfare measures. The standards cover production, transport, and slaughter or killing, as well as the animal welfare aspects of free-roaming dog population control and the use of animals in research and education.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
B_2	Category: Addition. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): The standards cover production, transport, and slaughter or killing, as well as the animal welfare aspects of free-roaming dog population control and the use of animals for work purposes, in research and education. Rationale: to better reflect the scope of that section which includes chapter 7.12 "Welfare of working equids". Supporting evidence: not relevant.	Agreed, but amended differently to clarify the target animal in accordance with the wording used in the Terrestrial Code Chapters.

- 10) The standards in each of the chapters of Sections 8 to 16, i.e. disease-specific chapters, are designed mainly to prevent the pathogenic agents inform of the occurrence of WOAHA listed diseases, infections or infestations and to prevent the pathogenic agents from being introduced into an importing country, or from spreading within a country or having harmful consequences, while facilitating safe trade. Some chapters include specific measures to prevent and control the infections of global concern. Sections 8 to 16 each relate to the host species of the pathogenic agent: multiple species or species of Apinae, Aves, Bovinae, Equidae, Leporidae, Caprinae, Suidae and Camelidae. Although WOAHA aims to include a chapter for each WOAHA listed disease, not all WOAHA listed diseases have been covered yet by a specific chapter. This is work in progress, depending on available scientific knowledge and the priorities set by the World Assembly of Delegates.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

B_3	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): The standards in each of the chapters of Sections 8 to 16, <u>i.e. disease-specific chapters</u>, are designed <u>mainly to prevent the pathogenic agents inform of the occurrence</u> of WOAHA listed diseases, infections or infestations <u>and to prevent the pathogenic agents</u> from being introduced into an importing country, <u>or from spreading within a country or having harmful consequences, while facilitating safe trade</u>. Some chapters include specific measures to prevent and control the infections <u>and infestations</u> of global concern. Sections 8 to 16 each relate to the <u>host species epidemiologically significant animal host/s</u> of the pathogenic agent: multiple species or species of Apinae, Aves, Bovinae, Equidae, Leporidae, Caprinae, Suidae and Camelidae. Although WOAHA aims to include a chapter for each WOAHA listed disease, not all WOAHA listed diseases have been covered yet by a specific chapter. This is work in progress, depending on available scientific knowledge and the priorities set by the World Assembly of Delegates. Rationale: Recommend changing "host species" to "epidemiologically significant animal host/s" or "primarily affected animal host/s" to align with description provided later in part B.10 (second bullet). The categories used to allocate listed diseases are more general classifications than the term species allows. Infestations are also included in these standards Supporting evidence: Part B.10) second bullet.	For the first proposal, agreed with first comment. For the second proposal, did not agree, but amended the sentence for consistency. Related to this, the second bullet point below was amended for clarity.

The standards take into account the nature of the traded commodity, the animal health status of the exporting country, zone or compartment, and the risk measures applicable to each commodity.

A disease-specific chapter covers some or all of the following components:

- Chapter title and number:
- An introductory Article on general provisions, including definitions of the disease and the animal hosts that play a significant role in the epidemiology of the disease, and definition of its occurrence ('case definition'); and the animal hosts that play a significant role in the epidemiology of the disease;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
B_4	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: "An introductory article, including definitions of the disease and the animal hosts <u>for the purposes for the Terrestrial Code</u> that play a significant role in the epidemiology of the disease, and definition of its occurrence ('case definition')" Rationale: The description needs to stay within the scope of the Terrestrial Code. The risk being that if the description goes beyond the needs of the Terrestrial Code it could bring confusion on what should be (or not be) the host species in relation to the Code.	Agreed, but added the proposed text in the different place of the paragraph. Noted that there is an ongoing work in the work programme on the 'animal hosts' and encourage Members to consult the report on this item (item 7.2.1).

	This would have an impact on trade or notification of diseases requirements. Indeed, we have noted certain discrepancies between the Code and the requirements in WAHIS as regards species for which notification is required. This needs to be avoided. A possible way forward is that each disease specific chapter of the Code details the species relevant for surveillance, notification purposes, certification requirements. A first step in this direction could be the review of the species listed in the Terrestrial Code (in general in Article 1 of most disease specific chapters) and compare it with the species mentioned in the Terrestrial Manual and possibly also compare it against the species that are linked to each listed disease in WAHIS. Possibly a subsequent step could be the definition in each disease specific chapter of the species that are relevant for surveillance, certification and notification purposes. Indeed, it is crucial to avoid contradictions between the Code and the Manual, and to have clarity in the Code on the species relevant for notification. Also, WAHIS needs to reflect the recommendations in the Code, and be strictly limited as regards notification of listed diseases to the species indicated in the disease specific chapter of the Code. Finally, perhaps the concept of “For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code...” could be explained in the User’s Guide, either in the paragraph above as this is where it is often used in the Code, or in section C.1) Notification, as it is very relevant for defining the notification obligations of listed diseases in particular in relation to the species.	

- Article on safe commodities;
- Articles on provisions for animal health status applied to countries, zones, compartments or herds/flocks;
- Articles on recommendations for safe trade of commodities;
- Articles on inactivation of the pathogenic agents present in specific animal products, materials or fomites; and
- Articles on surveillance of the disease.

Not all disease-specific chapters include all these components and some chapters may include only one the first article on the definition of occurrence for the purpose of notification to WOA. Each chapter includes only those provisions considered, at the time of adoption, relevant to address WOA Members’ needs with regards to the specific disease; and that are supported by sound scientific and technical knowledge.

The recommendations in these chapters that are related to international trade. These standards assume that the pathogenic agent is either not present in the importing country or is the subject of a control or eradication programme. Sections 8 to 16 each relate to the host species of the pathogenic agent: multiple species or species of Apinae, Aves, Bovinae, Equidae, Leporidae, Caprinae, Suidae and Camelidae. Some chapters include specific measures to prevent and control the infections of global concern. Although WOA aims to include a chapter for each WOA listed disease, not all WOA listed diseases have been covered yet by a specific chapter. This is work in progress, depending on available scientific knowledge and the priorities set by the World Assembly of Delegates. The sanitary measures recommended in the standards take into account

the nature of the moved or traded commodity, the animal health status of the exporting country, zone or compartment of origin, and the risk mitigation measures applicable to each commodity.

C. Specific issues

1) Notification

Chapter 1.1. describes Member Countries' obligations under Organic Statutes of the Office International des Epizooties. Listed diseases and emerging diseases, as prescribed in Chapter 1.1., are compulsorily notifiable. Member Countries are encouraged to also provide information to WOAHA on other animal health events of epidemiological significance.

Chapter 1.2. describes the criteria for the inclusion of a disease, an infection or infestation in the WOAHA List and Chapter 1.3. gives the current list. Listed Dd diseases are divided into nine categories based on the host species of the aetiological agents.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
C_1	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): Chapter 1.2. describes the criteria for the inclusion of <u>a disease, an</u> infection or infestation in the WOAHA List and Chapter 1.3. gives the current list. <u>Listed Dd</u> diseases are divided into nine categories based on the <u>host species epidemiologically significant animal host/s</u> of the aetiological agents. Rationale: Recommend changing "host species" to "epidemiologically significant animal host/s" or "primarily affected animal host/s" to align with description provided later in part B.10 (second bullet). The categories used to allocate listed diseases are more general classifications than the term species allows. Supporting evidence: Part B.10) second bullet.	comment addressed above (B_3) and (B_4) The Code Commission amended to use 'animal hosts' and epidemiological significance is already defined in above.

2) Diagnostic tests and vaccines

It is recommended that specified diagnostic tests and vaccines in *Terrestrial Code* chapters be used with a reference to the relevant section in the WOAHA *Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals* (hereafter referred to as the *Terrestrial Manual*). Experts responsible for facilities used for disease diagnosis and vaccine production should be fully conversant with the standards in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

3) Freedom from a disease, infection or infestation

Article 1.4.6. provides general principles for declaring a country or zone free from a disease, infection or infestation. This article applies when there are no and may be complemented by specific requirements in the listed disease-specific chapters.

4) Prevention and control

Chapters 4.4. and 4.5. describe the measures that should be implemented to establish zones and compartments. Zoning and compartmentalisation should be considered as some of the are important tools to prevent and used to control diseases and to facilitate safe trade.

Chapters 4.6. to 4.12. describe the measures which should be implemented during collection and processing of semen and embryos of animals, including micromanipulation and cloning, in order to prevent animal health

risks, especially when trading these commodities. Although the measures relate principally to WOA listed diseases or infections, general standards apply to all infectious disease risks. Moreover, in Chapter 4.8. diseases that are not listed are marked as such but are included for the information of Member Countries.

Chapter 4.15. addresses the specific issue of the prevention and control of bee diseases and some of its trade implications. This chapter should be read in conjunction with the specific bee disease chapters in Section 9.

Chapter 6.5. is designed for the implementation of general biosecurity measures in intensive poultry production. Chapters 6.6., 6.13. and 6.14. provide recommendations for some specific on farm prevention and control plans for the unlisted foodborne pathogenic agent *Salmonella* in poultry, bovine and pig production systems as part of the Veterinary Services mission to prevent, eliminate or control food safety hazards in animal production.

Chapter 6.12. deals specifically with the zoonotic risk associated with the movements of non-human primates and gives standards for certification, transportation and import conditions for these animals.

5) Trade requirements

Animal health Sanitary measures related to international trade should be based on WOA standards. A Member Country may authorise the importation of animals or animal products into its territory under conditions different from those recommended by the *Terrestrial Code*. To scientifically justify more stringent measures, the importing country should conduct a risk analysis in accordance with WOA standards, as described in Chapter 2.1. Members of the WTO should refer to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
C_2	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: To scientifically justify more stringent measures, the importing country should conduct a risk analysis in accordance with WOA standards, as described in Chapter 2.1. Members of the WTO should refer to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) <u>and relevant SPS Committee guidelines</u>. Rationale: This document should also make reference to the SPS Committee guidelines in addition to the SPS Agreement. Guidelines on “appropriate level of protection” or ALOP can be found in WTO document G/SPS/15. It serves as a reference for WTO Members to defines the ALOP for when setting their own standards that would differ from International Standard Setting Bodies (ISSBs) or other WTO Members standards. The proposed addition does not refer to document G/SPS/15 directly in order to leave the door open for potentially new Committee guidelines on ALOP in the future.	Did not agree at this stage as this is related to the current works of revision of chapters in Section 5. This will be considered after the relevant works will be finished.

Chapters 5.1. to 5.3. describe the general obligations and ethical responsibilities of importing and exporting countries in international trade. Veterinary Authorities and all veterinarians directly involved in international trade should be familiar with these chapters. Chapter 5.3. also describes the WOA informal procedure for dispute mediation.

WOAH aims to include an article listing the commodities that are considered safe for trade without the need for risk mitigation measures specifically directed against a particular listed disease, infection or infestation, regardless of the status of the country or zone of origin for the agent in question, at the beginning of each listed disease-specific chapter in Sections 8 to 16. This is work in progress and some chapters do not yet contain articles listing safe commodities. When a list of safe commodities is present in a chapter, importing countries should not apply trade restrictions to such commodities with respect to the agent in question. Chapter 2.2. describes the criteria for inclusion of a used to assess the safety of commodities in the list of

safe commodities of a disease-specific chapter.

6) International veterinary certificates

An international veterinary certificate is an official document that the Veterinary Authority of an exporting country issues in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. It lists animal health requirements and, where appropriate, public health requirements for the exported commodity. The quality of the exporting country's Veterinary Services is essential in providing assurances to trading partners regarding the safety of exported animals and products. This includes the Veterinary Authority's ethical approach to the provision of veterinary certificates and their history in meeting their notification obligations.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
C_3	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): An ~~international veterinary certificate~~ <i>international veterinary certificate</i> is an official document that the Veterinary Authority of an exporting country issues in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. It lists animal health requirements and, where appropriate, public health requirements for the exported commodity. The quality of the exporting country's Veterinary Services is essential in providing assurances to trading partners regarding the safety of exported animals and products. This includes the Veterinary Authority's ethical approach to the provision of veterinary certificates and their history in meeting their notification obligations. Rationale: The words "international veterinary certificate" is in the Glossary, hence the term has been italicized, as well as any other use of that phrase in this Chapter.	Agreed, comment addressed above (A_1)

International veterinary certificates underpin international trade and provide assurances to the importing country regarding the health status of the animals and products imported. The measures prescribed should take into account the animal health status of both exporting and importing countries, and zones, herds/flocks or compartments within them, and be based upon the standards in the *Terrestrial Code*.

The following steps should be taken when drafting international veterinary certificates:

- identify the diseases, infections or infestations from which the importing country is justified in seeking protection because of its own health status. Importing countries should not impose measures in regards to diseases that occur in their own territory but are not subject to official control programmes;
- for commodities capable of transmitting these diseases, infections or infestations through international trade, the importing country should apply the relevant articles in the listed disease-specific chapters. The application of the articles should be adapted to the disease-animal health status of the country, zone, or compartment or herd/flock of origin. Such status should be established according to Article 1.4.6. except when articles of the relevant listed disease chapter specify otherwise;
- when preparing international veterinary certificates, the importing country should endeavour to use terms and expressions in accordance with the definitions given in the Glossary. International veterinary certificates should be kept as simple as possible and should be clearly worded, to avoid misunderstanding of the importing country's requirements;
- Chapters 5.10. to 5.13. provide, as further guidance to Member Countries, model certificates that should be used as a baseline.

7) Guidance notes for importers and exporters

It is recommended that Veterinary Authorities prepare “guidance notes” to assist importers and exporters understand trade requirements. These notes should identify and explain the trade conditions, including the measures to be applied before and after export and during transport and unloading, and the relevant legal obligations and operational procedures. The guidance notes should advise on all details to be included in the health certification accompanying the consignment to its destination. Exporters should also be reminded of the International Air Transport Association rules governing air transport of animals and animal products.

[...]

NOT FOR COMMENT

D. Name of animal species

In the *Terrestrial Code*, common terms (in bold in the table below) referring to animals are based on scientific names as shown below. In each chapter of the *Terrestrial Code*, scientific names of the animals are provided when the vernacular names used in the chapter do not include all the species as described in the table below, e.g. 'bovines (*Bos indicus*, *B. taurus*, *B. grunniens*, *Bubalus bubalis* and *Syncerus caffer*)', which in that example does not include animals of genus bison, or when the list of animals is long, e.g. 'animals of the families *Suidae* and *Cervidae*, the subfamilies *bovinae*, *caprinae* and *antilopinae* of the family *Bovidae*, and *Camelus bactrianus*'.

Higher level terms	Terms based on Order or Sub-order	Terms based on Family	Terms based on Sub-Family	Terms based on Tribe	Terms based on Genus
Class 'Insecta'	=	Family 'Apidae'	Sub-Family 'Apinae' <u>'bees' means animals of Sub-Family 'Apinae'</u>	Including animals of Tribe: • 'Apini'	Including animals of Genus: • 'Apis' <u>'honey bees' means animals of Genus Apis.</u>
				Including animals of Tribe: • 'Bombini'	Including animals of Genus: • 'Bombus' <u>'bumble bees' means animals of Genus Bombus.</u>
				Including animals of Tribe: • 'Meliponini' <u>'stingless bees' means animals for Tribe 'Meliponini'</u>	=
Class 'Aves' <u>'avian' means animals of class Aves</u>	Order 'Galliformes'	=	=	=	Including animals of Genus: • 'Gallus' • 'Meleagris' etc. <u>'chicken' means <i>Gallus gallus domesticus</i>.</u> <u>'turkey' means <i>Meleagris gallopavo</i>.</u>
	Order 'Anseriformes'	=	=	=	Including animals of Genus: • 'Anser' • 'Branta' • 'Anas' etc. <u>'geese' means animals of Genera Anser and Branta.</u> <u>'ducks' means <i>Anas platyrhynchos</i>.</u>

					<u>('domestic ducks' means <i>Anas platyrhynchos domesticus</i>.)</u>
<u>'mammals'</u> means animals of Class 'Mammalia' <u>'ungulates'</u> means animals of Order 'Artiodactyla' (even-toed ungulates) and Order 'Perissodactyla' (odd-toed ungulates) <u>'artiodactyls'</u> means animals of Order 'Artiodactyla' (even-toed ungulates)	<u>'ruminants'</u> means animals of Sub-order 'Ruminantia'	<u>'bovids'</u> means animals of Family 'Bovidae'	<u>'bovines' means</u> animals of Sub- Family 'Bovinae'	=	<u>Including animals of Genus:</u> • 'Bos' • 'Bubalus' • 'Bison' • 'Syncerus' etc.
			<u>'caprines' means</u> animals of Sub- Family 'Caprinae'	=	<u>Including animals of Genus:</u> • 'Ovis' • 'Capra', etc. <u>'sheep' means <i>Ovis aries</i>.</u> <u>'goats' means <i>Capra hircus</i> (domestic goats) and <i>Capra aegagrus</i> (wild goats).</u>
			Sub-Family 'Antilopinae'	=	<u>Including animals of Genus:</u> • 'Gazella' • 'Antilope' • 'Dibatag', etc.
			Sub-Family 'Cervinae'	=	<u>Including animals of Genus:</u> • 'Cervus' • 'Dama', etc.
		<u>'cervids'</u> means animals of Family 'Cervidae'	Sub-Family 'Capreolinae'	=	<u>Including animals of Genus:</u> • 'Capreolus' • 'Odocoileus' • 'Rangifer', etc.
	Sub-Order 'Suina'		=	=	<u>Including animals of Genus:</u> • 'Sus' • 'Phacochoerus' • 'Hylochoerus', etc. <u>'pigs' means <i>Sus scrofa</i> (domestic and wild).</u>
	Sub-Order 'Tylopoda'	<u>'camelids'</u> means animals of Family 'Camelidae'	Sub-Family 'Camelinae'	=	<u>Including animals of Genus:</u> • 'Camelus' • 'Lama' • 'Vicugna' <u>'dromedary camels' means <i>Camelus dromedarius</i>.</u> <u>'bactrian camels' means <i>Camelus bactrianus</i>.</u> <u>'alpacos' means <i>Lama guanicoe pacos</i>.</u> <u>'llamas' means <i>Lama guanicoe glama</i>.</u>

					<u>'New World camelids'</u> means animals of Genus alpacas and Lamas (including 'llamas', 'guanacos' and 'alpacas') and Vicugna.
<u>Sub-Order 'Hippomorpha'</u>	<u>'equids'</u> means animals of Family 'Equidae'	<u>'equines'</u> means animals of Sub-Family 'Equinae'	=		Including animals of only Genus 'Equus' <u>'horses'</u> means <i>Equus ferus caballus</i> . <u>'donkeys'</u> means <i>Equus africanus asinus</i> . <u>'mules'</u> means <i>Equus africanus asinus</i> (male) × <i>Equus ferus caballus</i> (female). <u>'hinnies'</u> means <i>Equus ferus caballus</i> (male) × <i>Equus africanus asinus</i> (female). <u>'zebras'</u> means animals of subgenus Hippotigris.
<u>'lagomorphs'</u> means animals of Order 'Lagomorpha'	<u>'leporids'</u> means animals of Family 'Leporidae'	=	=		Including animals of Genus: • 'Oryctolagus' • 'Lepus' • 'Sylvilagus' <u>'rabbits'</u> means animals of Genus Oryctolagus'. <u>'hares'</u> means animals of Genus Lepus. <u>'European hares'</u> means <i>Lepus europaeus</i> .
<u>'carnivores'</u> means animals of Order 'Carnivora'	<u>'canids'</u> means animals of Family 'Canidae'	Sub-Family 'Caninae'	=		Including animals of Genus: • 'Canis' <u>'dogs'</u> means <i>Canis lupus familiaris</i> .
	<u>'felids'</u> means animals of Family 'Felidae'	=	=		Including animals of Genus: • 'Felis' <u>'cats'</u> means <i>Felis catus</i> .
	Family 'Mustelidae'				Including animals of Genus: • 'Mustela' <u>'ferrets'</u> means <i>Mustela furo</i> .
<u>'rodents'</u> means animals of Family Order 'Rodentia'	=	=	=		=
<u>'bats'</u> means of animals of Order 'Chiroptera'	=	=	=		=

	<u>'non-human primates' means animals of Order 'Primates' except for humans (Genus 'Homo')</u>	=	=	=	=

In each chapter of the *Terrestrial Code*, scientific names of the animals are provided when the vernacular names used in the chapter do not include all the species as described in this table, e.g. 'bovines (*Bos indicus*, *B. taurus*, *B. grunniens*, *Bubalus bubalis* and *Syncerus caffer*)', which in that example does not include animals of genus bison, or when the list of animals is very long, e.g. 'animals of the families *Suidae* and *Cervidae*, the subfamilies *bovinae*, *caprinae* and *antilopinae* of the family *Bovidae*, and *Camelus bactrianus*'.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
1.6._1	Categoría: General. Texto modificado propuesto No aplica. Justificación: Miembro respalda los cambios propuestos al capítulo, los que resultan necesarios. Además, Miembro respalda la incorporación de las disposiciones específicas, incluidas como artículo 1.6.4. Evidencia documentada: No corresponde.	Noted
1.6._2	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member in general supports this draft revised chapter provided specific comments below are taken into consideration.	Noted

CHAPTER 1.6.

PROCEDURES FOR OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF ANIMAL HEALTH STATUS, ENDORSEMENT OF AN OFFICIAL CONTROL PROGRAMME, AND PUBLICATION OF A SELF-DECLARATION OF ANIMAL HEALTH STATUS, BY WOAHP

Article 1.6.1.

Application for official recognition of animal health status and endorsement of an official control programme by WOAHP

A Member Country may request:

- 1) official recognition of *animal health status* by WOAHP of:
 - a) freedom of a country or *zone* from African horse sickness (AHS);
 - b) risk status of a country or *zone* with regard to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE);
 - c) freedom of a country or *zone* from classical swine fever (CSF);
 - d) freedom of a country or *zone* from contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP);
 - e) freedom of a country or *zone* from foot and mouth disease (FMD), where *vaccination* is either practised or not practised;
 - f) freedom of a country or *zone* from peste des petits ruminants (PPR);

- 2) endorsement by WOA of:
- a) an *official control programme* for CBPP;
 - b) an *official control programme* for FMD;
 - c) an *official control programme* for PPR;
 - d) an *official control programme* for dog-mediated rabies.

WOAH does not grant official recognition of *animal health status* or endorsement of an *official control programme* for diseases other than those listed under points 1 and 2 above.

The Member Country should present documentation setting out the compliance of their *Veterinary Services* with the provisions of Chapters 1.1., 1.4., 3.2., 3.3. and 4.4. of the *Terrestrial Code*, when relevant, and with the provisions of the relevant disease-specific chapters in the *Terrestrial Code* and the *Terrestrial Manual*.

When requesting official recognition of *animal health status* or endorsement by WOA of an *official control programme*, the Member Country should follow the Standard Operating Procedures (available on the WOA website) and submit to WOA a dossier providing the information requested in the following chapters (as appropriate): 1.7. (for AHS), 1.8. (for BSE), 1.9. (for CSF), 1.10. (for CBPP), 1.11. (for FMD) or 1.12. (for PPR).

The WOA framework for the official recognition of *animal health status*, the endorsement of *official control programmes*, and their maintenance is described in relevant Resolutions adopted by the World Assembly of WOA Delegates.

The country or the *zone* will be included in the relevant lists of official *animal health status* or endorsed *official control programmes* only after the evidence submitted has been adopted by the World Assembly of WOA Delegates.

When a Member Country requests official recognition of *animal health status* for a *zone*, the geographical boundaries of the proposed *zone* should be clearly defined. When applying for recognition of a free *zone* that is adjacent to another *zone* of the same status, it should be stated whether the new *zone* is being merged or kept separate. If the proposed *zone* remains separate, details should be provided of the control of the movement of relevant *commodities* between the *zones* in accordance with Chapter 4.4.

The overall objective of the WOA endorsed *official control programmes* is for Member Countries to progressively improve their animal health situation and eventually attain official recognition of *animal health status* or in the case of dog-mediated rabies to make a self-declaration as a free country or *zone*. The *official control programme* should be applicable to the entire country even if certain measures are directed towards defined *zones*.

Article 1.6.2.

Maintenance of official recognition of animal health status and endorsement of an official control programme by WOA

Retention on the lists of countries and *zones* having an official *animal health status* or of countries having an endorsed *official control programme* requires that the information in relevant chapters be re-submitted annually and that changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events be notified to WOA in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
1.6.2._1	Category: (deletion) Proposed amended text:	Did not agree, as annual reconfirmation requires more than notification of events or changes in

	“Retention on the lists of countries and zones having an official animal health status or of countries having an endorsed official control programme requires that <u>the information in relevant chapters be re-submitted annually and that</u> changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events be notified to WOAHA in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1.” Rationale: This modification aligns with the Member's previous requests to simplify the reconfirmation process for official statuses. This annual resubmission can place a considerable administrative burden on Member Countries, especially given that the end result of disease management measures lead transparency in the animal health situation, which is already covered under the notification requirements of Chapter 1.1. By fulfilling these requirements, Member Countries provide the necessary assurances to promptly inform all parties of any changes in animal health status. As a result, adding further documentation requirements beyond the requirements of Chapter 1.1. may not be strictly necessary. Follow-up changes in the respective disease-specific chapters should be made accordingly.	situation, rather this is also required in other corresponding chapter texts in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>, notably in Article 1.4.6.

Non-compliance with the requirements for the maintenance of *animal health status* results in the suspension of that status. Within 24 months of suspension, except otherwise stated in the disease-specific chapter, a Member Country may apply for the recovery of a previously recognised status, following the provisions of the relevant disease-specific chapter. When the status has not been recovered within the specified period of its suspension, it is withdrawn and the Member Country should reapply following the procedure for the application for official recognition of *animal health status*.

WOAH may withdraw the endorsement of an *official control programme* if there is evidence of:

- non-compliance with the timelines or performance indicators of the programme; or
- significant problems with the quality of the *Veterinary Services* as described in Section 3 of the *Terrestrial Code*; or
- an increase in the *incidence* or distribution of the disease that cannot be addressed by the programme.

Article 1.6.3.

Publication by WOAHA of a self-declaration of animal health status by a Member Country

A Member Country may make a self-declaration of freedom of a country, *zone* or *compartment* from a WOAHA *listed disease* or another animal disease, *infection* or *infestation*. The Member Country may inform WOAHA of the claimed status and request publication by WOAHA of the self-declaration to inform WOAHA Member Countries.

A Member Country requesting the publication of a self-declaration should follow the Standard Operating Procedure (available on the WOAHA website) for submission of a self-declaration of *animal health status* and provide documented information on its compliance with the relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including:

- evidence that the *infection* or *infestation* is a *notifiable disease* in the entire country;
- history of absence or eradication of the *infection* or *infestation* in the country, *zone* or *compartment*;

- *surveillance* including an *early warning system* for all relevant species in the country, *zone* or *compartment*;
- measures implemented to maintain freedom in the country, *zone* or *compartment*.

The self-declaration may be published only after all the information provided has been received and administrative and technical screening has been performed by WOA. Publication does not imply endorsement of the claim of freedom by WOA and does not reflect the official opinion of WOA. Responsibility for the accuracy of the information contained in a self-declaration lies entirely with the WOA Delegate of the Member Country concerned.

Except when otherwise provided for in the *listed disease*-specific chapter, an *outbreak* in a Member Country, a *zone* or a *compartment* having a self-declared free status results in the loss of the self-declared free status. A Member Country wishing to reclaim a lost free status should submit a new self-declaration following the procedure described in this article.

WOAH does not publish self-declarations for *listed diseases* in point 1 of Article 1.6.1.

Article 1.6.4.

Specific provisions

The *animal health status* of a country or zone is not affected by:

- the presence of the disease, infection, or infestation in imported animals in a quarantine centre:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
1.6.4._1	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): <u>Specific provisions</u> <u>The <i>animal health status</i> of a country or zone is not affected by:</u> – <u>the presence of the disease, infection, or infestation in imported animals in a <i>quarantine centre</i>:</u> Rationale: Italicized 'quarantine centre' to align with formatting of a glossary term.	Noted
1.6.4._2	Category: Addition Proposed: <u>The <i>animal health status</i> of a country or zone is not affected by:</u> – <u>the presence of the disease, infection, or infestation in imported animals in an <i>approved</i> quarantine centre:</u> Rationale: The quarantine centre should be officially approved and registered with the Veterinary Authority to ensure appropriate regulatory oversight and the presence of biosecurity and biosafety procedures for the laboratory that safeguard the animal health status of the country outside of the approved facility.	Did not agree, as no need for that word: the currently revised Glossary definition for 'quarantine centre' provides that it is under the control of the Veterinary Authority.

- the importation or the presence of the *pathogenic agent*, or of *commodities* or organisms carrying the *pathogenic agent*, in a *laboratory* or other *approved facilities* with appropriate laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity in accordance with the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
1.6.4._3	Category: addition Proposed amended text: – <u>the importation or the presence of the <i>pathogenic agent</i>, or of <i>commodities</i> or organisms carrying the <i>pathogenic agent</i>, in a <i>laboratory</i> or other <i>approved facilities</i> with appropriate laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity in accordance with the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i>.</u> – <u>the presence of the <i>pathogenic agent</i>, or of <i>commodities</i> or organisms carrying the <i>pathogenic agent</i>, at a border inspection post</u> Rationale: There may be the case where a pathogenic agent of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements, or a commodity or organism carrying such pathogenic agent is detected by import quarantine at border inspection posts. Provided that appropriate actions are taken following the detection of the pathogenic agent, such detection should not affect the animal health status of the importing country. Without the clarification in this regard, for example, if a small hive beetle (<i>Aethina tumida</i>) is detected in honey at a border inspection post of an importing country, free status of the country may be affected by the presence of the beetle in accordance with Chapter 9.4.	Agreed but the text was amended differently. Refer to item 6.3. of the report for more explanation on this point.
1.6.4._4	Category: Addition Proposed: <u>or the presence of the <i>pathogenic agent</i>, or of <i>commodities</i> or organisms carrying the <i>pathogenic agent</i>, <i>contained</i> in a <i>laboratory</i> or other <i>approved facility meeting the conditions of Chapter 5.8 and with laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity in accordance with the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i> in place.</i></u> <u>The importation of the pathogen <i>should be consistent with the requirements in Chapter 5.8.</i></u> Rationale: The intent of this clause is for WOA Member's to have confidence in the preservation of a country's animal health status for pathogens exotic to a country or a under a disease control programme, while providing for contained diagnostic testing or experimentation. WHO Biosafety levels 2–4 are necessary to ensure an appropriate level of containment is in place to prevent exposure to the country's animal population. The requirement for containment in a laboratory and for BSLs	Did not agree, as the relevance to the recommendations described in the other chapters in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> and <i>Manual</i> are adequately covered by the last sentence in this article.

	is also consistent with the requirements in the Code Chapter 5.8. 'Approved facilities' is not necessary in the text. Research facilities holding exotic organisms are included in the WHO BSLs and should be required to be approved as a laboratory and to an appropriate BSL level. In addition, the wording unnecessarily risks increasing the types of premises that could hold exotic agents and the risk of a containment breach.	

This should be supported by evidence of compliance with all relevant standards of the *Terrestrial Code* and *Terrestrial Manual*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X._1	Comment Category: General A Member would like to thank the Code Commission for their work on this chapter. The same Member is concerned with the number of comments we have received on the chapter, that it may not be ready for adoption in May 2025 and that consideration should be given to delaying the chapter and sending out for an additional round of comments.	Noted. Agreed, since the number of changes is important, to defer the adoption to the next General Session and send the current draft for comments again.
4.X._2	Category: General Comment A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted
4.X._3	Category: General Comment We do not support the progression of this chapter. The chapter is ambitious in its attempt to provide recommendations for biosecurity that covers both domestic premises (such as farms or other premises with animals) and international trade. However, by the standard attempting to be so broad, it introduces statements that can be interpreted to run counter to international trade principles. We reiterate our suggestion for the Code Commission to cease work on this chapter and instead redirect the work into a separate guidance document that could be more usefully expanded. Examples include the Guidelines for Aquatic Animal Health Surveillance or the General Guidelines for Surveillance of Diseases, Pathogens and Toxic Agents in Free-ranging Wildlife. Alternatively, the chapter should be renamed "Domestic biosecurity" and significantly re-written to constrain its scope to in-country biosecurity.	Did not agree, refer to item 6.4 of the report.
4.X._4	Category: General Comment The Members commend the Code Commission for its work in aligning the Annex 7 to use terms that reflect current usage in scientific literature.	Noted
4.X._5	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Members support this revised chapter provided the comments below are considered.	Noted

SECTION 4.

DISEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL

CHAPTER 4.X.

BIOSECURITY

Article 4.X.1.

Introduction

Biosecurity is the cornerstone of health programmes and as such should be implemented to prevent and control diseases in *populations*. In addition to reducing the risk of disease, the benefits of *biosecurity* include a reduced need for *veterinary medicinal products*; reduced *killing* of *animals* for disease control purposes; reduced economic losses; protection of livelihoods; assurance of sustainability of animal production; improved food security and food safety; promotion of animal, human and environmental health, and assurance of safe trade and business continuity.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.1._1	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: <i>Biosecurity</i> is the cornerstone of animal health programmes Rationale For clarity purposes	Agreed.
4.X.1._2	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: In addition to reducing the risk of disease, the benefits of <i>biosecurity</i> include a reduced need for <i>veterinary medicinal products</i>; reduced <i>killing</i> of <i>animals</i> for disease control purposes; reduced economic losses; protection of livelihoods; ~~assurance of sustainability of animal production improved~~ animal production; improved food security and food safety; promotion of animal, human and environmental health, and assurance of safe trade and business continuity. Rationale: Term sustainability is largely associated to food security, economic and environmental stewardship. It is too broad to be used in the context that biosecurity would provide assurances of sustainability.	Agreed.
4.X.1._3	Category: Editorial Proposed <i>Biosecurity</i> is the cornerstone of health programmes and as such should be implemented to prevent and control diseases <u>in</u> <u>populations</u>. In addition to reducing the risk of disease, the benefits of <i>biosecurity</i> include a reduced ~~need for use of~~ <i>veterinary medicinal products</i>; reduced <i>killing</i> of <i>animals</i> for disease control purposes; reduced economic losses; protection of livelihoods; ~~assurance of~~ ensuring sustainability of animal production; improved food security and food safety; promotion of animal, human and environmental health, and ~~assurance of~~ enabling safe trade and business continuity. Rationale:	Agree with the first proposal Did not agree with the second and third proposals as it is a list of nouns and not verbs

	Clarity and to re-enforce the role of international standards in the Code to enable safe trade.	
4.X.1._4	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): <i>Biosecurity</i> is the cornerstone of animal health programmes and as such should be implemented to prevent and control diseases <u>in animal populations</u>. In addition to reducing the risk of disease, the benefits of <i>biosecurity</i> include a reduced need for <i>veterinary medicinal products</i>; reduced <i>killing of animals</i> for disease control purposes; reduced economic losses; protection of livelihoods; assurance of sustainability of animal production; improved food security and food safety; promotion of animal, human and environmental health, and assurance of safe trade and business continuity. Rationale: For clarity, add “animal” to read “animal Health” and “ “animal populations”	Agreed with first proposal, comment addressed above. Did not agree with the second proposal, as already included in Glossary definition for ‘population’.

Article 4.X.2.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles and recommendations to allow for a consistent approach that could be applied to implement *biosecurity* for a *population* or *subpopulation* irrespective of the settings or scale, such as at country, *zone*, *compartment*, *herd/flock*, farm or non-production establishment level.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.2._1	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): <u>This chapter provides general principles and recommendations to allow for a consistent approach that could be applied to implement <i>biosecurity</i> for a <i>population</i> or <i>subpopulation</i> of animals irrespective of the settings or scale, such as at country, <i>zone</i>, <i>compartment</i>, <i>herd/flock</i>, farm or non-production establishment level.</u> Rationale: For clarity.	Did not agree, as it is implied in glossary definitions for population and subpopulation.
4.X.2._2	Category: (change) Proposed amended text: Invert the order of “country, zone, compartment, herd/flock, farm or non-production establishment level” Rationale: The content of the chapter in its current form mainly focuses on animal groups/herd level and that it might therefore be more correct to reverse the enumeration in the article, i.e. to start with establishment and end with country level.	Agreed.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to the *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant actors, as described in Article 4.X.4., on the principles, implementation and evaluation of *biosecurity* to support disease prevention and

control programmes. The chapter applies to *animals*, their gatherings and husbandry systems, to all components of animal keeping and to the interface between domesticated *animals*, humans and *wildlife*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.2._3	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: The chapter applies to <u>terrestrial animals, their gatherings and husbandry systems, to all components of animal productionkeeping and to the interface between domesticated animals, humans, the environment and wildlife.</u> Rationale: first addition - for clarity purpose - unless this applies to the aquatic animal health code as well.; 2nd addition, As WOAHA is part of the Quadripartite, then environment is one of the four pillars of One Health and should be included explicitly to support the One Health goal and trans-disciplinarity of biosecurity.	Did not agree with the first proposal, refer to item 6.4 of the report. Agree with the second proposal.
4.X.2._4	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> and other relevant actors, as described in Article 4.X.45., on the principles, implementation and evaluation of <i>biosecurity</i> to support disease prevention and control programmes. <u>The chapter applies to animals, their gatherings and husbandry systems, to all components of animal productionkeeping, transport, harvest and to the interface between domesticated animals, humans and wildlife.</u> = Rationale: Transportation and slaughter are often points where biosecurity lapses may occur. It will be important to specifically identify these situations instead of assuming they are covered in the other descriptors.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

More specifically, this chapter aims to:

- describe the general guiding principles of *biosecurity*;
- identify the roles and responsibilities of the different actors in *biosecurity*;
- describe the potential sources and pathways for entry of pathogenic agents into a *population* and the exposure of *animals* and factors for the transmission of pathogenic agents;
- describe the components of *biosecurity*;
- provide guidance on the design, application, monitoring, evaluation and training with regards to *biosecurity* and *biosecurity plans*.

The chapter does not apply to laboratories, whose approaches to biosecurity are addressed in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.2._5	Category: Delete	Agreed with the rationale, however

	Proposed text: The chapter does not apply to laboratories, whose approaches to laboratory biosecurity are addressed in the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i> and Chapter 5.8 of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>. Rationale: As applicable, in addition to the requirements in the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i>, laboratories should be required to meet the requirements in Chapter 5.8. and the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i>.	the text was amended differently.

4.X.Y._1	Comment Category: Recommendation Recommendation: A Member feels that if these definitions are removed, they should be added to the general glossary of the Code or remain specific to this chapter. Rationale: A lack of clear definitions is problematic in many cases. As biosecurity is a foundational instrument for all diseases, the definition of common terms is important for international understanding of guidelines.	Did not agree, comment was addressed previously in the March 2024 Biosecurity <i>ad hoc</i> Group Report.

Article 4.X.3.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._1	Category: General Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): These “General Guiding Principles” are written more as considerations. Rationale: Principles lay out the essential cornerstones of an issue, in this case, biosecurity. These sentences are not wrong, they just do not read as principles.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

General guiding principles

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._2	Comment Category: addition Proposed Amendment <u>General Guiding general principles and issues</u> Rationale Some of the items on the list are not principles. For example, “Socio-economic impacts of biosecurity” or “Impacts on other populations and the environment.” are issues, not principles. They could also be labeled consequences.	Agreed, comment addressed in 4.3.X-1.

4.X.3._3	Category: Addition Proposed <u>When considering international movement of animals and animal commodities, biosecurity sanitary measures should only be applied to the extent necessary to manage disease risk, as outlined in Chapter 5.3.</u> Rationale: If international trade is not excluded from this chapter, then there needs to be a guiding principle of applying measures only to the extent necessary to manage the risk. Without that this, the chapter may encourage countries to adopt an approach to biosecurity that creates trade-barriers.	Did not agree, refer to item 6.4 of the report.

To achieve the objective of *biosecurity*, the following should be considered:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._4	Comment Category: addition Proposed Amendment ~~Biosecurity aims to reduce the risk of introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents break the cycle of infection by intervening at their source, during their transmission, or at the susceptible hosts.~~ To achieve the objectives of <i>biosecurity</i> this, the following principles should be considered <u>when designing biosecurity plans that are context and site specific</u>: Rationale Different organizations, producers, industries etc. may have different biosecurity objectives within and among them. Not all will wish to achieve the same degree of disease mitigation - for example producers operating a beef feedlot may accept a higher level of risk when bringing in animals from different sources while an artificial insemination center will have a lower risk tolerance. Second change: Context applies to the health status for region or country and pathogen(s) of concern; all biosecurity plans must be site specific. Standards and guidelines can be broader to a management or country context.	Agreed with first proposal. Did not agree, with second proposal comment was addressed previously in 4.X.3._1
4.X.3._5	Category: Addition/change. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): To achieve <u>the objective of biosecurity</u> this, the following <u>principles</u> should be considered: Rationale: We recommend retaining the term 'principles,' as its omission would result in an awkward phrasing Supporting evidence: not relevant.	Did not agree, comment addressed in 4.3.X_1.

- 1) The *population* for which *biosecurity* is to be implemented, including context and size, and ~~its~~ *animal health status*.)

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._6	Comment Category: addition Proposed Amendment <u>The <i>population</i> for which <i>biosecurity</i> is to be implemented, including <i>context and size</i>, and <i>it's the current animal health status of the region or country</i>.</u> Rationale 1st change - For clarity purposes; Context should come into the overall design of the biosecurity plan. It is not directly linked to a site-specific population under the protection of the broader health status with evidence provided by surveillance. 2nd addition - for clarity purposes, health status is not generally assigned to a herd or flock level unless ones is speaking of herd level freedom. That is a different metric which can be supported by biosecurity plans for compartments which are free of a hazard despite the surroundings not having that high a status.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

- 2) The identification of the *hazards* and from where and how the pathogenic agents may be introduced, established and spread in the *population*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._7	Comment Category: addition Proposed Amendment ~~<i>Risk assessments</i> applied to <i>biosecurity</i> should identify the <i>hazards</i> and how and where these pathogenic agents~~ <u>The identification of the <i>hazards of concern</i> and <i>transmission pathways</i> from where and how and where the pathogenic agents are may be introduced, established and spread and established in the <i>population</i>.</u> Rationale 1st Change: Biosecurity plans are general to keep animals within a herd or flock healthy, however if we are seeking to keep out specific viral, bacterial or arthropod hazards, then they should be identified explicitly. Biosecurity cannot keep out all biological hazards unless the animals are being raised in a sterile environment; which would not be commercially viable for most enterprises. 2nd change: This terminology is well understood by the readers of this document and addresses the context of the text following this.	Agree with first proposal Did not agree, with second proposal, addressed by 4.x.3_10 and 4.X.3_11.
4.X.3._8	Category: Addition Proposed <u>The identification of the <i>hazards/risk organisms</i> and from where and how and where pathogenic agents are may be introduced, established and spread and established in the <i>population</i>. <i>Recognising that in international commodity trade the application of measures to manage risks should be in consistent with Chapter 5.3 and, as applicable, follow a risk analysis process consistent with the requirements of Chapter 2.1.</i></u> Rationale:	Did not agree, as this is out of the scope of the chapter.

	An identified hazard is not necessarily a risk. Risk is likelihood and consequence. The guiding principle must be the application of measures to manage assessed risks, not identified hazards.	
4.X.3._9	Category: Change. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): The identification of the <i>hazards</i> and <u>potential sources and pathways from which from where and how and where the pathogenic agents are may be introduced, established and spread and established in the population.</u> Rationale: More precise wording. Supporting evidence: not relevant.	Did not agree, addressed below in comments 4.x.3._10 and 4.X.3._11.
4.X.3._10	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): The identification of the <i>hazards</i> and <u>from where and how and where the pathogenic agents are may be introduced, established pathways for introduction, establishment, and spread and established in the population.</u> Rationale: For clarity. Suggest editing to read: "The identification of hazards and pathways for introduction, establishment and spread in the population."	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.
4.X.3._11	Category: (change) Proposed amended text: "The identification of the <u>hazards pathogenic agents</u> and from where and how the pathogenic agents may be introduced, established and spread in <u>or spread from</u> the population" Rationale: Given that pathogenic agents is being defined, it would appear to be a more specific term within the scope of the Code. Also risk of spread from the population should be considered.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

- 3) The factors and frequency of events that influence the introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents.
- 4) Scientific evidence and proportionality to the *risk*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._12	Comment Category: Edits Proposed Amendment ~~Biosecurity should be based on~~ Scientific evidence <u>on and proportionality</u> the risk <u>of introduction of the hazard of concern into the population.</u> Rationale	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

	1st addition – clarity purposes; 2nd addition – clarity purposes – a hazard which is not present in the region or country of origin of the animals, is a much different risk level than one which is widely present in the surrounding populations (outside of the flock or herd which is managed by the biosecurity plan). This should be made explicit.	

5) Sustainability, adaptability, monitoring.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._13	Comment Category: edit Proposed Amendment <i>Sustainability, adaptability, and monitoring which includes review and scheduled improvements timeframes (based on the population and the hazard(s) of concern).</i> Rationale Scheduled monitoring, verification and audits of any biosecurity plan is standard quality assurance of all management practices. Continuous improvement is also foundational to all quality assurance programs. All of this should be explicit in any standard. The terms 'sustainability and adaptability' are not defined and therefore cannot be assessed by an auditor. They should either be replaced by standard audit terms or clearly defined in a glossary. Suggestions for definitions: sustainability means the management had committed the financial and human resources needed for the plan to be implemented as written, including those required for monitoring and audits; Adaptability means the plan takes into consideration changing context and will be modified in response when the risk has changed for a hazard of concern.	Did not agree, as this proposal is too detailed for this chapter.

6) Human behaviour to maximise compliance.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._14	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): Training on biosecurity taking into account ~~H~~human attitudes, and beliefs to maximise compliance. Rationale: Training on biosecurity procedures needs to be emphasized in this point and the next. Compliance is impossible to achieve if adequate training is not conducted, and considerations of a range of human traits.	Did not agree, as training is covered further down in the chapter.

7) Evaluation of compliance built into the day-to-day operations.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._15	Comment Category: edit Proposed Amendment	Did not agree, as this proposal is too detailed, and is

	Evaluation of compliance of biosecurity ~~should be built into the day-to-day operations~~ <u>with the plan, as written, is outlined within the standard operating procedure(s) including routine monitoring, verification of the monitoring and periodic audits (including on site).</u> Rationale 1st addition - The SOP must be part of the biosecurity plan and mentioned within the plan standards. The plan or SOP should have detailed timelines for monitoring, verification and formal desk and on-site audits. 2nd comment (deletion) – unnecessary. The timeframe for these activities will vary by the level (monitoring vs audit) and objective (compliance with plan vs plan's effectiveness) of the review.	covered in other articles.

8) Socio-economic impacts of *biosecurity*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._16	Comment Category: edit Proposed Amendment Socio-economic impacts of biosecurity <u>implementation versus the introduction of the hazard of concern</u> Rationale 1st addition - Since biosecurity plans are by definition site specific, and businesses are in charge of the management of their sites, this is not generally needed for commercial enterprises, as a cost benefit analysis is routine in their work. However, outlining the costs of introducing the hazards of concern to themselves and the broader community would be a One Health exercise that could be taken on by the competent authority.	Did not agree, as this proposal is too detailed for this chapter.

9) Impacts on other *populations* and the environment.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._17	Comment Category: edit Proposed Amendment <u>Impacts on other populations including wildlife, and the environment of the plan vs the introduction of the hazard(s) of concern</u> Rationale 1st addition - Biosecurity could interfere with the environment (fencing, water diversion, etc) but so could introduction of diseases or pests by failing to implement a plan (via imported animals). A holistic approach to cost benefit analysis is warranted so that downstream costs of biosecurity plans or lack thereof are not made external to the management implementing the plan or failing to do so.	Did not agree, as this proposal is too detailed for this chapter.

10) A *biosecurity plan* that promotes consistent implementation of *biosecurity*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._18	Comment Category: deletion	Did not agree, as the previous

	Proposed Amendment <u>A biosecurity plan that promotes consistent implementation of biosecurity.</u> Rationale 1st comment - recommend complete deletion Unnecessary if use previous wording on implementation, monitoring and verification of monitoring and periodic audits.	proposed wording was not accepted.

11) Engagement with, training and awareness of, and communication with, all actors involved in *biosecurity*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._19	Comment Category: Change Proposed Amendment The Members propose merging point number 6) and 11) and rephrase the end of the sentence in point 11) 11) <u>Engagement with, training and awareness of, and communication with, all actors involved in biosecurity to influence human behaviour to maximise compliance</u> is essential to successful outcomes. Rationale Adding "<i>to influence human behavior to maximize compliance</i>" highlights the ultimate objective of engagement and training efforts. It shifts the focus from mere action to outcomes.	Did not agree, as this proposal is too detailed for this chapter.

These principles of *biosecurity* apply to any type of activity (intensive, extensive, commercial or non-production); only the measures comprising the *biosecurity* should be adapted to the situation.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.3._20	Comment Category: edit Proposed Amendment <u>These principles of biosecurity apply to any type of activity (intensive, extensive, commercial or non-production); only the details of measures comprising the biosecurity should be adapted to the situation</u> Rationale 1st addition - General measures of biosecurity apply to all production types, and all species. Example - C&D of equipment before and after use and tracking of all movement onto and off of the premises apply to even hobby farms with a biosecurity plan. The details of that C&D vary, as does whether only pre-authorized visits are allowed.	Did not agree, no clarity added.

4.X.3._21	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: These principles of <i>biosecurity</i> apply to any type of activity (intensive, extensive, commercial or non-production); only the measures comprising the <i>biosecurity</i> should be adapted to the situation <u>while remaining scientifically justifiable</u>. Rationale: The Member agrees with the last paragraph of Article 4.X.3. that the principles of biosecurity apply to all types of activities and only the measures comprising biosecurity should be subject to adaptation. However, experience has shown that farmer associations, veterinary and para-veterinary associations, and other relevant associations may not always take into account that the biosecurity measures that they consider implementable also have to be scientific justifiable to be included in official standards. The member thus proposes the insertion of '<i>while remaining scientifically justifiable</i>' in order to avoid misunderstandings and emphasize the need for biosecurity measures to remain scientifically justifiable even when the individual measures are adapted to a particular situation. Supporting evidence: not relevant	Did not agree due to no added value.

Article 4.X.4

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.4._1	Comment Category: General comment Comment While the Member is in agreement with the <i>ad hoc</i> Group's position of March 2024, we recommend that the involvement of public - private partnerships be included in Article 4.X.5 Roles and responsibilities. From its 2024 report: "The <i>ad hoc</i> Group, in line with the opinion of the Code Commission, agreed with a comment that biosecurity should be encouraged outside of the powers of Competent Authorities. The <i>ad hoc</i> Group also agreed that producers should be able to establish a biosecurity plan and implement even without it being a requirement by one or more Competent Authorities. The <i>ad hoc</i> Group then considered that the proposed text reflected that, noting that in any case, it should comply with an existing regulatory framework." Rationale; The Member maintains the view that while the veterinary authority can provide the regulatory framework for industry stakeholders to develop biosecurity protocols, the supervision of those protocols should be industry led, unless the biosecurity protocol is included in a negotiated international health certificate. The veterinary authority can review industry biosecurity protocols and make recommendations, but the implementation of those protocols, should be led by industry. The current roles and responsibilities outlined in the draft Article 4.X.5 should be simplified to make it much clearer as to the roles of the individual parties and the use of public – private partnerships. The majority of questions arising from industry had to do with the roles and	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

	responsibilities as outlined in this section as Industry was not clear on what WOAHP was outlining in this article.	

Roles and responsibilities

The roles and responsibilities of different actors in *biosecurity* should be clearly defined and communicated with consideration made to the context (e.g. country, zone, compartment, establishment level), scale and type of operations. Implementation of *biosecurity* requires engagement and collaboration amongst all actors involved.

- 1) **Veterinary Authority** or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should be responsible for the development and oversight of policy on and legislative frameworks for *biosecurity*. These policies should include the relative contribution and roles of *veterinarians* and *veterinary paraprofessionals* in both the private and public sectors, and provide guidance for the implementation of *biosecurity*. For international trade purposes, the *Veterinary Authority* should have an active role in enforcement, oversight, and verification of *biosecurity* and *biosecurity plans*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.4._2	Comment Category: Addition and deletion Proposed Amendment Veterinary Authority, <u>or in collaboration with other relevant Competent Authorities</u>, should be responsible for the development and oversight of policy on and legislative frameworks <u>for biosecurity</u>. These policies should include the relative contribution and roles of <i>veterinarians</i> and <i>veterinary paraprofessionals</i> in both the private and public sectors, <u>and provide guidance for the implementation of biosecurity. They may as well promote, via incentives, the application of on-farm and regional biosecurity.</u> For international trade purposes, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should have an active role in the <u>development, implementation, development, implementation, enforcement</u>, oversight, and verification of <i>biosecurity</i> and <i>biosecurity plans</i>. Rationale: First change: The promotion of biosecurity (going beyond guidance and regulations) should be a function of Veterinary Authorities. It is done in several countries via ads, financial incentives, participations in meetings, etc. This is significant and it should be highlighted as expected leadership from Veterinary Authorities. Second change : This paragraph suggest that biosecurity should be legislated. This raises questions associated to capacity, risks, competitiveness. Suggest amendment above; however, addition of "could be legislated" is acceptable.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.
4.X.4._3	Category: Change. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): Veterinary Authority, <u>or in collaboration with other relevant Competent Authorities</u>, should be responsible for the development and oversight of <u>biosecurity</u> policy <u>on</u> and <u>related</u> legislative frameworks <u>for biosecurity</u>. Rationale: More precise wording.	Agreed, comment addressed above in 4.X.4._2.

	Supporting evidence, if relevant (e.g. scientific references, national and international reports, tangible experiences in this regard attached to this table)	

- 2) **Veterinary Services** should execute and implement policies and legislation on *biosecurity* under the supervision of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.4._4	Category: Change Proposed: The roles and responsibilities of different actors in <i>biosecurity</i> should be clearly defined and communicated with consideration made to the context (e.g. <u>country, zone establishment, compartment or establishment zone, country level</u>), scale of operations, and type of production operations and supply chain. Implementation of <i>biosecurity</i> requires engagement and <u>collaboration amongst consultation with</u> all actors involved. 1) Veterinary Authority, <u>in coordination with</u> ~~or in collaboration with~~ other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u>, should be responsible for the development and oversight of policy on and legislative frameworks ~~for~~ <i>biosecurity</i>. These policies should include the relative contribution and roles of <i>veterinarians</i> and <i>veterinary paraprofessionals</i> in both the private and public sectors, <u>and provide guidance for the implementation of biosecurity</u>. For international trade purposes, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should have an active role in the <u>development, implementation, development, implementation</u>, enforcement, oversight, and verification of <i>biosecurity</i> and <i>biosecurity plans</i>. 2) Veterinary Services should execute and implement policies and legislation on <i>biosecurity</i> under the supervision of the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>ies or other relevant Competent Authorities</u>. Rationale: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> within the Member Country should ultimately be responsible for implementing and meeting the requirements of international animal and animal health trade standards.	Did not agree, because 'collaboration' is more accurate.

- 3) **Veterinarians and veterinary paraprofessionals and other relevant advisors** should give advice on *biosecurity* and the *biosecurity plans*. This advice should be aligned with the policies and legislation, where available.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

4.X.4._5	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): <i>Veterinarians and veterinary paraprofessionals and other relevant animal health advisors</i> should give advice, <u>including on design, training, and evaluation of biosecurity plans</u> to animal breeders, owners, and keepers on <i>biosecurity</i> which may include the design, ~~and the and evaluation of biosecurity and biosecurity plans and training.~~ This advice should be aligned with the policies and legislation set by the ~~Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities, where available.~~ Rationale: Veterinarians and other animal health advisors provide educated interface with animal producers and others on biosecurity. They are of great value and their contribution to the design and implementation of biosecurity should be maximized in this chapter.	Did not agree, as this proposal is too detailed for this chapter.

- 4) **Breeders, owners, managers, keepers, transporters, feed producers and other relevant actors** are responsible for developing, implementing and monitoring *biosecurity* and the *biosecurity plan* and should seek advice from *veterinarians, veterinary paraprofessionals* or other relevant advisors.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.4._6	Comment Category: Change Proposed Amendment African Union proposes to revise the article to read as follows: 4) ~~Animal~~ Breeders, owners, keepers, managers, transporters, and feed producers and other relevant <u>Animal value chain actors</u> are responsible for developing, implementing and monitoring biosecurity and biosecurity plans and should seek advice from veterinarians, and veterinary paraprofessionals and or other animal health relevant advisors. Rationale Replacing the list ("breeders, owners, managers, keepers, transporters, feed producers and other relevant actors") with "animal value chain actors" simplifies the sentence while maintaining inclusivity. The term encompasses all stakeholders involved in the animal health, production and management process. This makes this Article more concise and universally applicable.	Did not agree due to no added clarity.

- 5) **Training entities** should provide training in *biosecurity* for relevant actors. Coordination between the *Veterinary Authority*, other relevant *Competent Authorities*, the *veterinary statutory body* and veterinary educational institutions may be required to ensure biosecurity training delivered to *veterinarians, veterinary paraprofessionals* and other relevant advisors meets relevant standards.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

4.X.4._7	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: Can it be clarified if, Under point 5) of Article 4.X.4 “Training entities” and in article 4.X.9, training on risk assessment, specially risk pathway identification, be included for the veterinarians, veterinary paraprofessionals and other relevant advisors in order to meet relevant standards on biosecurity?	Clarified in the text.

- 6) **Farmer associations, veterinary and para-veterinary associations, and other relevant associations** should advocate and promote *biosecurity* among their members.

Article 4.X.5.

Potential sources of pathogenic agents

Pathogenic agents can be spread through different sources which should be considered when implementing *biosecurity* and developing a *biosecurity plan*. The main sources of pathogenic agents to be considered include:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.5._1	Category: Change Proposed amended text: Pathogenic agents can be spread through different sources which should be <u>assessed based on scientific evidence considered</u> when implementing <i>biosecurity</i> and developing a <i>biosecurity plan</i> . Rationale: An evidence-based assessment of the sources of pathogenic agents (and their risks) should feed into the implementation of biosecurity and the development of a biosecurity plan.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.
4.X.5._2	Category: editorial. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): Pathogenic agents can ~~be introduced from and~~ spread through different sources ~~of infection which~~ . <u>This</u> should be considered when implementing <i>biosecurity</i> and developing a <i>biosecurity plan</i> . Rationale: more precise wording is recommended. Supporting evidence , if relevant (e.g. scientific references, national and international reports, tangible experiences in this regard attached to this table)	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.
4.X.5._3	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): Pathogenic agents can be ~~introduced from and~~ spread through different sources ~~of infection~~ which should be considered when <u>developing and implementing a biosecurity plan</u> ~~implementing biosecurity and developing a biosecurity plan~~ . The main sources of pathogenic agents to be considered include: Rationale:	Did not agree due to no added value.

	The biosecurity plan should be developed before implementation of biosecurity. The sentence flows better as corrected	

1) *animals*,

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.5._4	Category: Editorial Proposed Pathogenic agents can be ~~introduced from and~~ spread ~~from~~through different sources ~~of infection~~ which should be considered when implementing <i>biosecurity</i> and developing a <i>biosecurity plan</i>. The main sources of pathogenic agents ~~may to be considered~~ include: 1) <i>live animals</i>, Rationale: Clarity.	Agreed with the rationale for first and second proposal, however the text was amended differently. Agreed with rational for third proposal.

2) *germinal products*,

3) secretions and excretions,

4) *animal products*,

5) dead *animals* and parts thereof and afterbirth materials,

6) arthropods such as mosquitoes, midges, flies, lice or ticks,

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.5._5	Comment Category: Addition Proposed Amendment arthropods such as mosquitoes, midges, flies, lice ~~or~~ ticks, <u>or beetles</u> Rationale: Darkling beetles are a very significant source of problems in poultry production, including as a biological vector. They are arguably the number one insect of concern to the poultry industries in the Americas. Hundreds of scientific publications are available on their role regarding the spread of important infectious pathogens. We are listing five below. Goodwin, M. A., & Waltman, W. D. (1996). Transmission of Eimeria, viruses, and bacteria to chicks: darkling beetles (Alphitobius diaperinus) as vectors of pathogens. <i>Journal of Applied Poultry Research</i>, 5(1), 51-55. Smith, R., Hauck, R., Macklin, K., Price, S., Dormitorio, T., & Wang, C. (2022). A review of the lesser mealworm beetle (Alphitobius diaperinus) as a reservoir for poultry bacterial pathogens and antimicrobial resistance. <i>World's Poultry Science Journal</i>, 78(1), 197-214. Barua, S., Bailey, M., Zhong, K., Iduu, N., Dormitorio, T., Macklin, K., ... & Wang, C. (2023). Research Note: Role of darkling beetles	Agreed

	(<i>Alphitobius diaperinus</i>) and litter in spreading and maintaining <i>Salmonella Enteritidis</i> and <i>Campylobacter jejuni</i> in chicken flocks. <i>Poultry Science</i>, 102(11), 103061. Hazeleger, W. C., Bolder, N. M., Beumer, R. R., & Jacobs-Reitsma, W. F. (2008). Darkling beetles (<i>Alphitobius diaperinus</i>) and their larvae as potential vectors for the transfer of <i>Campylobacter jejuni</i> and <i>Salmonella enterica</i> serovar paratyphi B variant Java between successive broiler flocks. <i>Applied and Environmental Microbiology</i>, 74(22), 6887-6891. Data, B. P., & Cost, L. P. (2005). The influence of the darkling beetle (<i>Alphitobius diaperinus</i>) as a vector and repository of food borne pathogens—A literature review. <i>The Department of Avian Medicine, University of Georgia</i>, 1-10.	

- 7) fomites such as peoples' clothing, boots, *vehicles*, crates, bedding, or farm equipment,
- 8) *feed* and *feed ingredients* including forage, grazing pastures and swill,

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.5._6	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): <i>feed</i> and <i>feed ingredients</i> <u>including such as</u> forage, grazing pastures and swill, Rationale: Other types of feed ingredients can be potential sources of pathogenic agents. The phrase "such as" implies more examples than simply stating the word "including" which does not necessarily imply that additional examples exist.	Agreed.

- 9) water, soil-and air,

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.5._7	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: 9) <u>the environment such as</u> water, soil, ~~surfaces~~ and air, Rationale: Water, soil, and air are environmental sources and should be defined as such. Additionally, the point should not limit environmental sources to strictly water, soil and air.	Did not agree due to no added clarity.

- 10) *biological products*,
- 11) humans.

Article 4.X.6.

Transmission pathways

Transmission of pathogenic agents can occur either through *animal-to-animal* contact without an intermediate (direct transmission), or through an intermediate such as fomites, water, *feed*, *animal products*, *germinal products*, *biological products*, humans and animal environment (indirect transmission). Transmission pathways of pathogenic agents should be considered when implementing *biosecurity* or developing a *biosecurity plan*. Transmission pathways are not mutually exclusive and include:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.6._1	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: Transmission of pathogenic agents can occur either through <i>animal-to-animal</i> contact without an intermediate (direct transmission), or through an intermediate such as fomites, water, <i>feed</i>, <i>animal products</i>, <i>germinal products</i>, <i>biological products</i>, humans and <i>animal</i> environment (indirect transmission). Rationale: Deletion as wording is unnecessary.	Did not agree, as this is necessary to indicate which environment is targeted.
4.X.6._2	Category: Change Proposed amended text: Transmission pathways of pathogenic agents should be <u>assessed based on scientific evidence considered</u> when implementing <i>biosecurity</i> or developing a <i>biosecurity plan</i>. Transmission pathways are not mutually exclusive and include: Rationale: An evidence-based assessment of the sources of pathogenic agents (and their risks) should feed into the implementation of biosecurity and the development of a biosecurity plan.	Agreed.
4.X.6._3	Category: Editorial Proposed <u>Transmission of pathogenic agents can occur either through <i>animal-to-animal</i> contact ~~without an intermediate~~ (direct transmission), or through an intermediate such as fomites, water, <i>feed</i>, <i>animal products</i>, <i>germinal products</i>, <i>biological products</i>, humans and animal environment (indirect transmission).</u> Transmission pathways of pathogenic agents should be <u>assessed</u> when implementing <i>biosecurity</i> or developing a <i>biosecurity plan</i>. Transmission pathways are not mutually exclusive and include: Rationale: Clarity	Did not agree with first proposal, did not add clarity. Agreed with the rationale of the second proposal, however the text was amended differently.
4.X.6._4	Category: change. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): <u>Transmission of pathogenic agents can occur either through <i>animal-to-animal</i> contact without an intermediate ~~source~~ (direct transmission), or through an intermediate ~~source such as fomites, water, feed, animal products, germinal products, biological products, humans and animal environment~~ referred to in Article 4.X.6. other than <i>animal-to-animal</i> contact (indirect transmission).</u> Rationale: clarification.	Did not agree with first proposal due to no added value. Agreed with the rationale of the second proposal, however the text was amended

	Supporting evidence: not relevant.	differently. (added point 7 in Article 6)
4.X.6._5	Comment Category: Addition Proposed Amendment <u>Specific examples of transmission pathways that should be considered include:</u> Rationale: For clarity purposes	Did not agree due to no added value.

- 1) Vertical transmission from parents to offspring *in ovo*, *in utero* or during birth.
- 2) Horizontal transmission from one *animal* to another that is not vertical.
- 3) Iatrogenic transmission.
- 4) Sexual transmission through reproductive secretions such as semen and vaginal fluids or transmitted directly between surfaces in contact during mating.
- 5) Vector-borne transmission via *vectors* including blood-feeding arthropods such as mosquitoes, flies, ticks, fleas and lice. *Vectors* may be mechanical with no biological association between the *vector* and pathogenic agent or biological where the pathogenic agent undergoes a multiplication or a developmental change within the *vector*, necessary for survival, transmission or host *infection*.
- 6) Droplets or airborne transmission of pathogenic agents through particles suspended in the air. Pathogenic agents may travel in particles of multiple sizes (droplets and droplet nuclei) that remain suspended in the air or deposited on surfaces. Airborne transmission may include short or long distances (which may be referred to as aerosol or wind-borne transmission, respectively).

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.6._6	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: 6) Droplets or airborne transmission ~~of pathogenic agents~~ through particles suspended in the air. Pathogenic agents may travel in particles of multiple sizes (droplets and droplet nuclei) that remain suspended in the air or deposited on surfaces. Airborne transmission may include short or long distances (which may be referred to as aerosol or wind-borne transmission, respectively). Rationale: Deletion for consistency with the other points in this list.	Agreed
4.X.6._7	Comment Category: Addition Proposed Amendment <u>Dependent on the hazard of concern some, or all, of these routes of transmission mentioned above may be part of the potential spread of the pathogen.</u> Rationale: For clarity purposes	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

4.X.6._8	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: <u>“7) Other types of indirect transmission than with vectors, from humans or surfaces/tools with which the animals have been in contact.”</u> Rationale: Clarification should also be made regarding the indirect transmission (from the human or animal environment).	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

Article 4.X.7.

Components of biosecurity

Biosecurity can be applied to any type of *population*. The components of *biosecurity* focus on reducing the risk of transmission of pathogenic agents through interactions with elements outside the *population* (external *biosecurity*) and on reducing risk of transmission of pathogenic agents within the *population* (internal *biosecurity*). All relevant components of *biosecurity* should be applied to address all sources of pathogenic agents, transmission pathways as well as unexpected events, and may vary according to the *population*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._1	Category: Changes Proposed: <u><i>Biosecurity</i> can be applied to any type of <i>population</i>. The components of <i>biosecurity</i> focus on ~~manag~~reducing the ~~likelihood~~risk of transmission of pathogenic agents through interactions with elements outside the <i>population</i> (external <i>biosecurity</i>) and on reducing the ~~likelihood~~risk of transmission of pathogenic agents within the <i>population</i> (internal <i>biosecurity</i>). All relevant components of <i>biosecurity</i> should be applied to address all ~~likely~~ sources of pathogenic agents, and their transmission pathways as well as unexpected risks events, and may vary according to the <i>population</i>.</u> Rationale: It is inconsistent with Chapter 2.1 to refer to the ‘risk’ of transmission, instead the word ‘likelihood’ is more appropriate. Furthermore, the focus on risk management measures should be on the likely sources rather than unlikely or unexpected risk events. An objective and defensible approach depends on consideration of those pathways and events that are probable rather than possible.	Refer to item 6.4 of the report.

- Components of external biosecurity may include the following:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._2	Comment Category: addition Proposed Amendment Components of external biosecurity may include, <u>are but not limited to</u> the following Rationale	Did not agree due to no added clarity.

	By making this change it indicates that the following components are the key components	

- a) Introduction of *animals*, *animal products* and *germinal products* should be minimised and if undertaken, the *animal health status* of the source *population* should be assessed.
- b) Whenever *animals* are introduced into the *population*, they should go through a monitored isolation period of sufficient length, during which measures may be implemented to mitigate the risk of transmission of pathogenic agents.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._3	Comment Category: addition Proposed Amendment Whenever <i>animals</i> are introduced into a ~~the~~ <i>population</i>, they should go through an <u>monitored</u> isolation period of sufficient length (<u>a.k.a. quarantines</u>); <u>length of isolation will vary depending on the hazard of concern</u>, during which measures may be implemented to ~~mitigate~~ <u>minimise</u> the risk of transmission of pathogenic agents. <u>The status of the individual animal may need to be assessed, if a validated live animal test exists for the hazard of concern.</u> Rationale 1st addition - Plain language commonly used in international trade, for clarity purposes. 2nd addition - Recommending pre-movement testing for common diseases for which validated tests exist in a particular species is good biosecurity practices (cost benefit analysis dependent). A similar guideline could be used for routine vaccinations for illnesses with effective prevention methods (such as leptospirosis to decrease both transmission and promoted prudent antimicrobial use).	Did not agree, as this first proposal is too detailed for this chapter. Agreed with the rationale of the second proposal, however the text was amended differently.

- c) Contact between *populations* of unknown or different *animal health status* should be avoided through segregation using managerial measures, physical or natural barriers.
- d) Human access to the *population* should be controlled. When humans come in contact with *animals*, they should take measures to mitigate the *risk* of bi-directional transmission of pathogenic agents, which includes as a minimum wearing dedicated clothing and footwear, and hand hygiene.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._5	Comment Category: addition Proposed Amendment <u>...clean</u> clothing and footwear, ~~and~~ hand hygiene <u>and showering-in, showering-out. Persons who are ill should avoid handling animals.</u> Rationale 1st addition - Unless dedicated is clearly defined to include clean within the glossary. 2nd addition - Given the increasing spill over of biological hazards, the rejection of germ theory and spread of misinformation and disinformation in the general public, the biosecurity standards should be explicit about general hygiene beyond hand washing, and if a person is unwell, even without a diagnosis, they should not expose themselves to the animals under their care.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

4.X.7._6	Category: Deletion Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): <u>Human access to the <i>population</i> should be managed controlled. When humans come in contact with <i>The contact between humans and animals</i>, they should be limited where possible but when required take precautionary measures should be used to mitigate reduce the risk of bi-directional transmission of pathogenic agents, ~~which includes as a minimum such as wearing farm dedicated specific clothing and footwear, and hand hygiene.~~</u> Rationale: Listing at minimum actions may preclude creative thinking or actions that could accomplish the same level of protection as is stated. This is a section on biosecurity components and the level of detail of precautionary measures that we propose to delete text does not diminish component of biosecurity noted.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

- e) Equipment used to handle or care for *animals* should not be shared between different *populations*. If shared, equipment should undergo cleaning and *disinfection* before and after use.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._7	Comment Category: addition Proposed Amendment Equipment <u>and clothing</u> used to handle or care for <i>animals</i> should not be <u>used with</u> ~~shared between~~ different <i>populations or sites</i>. If shared, <u>all things used on more than one site or population</u> ~~equipment~~ should undergo <u>cleaning and disinfection before and after use for each location.</u> Rationale Given the increasing spill over of biological hazards, the rejection of germ theory and spread of misinformation and disinformation in the general public, the biosecurity standards should be explicit about C&D recommendations anytime anything moves between sites or populations within a site.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

- f) Transport vehicles in contact with *animals* or their products should undergo cleaning and *disinfection* before and after use.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._8	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: For point e) and f), the Members suggest to add 'as appropriate' linked to cleaning before and after use. Rationale: it is not always necessary to do both parts if the transport or equipment has not been used for other purposes after the previous cleaning. It needs to be clarified so that the recommendations are reasonable based on the situation.	Did not agree due to no added value.

- g) *Animal products*, faeces, manure or waste materials should be handled in a way to mitigate the spread of pathogenic agents.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._9	Comment Category: addition Proposed Amendment Faeces, ~~urine~~ or manure ~~or blood, or other waste materials~~ should be handled ~~and disposed of~~ in a way to mitigate the spread of pathogenic agents. <u>Special care should be taken to avoid attraction of other animals in particular wildlife and arthropods.</u> Rationale All bodily secretions and tissues are potential carriers of pathogens so should be explicitly mentioned. More explicit instructions on all bodily secretions and tissues, being risk factors, as well as proper disposal of these is warranted. See above comment on mis and disinformation.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

- h) Dead *animals* and parts thereof should be handled, stored and disposed of in a way to mitigate the spread of pathogenic agents and to avoid contact with or attraction of other *animals* and arthropods.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._10	Comment Category: Comment General comment It is not just carcasses which can attract scavengers and pests (so rationale for including this in the above bullet. See above comment on mis and disinformation.	Noted.
4.X.7._11	Category: Deletion. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): Dead animals and parts thereof should be handled, ~~and stored and disposed of~~ in a way to mitigate the spread of pathogenic agents and ~~in specific containers, or in designated areas to avoid contact with or attraction of other animals in particular wildlife and arthropods.~~ Rationale: The word “animals” already covers “arthropods” (arthropods are animals). Supporting evidence: not relevant.	Did not agree. Definition of animals only contains bees, not other arthropods.
4.X.7._12	Category: Changes Proposed: <u>Components of external biosecurity may include the following:</u> <u>The animal health status of source populations for introduced</u>~~Introduction of~~ <i>animals</i>, <i>animal products</i> and <i>germinal products</i> ~~should be minimised as much as possible and if undertaken, the animal health status of the animal and their source population~~ should be assessed. - Whenever <i>animals</i> are introduced into ~~a the~~ <u>the population</u>, they should ~~be subject to pre-movement testing or go through an monitored isolation/quarantine~~ period of sufficient length, during which measures may be implemented to	Did not agree, refer to item 6.4 of the report.

	~~mitigate~~<u>minimise</u> <u>manage</u> the risk of transmission of pathogenic agents. c) ~~Direct~~<u>Contact</u> between <i>populations</i> of unknown or different <i>animal health status</i> should be avoided through segregation using managerial measures, ~~or~~ physical or natural barriers. d) <u>Human access to the population</u>~~quarantined animals~~ should ~~be managed~~ controlled. When humans come in contact ~~with the contact between humans and animals during a quarantine period~~, they should ~~be limited where possible but when required take~~ precautionary measures should be used to ~~mitigate~~<u>reduce</u> the <i>risk of bi-directional transmission of pathogenic agents</i>, which includes as a minimum ~~such as~~ wearing ~~farm-dedicated~~<u>specific</u> clothing and footwear, and hand hygiene. e) Equipment used to handle, <u>treat</u> or <u>otherwise be used</u> ~~with care for animals~~ should not be shared between different <i>populations</i>. If shared, equipment should undergo <u>cleaning and disinfection before and after use</u>. f) Transport vehicles in ~~direct and indirect~~ contact with <i>animals</i> or their products should undergo <u>cleaning and disinfection before and after use</u>. g) <u>Animal products</u>, ~~Faeces, or~~ manure or waste materials <u>that may be contaminated by pathogenic agents</u> should be handled in a way to mitigate the spread of ~~these~~<u>pathogenic</u> agents. h) Dead animals and parts thereof <u>that may be contaminated by pathogenic agents</u> should be handled, ~~and~~ stored <u>and disposed of in a way to mitigate the spread of pathogenic these agents and in specific containers, or in designated areas</u> to avoid contact with or attraction of other <u>likely host species</u>~~animals~~ in particular ~~wildlife~~ and arthropods. Rationale: The introduction of this section needs to provide clarity on who these recommendations are intended for. As currently written, it is not suitable for an international trade context. However, some points seem applicable to the commercial farming context. Specific comments: Point a: A primary role of the WOAHS standards is the enabling of safe movement of animals and animal products. We appreciate the intent of the clause, but unless the scope of this Chapter is excluding biosecurity measures for international trade or this clause is rephrased, then the clause is inappropriate in the Terrestrial Code as it is effectively advocating that countries should minimise the introduction of animal products as much as possible. Point d: As was written it can be read to mean all human and animal interactions should be minimised and protective equipment always used, which is impractical when considering non-commercial animals e.g. pets, disability support animals, and tourist facilities etc.	

- i) *Feed* should be produced, stored and transported in dedicated equipment to minimise the contact with potential sources of pathogenic agents. Feeding of untreated swill should be avoided. Water should

originate from low-risk sources or be treated to remove or inactivate pathogenic agents. The safety of the water and *feed* should be checked regularly.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7_13	Comment Category: addition Proposed Amendment <i>Feed</i> should be produced, <u>in either dedicated facilities or effective treatments and/or processes are used to mitigate risks of the presence and exposure to pathogenic agents. Feed should be</u> stored and transported in dedicated equipment <u>to minimise the contact with potential sources of pathogenic agents and toxins only for the purpose of feeding animals</u>. Feeding of untreated swill should be avoided. Water should originate from low-risk sources or be treated <u>to remove or inactivate</u> with pathogenic ~~inactivating~~ agents prior to use. The safety of the water and <i>feed</i> should be checked regularly. Rationale 1st addition Feed is produced in either dedicated facilities or effective treatments and/or processes are used to mitigate risks of the presence and exposure to pathogenic agents. The production of feed and the concept of dedicated equipment does not align well unless one considers prions. It is certainly applicable to storage and transport. I would separate feed production from the storage and transport and address the concept of dedicated equipment or facility in a separate statement. 2nd addition feed and water may be contaminated with toxic substances that while the animal may survive could pose serious hazard to the environment or humans that consume the animals or their products. Some examples of toxic substances in feed not causing immediate harm to the animals that consume the product immediately. As one health champions foreseeable hazards should all be assessed. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3050964/, https://www.oregon.gov/ODA/shared/Documents/Publications/AnimalHealth/ForeseeableHazardsAnimalFeed.pdf	Did not agree, refer to item 6.4 of the report.
4.X.7_14	Category: (change) Proposed amended text: "i) Feed should be produced, stored and transported in dedicated equipment to minimise the contact with potential sources of pathogenic agents. Feeding of untreated swill should be avoided. <u>The safety of the feed should be checked regularly.</u> <u>i) Water should originate from low-risk sources or be treated to remove or inactivate pathogenic agents. The safety of the water ~~and feed~~ should be checked regularly."</u> Then adapt the numbering accordingly in the rest of the Article. Rationale: Water and feed are two important items that needs to be addressed separately due to different risk mitigating measures to be applied.	Did not agree with the first proposal, comment addressed above in 4.X.7_13. Agreed with the rationale of the second proposal, however the text was amended differently.

- j) Contacts between the *population* and pets, birds, rodents, insects, and other *wildlife* or pests should be avoided using engineering, mechanical or chemical control.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._15	Categoría: Adición Texto modificado propuesto (o supresión sugerida): j) el contacto directo e indirecto de la <i>población</i> con mascotas, aves, roedores, aves, mascotas, y otra <i>fauna silvestre</i>, o plagas deberá evitarse mediante control de ingeniería, mecánico o químico; <u>k) Se deben considerar medidas de mitigación frente a cercanía de las granjas o establecimiento a cuerpos de aguas que concentren una alta densidad de fauna silvestre, principalmente aves silvestres;</u> Justificación: La presentación de casos positivos de IAAP en Miembro, fueron principalmente establecimientos cercanos a cuerpos de agua. Evidencia documentada, si corresponde: (por ejemplo, referencias científicas, informes nacionales o internacionales, experiencias referidas al tema).	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

- k) To minimise airborne transmission of pathogenic agents, sufficient distance between *populations* and possible sources of pathogenic agents should be considered. In some circumstances, air treatments might be considered.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._17	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: <u>To minimise airborne transmission of pathogenic agents, Sufficient distance between <i>populations</i> and other possible sources of pathogenic agents should be considered if feasible. In some circumstances, physical barriers (e.g. trees or walls) and structural/engineering controls (ventilation exhaust fan hoods and air treatment) air filtration might be considered. when feasible and sufficient distance or other measures cannot be implemented to mitigate the risk of transmission.</u> Rationale: 1st addition the term "should" is not mandatory so recommending more than considering is warranted. 2nd addition The option of a physical barrier, natural or not, like bushes and trees between a source of contamination and a site where susceptible animals are kept, is missing from point k. There are currently few studies on this topic, but the growing concern regarding airborne transmission of pathogens and the role of particles and insects is generating a renewed interest in this approach, in support of other measures. Vegetative buffers and walls/buildings can be used to mitigate airborne transmission and can be simple and cost effective. Ventilation exhaust fan hoods are also effective at reducing downwind	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

	particulate transmission. These would be easier and more cost effective to implement than air filtration, however, they would not achieve the same degree of mitigation as filtration. Guo, L., Ma, S., Zhao, D., Zhao, B., Xu, B., Wu, J., ... & Chang, Z. (2019). Experimental investigation of vegetative environment buffers in reducing particulate matters emitted from ventilated poultry house. <i>Journal of the air & waste management association</i>, 69(8), 934-943.	

- l) When cleaning and *disinfection* or other measures are not feasible or effectiveness is undetermined, an additional period of no contact between potential sources of pathogenic agents (e.g. humans, buildings, *vehicles*, equipment, materials, pastures) and the *population* may be applied. The effectiveness of this measure will depend on the specific circumstances and should be verified.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._19	Comment Category: addition Proposed Amendment ... applied <u>after an outbreak of the hazard of concern. This is known as a fallow period.</u> The effectiveness of this measure will depend on the specific circumstances <u>and should be verified by use of sentinel animals prior to full restocking, if no environmental test is considered validated for the hazard of concern.</u> Rationale This appears to be aimed at declarations of regaining freedom from a particular hazard after an incursion within a herd or compartment where the majority of the animals within a region or country are not affected by the hazard(s). It seems odd to have it within a biosecurity standard as by definition, this will mean the plan for that site was either ineffective or not implemented as written.	Did not agree, refer to item 6.4 of the report.
4.X.7._20	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: <u>m) When regional management of populations involves visiting different farms, the workflow should be organised from the lowest to the highest risk of infection.</u> Rationale: A regional biosecurity perspective is essentially missing from the text. The same principle presented under internal biosecurity should apply for external biosecurity, i.e., vehicle, people, etc should flow from lower risk to higher risk.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently (in paragraph d).

2. Components of internal biosecurity

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._21	Comment Category: addition Proposed Amendment Components of internal biosecurity <u>may include, are but not limited to the following</u>	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

	Rationale To maintain consistency with components of external biosecurity	
4.X.7._22	Category: editorial Proposed amended text: 2. Components of internal biosecurity <u>may include the following:</u> Rationale: For consistency with 1. <u>Components of external biosecurity.</u>	Agreed, comment addressed above in 4.X.7._21.

- a) Sick *animals* should be isolated to prevent other *animals* from being exposed. Treatments should be administered safely to avoid iatrogenic transmission.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._24	Comment Category: General comment Comment ~~Diseased~~ Sick <i>animals</i> should be isolated to prevent other <i>animals</i> <u>from</u> being exposed. Treatments should be administered <u>safely</u> to avoid iatrogenic transmission. Rationale Unless we define 'safely' it is superfluous. Preventing iatrogenic infection is the desired outcome. Standards for administering various medications (oral vs injectable) can be included in an annex (no shared equipment, etc)	Agreed

- b) All-in all-out management should be applied to all *animals* kept in the same space including cleaning and *disinfection* of the space between groups of *animals*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._25	Comment Category: General comment Comment The all-in all-out management is not applicable to all livestock management practices. Rationale The wording should be changed to indicate that this may be preferable in some situations, but is not applicable in for example Dairy situations or cow calf operations where there is constant additions and deletions from the herd.	Agreed
4.X.7._26	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: All-in all-out management should be applied, <u>when possible</u> , to all <i>animals</i> kept in the same <u>air</u> ~~air~~ <u>space including cleaning and disinfection of the space between groups of animals.</u> Rationale: First change: Recognizing that all-in all-out is the preferred approach but may not be possible in all circumstances.	Did not agree, refer to item 6.4 of the report.

	Second change: Member, does not agree with the removal of the word "air". The Canadian National Swine Guidelines use the following definition: "All-in all-out is the management practice to remove all the animals prior to new animals entering a shared air space with the subsequent cleaning and decontamination of the space where the animals are housed to prevent the transmission of pathogenic agents between groups of animals. The use of "shared air space" instead of "space" defines a segregation component of importance for more clarity. If just using the word "space" one could claim to have AIAO by site, AIAO by barn on site, MAYBE AIAO by room within a barn or even just by pen however in the later case it is not feasible for most infectious disease to attain the desired biosecurity goal with AIAO by pen. Member would appreciate that parties referring to the WOA code understand that disease risk changes depending on the interpretation and implementation of AIAO. For example a barn or large room with dynamic pens could potentially be AIAO even if the animals are moving between different pens within that room. They could be AIAO if they were all loaded/arrived at the same time from the same source, are the same age (similar age matters) and about the same weight. They are then just sorted internally by the weight algorithm BUT then all marketed at essentially the same time. For example, once the heaviest 180 pigs reach a set target weight these animals are shipped, let's say they are on week 14 in the barn, and then on week 16 the rest of the entire barn (let's say another 1800 pigs, regardless of weight) are then shipped. That is often done in Member. Because they were all a cohort at entry, there is really very little variation at harvest. So that type of AIAO system has become very popular for larger systems in particular. However, those rooms could also be "dynamic" with 5 (example) weeks of different sub-populations. Example: there is a new cohort of 35 kg pigs entering the east end of the barn/room at the same time as established 130 kg pigs are exiting the west end. So, in that case Member refers to this as continuous flow and not AIAO.	

- c) Stocking densities that result in impaired health through increased transmission rates of pathogenic agents or increased susceptibility to *infections* should be avoided.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._27	Category: Change Proposed amended text: c) Stocking densities that result in impaired health through increased transmission rates of pathogenic agents or increased susceptibility to infections should be avoided. The increased risk of emerging virulent pathogen strains at higher stocking density should be considered and appropriate measures implemented to reduce the risk. Rationale: Evolution of more virulent strains of pathogens may occur in high density environments. This risk is not acknowledged in the document. It may occur as a mutation from a low virulent strain into a more virulent strain (avian influenza for example), or an as on-site benign pathogen that gradually increases in virulence (Mareks disease	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

	for example). Both examples show what can happen when the environment (in these cases host density) changes.	

- d) Within the *population*, *units* with different characteristics should be kept separately.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.7._28	Category: Change Proposed: e) ~~Diseased-Sick~~ <i>animals</i> should be isolated to prevent other <i>animals</i> from being exposed. Treatments should be administered <u>safely</u> to avoid iatrogenic transmission. f) All-in all-out management should be applied to all <i>animals</i> kept in the same air-space including cleaning and <u>disinfection</u> of the space between groups of <i>animals</i>. g) <u>The impact of s</u>Stocking density <u>ies that may result in impaired health through increased on disease transmission rates of pathogenic agents or increased susceptibility to infections</u> should be <u>assessed</u> ~~avoided~~ ~~avoided~~ ~~considered in the risk analysis~~. h) ~~Animals W~~within the <i>population</i>, <i>units</i> with different characteristics such as age and immune status should be kept separately. Rationale: Clarity. We suggest Point b should be rephrased. It is not clear what is encompassed by the word 'space'. Point d needs to clarify what is meant by 'characteristics'. For example, with a literal interpretation it might mean calves and lambs should be kept separately from their mothers.	Refer to item 6.4 of the report.
4.X.7._29	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): ~~Animals W~~within the <i>population</i>, <u>units animal categories</u> with different characteristics such as age and immune status should be kept separately. Rationale: "Units" needs to be defined or it could be considered to be different barns, or something else. Suggest the words "animal categories" that may be more easily understood than units.	Did not agree, need to use the defined term.

- i) When the management of the *population* involves contact with different *units*, the workflow should be organised from the lowest to the highest risk of *infection*, considering transmission of pathogenic agents and susceptibility of the *units*. When moving between the *units*, measures to mitigate transmission of pathogenic agents should be applied.
- j) Cleaning and *disinfection* of the equipment and surfaces should be applied between consecutive groups of *animals*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

4.X.7._30	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: A clarification on where risks related to transport of manure and feed are addressed would be welcome. Rationale: This suggestion is related to the significant risk represented by moving from and in the establishment manure and feed.	Did not agree, comment was addressed in paragraph 1, point g) of Article 7.

Article 4.X.8.

Biosecurity plan

A *biosecurity plan* promotes consistent implementation of *biosecurity*, and should balance practicality, cost, regulatory requirements and include necessary provisions for its maintenance. The aim of a *biosecurity plan* is to organise, structure and document *biosecurity* including its evaluation.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.8._2	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: <u>A <i>biosecurity plan</i> promotes consistent implementation monitoring, and verification of biosecurity, and should balance the objectives, intended benefits and potential negative consequences with the practicality, cost, regulatory requirements and include necessary provisions for its maintenance and continuous improvement.</u> The ~~aim~~<u>purpose</u> of a <i>biosecurity plan</i> is to ~~document~~, organise, and structure and document <i>biosecurity</i> <u>as implemented</u> including its evaluation <u>for effectiveness</u>. Rationale: The objectives and intended benefits and negative outcomes are going to be the first considerations in developing a plan. These need to be balanced with all of the other considerations. In audit principles (see ISO 19011 guidelines for auditing management systems), one must assess for both compliance with the plan as written and its effectiveness at achieving its objectives. This includes both routine monitoring, periodic verifications and scheduled and unscheduled audits. Continuous improvement and regular scheduled reviews of the plan itself to ensure the plan aligns with best practices is a core principle.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

4.X.8._3	Category: Change Proposed: <u>A biosecurity plan promotes consistent implementation of biosecurity, and should balance practicality, cost, regulatory requirements and include necessary provisions for its maintenance.</u> The ~~aim~~purpose of a biosecurity plan is to <u>provide effective biosecurity through an document, organised, and structured and documented animal health plan-biosecurity</u> including its evaluation. Rationale: Clarity	Did not agree due to no added clarity.
4.X.8._4	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: A biosecurity plan promotes consistent implementation of biosecurity, and, <u>while remaining scientifically justifiable,</u> should balance practicality, cost, regulatory requirements and include necessary provisions for its maintenance. Rationale: Member agrees with the sentiment that the imperatives of practicality, cost and regulatory requirements need to be balanced in a biosecurity plan. However, experience has shown that farmer associations, veterinary and para-veterinary associations, and other relevant associations may not always take into account that the biosecurity measures that they consider practical and cost-effective also have to be scientifically valid in order to be justifiable for any official standard. Member thus proposes the insertion of 'while remaining scientifically justifiable' as an insertion before the mention of practicality and cost, in order to avoid misunderstandings and emphasize the need for a biosecurity plan to remain scientifically justifiable even when it is tailor-made to the practicalities and affordability of a particular enterprise. Supporting evidence: not relevant	Agreed.

The *biosecurity plan* should include the following sections:

a) Purpose and scope

This section should provide an overview of the plan, its purpose and scope. In addition, it should outline the goals and objectives of the plan, as well as the *population* characteristics, including animal husbandry systems, and context.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.8._5	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: This section should provide an overview of the plan, its purpose and scope. In addition, it should outline the goals and objectives of the plan, as well as the <i>population</i> characteristics, including animal husbandry systems, and context, <u>the specific site(s) where it will be applied.</u> Rationale each biosecurity plan must be specific to a site under one single management system for implementation to be possible. Having one plan for multiple site(s) with identical context and population factors	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

	and the same management system might be possible. One management of animals with non-identical context and population factors at multiple sites would require differences to be acknowledged, resulting in different plans for those sites.	

b) Roles and responsibilities

Design, implementation, and monitoring is a shared responsibility. Therefore, it is essential to describe the roles and responsibilities of all actors for ensuring adherence and compliance with *biosecurity*.

c) Identification of pathogenic agents, sources and transmission pathways

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.8._6	Category: (change) Proposed amended text: “Identification of <u>sources of and pathogenic agents, sources and transmission pathways for pathogenic agents into, within and from the population</u>” Then adapt the numbering accordingly in the rest of the Article. Rationale: biosecurity plan should be based on a risk assessment concerning infection routes into, within and out of the herd, rather than the identification of specific pathogens. This is because most biosecurity measures are general and generic.	Did not agree due to no added clarity.

In addition to the identification of the potential pathogenic agents of concern, this section should include their potential sources and transmission pathways.

d) Description of biosecurity

This section should describe the relevant components of *biosecurity* in accordance with Article 4.X.7.

It should also include relevant response procedures for emergencies.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.8._8	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: It should also include <u>emergency and relevant response procedures for emergencies or animal health events</u>~~animal health events.~~ Rationale: An emergency is quite different than an animal health event. Not all emergencies are animal health events and not all animal health events are emergencies. We believe the use of the terminology "animal health events" was to recognize that there are biosecurity concerns that might not result in a disease outbreak and that illness is not always the result of a pathogen. However, using the term emergency changes the intent of the meaning. It may be best to include both and not delete animal health events	Did not agree due to no added clarity.
4.X.8._9	Comment Category: Addition	Did not agree, comment was

	Proposed amended text: <u>Standard Operating Procedures should be created for all entry and exits from the site(s) of animals, humans, feed and equipment and any other identified transmission pathway (pathogen dependent). The SOPs can be attached as appendices to the plan.</u> Rationale: Restated for emphasis as a foundational principle of both biosecurity and plans which are implementable and auditable require written SOPs.	already addressed in point h) of Article 8.

e) Surveillance of pathogenic agents

The *biosecurity plan* should include the procedures for *surveillance* to detect the presence of pathogenic agents in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.8._10	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: <u>Disease monitoring and early detection Surveillance and monitoring of pathogenic agents</u> The <i>biosecurity plan</i> should include the procedures <u>for disease monitoring and early detection and surveillance to detect for</u> the presence of pathogenic agents <u>of concern in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Prompt clinical investigation of any unusual illness or death is a pre-requisite for maintaining an effective biosecurity plan.</u> Rationale: Biosecurity plans should not rely on surveillance for WOAHA listed diseases alone. All unexpected illness or death should be clinically investigated, with diagnostics, and post-mortems as required. The services of an experienced herd health and clinical veterinarian should be used to determine when further diagnostics are necessary. Surveillance would be used to declare premise freedom or establish a within herd prevalence/incidence. They are not part of the biosecurity plan itself.	Did not agree, refer to item 6.4 of the report.
4.X.8._11	Category: Change Proposed: c) Hazard identification of pathogenic agents <u>being managed, their sources and transmission pathways and risk assessment</u> In addition to the <u>identification of the potential pathogenic agents of concern risk organisms (i.e. hazards) and their transmission pathways, This this section should include their potential sources and transmission pathways a summary of the relevant parts of risk assessment, notably the relevant routes of introduction and spread of pathogenic agents and susceptibility of the units in the population and transmission pathways e.g.</u> d) Description of biosecurity This section should <u>describe outline the relevant components of biosecurity measures to reduce the risk of introduction,</u>	Did not agree due to no added clarity.

	~~establishment and spread of pathogenic agents to, within and from the population~~ in accordance with Article 4.X.78. It should also include ~~emergency and relevant~~ response procedures for ~~emergencies, animal health events~~. e) <u>Surveillance</u> ~~Surveillance and monitoring~~ <u>foref</u> pathogenic agents The <i>biosecurity plan</i> should include the procedures for ~~monitoring and surveillance~~ to detect the presence of pathogenic agents in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Rationale: Need to be clear what risks are being managed through a biosecurity plan.	
4.X.8._12	Category: Change. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): The <i>biosecurity plan</i> should include the <u>surveillance</u> procedures ~~for monitoring and surveillance~~ to detect the presence of pathogenic agents in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Rationale: clarification. Supporting evidence, if relevant (e.g. scientific references, national and international reports, tangible experiences in this regard attached to this table)	Did not agree due to no added value.

f) Communication and reporting

This section should outline the procedures for communicating information about the *biosecurity plan* to all relevant actors. It should also include procedures for reporting incidents and sharing information with relevant authorities.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.8._13	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: This section should outline the procedures for communicating information about the <i>biosecurity plan</i> to <u>all relevant</u> actors. It should also include procedures for reporting incidents and sharing information with relevant authorities. <u>Prompt reporting to the Veterinary Authorities, if required, of any unusual illness or death which could be a WOAHA listed or reportable disease is a prerequisite for maintaining an effective biosecurity plan and early response to limit spread between sites.</u> Rationale This seems more geared for WOAHA listed diseases, so making it explicit that this is the purposed of communication adds clarity.	Did not agree, out of scope.

g) Training and education

This section should outline the training and education needs and identify programmes to ensure all relevant actors are aware of the *biosecurity plan* and clearly understand their roles and responsibilities to implement and maintain the *biosecurity* and the consequences of non-compliance.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.8._14	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: This section should outline the training and education needs and identify programmes to ensure all relevant actors are aware of the biosecurity plan and clearly understand their roles and responsibilities to implement and maintain the biosecurity and the consequences of non-compliance. This includes documentation of the training. Rationale This is a standard of audit principles (see ISO guidelines)	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently in paragraph 1 of Article 9.

h) Supporting documents

This section should outline the standard operating procedures (SOPs), checklists, and record-keeping templates which describe routine management processes and ensure that responsibilities and duties are consistently fulfilled and documented.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.8._15	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Standard Operating Procedures and Records Supporting documents ... This section should describe the procedures for monitoring and evaluation of the biosecurity plan and its implementation in accordance with Article 4.X as well as record templates for such monitoring and verification tasks. Rationale Additions for purposes of clarity. The term "supporting documents" is not routinely used within audit frameworks. Adding the last sentence makes explicit the need for details on the monitoring, verification and audit frequency to which the biosecurity plan is to be subjected.	Did not agree as it is already addressed later in the text.
4.X.8._16	Category: Editorial Proposed: This section should outline the standard operating procedures (SOPs), checklists, and record-keeping templates which describe routine management processes and ensure that responsibilities and duties are consistently fulfilled and documented. Rationale: No need to abbreviate as there is no subsequent reference to SOPs in this chapter.	Agreed

i) Evaluation and improvement

This section should describe the procedures for monitoring and evaluation of the *biosecurity plan* and its implementation in accordance with Article 4.X.10. Biosecurity Incidents and breaches in *biosecurity*, as well as corrective actions taken, should be documented. The *biosecurity plan* should be reviewed and updated regularly to ensure its relevance and effectiveness.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

4.X.8._17	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Evaluation and <u>Continuous</u> improvement ~~This section should describe the procedures for monitoring and evaluation of the biosecurity plan and its implementation in accordance with Article 4.X.1110. Biosecurity incidents and breaches in biosecurity, and as well as corrective actions taken, must~~ should be documented. The <i>biosecurity plan</i> should be <u>reviewed and</u> updated regularly <u>to ensure its relevance and effectiveness</u> ~~with a goal of continuous improvement.~~ Rationale ISO audit principle best practice is that continuous improvement must be applied throughout the management system. Added for clarity.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.
4.X.8._18	Category: Addition If this chapter is including biosecurity related to international animal and animal product trade, there should be reference to oversight by the Veterinary Authority of auditing for compliance with regulatory requirements.	Did not agree, comment addressed above in 4.X.3_3 .

Article 4.X.9.

Training and awareness

1. Training

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.9._1	Category: (change) Proposed amended text: Reference is made to the comment made under point 5) of Article 4.X.4. Rationale:	Agreed.

Regular training on *biosecurity* should be undertaken according to the needs identified and should include all actors. Training should be provided by those with sufficient qualifications and experience. The training should be in line with legislative and policy frameworks. Such training may include:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.9._2	Category: Change Proposed: Regular training on <i>biosecurity</i> should be undertaken according to the needs identified and should include <u>all relevant</u> actors. Training should be provided by those with sufficient qualifications and experience. The training should be in line with legislative and policy frameworks. Such training may include:	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

	Rationale: In a given scenario all actors may not be appropriate so the standard should ensure only those relevant to that scenario are included in this requirement.	

- Principles of *biosecurity*,
- Sources of pathogenic agents, transmission pathways and relevant factors to susceptibility,
- Components and implementation of *biosecurity*, including emergency planning and response,
- Monitoring and evaluation of *biosecurity*,
- Purpose, development and implementation of a *biosecurity plan*,
- Competency-based training requirements should be identified and documented for each actor. The training achieved should be monitored to ensure the required level of competencies are obtained or maintained.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.9._3	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Competency-based training requirements should be identified and documented for each actor. The training achieved should be monitored to ensure the required level of competencies are obtained or maintained. <u>Records are to be maintained of all training delivered (who, what, when, how, and outcome)</u> Rationale ISO audit principle is that records must be maintained not just for specific tasks, monitoring, verification but also any training on such responsibilities throughout the management system. Added for clarity.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

2. Awareness

All relevant actors described in Article 4.X.4. and the general public, when applicable, should be made aware of the importance of *biosecurity* (and the *biosecurity plan* if appropriate) at strategic places (e.g. *border inspection posts*, farm entrances, *markets*) and times (e.g. *disease outbreaks*, changes in the epidemiological situation). Raising awareness may be the responsibility of the *Veterinary Authority*, other relevant *Competent Authorities*, *Veterinary Services*, or producers, and other relevant actors depending on the context and extent of the *risk*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.9._4	Category: editorial. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion):	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

	This <u>Raising awareness</u> may be the responsibility of the <u>Veterinary Authority, other relevant Competent Authorities, Veterinary Services, or even producers, farmers and/or other relevant actors/stakeholders</u> depending on the context and extent of the <i>risk</i>. Rationale: to improve the language. Supporting evidence, if relevant (e.g. scientific references, national and international reports, tangible experiences in this regard attached to this table)	

Article 4.X.10.

Evaluation and improvement

The implementation of *biosecurity*, the compliance with the *biosecurity plan* and the effectiveness of implemented measures should be subjected to evaluation for improvement.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.10._1	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Evaluation and <u>continuous</u> improvement <u>of the biosecurity plan (as written)</u> The implementation of <i>biosecurity</i>, the compliance with the <i>biosecurity plan</i> and the effectiveness of <u>biosecurity implemented measures, as implemented and as the plan is written</u> should be subjected to evaluation for improvement Rationale For clarity purposes. Poor implementation of a good plan, or excellent implementation of an inadequate plan can both result in introduction or spread of hazards within a site. The solution to each however is different, dependent on the root cause.	1-Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently. 2-Did not agree due to no added value

- 1) The evaluation of implementation should be based on predefined scope and criteria, taking into consideration the expected scale of the operation and the characteristics of the *population* concerned. This will determine at which level of responsibility the evaluation should be conducted, and at which frequency. The frequency should be adapted to changing circumstances such as new animal health status, newly identified pathogenic agents or changes in epidemiological situation, previous evaluations, changes in production or changes in plan. The evaluation should determine the level of implementation of *biosecurity*, through collected evidence that may include documentation of procedures, other routine records, monitoring technologies, onsite audits as well as interviews with personnel. Based on these findings, the evaluation may allow the establishment of a risk-based *biosecurity* score as a whole or for each measure.
- 2) Compliance with the *biosecurity plan* should be evaluated routinely or following a change in epidemiological situation. Documented evidence of compliance should be collected routinely and be provided for any evaluation. The evaluation of compliance with the *biosecurity plan* should be executed by an independent party, in accordance with the policies and legislation, where available.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.10._2	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text:	Did not agree due to no added value.

	Compliance with the <i>biosecurity plan</i>, as written, should... evidence of compliance with outcomes Rationale for clarity, and Poor implementation of a good plan, or excellent implementation of an inadequate plan can both result in introduction or spread of hazards within a site. The solution to each however is different, dependent on the root cause. Stated outcomes within the plan should be achievable within the site.	
4.X.10._3	Category: editorial. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): Compliance with the <i>biosecurity plan</i> should be evaluated routinely or following a change in the epidemiological situation risks. Rationale: to improve the language. Supporting evidence, if relevant (e.g. scientific references, national and international reports, tangible experiences in this regard attached to this table)	Agreed.
4.X.10._4	Comment Category: Addition Proposed Amendment The Members propose to revise the article to read as follows: 2).....The evaluation of compliance with the <i>biosecurity plan</i> should be executed optionally by an independent party, in accordance with the policies and legislation, where available. Rationale Including "optionally" provides flexibility for situations where an independent evaluation might not be feasible due to resource constraints, availability of independent evaluators, or context-specific factors. This aligns with the principle of adaptability to different circumstances, particularly in regions with varying capacities. In some settings, internal audits or assessments conducted by trained in-house personnel might be sufficient, provided they meet policy and legislative requirements. Adding "optionally" accommodates such scenarios without compromising the intent of ensuring compliance.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

- 3) The effectiveness of the *biosecurity plan* should be evaluated routinely or following a change in epidemiological situation, to ensure the *biosecurity plan* is complete, fit for purpose and up to date. The evaluation should be based on animal health or performance data. The outcomes of the evaluations should be communicated to all relevant actors and should inform which risk mitigation or corrective actions are needed so that the *biosecurity plan* can be updated accordingly.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X.10._5	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: The ability effectiveness of the <i>biosecurity plan</i> to meet its objectives should be evaluated routinely or following any change in production type, epidemiological situation risks, or other significant change to the site where the plan is applied, to ensure the <i>biosecurity plan</i> is	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

	complete, fit for purpose and up to date. The evaluation should be based on records, animal health or performance data from the site of application. Rationale for clarity purposes that the effectiveness of a plan is different than a pre-emptive review after context or population changes to ensure the plan is still capable of achieving its objectives.	
4.X.10._6	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: The outcomes of the evaluations should be communicated to all relevant actors and should inform if or how the plan needs to be modified, and which risk mitigation or corrective actions are needed so that the <i>biosecurity plan</i> can be updated accordingly. Rationale For clarity that not every review will automatically require amendments or corrective actions.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.
4.X.10._7	Category: (change, addition) Proposed amended text: “The effectiveness of the biosecurity plan should be evaluated routinely or and when needed following a change in epidemiological situation, change in the structure of production or other changes that call for an update to ensure the biosecurity plan is complete, fit for purpose and up to date” Then adapt the numbering accordingly in the rest of the Article. Rationale: Brings in clarifications as we do not consider that we can sample at random to check if there are pathogens around the animals, but we can see if our measures against pests have had an effect or continue to have an effect.	Agreed, comment addressed above.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4._1	Category: General Rationale: A Member supports the use of the term “disinsection” alongside “disinfection” and they are two different processes. Currently, “disinfection” has been used across Chapters 5.4 to 5.7. We note the considerations between the Code Commission and ad hoc Group around this matter. We also understand this matter will be considered further in conjunction with the revision of Chapter 4.14. General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection.	Noted As a new Glossary definition for ‘disinsection’ is proposed, the Code Commission decided to use ‘disinsection’ in draft Chapters 5.4. to 5.6., respectively.
5.4._2	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member agrees with the clear definitions of terms related to exportation, the detailed explanation regarding the responsibilities of Operators, and the Official Controls of Veterinary Authority for exportation.	Noted
5.4._3	Category: (editorial, general) Proposed amended text: Sustituir la palabra remesas por mercancías o embarque según corresponda en todo el texto Rationale: Se propone cambiar remesas por mercancías o embarque, a fin de dar más claridad a la redacción. Lo anterior, debido a que le termino remeses se utiliza más para referir al envío de dinero de aquellas personas que radican en otra nación a su país de origen. Por embarque se entiende la acción de cargar las mercaderías sobre los medios de transporte en que han de salir del recinto aduanero con destino al exterior o a otras Aduanas del país. (Código Aduanero. Artículo 46) Supporting evidence, if relevant: https://www.condusef.gob.mx/?p=remesas#:~:text=%C2%BFQu%C3%A9%20son%20las%20REMESAS%3F,familias%20que%20viven%20en%20M%C3%A9xico. https://www.aduanas.gub.uy/innovaportal/v/2610/8/innova.front/embarque-definicion.html	Agreed with the terms used in Spanish

5.4._4	Category: General Comment Rationale: In Chapters 5.4, 5.5. and 5.6 it is proposed for the term Operators to be used for Exporter, Importer, or both Importers and Exporters. In some instances, it is confusing who is being referred to, even with the terms being defined within the chapters. In addition, the same term is being unnecessarily used for different purposes in more than one chapter, when acceptable cleaner terminology is available. It would be better to retain Importers and Exporters, as the text is clear on who is being referred to. Moreover, it is better for terms to be used consistently throughout the Code to avoid confusion when interpreting and communicating to stakeholders the requirements of the Code.	Noted and the Commission made amendments to clarify the definition of 'operator' for the purpose of the Chapters 5.4. to 5.6., respectively. Refer to item 6.5. of report for more explanation.
5.4._5	Category: General. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): In this chapter, the term 'Veterinary Authority' is frequently used; however, it may be more appropriate to refer to the 'Competent Authority.' Rationale: This is to recognise that the approval and registration of establishments, as the delivery of official controls already mentioned in specific sections below, may not always be undertaken by a veterinary authority. Supporting evidence: not relevant.	Noted
5.4._6	Category: General Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): Throughout this Article, a Member is unclear why the term operator was added without a definition provided. We believe that the word "operator" is incorrectly used throughout the chapter, except in two paragraphs. Rationale: The operator is usually the person moving a shipment. The Exporter is usually the one preparing the shipment for export.	Noted and addressed above in comment 5.4._4
5.4._7	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member supports this draft revised chapter.	Noted

CHAPTER 5.4.

MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE IN TO THE EXPORTATION OF COMMODITIES

Article 5.4.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable ~~in to~~ the exportation of *commodities* to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through *international trade of commodities*, without creating unjustified restrictions, covering from facilities of origin (such as *establishment, slaughterhouse/abattoir, semen collection centre*) to the *point of exit*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.1._1	Comment category: Addition Proposed amended text: This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable ~~in to~~ the exportation of <i>commodities</i> to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through <i>international trade of commodities</i>, without creating unjustified <u>trade</u> restrictions, covering from facilities of origin (such as <i>establishment, slaughterhouse/abattoir, semen collection centre</i>) to the <i>point of exit</i>. Rationale: To be coherent with Annex 20 and Annex 6 and be more precise, Member would propose to add “trade” in this sentence.	Agreed

This chapter provides *exporting countries* with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities, ~~and of business operators any natural or legal entity or person responsible for export of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter (hereafter ‘operator’)~~, in addition to responsibilities that are described in Article 5.1.3. This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and ~~performance implementation~~ of official controls for exportation.

This chapter applies to all *commodities*; some recommendations are specifically addressed to certain ~~of these commodities~~.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.1._2	Category: General Proposed amended text: This chapter provides <i>exporting countries</i> with recommendations on measures and procedures, <u>and the</u> roles and responsibilities of the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>in collaboration with</u> other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u>, ~~and of business operators any natural or legal entity or person responsible for export of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter (hereafter ‘operator’)~~, in addition to responsibilities that are described in Article 5.1.3. This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and ~~performance implementation~~ of official controls for exportation. Rationale: As per previous comment. The Veterinary Authority within the Member Country should ultimately be responsible for implementing and meeting the requirements of international animal and animal health trade standards.	Did not agree. This sentence does not provides for who has the ultimate authority to perform the activities, rather, simply provides that the chapter describes the role and responsibilities of the different of actors and authorities involved in exportation.

Article 5.4.2.

General considerations

The *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country* should ~~ensure that make operators aware of the importing country requirements, if they are available to the Veterinary Authority in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. In addition,~~

the *Veterinary Authority* should make operators aware of the process required to meet the conditions of the *international veterinary certificate* including *importing country* requirements, including all information required for the *agreed international veterinary certificate*, in accordance with Article 5.1.1. and Chapter 5.3., are available to exporters.

The *Veterinary Authority* of the ~~exporting country~~ should be responsible for the implementation performance of official controls in coordination with other relevant *Competent Authorities* in accordance with *veterinary legislation* to ensure that exported *commodities* ~~can be traded safely and meet the requirements of the importing country requirements~~. ~~Its~~ Their legal mandate and responsibilities, as described in Article 3.4.5. and 3.4.13., should include the export official controls activities at any step and the opportunity to request from the operator-exporter any necessary information. Where appropriate, the *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant *Competent Authorities* may delegate certain tasks in accordance with point 2 of Article 3.4.5. Adequate human, technical, physical and financial resources should be available in the *exporting country* for the *Veterinary Services* to ~~allow these~~ effectively implement official controls ~~to be undertaken effectively~~ and to properly apply the certification obligations and procedures laid down in Chapters 5.1. and 5.2., in accordance with the quality principles described in Article Chapter 3.2.2.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.2._1	Category: (editorial) Proposed amended text: La <i>autoridad veterinaria</i> del país exportador deberá ser responsable de la <u>implementación</u> ~~realización~~ de los controles oficiales en <u>coordinación</u> con otras <i>autoridades competentes</i> relevantes <u>een arreglo de conformidad con</u> la <i>legislación veterinaria</i>, con fines de garantizar que las <i>mercancías</i> ~~puedan comercializarse de forma segura y~~ <u>satisfechen cumplan con</u> las exigencias del <i>país importador</i>. Su mandato legal <u>y sus responsabilidades</u>, ~~según se describe en los~~ <u>Artículos 3.4.5. y 3.4.13.</u>, deberán incorporar <u>actividades de el</u> los <u>controles oficiales</u> en cualquier etapa y <u>la posibilidad</u> ~~oportunidad de solicitar al exportador~~ <u>operador</u> toda información necesaria. Cuando proceda, la <i>autoridad veterinaria</i> y otras <i>autoridades competentes</i> relevantes pueden delegar ciertas tareas <u>a actores no oficiales</u> ~~según el apartado 2 del Artículo 3.4.5.~~ <u>Los servicios veterinarios del</u> ~~Del~~ país exportador deberán disponer de los recursos humanos, técnicos, <u>físicos</u> y financieros adecuados para <u>realizar</u> ~~implementar de forma eficaz~~ <u>permitir que dichos</u> ~~controles oficiales se lleven a cabo con eficacia~~ y aplicar correctamente las obligaciones y procedimientos de certificación que figuran en los Capítulos 5.1. y 5.2., de conformidad con los principios de calidad descritos en el <u>Artículo</u> ~~Capítulo~~ 3.2.2. Rationale: Se propone las modificaciones editoriales, al considerar que pudieran ser por cuestiones de traducción. Por lo que al realizarlas dan coherencia al texto en español.	Agreed with the edit in Spanish Did not agree to add the proposed text as it is considered not necessary. Delegation can be to official and non-official actors.
5.4.2._2	Category: Deletion/addition. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): Where appropriate, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> and other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u> may delegate certain tasks ~~in accordance with point 2 of Article 3.4.5.~~ Adequate human, technical, <u>physical</u> and financial resources should be available in the <i>exporting country</i> for the <u>Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities</u> ~~Veterinary Services~~ <u>to allow these</u> ~~effectively implement~~ official controls ~~to be~~	Did not agree as Glossary definition for 'Veterinary Services' include any organisations that perform activities to implement the standards of the Terrestrial Code.

	~~undertaken effectively~~ and to properly apply the certification obligations and procedures laid down in Chapters 5.1. and 5.2., in accordance with the quality principles ~~described in Article Chapter 3.2.2.~~ Rationale: We would suggest keeping the words “Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities” to be consistent with the previous paragraph and to acknowledge that in countries, official controls are not only delivered by the Veterinary Services. Supporting evidence: not relevant.	
5.4.2._3	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): The <i>Veterinary Authority of the exporting country</i> should be responsible for the <u>implementation performance</u> of official controls in coordination with other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i>, in accordance with <i>veterinary legislation</i>, to ensure that exported <i>commodities</i> can be traded safely and meet the ~~requirements of the importing country requirements~~. ~~Its~~ <u>Their</u> <u>Veterinary Authority's</u> legal mandate and responsibilities, as described in Article 3.4.5. and 3.4.13., should include <u>the export official controls activities</u> at any step <u>in the export process</u> and <u>the opportunity</u> to request from the <u>operator-exporter</u> any necessary information. Where appropriate, the <i>Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities</i> may delegate certain tasks in accordance with point 2 of Article 3.4.5. Adequate human, technical, <u>physical</u> and financial resources should be available in the <i>exporting country for the Veterinary Services</i> to ~~allow these effectively implement~~ official controls ~~to be undertaken effectively~~ and to properly apply the certification obligations and procedures laid down in Chapters 5.1. and 5.2., in accordance with the quality principles ~~described in Article Chapter 3.2.2.~~ Rationale: Grammatical edits: use of commas to set off phrase clarifying who is responsible for the legal mandate. Clarification regarding which official controls	Did not agree with the first proposal as it includes both Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities. The Commission amended to clarity. Agreed with the second proposal to add proposed text.

The *Veterinary Authority* should cooperate closely with the customs authority and other authorities of the *exporting country* dealing with exports to ensure that official controls are implemented effectively, ~~and to protect maintain the status compliance~~ of the *commodities with importing country requirements* ~~without creating unjustified barriers to trade~~. This cooperation should also cover actions to prevent and combat fraud or illegal pathways.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.4.2._4	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should cooperate closely with <u>the</u> customs authority and other authorities of the <i>exporting country</i> dealing with exports to ensure that official controls are <u>implemented</u> ~~performed~~ effectively, ~~and to protect maintain the status compliance of the commodities with importing country requirements without creating unjustified barriers to trade~~. This cooperation should also cover actions to prevent and combat fraud <u>or illegal pathways</u>. Rationale: grammatical correction	Agreed
5.4.2._5	Category: Editorial. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should cooperate closely with <u>the</u> customs authority and other authorities of the <i>exporting country</i> dealing with exports to ensure that official controls are <u>implemented</u> ~~performed~~ effectively, ~~and to protect maintain the status compliance of the commodities with importing country requirements without creating unjustified barriers to trade~~. Rationale: More precise wording. Supporting evidence: not relevant.	Comment addressed above

The *Veterinary Authority* should have procedures, as applicable, for certification of the *animal health status* of the country, *zone, compartment, or herd/flock* as well as of the disease situation in *establishments* and other premises and communicate with the operator-exporter regarding any additional documentary evidence that may be required to support such certification.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.2._6	Comment category: Addition The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should have procedures, <u>as applicable</u>, for certification of the <i>animal health status</i> of the country, <i>zone, compartment, or herd/flock</i> <u>animals</u> as well as of the disease situation in <i>establishments</i> and other premises and communicate with the <u>operator-exporter</u> regarding any additional documentary evidence that may be required to support such certification Rationale: change to animals as herd/flock isn't inclusive of companion animals /individual animals	Did not agree as this is related to animal health status and Glossary definition for 'herd' and 'flock' usually means an epidemiological unit. Individual animals are not assigned an 'animal health status'.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~in the exporting country~~ should ensure that the applicable certified *animal health status* of the country, *zone, compartment, or herds/flock* ~~or animals~~, is based on appropriate *surveillance* and reporting in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.2._7	Categoría: cambio. Texto modificado propuesto (o supresión sugerida): La <i>autoridad veterinaria</i> en el <i>país exportador</i> deberá garantizar que el <i>estatus zoosanitario</i> certificado <u>aplicable al</u>	Comment addressed above (5.4.2._6)

	del país, zona, compartimento, rebaños <u>o animales</u> ~~o animales~~ se basa en la <i>vigilancia</i> y en la notificación apropiadas de acuerdo con el Capítulo 1.4. Justificación: Debe dejarse “animales”, ya que hay algunos que se exportan como individuos, en especial los de genética, zoológicos, mascotas. Evidencia documentada: no corresponde.	
5.4.2._8	Category: Change Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should have procedures, <u>as applicable</u>, for certification of the <i>animal health status</i> of the country, <i>zone, compartment</i>, or <u>herd/flock animals</u> as well as of the disease situation in <i>establishments</i> and other premises and communicate with the <u>operator</u> ~~exporter~~ regarding any additional documentary evidence that may be required to support such certification. The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> ~~in the exporting country~~ should ensure that the <u>applicable</u> certified <i>animal health status</i> of the country, <i>zone, compartment</i>, or <u>herd/flock animals</u> ~~or animals~~, is based on appropriate <i>surveillance</i> and reporting in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Rationale: Herd/flock is not inclusive of exported companion animals.	Comment addressed above (5.4.2._6)

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~in the exporting country~~ should have procedures for registration and approval of *establishments* of origin, where applicable, and other facilities used for production and handling of consignments, to comply with the ~~agreed international veterinary certificate~~. Operators should not hinder access by the *Veterinary Authority* to the *commodities*, the premises where they are located and the *means by which they are transported of transport*. During official controls, operators should assist and cooperate with the *Veterinary Authority Services* and make available all information concerning the consignment.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.2._9	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: The Veterinary Authority should have procedures for registration and approval of establishments of origin, where applicable, and other facilities used for production and handling of consignments, to comply with the international veterinary certificate. Operators should not hinder access by the Veterinary Authority to the commodities, the premises where they are located and the means of transport. During official controls, operators should assist and cooperate with the Veterinary Services and make available all information <u>relevant from a veterinary point of view</u> concerning the consignment. Rationale: International Organisation encourages the Commission to consider that Veterinary authorities do not need to know all information about consignments, but only those pertaining to the animals being transported from a veterinary health's	Agreed, text amended differently.

	perspective. Certain information, like the commercial value, might be too sensitive to be shared. E.g., genetic lines may be considered proprietary information and disclosed only under special circumstances. Organisation is perfectly aware that the Commission was not referring to sensitive information to be shared, but clarifying that point could be beneficiary for all stakeholders.	

The *Veterinary Authority of the exporting country* should ensure that appropriate identification of *commodities* is in place to support traceability for the consignment to comply with the ~~agreed~~ *international veterinary certificate*. *Animal identification* should be in accordance with Chapter 4.2. and Chapter 4.3.

Upon request from the *Veterinary Authority of the importing country* or from the *Veterinary Authority of the transit country*, the *Veterinary Authority of the exporting country* should provide additional information on the process to ensure compliance with the conditions included in the ~~agreed~~ *international veterinary certificate*, and undertake investigation and reporting, and give reasonable access for audit in case of repeated non-compliant consignments ~~jeopardising the safety of trade~~. The *Veterinary Authority of the exporting country* should ~~take~~ ensure that the appropriate and necessary preventive measures to ensure that the status of the commodities remain compliant is not jeopardised before and during transport to the point of exit. The *exporting country* should suspend the export of a *commodity* when there is reason to believe that it may present a risk for animal and public health or ~~that if~~ it does not comply with the ~~agreed~~ *international veterinary certificate*.

The *Veterinary Authority of the exporting country* should promptly communicate to the *Veterinary Authority of the importing country*, any change or situation, such as a change of the animal health status, that may affect its capacity to ~~fulfil~~ certify the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ *international veterinary certificate*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.2._10	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority of the exporting country</i> should promptly communicate to the <i>Veterinary Authority of the importing country</i>, any change or situation, <u>such as a change of the animal health status, of a property, zone or region</u>, that may affect its capacity to ~~fulfil~~ <u>certify</u> the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ <i>international veterinary certificate</i>. Rationale: added wording for precision and to indicate which health status changes are being addressed.	Did not agree as Glossary definition for 'animal health status' is clear .

The *Veterinary Authority of the exporting country* should also inform without delay the *Veterinary Authority of the importing country*, and, where necessary, the *transit country*, in the event that a particular issue such as the occurrence of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements which may affects the compliance status of a commodity which has already left the exporting country. This information should be part of the relevant emergency response plan developed in accordance with Chapter 4.19.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.4.2._11	Category: General Proposed amended text: Rationale: International Organisation encourages the Commission to address aspects pertaining to animals such as baby poultry that hatch within hours or a few days from a disease incident. Those hatching eggs were collected weeks before hatch day and thus, likely outside of the period of epidemiological concern with regards to the disease outbreak being addressed by the Chapter. Organisation believes that for certain commodities (like meat) it is easier to have a plain black and white approach, while for live animals, including embryos, hatching eggs and baby poultry, a different approach should be considered.	Noted The current text is considered to cover the point.

In case of *animals*, operators should ensure that *animal welfare* is maintained throughout the export process in accordance with Section 7 as relevant.

The ~~Veterinary Authority of the exporting country~~ should carry out collaborative activities with other relevant Competent Authorities, customs, other authorities and operators, and with *Veterinary Authorities* in other countries, to control the risk posed by the illegal cross-border movement of *commodities*, i.e. the international movement of *commodities* done in a way to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls.

Article 5.4.3.

General principles applicable to procedures for official controls for exportation

1. Preparation for exportation

~~Operators~~Exporters should ~~announce~~ inform the Veterinary Authority of their intention to the export to the Veterinary Authority sufficiently in advance ~~as to meet these conditions of the agreed-international veterinary certificate~~ and the administrative requirements of the *exporting, transit and importing countries*.

~~Operators~~Exporters should provide to the *Veterinary Authority* ~~the~~as required details of the consignment. The *Veterinary Authority* should outline to the ~~operator~~exporter the procedures, standards and timeframe for preparation of the consignment, and the documentary evidence required to demonstrate compliance with these requirements. Where relevant, the *Veterinary Authority* should identify eligible bodies or officers for the implementation~~performance~~ and certification of procedures specified in the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~.

The ~~operator~~exporter and the *Veterinary Authority* should coordinate the implementation, and its documentation, of the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~. Implementation of these conditions and its documentation should be in accordance with the procedures and standards communicated by the *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country* and will form the basis upon which the *Official Veterinarian* will issue the *international veterinary certificate* for the consignment.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that the facilities and operational procedures required for isolation of animals or processing of products comply with the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~, which may including include registration, approval, and inspection, in accordance with ~~Chapters 4.6., 4.7. and 5.7. or other relevant chapters of the Terrestrial Code~~.

Testing of *commodities* required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~ should be in accordance with Article 3.2.10. and with the *Terrestrial Manual*. The *Veterinary Authority* should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~exporter the procedures for sample collection, identification and submission, the list of ~~approved laboratories~~ and the *approved* diagnostic tests.

The *Veterinary Authority* should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~~~exporter~~ the procedures for *vaccination* and treatment if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~*international veterinary certificate*. The ~~operator~~~~exporter~~ should arrange for *vaccination* or treatment of *animals*, noting timeframes relevant to the scheduled date of exportation. *Vaccination* and treatment of *animals* should use *veterinary medicinal products* registered or allowed in the *exporting country*, in line with the conditions of the ~~agreed~~*international veterinary certificate*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.3._1	Category: Change Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should define and communicate to the <del>operator</del>~~exporter~~ the procedures for <i>vaccination</i> and treatment if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~<i>international veterinary certificate</i>. The <del>operator</del>~~exporter~~ should arrange for <i>vaccination</i> or treatment of <i>animals</i>, noting timeframes relevant to the scheduled date of exportation <u>and in accordance with the conditions of the ~~agreed~~<i>international veterinary certificate</i></u>. <i>Vaccination</i> and treatment of <i>animals</i> should use <i>veterinary medicinal products</i> registered <u>or allowed</u>~~approved by the Veterinary Authority for use~~ in the <i>exporting country</i>. <u>, in line with the conditions of the ~~agreed~~<i>international veterinary certificate</i></u>. Rationale: We suggest moving the end of the final sentence to avoid confusion in interpretation. In addition, the wording relating to the use of vaccination and treatment should be more precise. The presence or use of vaccinations within a country should have the oversight of the <i>Veterinary Authority</i>. This is particularly important because of the potential impact of vaccinated animals on Member Countries' early warning systems. Vaccines should be registered by the <i>Veterinary Authority</i>. Such registration may be for different levels of use nationally, or approval for a specific use by the <i>Veterinary Authority</i>.	For the first proposal, agreed, text amended differently. For 'approve', did not agree, as considered a possibility of off label use.

The *Veterinary Authority* should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~~~exporter~~ the standards and procedures for *disinfection of* ~~and disinsection~~ elimination of arthropod vectors from ~~of vehicles/vessels~~ the means of transport and containers in accordance with Chapter 4.14., if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~*international veterinary certificate*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.4.3._2	Category: Change Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~^{exporter} the standards and procedures for ~~disinfection of and disinsection~~^{disinsection elimination of arthropod vectors from of vehicles/vessels} the means of <i>transport</i> and containers in accordance with Chapter 4.14., if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed international~~ <i>veterinary certificate</i>. Rationale: Clarity. Disinsection is a word utilised by the World Health Organisation which describes the process of controlling or killing insects that may carry diseases, such as mosquitoes, in order to prevent the spread of disease. Supporting evidence: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240080317	Comment addressed above (5.4._1)
5.4.3._3	Category: General. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): None. The use of the term “operator” is only correctly used in the paragraph above and below.	Comment addressed above (5.4._4)

In the case of *animals*, ~~The operator~~^{exporter} should also be able to provide to the *Veterinary Authority* a *journey* travel transport plan from the point of exit in the exporting country to the point of unloading in the importing country. In the case of animals, it should be in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. or 7.4. Section 7, and in compliance with *importing country* requirements as relevant.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.3._4	Category: Addition and Deletion Proposed amended text: <u>In the case of <i>animals</i>, ~~The operator~~^{exporter} should also be able to provide to the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> a <i>journey</i> travel transport plan from the point of exit in the exporting country to the point of unloading in the importing country. In the case of animals, it should be in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. or 7.4. Section 7, and in compliance with <i>importing country</i> requirements as relevant.</u> Rationale: i) Retain wording. The new wording is not as clear as previously written. The glossary definition of Journey does not make it clear that in the context of this clause the plan is from the point of exit from the exporting country until unloading in the importing country and for its entire journey. For example, changes in sea-vessels, aircraft and containers as part of the travel need to be considered.	Agreed with deletion of ‘travel’ Did not agree with addition, as the current text is considered clear.

	ii) Journey plan is sufficient wording. The word 'travel' is not necessary.	
5.4.3._5	Category: Addition/change. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): ~~In the case of <i>animals</i>, the <u>operator</u> exporter should also be able to provide to the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> a <u>journey travel</u> transport plan from the <u>point of exit</u> in the <u>exporting country</u> to the point of <u>unloading</u> in the <u>importing country</u>. In the case of <i>animals</i>, it should be in accordance with <u>Chapters 7.2., 7.3. or 7.4. Section 7</u>, and in compliance with <u>the importing country's requirements</u> as relevant.~~ Rationale: More precise wording. Supporting evidence, if relevant (e.g. scientific references, national and international reports, tangible experiences in this regard attached to this table)	Agreed with addition of 'the'. Did not agree with addition of 's' as editorial perspective.
5.4.3._6	Category: General. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): None. The use of the term "operator" is only correctly used in the two paragraphs above. Rationale: The Exporter is the one preparing the shipment for export.	Comment addressed above (5.4._4)

2. Procedures of exportation

a) Verification and certification

The operator exporter should cooperate with the *Veterinary Authority* to demonstrate that the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~ have been met and that the consignment is eligible for certification and export. The operator exporter should provide all documentary evidence of compliance with the importing country requirements ~~conditions of the agreed and international veterinary certificate~~ as required by the *Veterinary Authority*, including an import permit where appropriate. There should be clear traceability and linkage, at every stage of preparation of ~~animals and animal product commodities~~, to the final consignment presented for export, as relevant to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.3._7	Category: editorial. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): The <u>operator</u> exporter should cooperate with the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> to demonstrate that the conditions of the ~~agreed international veterinary certificate~~ have been met and that the consignment is eligible for certification and export. The <u>operator</u> exporter should provide all documentary evidence of compliance with the <u>importing country requirements</u> ~~conditions of the agreed and~~ <u>the international veterinary certificate</u> as required by the <i>Veterinary Authority</i>, including <u>an</u> import permit where appropriate. There should be clear traceability and linkage, at	Agreed

	every stage of preparation of ~~animals and animal product~~<u>commodities</u>, to the final consignment presented for export, as relevant to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ <i>international veterinary certificate</i>. Rationale: to improve the language. Supporting evidence, if relevant (e.g. scientific references, national and international reports, tangible experiences in this regard attached to this table)	
5.4.3._8	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): The ~~operator~~<u>exporter</u> ~~exporter~~ <u>exporter</u> should cooperate with the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> to demonstrate that the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ <i>international veterinary certificate</i> have been met and that the consignment is eligible for certification and export. The ~~operator~~<u>exporter</u> should provide all documentary evidence of compliance with the <u>importing country requirements</u> ~~conditions of the agreed and international veterinary certificate~~ as required by the <i>Veterinary Authority</i>, including <u>an</u> import permit where appropriate. There should be clear traceability and linkage, at every stage of preparation of ~~animals and animal product~~<u>commodities</u>, to the final consignment presented for export, as relevant to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ <i>international veterinary certificate</i>. Rationale: The exporter is the person responsible for preparing the shipment and the operator is the person hauling the shipment.	Comment addressed above (5.4._4)

The *Official Veterinarian* should review the preparation of the export consignment to confirm that commodities ~~animals and animal products~~ have been clearly identified at every stage of their preparation, that the consignment complies with the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ *international veterinary certificate* and is in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The *Official Veterinarian* should also review ~~all transport arrangements~~ the journey travel plan for the consignments of animals to ensure it they support maintenance compliance ~~of the commodity's status and animal welfare~~.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.3._9	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: The <i>Official Veterinarian</i> should also review ~~all transport arrangements~~ <u>the journey travel plan</u> for the consignments <u>of animals</u> to ensure <u>it they support maintenance compliance</u> <u>the consignment's status is maintained and animal welfare conditions are met</u> ~~of the commodity's status and animal welfare~~. Rationale: This text should be retained for clarity. The maintenance of the commodity's health status is the key reason for the presence of trade standards. See comment on deletion of travel above.	For deletion of 'travel', agreed. For amendment of text, agreed, text amended differently.

5.4.3._10	Category: Addition/change. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): The ~~Official Veterinarian~~ <u>Certifying Officer</u> should review the preparation of the export consignment to confirm that ~~commodities animals and animal products~~ have been clearly identified at every stage of their preparation, that the consignment complies with the conditions of the ~~agreed international veterinary certificate~~ and is in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>. The <i>Official Veterinarian</i> should also review ~~all transport arrangements~~ <u>the journey travel plan</u> for the consignments <u>of animals</u> to ensure <u>it</u> ~~they support maintenance compliance of the commodity's status and animal welfare.~~ Rationale: Since some export certificates are not issued by veterinarians, a Member suggests to replace “Official Veterinarian” by “certifying officer”. Supporting evidence: not relevant.	Did not agree, as described in the corresponding Chapters in Section 5 and Glossary definition for ‘Official Veterinarian’.

Once satisfied that preparation and journey travel plan ~~transport arrangements~~ are appropriate and that the consignment is eligible for certification and export, the *Official Veterinarian* should issue the *international veterinary certificate*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.3._11	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): Once satisfied that preparation <u>s</u> and <u>journey travel plans</u> ~~transport arrangements~~ are appropriate and that the consignment is eligible for certification and export, the <i>Official Veterinarian</i> should issue the <i>international veterinary certificate</i>. Rationale: Editorial.	Agreed
5.4.3._12	Category: General Proposed amended text: Rationale: International Organisation encourages the Commission to further clarify the point about the “journey travel”, since in practical experience, the text as it is might apply more to ground transportation than air (e.g.). The latter is more subject to the vagaries proper to this mode of transportation with frequent needs for adjustments (of time and less frequently route). Only under very special circumstances the journey is relevant with regards to disease control.	The Code Commission explained that all transportation is included.

b) Domestic transportation of commodities

The *Veterinary Authority* should collaborate with other relevant authorities and stakeholders to ensure that management of the consignment ~~pre-export~~ before and during transport is consistent with ~~agreed~~ established processes and standards.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.3._13	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: 2. <u>Procedures of exportation</u> b) Domestic transportation of commodities The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should collaborate with other relevant authorities and stakeholders to ensure that management of the consignment ~~pre-export before~~ and during transport <u>to the point of exit</u> is consistent with ~~agreed~~ <u>established</u> processes and standards. Rationale: Clarity to reflect the fact that the exporting country cannot control activities that are outside its jurisdiction while animals are in transit.	Agreed

The ~~operator~~ ~~exporter~~ should ensure that the assembly, *loading* and crating of *animals* or other *commodities* is appropriate to maintain compliance with the importing country requirements ~~preserving the status and animal welfare~~ of the consignment from the *place of shipment*, including adequate *disinfection of* and ~~disinsection~~ elimination of arthropod vectors ~~from~~ the ~~vehicle/vessel~~ means of transport and *container*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.3._14	Category: Change Proposed amended text: The ~~operator~~ ~~exporter~~ should ensure that the assembly, <i>loading</i> and crating of <i>animals</i> or other <i>commodities</i> is appropriate to <u>maintain compliance with the importing country animal health status requirements</u> ~~preserving the status and animal welfare~~ of the consignment from the <i>place of shipment</i>, including adequate <i>disinfection of</i> and ~~disinsection~~ <u>elimination of arthropod vectors</u> ~~from~~ the ~~vehicle/vessel~~ <u>means of transport</u> and <i>container</i>. Rationale: This text on status should be retained for clarity. The maintenance of the commodity's health status is the key reason for the presence of the Code Standards.	Did not agree, as importing country requirements are not limited to the animal health status. Compliance with all requirements must be maintained.

The *Veterinary Authority* in the *exporting country* may require health and welfare inspection of consignments of *animals* at the *point of exit*, which includes the possibility to deny permission to export if concerns are identified.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.3._15	Category: Deletion. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): ~~The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> in the <i>exporting country</i> may require health and welfare inspection of consignments of <i>animals</i> at the <i>point of exit</i>, which includes the possibility to deny permission to export if concerns are identified.~~ Rationale:	Did not agree, this paragraph provides general information and the corresponding paragraph in article below is more specific to animal welfare issues.

	Duplicative of last sentence of Article 5.4.4 part 1.	

Article 5.4.4.

Specific recommendations depending on commodities

1. Animals

~~In the case of animals, the Veterinary Authority should ensure that animal welfare is maintained throughout the whole process of exportation, in accordance with Chapters 7.1., 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4. as relevant.~~

The ~~operator~~exporter should ensure that ~~vehicles/vessels~~means of transport used for transportation of *animals* throughout the ~~whole export process of exportation~~ undergo adequate *disinfection*, and that measures are implemented to prevent and control vermin such as rodents or arthropods. These measures should be applied before every *loading* of *animals*. ~~Vehicles/vessels~~Means of transport should contain only *animals* of the same health status except where adequately separated.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.4._1	Comment category: Addition The ~~operator~~exporter should ensure that ~~vehicles/vessels~~<u>means of transport</u> used for transportation of <i>animals</i> throughout the ~~whole export process of exportation~~ undergo adequate <i>disinfection</i>, and that measures are implemented to prevent and control vermin such as rodents or arthropods. These measures should be applied before every <i>loading</i> of <i>animals</i>. ~~Vehicles/vessels~~<u>Means of transport</u> should contain only <i>animals</i> of the same <u>health status except where adequately separated</u>. Rationale: Use of generic term 'operator' is potentially confusing when applied to import/exporter. A Member feels that consideration to changing this in the importation and transit chapters as well.	Comment addressed above (5.4._4)
5.4.4._2	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: The ~~operator~~exporter should ensure that ~~vehicles/vessels~~<u>means of transport</u> used for transportation of <i>animals</i> throughout the ~~whole export process of exportation~~ undergo adequate <i>disinfection</i>, and that measures are implemented to prevent and control vermin such as rodents or arthropods. These measures should be applied before every <i>loading</i> of <i>animals</i>. ~~Vehicles/vessels~~<u>Means of transport</u> should contain only <i>animals</i> of the same <u>health status except where adequately separated to prevent disease transmission</u>. Rationale: Clarity	Agreed, text amended differently.

Containers should be either new or cleaned and disinfected before every *loading* of *animals*, in accordance with Chapter 4.14., ~~or be for single use~~

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that, before leaving the *exporting country*, consignments of *animals* ~~should be~~ subjected to a visual examination, at an appropriate place and time according to the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country. It should be ensured that, from the time of this visual inspection until the time of leaving the *exporting country*, the *animals* in the consignment are not in contact with other *animals* of a different health status.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.4._3	Category: Change Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should ensure that, before leaving the <i>exporting country</i>, consignments of <i>animals</i> ~~should be~~ subjected to a visual examination, at an appropriate place and time according to the <u>procedures of the exporting country and the agreed international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country</u>. It should be ensured that, from the time of this visual <u>inspection examination</u> until the time of leaving the <i>exporting country</i>, the <i>animals</i> in the consignment are not in contact with other <i>animals</i> of a different <u>health</u> status. Rationale: Currently examination and inspection appear to be used interchangeably in this paragraph. Suggest examination for consistency here and with other relevant paragraphs. Examination also implies a greater level of scrutiny than an inspection.	Agreed
5.4.4._4	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): The ~~Veterinary Authority~~ <u>operator Veterinary Authority</u> should ensure that, before leaving the <i>exporting country</i>, consignments of <i>animals</i> ~~should be~~ subjected to a visual examination, at an appropriate place and time according to the <u>procedures of the exporting country and the agreed international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country</u>. It should be ensured that, from the time of this visual inspection until the time of leaving the <i>exporting country</i>, the <i>animals</i> in the consignment are not in contact with other <i>animals</i> of a different <u>health</u> status. Rationale: The actions described in the paragraph above are the responsibility of the Veterinary Authorities, not an operator.	Noted

The ~~Veterinary Authority in the exporting country~~ may require welfare inspection of consignments of *animals* at the *point of exit*. Such inspections should be supported by *veterinary legislation*, which should also ascribe authority to deny permission to export if *animal welfare* concerns are identified.

2. Germinal products

Consignments of *germinal products* should be packed, dispatched, and transported in a way that preserves the viability and integrity of the products.

Consignments of *hatching eggs* should be dispatched from parental *flocks* that meet the conditions of the ~~agreed international veterinary certificate~~. Containers should be either new or cleaned and disinfected before every use, in accordance with Chapter 4.14.

Cryogenic tanks for semen, oocytes or, embryos should be dispatched from *semen collection centres* or *collection centres* that meet the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ *international veterinary certificate*. They should be single-use cryogenic tanks or be cleaned and disinfected before use in accordance with Chapter 4.14. and use new liquid nitrogen.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.4._5	Category: Change. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): Cryogenic tanks for semen, oocytes <u>or</u>, embryos should be dispatched from <i>semen collection centres</i> or <i>collection centres</i> that meet the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ <i>international veterinary certificate</i>. They should be <u>single-use cryogenic tanks new</u> or be cleaned and disinfected before use in accordance with Chapter 4.14. and use new liquid nitrogen. Rationale: More precise wording. Supporting evidence: not relevant.	Did not agree, as the current text is considered clear.

Consignments of semen, oocytes or, embryos, should be identified in accordance with the relevant recommendations of Chapters 4.6. to 4.11.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that, before leaving the *exporting country*, consignments of *germinal products* ~~be~~ are subjected to a visual examination and documentary check and cryogenic tanks for semen, oocytes or, embryos ~~be~~ are sealed and marked, according to the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country.

3. Animal products

Containers used for transporting *animal products* should be suitable for the type of product, protect the *animal products* from damage or contamination, and fulfil the conditions of the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that adequate measures are taken to clean and, where necessary after cleaning, to disinfect before use, *containers* and *means of transportation* in accordance with Chapter 4.14., particularly when conveying or transporting unpacked materials.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that, before leaving the *exporting country*, consignments of *animal products* ~~should be~~ are subjected to a visual examination and documentary check, according to the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country.

Article 5.4.5.

Emergency pPlanning for unexpected events

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.4.5._1	Category: (change) Proposed amended text: Plan de emergencia contingencia ~~Planificación para eventos inesperados~~ Rationale: Es plan de contingencia propuesta va más allá de las atribuciones de la OMSA siendo injerencista en como los países se regulan y establecen las competencias de sus ministerio o secretarías. Dado lo cual se propone regresar a la redacción original.	Did not agree, comment was addressed previously in the September 2024 meeting. Refer to Item 7.3. of the September 2024 report.

~~The Veterinary Authority should develop a plan to address the occurrence within the exporting country after the commodities have been exported, of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements, which may have impacted the status of the exported commodities. The Veterinary Authority should be guided by importing country requirements in implementing the plan.~~

The Veterinary Authority should ensure that the ~~operator~~ exporter develops a plan to address emergencies ~~unexpected events~~ which may impact the ~~compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations in Section 7.~~ being exported, failure of transport arrangements, The plan should address concerns such as deviation from the journey plan, failure to reach the transit or importing country, or rejection of the consignment by them ~~transit or importing country~~. The emergency plan may be generic or specific to each consignment, ~~and should focus on preserving the status of the consignment and animal welfare in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4.5._2	Category: Change Proposed amended text: The Veterinary Authority should ensure that the ~~operator~~ exporter develops a plan to address emergencies ~~unexpected events~~ which may impact the ~~compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements status of the commodities, and their compliance with animal welfare recommendations in Section 7.~~ <u>being exported, failure of transport arrangements, The plan should address concerns such as deviation from the journey plan, failure to reach the transit or importing country, or rejection of the consignment by them</u> ~~transit or importing country~~. The emergency plan may be generic or specific to each consignment, <u>and should focus on preserving the animal health status of the consignment.</u> Rationale: A key underlying reason for the WOH Standards, as recognised through the SPS Agreement, is the prevention of the transboundary movement of animal disease. The plan should focus on preserving the status of the consignment and this should be stated to ensure the clarity of this trade expectation.	For the first proposal to amend the text, did not agree, as the current text is clear. For the second proposal to add text, agreed, text amended differently.
5.4.5._3	Category: Change Proposed amended text: The Veterinary Authority should ensure that the operator develops a plan to address unexpected events which may impact the compliance with	Did not agree, as considered not necessary to mention.

	importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations in Section 7. The plan should address concerns such as deviation from the journey plan, failure to reach the transit or importing country, or rejection of the consignment by them. The plan may be generic or specific to each consignment, <u>and should focus on preventing the introduction to the importing country of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements.</u> Rationale: Text on planning for unexpected events should be consistent to relevant chapters (Article 5.5.4 of Chapter 5.5 “Measures and procedures applicable to the transit of commodities” and Article 5.6.5 of Chapter 5.6 “Measures and procedures applicable to the importation of commodities”). Supporting evidence: -	
5.4.5._4	Category: Additions. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should ensure that the <del>operator</del>~~exporter~~ develops <u>and documents</u> a plan to address ~~emergencies—unexpected events~~ which may impact the ~~compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations in Section 7. —being exported, failure of transport arrangements,~~ The plan should address concerns such as deviation from the ~~journey~~ plan, failure to reach the ~~transit or importing country,~~ or rejection of the consignment by ~~them~~ <u>transit or importing country</u> <u>the transit or importing country</u>. The ~~emergency~~ plan may be generic or specific to each consignment, ~~and should focus on preserving the status of the consignment and animal welfare in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~ Rationale: for clarifications and to improve the language. Supporting evidence: not relevant.	Agreed with addition of ‘and documents’. Second, did not agree, as the current text is clear.

The ~~emergency~~ plan should identify responsibility for development and communication of alternative transport arrangements when necessary. The relevant *Competent Authority* in the ~~exporting, transit and importing countries~~ should be consulted as appropriate by the operator regarding revised transport arrangements to assess the implications for the ~~compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations.~~ The *Veterinary Authority* in the ~~exporting country~~ should be consulted on alternative transport arrangements for consignments of ~~animals~~ to ensure that ~~animal welfare is preserved.~~

The ~~emergency~~ plan should include procedures for managing exported consignments that fail to reach the designated ~~transit or importing countries~~ or are rejected by them.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.5._1	Category: General Rationale: A Member supports the use of the term “disinsection” alongside “disinfection” and they are two different processes. Currently, “disinfection” has been used across Chapters 5.4 to 5.7. We note the considerations between the Code Commission and ad hoc Group around this matter. We also understand this matter will be considered further in conjunction with the revision of Chapter 4.14. General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection.	Comment addressed in Chapter on export, comment 5.4._4
5.5._2	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member agrees with the explanation of terms related to transit, the role of transit countries, and the official control procedure.	Noted
5.5._3	Category: (editorial, general) Proposed amended text: Sustituir la palabra remesas por mercancías o embarque según corresponda en todo el texto Rationale: Se propone cambiar remesas por mercancías o embarque, a fin de dar más claridad a la redacción. Lo anterior, debido a que le termino remesas se utiliza más para referir al envío de dinero de aquellas personas que radican en otra nación a su país de origen. Por embarque se entiende la acción de cargar las mercaderías sobre los medios de transporte en que han de salir del recinto aduanero con destino al exterior o a otras Aduanas del país. (Código Aduanero. Artículo 46) Supporting evidence, if relevant: https://www.condusef.gob.mx/?p=remesas#:~:text=%C2%BFQu%C3%A9%20son%20las%20REMESAS%3F,familias%20que%20vi%20en%20M%C3%A9xico. https://www.aduanas.gub.uy/innovaportal/v/2610/8/innova.front/embarque-definicion.html	Comment addressed in Chapter on export, comment (5.4._3)
5.5._4	Category: General Rationale: In Chapters 5.4, 5.5. and 5.6 it is proposed for the term Operators to be used for Exporter, Importer, or both Importers and Exporters. In some instances, it is confusing who is being referred to, even with the terms being defined within the chapters. In addition, the same term is being unnecessarily used for different purposes in more than one chapter, when acceptable cleaner terminology is available. It would be better to retain Importers and Exporters, as the text is clear on who is being referred to. Moreover, it is better for terms to be used consistently throughout the Code to avoid confusion when interpreting and communicating to stakeholders the requirements of the Code.	Comment addressed in Chapter on export, comment (5.4._4)

5.5._5	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member in general supports this draft revised chapter, provided the comment below is taken into account.	Noted

CHAPTER 5.5.

MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO THE TRANSIT OF COMMODITIES

Article 5.5.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents, without creating unjustified restrictions, when *commodities* destined for another country are either making a stopover in, or transported through a *transit country*, covering from the *point of entry* to the *point of exit*.

This chapter provides *transit countries* with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of the *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant *Competent Authorities* and of any natural or legal entity or person responsible for transit of *commodities* subject to the provisions of this chapter (hereafter 'operator'). An international movement of *commodities* may be considered a 'transit' if *commodities* are transported from an *exporting country* through a *transit country* to an *importing country*. The transit period should not exceed the time necessary for transport and logistics, and *commodities* and all relevant conditions as stated in the certificate issued by the *exporting country* should remain unchanged; otherwise the operation should be interpreted as an importation and exportation.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.5.1._1	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: This chapter provides <i>transit countries</i> with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> and other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> and of any natural or legal entity or person responsible for transit of <i>commodities</i> subject to the provisions of this chapter (hereafter 'operator'). An international movement of <i>commodities</i> may be considered a 'transit' if <i>commodities</i> are transported from an <i>exporting country</i> through a <i>transit country</i> to an <i>importing country</i>. The transit period should not exceed the time necessary for transport and logistics, and <i>commodities</i> and all relevant conditions as stated in the certificate issued by the <i>exporting country</i> should remain unchanged; otherwise the operation should be interpreted as an importation and exportation. Rationale: Clarity, there are three or more countries and, therefore, Veterinary Authorities and other relevant Competent Authorities involved in the movement of commodities that transit. This chapter is for the roles and responsibilities of the transit country.	Agreed
5.5.1._2	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Member recommends the change of this paragraph as following: The transit period should not exceed the time necessary for transport and logistics, <u>and of</u> commodities <u>and as well as</u> all relevant conditions as stated in the certificate issued by the exporting country should remain unchanged; otherwise, the operation should be interpreted as an importation and exportation. Rationale: For clarity	Did not agree, as the current text is clear.

This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and implementation of official controls for transit.

Article 5.5.2.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.5.2._1	Category: General Proposed amended text: Rationale: International Organisation notes that the different modes of transportation (water, land and air) pose different levels of risk by the exposure of animals or their products being transported through a transit country. Land transportation has the highest exposure by time and land distance covered, compared to water, especially maritime, and air. The latter two mean a transitory stop over at a given port but without leaving that port. If we look at air transport, most of the times, the transit airport facilities have special/dedicated buildings to hold live animals in case of transshipment, but there are also occasions	Noted

	when the cargo remains on the aircraft during that brief period of layover. Organisation believes it would be beneficial for the overall outcome of the Code Commission's workstream on this subject to make such distinction and to express a need to take these differences into consideration when drafting rules and regulations that affect transit.	

General considerations

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* of the *transit country* should ensure that *transit country* requirements and procedures, including a list of the *border inspection posts* designated for the transit of *commodities*, are made available to operators and to the *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country*.

A *transit country* may require adequate advance notice or approval regarding the date of entry into and exit from its territory of *commodities*, stating the type of *commodity*, species, quantity, *means of transport* and the *point of entry* or *border inspection post* and *point of exit* to be used.

Operators should be aware of the *transit country* requirements and procedures before shipment, which may include announcing to the *Competent Authorities* of the *transit country* the arrival of consignments at the *point of entry*. Operators should ensure that *commodities* are presented for official controls, including the original official certificates or documents, or digital equivalents, in accordance with *transit country* requirements, and that requirements and procedures defined by the *Competent Authorities* of the *transit country* are met.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.5.2._2	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: Operators should be aware of the <i>transit country</i> requirements and procedures before shipment, which may include announcing to the Veterinary Authority or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> of the <i>transit country</i> the arrival of consignments at the <i>point of entry</i>. Operators should ensure that <i>commodities</i> are presented for official controls, including the original official certificates or documents, or digital equivalents, in accordance with <i>transit country</i> requirements, and that requirements and procedures defined by the <i>Competent Authorities</i> of the <i>transit country</i> are met. Rationale: Communication regarding transiting consignments should be made between <i>Veterinary Authority</i> and/or other <i>Competent Authorities</i>.	Agreed

Operators should ensure that the *commodities* are separated from other *commodities* in the *transit country*, that all relevant conditions as stated in the certification issued by the *exporting country* remain unchanged, and that any unforeseen unloading of *commodities* in the *transit country* is informed to the *Veterinary Authorities* of the *transit country* and the *importing country*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.5.2._3	Category: Change Proposed amended text: Operators should ensure that the <i>commodities</i> are separated from any other <i>commodities</i> in the <i>transit country</i> that may be of a different animal health status, that all relevant conditions as stated in the certification issued by the <i>exporting country</i> remain unchanged, and	Agreed with addition of 'any'. Agreed with addition of text, text amended differently.

	that any unforeseen unloading of <i>commodities</i> in the <i>transit country</i> is informed to the <i>Veterinary Authorities</i> of the <i>transit country</i> and the <i>importing country</i>. Rationale: Commodities should be handled in such a way that the biosecurity risk is not increased during transit. Wording selected for consistency with draft Chapter 5.4.	
5.5.2._4	Comment Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Operators should ensure that the <i>commodities</i> are separated from other <i>commodities</i> originating from or situated in the <i>transit country</i>, that all relevant conditions as stated in the certification issued by the <i>exporting country</i> remain unchanged, and that any unforeseen unloading of <i>commodities</i> in the <i>transit country</i> is informed to the <i>Veterinary Authorities</i> of the <i>transit country</i> and the <i>importing country</i>. Rationale: The beginning of this paragraph could be confusing to the reader and propose an addition to clearly draw lines between commodities in transit and commodities already in the transiting country.	Comment addressed above by adding 'any' (5.5.2._3).
5.5.2._5	Category: Addition Operators should ensure that the <i>commodities</i> are separated from other <i>commodities</i> in the <i>transit country</i>, that all relevant conditions as stated in the certification issued by the <i>exporting country</i> remain unchanged, and that any unforeseen unloading of <i>commodities</i> in the <i>transit country</i> is informed to the <i>Veterinary Authorities</i> of the exporting country, <i>transit country</i> and the <i>importing country</i>. Rationale: The exporting country should also be informed to facilitate ensuring that the importing countries requirements are met or facilitating the exporter to identify an alternative designation.	Did not agree, as informing the exporting country is not relevant in this situation.

In the case of *animals*, operators should ensure that *animal welfare* is maintained throughout the transit process, in accordance with Section 7 as relevant.

Article 5.5.3.

General principles applicable to procedures for official controls for transit

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should implement official inspection based on risk and with appropriate frequency to ensure compliance with the *transit country* requirements. By way of derogation, the *Veterinary Authority* may exempt from inspection *safe commodities* or *commodities* posing a negligible risk and for which inspection is not considered necessary.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.5.3._1	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> of the transit country should implement official inspection based on risk and with appropriate frequency to ensure compliance with the <i>transit country</i> requirements. By way of derogation, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i>	Did not agree, as the current text is clear.

	may exempt from inspection <i>safe commodities</i> or <i>commodities</i> posing a negligible risk and for which inspection is not considered necessary. Rationale: additional wording for clarity	

A *transit country* may not accept the transit of *commodities* not complying with its requirements.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that conditions included in the *international veterinary certificate* at origin are maintained during official controls, stopover, storage and transport, that *biosecurity* is applied to prevent transmission of pathogenic agents throughout the transit process and that unnecessary delays are avoided. Original documentation intended for the *importing country* should remain with the consignment.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.5.3._2	Category: Change Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> should ensure that conditions included in the <i>international veterinary certificate</i> at origin are maintained during official controls, stopover, storage and transport, that <i>biosecurity</i> is applied to prevent transmission of pathogenic agents throughout the transit process and that unnecessary delays are avoided. <u>They should also ensure animal welfare is maintained during transit in accordance with Section 7.</u> Original documentation intended for the <i>importing country</i> should remain with the consignment. Rationale: There should be recognition in this chapter of the need to uphold animal welfare during transit by the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i>.	Agreed
5.5.3._3	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> <u>of the transit country</u> should implement official inspection based on risk and with appropriate frequency to ensure compliance with the <i>transit country</i> requirements. By way of derogation, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> may exempt from inspection <i>safe commodities</i> or <i>commodities</i> posing a negligible risk and for which inspection is not considered necessary. A <i>transit country</i> may not accept the transit of <i>commodities</i> not complying with its requirements. The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> <u>of the transit country</u> should ensure that conditions included in the <i>international veterinary certificate</i> at origin are maintained during official controls, stopover, storage and transport, that <i>biosecurity</i> is applied to prevent transmission of pathogenic agents throughout the transit process and that unnecessary delays are avoided. Original documentation intended for the <i>importing country</i> should remain with the consignment. Rationale: Clarity on which <i>Veterinary Authority</i> is being referred to.	Comment addressed above (5.5.3._1)

5.5.3._4	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: Adding “that animal welfare is maintained during official controls” to the first sentence in the third paragraph in Article 5.5.3: “The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities should ensure that conditions included in the international veterinary certificate at origin are maintained during official controls, stopover, storage and transport, that biosecurity is applied to prevent transmission of pathogenic agents throughout the transit process <u>that animal welfare is maintained during official controls</u> and that unnecessary delays are avoided. Original documentation intended for the importing country should remain with the consignment”. Rationale: While the responsibility of ensuring animal welfare during the import process lies on the operator, it is important that the competent authority maintain animal welfare during the official controls.	Comment addressed above (5.5.3._2)

Article 5.5.4.

Planning for the unexpected events

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.5.4._1	Category: (change) Proposed amended text: <u>Plan de emergencia contingencia</u> ~~Planificación para eventos inesperados~~ Rationale: Es plan de contingencia propuesta va más allá de las atribuciones de la OMSA siendo injerencista en como los países se regulan y establecen las competencias de sus ministerio o secretarías. Dado lo cual se propone regresar a la redacción original.	Comment addressed above (5.4.5._1)

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that the operator develops a plan to address unexpected events which may compromise the compliance of the transited *commodities* with the requirements of the *transit country* or the *importing country*. The plan may be generic, or specific to each consignment, and should focus on preventing the introduction to the *transit country* or the *importing country* of a *listed disease* or a disease referred to in the *transit country* or the *importing country* requirements, and on ensuring *animal welfare* recommendations in Section 7. The plan should identify responsibilities and include procedures for commodities not complying with the *transit country* or the *importing country* requirements.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.5.4._2	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> should ensure that the operator develops a plan to address unexpected events which may compromise the compliance of the transited <i>commodities</i> with the requirements of the <i>transit country</i> or the <i>importing country</i>. The plan may be generic, or specific to each consignment, and should focus on preventing the introduction to the <i>transit country</i> <u>or the importing country</u> of a <i>listed disease</i> or a disease referred to in the <i>transit</i> <u>or the importing country</u> requirements, and on ensuring <i>animal welfare</i> recommendations in Section 7. The plan should identify responsibilities and include procedures for commodities not complying with the <i>transit country</i> <u>or importing country's</u> requirements. Rationale: The intent should be to avoid the introduction of a listed disease (or a disease referred to in the consignment's documentation) to both the transit country and the destination country, as applicable.	Agreed.
5.5.4._3	Category: Addition. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> should ensure that the operator develops <u>and documents</u> a plan to address unexpected events which may compromise the compliance of the transited <i>commodities</i> with the requirements of the <i>transit country</i> or the <i>importing country</i>. The plan may be generic, or specific to each consignment, and should focus on preventing the introduction to the <i>transit country</i> of a <i>listed disease</i> or a disease referred to in the <i>transit country</i> requirements, and on ensuring <i>animal welfare</i> recommendations in Section 7. The plan should identify responsibilities and include procedures for commodities not complying with the <i>transit country</i> requirements. Rationale: More precise wording.	Agreed

Article 5.5.5.

General recommendations on measures to address identified informal or illegal movement of commodities at border inspection posts

To control the *risks* posed by informal or illegal cross-border movement at *border inspection posts*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should coordinate and cooperate with the customs authority as described in Article 5.6.8.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.5.5._1	Category: General Proposed amended text: No text proposed.	Noted (refer to Item 6.5. of report)

	We seek clarification on the term "informal movement of commodities" in Article 5.5.5, including examples, and its distinction from "illegal movement of commodities." Rationale: To ensure mutual understanding among WOAHA member countries Supporting evidence: -	

NOT FOR COMMENT

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6._1	Category: General Rationale: A Member supports the use of the term “disinsection” alongside “disinfection” and they are two different processes. Currently, “disinfection” has been used across Chapters 5.4 to 5.7. We note the considerations between the Code Commission and ad hoc Group around this matter. We also understand this matter will be considered further in conjunction with the revision of Chapter 4.14. General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection.	Comment addressed in comment 5.4._1
5.6._2	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member agrees with the clear definitions of terms related to importation, the import procedure, and the clear definitions and explanations regarding disposal of international catering waste.	Noted
5.6._3	Category: (editorial, general) Proposed amended text: Sustituir la palabra remesas por mercancías o embarque según corresponda en todo el texto Rationale: Se propone cambiar remesas por mercancías o embarque, a fin de dar más claridad a la redacción. Lo anterior, debido a que le termino remeses se utiliza más para referir al envío de dinero de aquellas personas que radican en otra nación a su país de origen. Por embarque se entiende la acción de cargar las mercaderías sobre los medios de transporte en que han de salir del recinto aduanero con destino al exterior o a otras Aduanas del país. (Código Aduanero. Artículo 46) Supporting evidence, if relevant: https://www.condusef.gob.mx/?p=remesas#:~:text=%C2%B4Qu%C3%A9%20son%20las%20REMESAS%3F,familias%20que%20viven%20en%20M%C3%A9xico. https://www.aduanas.gub.uy/innovaportal/v/2610/8/innova.front/embarque-definicion.html	Comment addressed in comment (5.4._3)
5.6._4	Category: General Comment In Chapters 5.4, 5.5. and 5.6 it is proposed for the term Operators to be used for Exporter, Importer, or both Importers and Exporters. In some instances, it is confusing who is being referred to, even with the terms being defined within the chapters. In addition, the same term is being unnecessarily used for different purposes in more than one chapter, when acceptable cleaner terminology is available. It would be better to retain Importers and Exporters, as the text is clear on who is being referred to.	Comment addressed in comment (5.4._4)

	Moreover, it is better for terms to be used consistently throughout the Code to avoid confusion when interpreting and communicating to stakeholders the requirements of the Code. Rationale: Clarity.	
5.6._5	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member in general supports this draft revised chapter, provided the comment below is taken into account.	Noted

CHAPTER 5.6.

MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE INTO THE IMPORTATION OF COMMODITIES

Article 5.6.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable to ~~in~~ the importation of *commodities* to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through *international trade of commodities*, without creating unjustified restrictions, covering from ~~the time of arrival at the~~ point of entry ~~border of~~ in the *importing country* until clearance of *commodities*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.1._1	Comment category: Addition Proposed amended text: This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable ~~in~~ <u>to</u> the exportation of <i>commodities</i> to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through <i>international trade of commodities</i> , without creating unjustified <u>trade</u> restrictions, covering from facilities of origin (such as <i>establishment, slaughterhouse/abattoir, semen collection centre</i>) to the <i>point of exit</i> . Rationale: To be coherent with Annex 20 and Annex 6 and be more precise, A Member would propose to add “trade” in this sentence.	Agreed

This chapter provides *importing countries* with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of the *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant Competent Authorities, and of any natural or legal entity or person responsible for import of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter ~~business operators (hereafter ‘operator’)~~, in addition to responsibilities that are described in Article 5.1.2. This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and implementation performance of official controls for importation. This chapter not only covers legal importation, but also provides general recommendations for illegal or informal entry of commodities.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.1._2	Comment category: Deletion Proposed amended text: <u>This chapter not only covers legal importation, but also provides general recommendations for illegal ~~or informal~~ entry of commodities</u> Rationale: informal should be removed as all movements should be legal or illegal and under official controls.	Comment addressed in comment (5.5.5._1)
5.6.1._3	Category: general Member requests that the Code Commission provide clarification on 'informal entry of commodities'. Rationale: In the current Terrestrial Animal Health Code, "informal entry of commodities" is not used and it would be better to avoid ambiguous words.	Comment addressed in comment (5.5.5._1)
5.6.1._4	Category: Change Proposed amended text: This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and ~~implementation~~ <u>performance</u> of official controls for importation. <u>This chapter not only covers legal importation, but also provides general recommendations for ~~measures to address identified illegal movement of or informal entry of~~ commodities.</u> Rationale: To ensure adequate biosecurity at the border of territories or countries, the movement of commodities should be regulated for animal health purposes by the Veterinary Authority. Commodities and should 'legally' be able to enter or not, dependent on the assessment of risk by the Veterinary Authority. The use of 'informal entry' introduces new and undefined terminology that i) makes expectations in the international trade environment less clear and unnecessarily complicated, and ii) incorrectly implies that a third introduction pathway that is not illegal and not regulated for animal health risks is legitimate.	Comment addressed in comment (5.5.5._1)
5.6.1._5	Category: General Proposed amended text: No text proposed. We seek clarification on the term "informal entry of commodities" in Article 5.6.1 and "informal movement of commodities" in Article 5.6.9, including examples, and its distinction from "illegal entry of commodities" and "illegal movement of commodities". Rationale: To ensure mutual understanding among WOA member countries Supporting evidence: -	Comment addressed in comment (5.5.5._1)

~~The animal health status of the importing country or zone is not affected by the presence of disease or infection in imported animals in a quarantine centre or at a border inspection post.~~

Article 5.6.2.

General considerations

The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country should ensure that the importing country requirements, which may be included in ing international veterinary certificates, and as well as up-to-date information relevant to the import procedures, including a list of the border inspection posts designated for the import and transit of those commodities, are made available to operators and to the exporting countries.

The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country should be responsible for the performance implementation of official controls in accordance with veterinary legislation to ensure that imported commodities can be safely imported. ~~Its~~ Their legal mandate and responsibilities, as described in Articles 3.4.5. and 3.4.13., should include the import official controls activities at any step and the possibility to request from the operator/importer any necessary information. Where appropriate, the Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities may delegate certain tasks in accordance with point 2 of Article 3.4.5. Adequate human, technical, physical and financial resources should be available in the importing country for the Veterinary Services to effectively implement ~~perform~~ official controls inspection in accordance with the quality principles described in Article Chapter 3.2.2.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.2._1	Category: change Proposed amended text: The <u>Veterinary Authority</u> or other relevant <u>Competent Authorities</u> of the <u>importing country</u> should be responsible for the <u>performance implementation</u> of official controls in accordance with <u>veterinary legislation</u> to ensure that <u>imported commodities</u> can be safely imported. Rationale: It's recommended to emphasize only the importing Members are responsible for formulating import measures to ensure the safety of imported commodities to avoid confusion that both importing and exporting Members can formulate import requirements, which may cut down the interests of trade subjects in the importing Members and lead to trade disputes. Same as Article 5.6.3.	Did not agree, as the current text is clear.
5.6.2._2	Category: (editorial) Proposed amended text: La <u>autoridad veterinaria</u> u <u>otras autoridades competentes relevantes</u> del <u>país importador</u> deberán ser responsables de la <u>realización implementación</u> de los controles oficiales de acuerdo con la <u>legislación veterinaria</u> con fines de garantizar que las <u>mercancías</u> puedan importarse de forma segura. Su mandato legal y responsabilidades, según se describe en los Artículos 3.4.5. y 3.4.13., deberán incorporar actividades de los controles oficiales de las importaciones en cada etapa y la posibilidad de solicitar al <u>operador importador</u> toda información necesaria. Cuando proceda, la <u>autoridad veterinaria y otras autoridades competentes relevantes</u> según corresponda, pueden delegar ciertas tareas <u>a actores no oficiales</u>, según el apartado 2 del Artículo 3.4.5. Los <u>servicios veterinarios</u> del <u>país importador</u> deberán disponer de los recursos humanos, técnicos, <u>físicos</u> y financieros adecuados para <u>implementar efectivamente</u> ~~llevar a cabo la inspección~~ los <u>controles</u> oficiales de conformidad con los principios de calidad descritos en el <u>Artículo Capítulo 3.2.2.</u> Rationale:	Comment addressed in comment (5.4.2._1)

	Se propone las modificaciones editoriales, al considerar que pudieran ser por cuestiones de traducción. Por lo que al realizarlas dan coherencia al texto en español.	
5.6.2._3	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: “The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities should be responsible for the implementation of official controls in accordance with veterinary legislation to ensure that commodities can be safely imported <u>and animal welfare is maintained</u> ”. Rationale: While the responsibility of ensuring animal welfare during the import process lies on the operator, it is important that the competent authority maintain animal welfare during the official controls.	Agreed, text amended differently.

An *importing country* may require adequate advance notice or approval regarding the date of entry of commodities into its territory ~~of commodities~~, stating the type of *commodity*, species, quantity, means of transport and the *border inspection post* to be used.

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities when relevant, should perform~~ Official inspections should be implemented in accordance with Article 3.2.12. regularly, on a risk basis and with appropriate frequency to ensure compliance with the *importing country* requirements. By way of derogation, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities may exempt from the inspection, *safe commodities* or *commodities* posing a negligible risk and for which inspection is not considered necessary.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.2._4	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: ~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities when relevant, should perform~~ Official inspections <u>should be implemented in accordance with Article 3.2.12.</u> regularly, on a risk basis and with appropriate frequency to ensure compliance with the <i>importing country</i> requirements. By way of derogation, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u> may exempt from the inspection, <i>safe commodities</i> or <i>commodities</i> posing a negligible risk and for which inspection is not considered necessary. Rationale: ‘regularly’ is not necessary as the text already states that official inspections should be implemented on a risk basis and with appropriate frequency.	Agreed, text amended differently for clarity.

Biosecurity should be applied to prevent transmission of pathogenic agents from *commodities* throughout the import process.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.6.2._5	Category: Change Proposed: <u>Biosecurity Sanitary measures</u> should be applied to prevent ~~introduction~~ <u>transmission</u> of pathogenic agents from <i>commodities</i> throughout the import process. Rationale: The measures applied to the import process aim to prevent introduction of pathogenic agents into the country.	Did not agree: biosecurity should be in place throughout the process while sanitary measures are very specific to mitigate a particular risk to protect a territory.

An *importing country* may prohibit the ~~introduction~~entry into its territory of a consignment of commodities not complying with the *importing country* requirements.

~~Operators~~Importers should be aware of the *importing country* requirements and import procedure before the importation and ~~inform~~announce, in advance, to the relevant Competent Authorities the arrival of consignments at the *border inspection post*, in accordance with *importing country* requirements. ~~Operators~~Importers should ensure that *commodities* are presented for official ~~controls~~inspection at the *border inspection post*, together with the original ~~official~~international veterinary certificates or documents, or digital equivalents, which are required to accompany the consignments.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.2._6	Category: Change Proposed amended text: ~~Operators~~ <u>Importers</u> should be aware of the <i>importing country</i> requirements and import procedure before the importation and ~~inform~~ <u>announce</u> , in advance, to the <u>Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities</u> the arrival of consignments at the <i>border inspection post</i> , in accordance with <i>importing country</i> requirements. ~~Operators~~ <u>Importers</u> should ensure that <i>commodities</i> are presented for official ~~controls~~ <u>inspection</u> at the <i>border inspection post</i> , together with the original ~~official~~ <u>international veterinary certificates</u> or documents, or digital equivalents, which are required to accompany the consignments. Rationale: Communication regarding the arrival of consignments should be made between Veterinary Authority and/or other Competent Authorities.	Agreed

In case of *animals*, ~~operators~~importers should ensure that *animal welfare* is maintained throughout the ~~whole import process of importation~~, in accordance with ~~Chapters 7.1., 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~Section 7 as relevant.

The ~~Veterinary Authority of the importing country~~ should carry out collaborative activities with other relevant Competent Authorities, customs, other authorities and operators, and with *Veterinary Authorities* in other countries, to control the risk posed by the illegal cross-border movement of *commodities*, i.e. international movement of *commodities* done in a way to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.6.2._7	Category: Addition Proposed: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>of the importing country</u> should carry out collaborative activities with other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u>, customs, other authorities and operators, and with <i>Veterinary Authorities</i> in other countries, to control the risk posed by the illegal cross-border movement of <i>commodities</i>, i.e. international movement of <i>commodities</i> done in a way to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls. Rationale: Retain text to improve clarity.	Did not agree, as the current text is clear.
5.6.2._8	Category: Addition Proposed text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> ~~of the importing country~~ <u>should be responsive to reported illegal movements of commodities</u> and carry out collaborative activities with other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u>, customs, other authorities and operators, and with <i>Veterinary Authorities</i> in other countries, to control the risk posed by the illegal cross-border movement of <i>commodities</i>, i.e. international movement of <i>commodities</i> done in a way to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls. Rationale: Inclusion of an expectation of Veterinary Authorities to be responsive to concerns raised by other Veterinary Authorities of certification fraud or illegal import activities.	Did not agree, as considered 'collaborative activities' covers.

Article 5.6.3.

General principles applicable to procedures for import official controls for importation

Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities should ~~take control of~~ the imported *commodities* to ~~decide~~ determine whether or not the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements.

Import-Official controls should be ~~performed~~ implemented at an appropriate place which might include a *border inspection post*, a point of entry, *quarantine centre*, the place of destination, or premises of the operator responsible for the consignment. The consignment should remain under the control of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities until formal clearance.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.3._1	Comment category: Addition Proposed amended text: ~~Import-Official controls~~ should be ~~performed~~ <u>implemented</u> at an appropriate place which might include a <i>border inspection post</i>, a point of entry, <i>quarantine centre</i>, the place of destination, or premises of the operator responsible for the consignment. The consignment should remain under the control of the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u> until formal clearance. <u>Official controls for importation should not constitute an unjustified barrier to trade.</u> Rationale: A Member proposes the addition of that sentence at the end of the paragraph as a preamble so that WOA members can acknowledge that the process detailed below should not be	Did not agree, as it is already covered in Articles 5.6.1.

	too burdensome so as to represent a non-trade barriers (NTB). This is also echoed in paragraph 1 of Article 5.6.3, point 2 (Sampling and testing).	

In case of emergency, ships and aircrafts may be granted access to a port or airport ~~which that~~ are not their intended destination. In those cases, they should be subjected to the animal health and animal welfare measures which the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities may consider necessary based on the potential risk.

1. Official inspection

Where official inspections of *commodities* are ~~performed~~ implemented, they should always include a documentary check and, depending on the risk to human and animal health and *animal welfare*, should also include identity checks and physical inspection checks. When the *Veterinary Authority* or other ~~Competent Authorities~~ Services needs to have full access to the consignment for the purpose of identity checks or physical inspection, consignments should be partially or fully unloaded from the means of transport.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.3._2	Category: Editorial Proposed: Where official inspections of <i>commodities</i> are ~~performed~~ <u>implemented</u>, they should always include a documentary check and, depending on the risk to human <u>health</u>, and animal health <u>and/or</u> <i>animal welfare</i>, should also include identity checks and physical <u>inspection checks</u>. When the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other ~~Competent Authorities~~ <u>Services</u> needs to have full access to the consignment for the purpose of identity checks or physical inspection, consignments should be partially or fully unloaded from the means of transport. Rationale: Editorial. The risk will not always impact all categories listed.	Agreed

a) Documentary check

A documentary check should be ~~implemented~~ performed on all consignments presented for official controls inspection to ensure that they meet the *importing country* requirements.

~~A~~ D documentary check should include examination of the *international veterinary certificate*, and possibly of laboratory reports or other documents, including those of a commercial nature, which are required to accompany the consignment.

When ~~implementing~~ performing a documentary check, the *Veterinary Authority* or other ~~Competent Authorities~~ Services should inspect the required documents, in original or their digital equivalents as agreed between the *importing* and *exporting country*, to ensure that:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.3._3	Comment category: Deletion Proposed amended text: When ~~implementing~~ <u>performing</u> a documentary check, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other ~~Competent Authorities~~ <u>Services</u> should inspect the required documents, in original or their digital equivalents <u>as agreed between the importing and exporting country</u>, to ensure that: Rationale: In the <i>Report of the Meeting of WOAHC ad hoc Group on the revision of chapters 5.4. to 5.7. of the Terrestrial Code</i>	Did not agree, as this paragraph does not pertain to the contents of the certificate, rather on the agreement regarding the use of 'original' or the 'digital equivalent' of the certificate.

	(Revised Chapter 5.4. Measures and procedures applicable to the exportation of commodities) : “The <i>Ad Hoc</i> Group noted that the international veterinary certificate may not always be based on bilateral negotiation. The Group decided to remove ‘agreed’ from the term ‘international veterinary certificate’ throughout the four draft chapters.” A Member would propose the deletion of the part in this paragraph that refers to “agreements” between parties.	

- i) the *international veterinary certificate* has been issued by the *Official Veterinarian* of the *exporting country*; complies with relevant principles set out in Article 5.2.3. and corresponds as relevant to the model ~~established~~ agreed between the exporting and by the importing country for that *commodity* and intended use, ~~based on Chapters 5.10. to 5.13.;~~ and

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.3._4	Comment category: Deletion Proposed amended text: the <i>international veterinary certificate</i> has been issued by the <i>Official Veterinarian</i> of the <i>exporting country</i>; complies with relevant principles set out in Article 5.2.3. ~~and corresponds as relevant to the model established agreed between the exporting and by the importing country for that commodity and intended use, based on Chapters 5.10. to 5.13.;~~ and Rationale: In the <i>Report of the Meeting of WOAHA ad hoc Group on the revision of chapters 5.4. to 5.7. of the Terrestrial Code</i> (Revised Chapter 5.4. Measures and procedures applicable to the exportation of commodities) : “The <i>Ad Hoc</i> Group noted that the international veterinary certificate may not always be based on bilateral negotiation. The Group decided to remove ‘agreed’ from the term ‘international veterinary certificate’ throughout the four draft chapters.” A Member would propose the deletion of the part in this paragraph that refers to “agreements” between parties.	Agreed with rationale Refer to comment below (5.6.3._5)
5.6.3._5	Category: addition i) the international veterinary certificate has been issued by the <i>Official Veterinarian</i> of the <i>exporting country</i>; complies with relevant principles set out in Article 5.2.3. and corresponds <u>as relevant</u> to the model ~~established~~ <u>established by the importing country or agreed between the exporting and by the importing country where applicable</u> for that commodity and intended use, ~~based on Chapters 5.10. to 5.13.;~~ and Rationale: As mentioned in the ad hoc Group in April 2024, the international veterinary certificate may not always be based on bilateral negotiation.	Agreed with the first proposal. Did not agree with the second proposal, as it is already optional by adding ‘or’.

- ii) the information contained in the checked documents complies with the *importing country* requirements.

b) Identity check

An identity check should be ~~implemented~~ performed upon arrival of the consignment at the point of inspection, as a visual inspection to verify that the content and the labelling of a consignment, including the identification of *commodities*, seals and means of transport, correspond to the information declared in the *international veterinary certificate* and accompanying documents.

The frequency of identity checks, the quantity of *commodities* to be inspected as well as the criteria for sampling selection for checking should be determined by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country based on risk assessment.

c) Physical inspection

Physical inspection should include, as appropriate:

- i) clinical examination of ~~an animals~~ for evidence of ~~transmissible~~ diseases and *animal welfare* issues
- ii) ~~and~~ physical checks of *animal products* and *germinal products*.
- iii) ~~and, as appropriate,~~ checks on packaging and labelling.
- iv) checks on the means of transport, ~~labelling~~ and temperature records,
- v) ~~the~~ sampling for analysis, testing or diagnosis, and
- vi) any other checks required by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities to verify compliance with the *importing country* requirements.

The frequency of physical inspection, the quantity of *commodities* to be inspected as well as the criteria for sampling selection for physical inspection should be determined by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country based on risk assessment, and considering the following:-

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.3._6	Category: Editorial Proposed: The frequency of <u>physical</u> inspection, the quantity of <i>commodities</i> to be inspected as well as the criteria for <u>sampling selection for physical inspection</u> should be determined by the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>in coordination with or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country</u> based on risk assessment, <u>and considering the following:-</u> Rationale: Clarity. The Veterinary Authority within the Member Country should ultimately be responsible for implementing and meeting the requirements of international animal and animal health trade standards.	Did not agree, as this is the list of authorities that can be responsible for the determination.
5.6.3._7	Category: Editorial. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): ~~ii) and~~ physical checks of <i>animal products</i> and <i>germinal products</i>. ~~iii) and, as appropriate,~~ checks on packaging <u>and labelling</u>. iv) <u>checks on</u> the means of transport, ~~labelling~~ and temperature records, ~~v) the~~ sampling for analysis, testing or diagnosis, and Rationale: Corrections.	Agreed

	Supporting evidence: not relevant.	

i) For animals

The ~~Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities of the importing country~~ should determine the number of *animals* to be clinically examined should be determined in accordance with the overall number of *animals* in the consignment and the declared purpose of the animals, ~~which it~~ may be increased if the physical checks carried out have not been satisfactory.

In some cases, such as ~~For animals that are not required to be identified individually~~ and animals considered to be dangerous, clinical examination ~~should~~ could consist of observation of the state of health and behaviour of the entire group or of a representative number of *animals*.

If the clinical examination reveals an anomaly, a more thorough clinical examination may be carried out, including sampling and testing, where appropriate.

ii) ~~Germinal~~ For germinal products

The ~~Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities~~ should carry out Physical checks of the consignment should be carried out to verify the compliance of labelling and the transport conditions with *importing country* requirements, including, when relevant, temperature records ~~when relevant~~ and the integrity of the seals, packaging material and cryogenic tanks.

The ~~Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities of the importing country~~ should determine the number of items to be checked, which may be increased if the checks carried out have not been satisfactory.

The ~~Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities~~ may carry out physical checks to verify that the labelling complies with *importing country* requirements.

Physical inspection may include laboratory testing of the *germinal products*.

If the physical checks reveal an anomaly, a more thorough inspection may be carried out.

iii) For animal products

The ~~Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities~~ should carry out physical checks of the consignment should be carried out to verify the compliance of labelling and the transport conditions with *importing country* requirements, including temperature records when relevant and the integrity of the packaging material and seals.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.3._8	Category: Editorial. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): ~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities should carry out~~ <u>p-Physical</u> checks of the consignment <u>should be carried out</u> to verify the compliance of <u>labelling and</u> the transport conditions with <i>importing country</i> requirements, including temperature records when relevant and the integrity of the packaging material <u>and seals</u> . Rationale: correction.	Agreed
5.6.3._9	Category: Editorial. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): ~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities should carry out~~ <u>p-Physical</u> checks of the consignment <u>should be carried out</u> to verify the compliance of <u>labelling and</u> the transport conditions with <i>importing country</i>	Agreed

	requirements, including temperature records when relevant and the integrity of the packaging material <u>and seals</u> .	
	Rationale: Capitalize the first letter of a sentence.	

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities may carry out physical checks to verify that the labelling complies with importing country requirements.~~

Physical inspection may include sensory examination and laboratory testing of the *animal products*.

If the physical checks reveal an anomaly, a more thorough inspection may be carried out.

2. Sampling and testing

Sampling and testing of imported *commodities* ~~with a view to checking compliance with the health-importing country requirements laid down in the international veterinary certificate,~~ may be ~~implemented~~ performed following a risk-based sampling plan or upon suspicion of non-compliance resulting from the documentary, identity or physical checks of *commodities*, without creating unjustified barriers to trade. Testing should be ~~implemented~~ performed in an ~~approved~~ laboratory.

The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities may develop a risk-based sampling plan for imported consignments, that should specify the percentage of consignments to be sampled, taking into account the animal health status of the importing and exporting country, the species concerned, the nature and declared purpose of the *commodities*, the number of incoming consignments and the results of previous sampling.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.3._10	Category: Change Proposed: The Veterinary Authority <u>in coordination with</u> other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u> may develop a risk-based sampling plan for imported consignments, that should specify the percentage of consignments to be sampled, taking into account <u>the animal health status of the importing and exporting country</u>, the species concerned, the nature and declared purpose of the <i>commodities</i>, the number of incoming consignments and the results of previous sampling. Rationale: The Veterinary Authority within the Member Country should ultimately be responsible for implementing and meeting the requirements of international animal and animal health trade standards.	Did not agree, as considered the collaboration is not always necessary.

Where no immediate danger to animal health or public health is suspected from *commodities* sampled in accordance with a sampling plan, a consignment may be released before the results of laboratory tests are available. A traceability system should be in place to recall commodities if needed.

3. Sanitary measures at import

To meet the *importing country* requirements, in addition to the *sanitary measures* implemented in the *exporting countries*, the Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities ~~of importing country~~ may require *sanitary measures* to be implemented at importation before release of the *commodities* from official controls. Measures may include disinfection of and ~~disinsection~~ elimination of arthropod vectors from

~~vehicles/vessels~~ means of transport and containers used in the transportation and unloading of commodities, in accordance with Chapter 4.14.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.3._11	Comment category: Addition Proposed amended text: To meet the <i>importing country</i> requirements, in addition to the <i>sanitary measures</i> implemented in the <i>exporting countries</i>, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant Competent Authorities of importing country</u> may require <i>sanitary measures</i> to be implemented at importation before release of the <i>commodities</i> from official controls. <u>Such measures shall be communicated to the Veterinary Authority of the exporting countries or other relevant Competent Authorities prior to exportation.</u> Measures may include <i>disinfection of</i> and ~~disinsection-elimination of~~ <i>arthropod vectors</i> ~~from~~ <i>vehicles/vessels</i> means of transport and containers used in the transportation and unloading of commodities, in accordance with Chapter 4.14. Rationale: The importing country should make sure that the exporting country is aware of any sanitary measures that may be applied as far in advance as possible to ensure predictability in the clearance process.	Did not agree, as considered this is only for the responsibility of the importing country.
5.6.3._12	Category: Addition Proposed: To meet the <i>importing country</i> requirements, in addition to the <i>sanitary measures</i> implemented in the <i>exporting countries</i>, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>in coordination with</u> ~~or~~ other <u>relevant Competent Authorities of importing country</u> may require <i>sanitary measures</i> to be implemented at importation before release of the <i>commodities</i> from official controls. Measures may include <i>disinfection of</i> and ~~disinsection-elimination of~~ <i>arthropod vectors</i> ~~from~~ <i>vehicles/vessels</i> means of transport and containers used in the transportation and unloading of commodities, in accordance with Chapter 4.14. Rationale: Clarity	For proposal of replacement, comment addressed in comment (5.6.3._10) Did not agree with addition of 'of importing country', as the current text is clear.

In the case of *animals*, measures may include *vaccination*, treatment or isolation. In the case of other *commodities*, measures may include a holding period or the application of physical or chemical treatment.

4. Release of consignments

Based on the ~~implement~~ performed import official controls, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of importing countries should decide whether the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements.

When the decision is made that the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements and has been cleared for release, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities should notify the ~~operator~~ importer and the information should be made available to the customs authorities.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.6.3._13	Category: Addition Proposed: Based on the ~~implement~~<u>performed import official controls</u>, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>in coordination with</u> other <u>relevant Competent Authorities of importing countries</u> should decide whether the consignment complies with the <i>importing country</i> requirements. When the decision is made that the consignment complies with the <i>importing country</i> requirements <u>and has been cleared for release</u>, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>in coordination with</u> other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u> should notify the <u>operator</u>~~importer~~ and the information should be made available to the customs authorities. Rationale: As per previous comment: The Veterinary Authority within the Member Country should ultimately be responsible for implementing and meeting the requirements of international animal and animal health trade standards.	Comment addressed in comment (5.6.3._10)

Article 5.6.4.

Further action for non-compliant commodities

Commodities identified as non-compliant based on the ~~implement~~performed import official controls should not be released by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities and should be ~~isolated~~detained under appropriate conditions including isolation for animals, pending further decision ~~by the Competent Authority~~.

Depending on the type of *commodity* and the *risk* the *commodity* represents to human and animal health, and environment, or ~~for due to animal welfare~~ reasons, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities, should identify the options for the disposition of the *commodities* and notify the operator~~importer~~. Disposition of *commodities* may include:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.4._1	Category: Editorial Proposed: Depending on the type of <i>commodity</i> and the <i>risk</i> the <i>commodity</i> represents to human <u>health and</u> animal health, <u>and the</u> environment, or ~~for due to animal welfare~~ reasons, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u>, should identify the options for the disposition of the <i>commodities</i> and notify the <u>operator</u>~~importer~~. Disposition of <i>commodities</i> may include: Rationale: Editorial. The risk will not always impact all categories listed i.e. human health, animal health, or the environment.	Agreed

- a) re-dispatching the *commodity* back to the *exporting country* or another country, with the agreement of the receiving *Competent Authority*;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.6.4._2	Category: Editorial Proposed: a) re- ~~dispatching~~ shipping the <i>commodity</i> back to the <i>exporting country</i> or another country, with the agreement of the receiving <i>Competent Authority</i> ; Rationale: Editorial	Agreed
5.6.4._3	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: “re-dispatching the commodity back to the exporting country or another country, ~~with the agreement of the receiving Competent Authority with information to or, where appropriate, the agreement of the receiving Competent Authority~~ ”. Rationale: It is important that the receiving competent authority receives information on the rejected consignment for re-dispatch, however it is not always necessary with a formal agreement. The requirement could lead to a considerable administrative burden. This would also be in line with the Official Controls Regulation (Article 72). Further, it is important that the WOA code does not contradict the Codex Alimentarius.	Agreed with rationale, text amended differently.

- b) subjecting the *commodity* to treatment or to other risk mitigation measures necessary to allow importation;
- c) *killing* and disposal of *animals*, or destruction of other *commodities*.

Any action applied to consignments of *animals* should comply with ~~Chapters 7.1. and 7.6.~~ the relevant provisions of Section 7.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of the *importing country* should notify any decision and reasons to refuse entry of a *commodity* to the customs authorities and are encouraged to communicate it to the *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country*. Where appropriate, the Veterinary Authority of the exporting country should be given the opportunity to explain the situation in an attempt to have the consignment released.

Following decisions taken in relation to non-compliant *commodities*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities should supervise the effective disposition of the *commodities* and apply measures to prevent the introduction into the country of *commodities* which have been refused import, and the reuse of the *international veterinary certificate* that accompanied the consignment.

The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authority of the importing country should inform the exporting country of any case of a listed disease or disease referred to in the importing country requirements in a consignment of animals.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.6.4._4	Category: change Proposed amended text: ~~The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authority of the importing country should inform the exporting country of any case of a listed disease or disease referred to in the importing country requirements in a consignment of animals.~~ Rationale: According to Chapter 1.1 of the Code on notification of animal diseases, there is no obligation for importing countries/regions to notify exporting countries/regions. If every shipment of commodities is notified to the exporting country/region of the positive disease situation, it will additionally increase the workload of the importing country/region. Supporting evidence: not relevant	Did not agree, as considered this is basic information. The Code Commission noted that Chapter 1.1. is obligation of notification to WOA, and this chapter is the recommendation for Members.
5.6.4._5	Category: Addition Proposed: ~~The Veterinary Authority in coordination with other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country should notify any decision and reasons to refuse entry of a commodity to the customs authorities and are encouraged to communicate it to the Veterinary Authority of the exporting country. Where appropriate, the Veterinary Authority of the exporting country should be given the opportunity to explain the situation in an attempt to have the consignment released.~~ Following decisions taken in relation to non-compliant commodities, the Veterinary Authority in coordination with other relevant Competent Authorities should supervise the effective disposition of the commodities and apply measures to prevent the introduction into the country of commodities which have been refused import, and the reuse of the international veterinary certificate that accompanied the consignment. ~~The Veterinary Authority in coordination with other relevant Competent Authority of the importing country should inform the exporting country of any case of a listed disease or disease referred to in the importing country requirements in a consignment of animals.~~ Rationale: As per previous comments. The Veterinary Authority within the Member Country should ultimately be responsible for implementing and meeting the requirements of international animal and animal health trade standards.	Comment addressed in comment (5.6.3._10)

Article 5.6.5.

Emergency Planning for unexpected events

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.6.5._1	Category: (change) Proposed amended text: <u>Plan de emergencia contingencia Planificación para eventos inesperados</u> Rationale: Es plan de contingencia propuesta va más allá de las atribuciones de la OMSA siendo injerencista en como los países se regulan y establecen las competencias de sus ministerio o secretarías. Dado lo cual se propone regresar a la redacción original.	Comment addressed in comment (5.4.5._1)

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities of the importing country should develop a plan to address the occurrence, within the exporting country after the commodities have been exported or within the transit country after the commodities have transited, of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements which may have impacted the status of the exported commodities.~~

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities may also develop a plan to address the occurrence of a listed disease, or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements, within the importing country before the animals have been released.~~

The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities should ensure that the operator/importer develops a plan to address unexpected events/emergencies which may impact the compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements being imported, and non-compliant commodities described in Article 5.6.4. The emergency plan may be generic, or specific to each consignment, and should focus on preventing the introduction to the importing country of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements, and on animal welfare recommendations in accordance with Section 7 Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4. The emergency plan should identify responsibility and include procedures for actions taken for non-compliant commodities described in Article 5.6.4.

Article 5.6.6.

General recommendations applicable to vehicles/vessels/means of transport and containers that transported infected animals

~~Vehicles/vessels/Means of transport~~ and containers that transported animals found to be infected with a pathogenic agent of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements should be considered as contaminated, and the Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities should apply the following measures as appropriate to the risk:

- treatment or safe disposal of the litter, forage and any other potentially contaminated material, by its removal from the vehicles/vessels/means of transport and containers for immediate transportation to an establishment assigned in advance, where the animal health measures required by the importing country should be strictly applied;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.6._1	Category: Editorial Proposed: treatment <u>or safe disposal</u> of the litter, forage and any other potentially contaminated material, by its removal from the <u>vehicles/vessels/means of transport</u> and containers for immediate transportation to an establishment assigned in advance, where the animal health measures required by the importing country should be strictly applied;	Agreed

	Rationale: Spelling	
5.6.6._2	Category: Editorial. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): treatment ~~or safe disposal~~ of the litter, forage and any other potentially contaminated material, by its removal from the ~~vehicles/vessels~~ <u>means of transport</u> and <i>containers</i> for immediate transportation to an establishment assigned in advance, where the animal health measures required by the <i>importing country</i> should be strictly applied; Rationale: Correction of a spelling error.	Agreed

- b) *disinfection* of all parts of the ~~vehicles/vessels~~means of transport and *containers* which were used in the transport, feeding, watering, moving and *unloading* of the *animals*, as well as all baggage of travelling attendants, in accordance with Chapter 4.14.;
- c) ~~disinsection~~elimination of arthropod vectors from of ~~vehicles/vessels~~means of transport and *containers* in case of *vector* disease.

Article 5.6.7.

General principles applicable to disposal of international catering waste

International catering waste is a high-risk category of product and should therefore be subject to strict controls to minimise the risk of introduction of pathogenic agents.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.7._1	Category: Deletion Proposed: International catering waste ~~is a high-risk category of product~~ and should ~~therefore~~ be subject to strict controls to minimise the risk of introduction of pathogenic agents. Rationale: Clarity and brevity.	Agree, text amended differently.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that all international catering waste entering the country from the international means of transport is handled, collected and disposed of in a way to minimise the risk of introduction of pathogenic agents.

Article 5.6.8.

General recommendations on measures to address identified illegal movement of commodities at border inspection posts

To control the *risks* posed by illegal cross-border movement at *border inspection posts*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should coordinate and cooperate closely with the customs authority to ensure that the official ~~controls inspection of for commodities~~ entering the country ~~are implemented~~ performed in accordance with the rules of this chapter and national legislation, including when fraud is suspected.

For that purpose, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure the timely exchange with the customs authority, including via electronic means, of information and decisions made relevant to

the organisation and conduct of their respective activities for *commodities* entering the country. The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities should collaborate with the customs authority to ensure immediate notification to the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities ~~if of circumstances where a declaration is submitted to the customs authority for a consignment of those categories of commodities that should be subject to official inspection control~~ but with no evidence of an official inspection control having been conducted.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities, in collaboration with the customs authorities, should have practical arrangements in place to ensure ~~the~~ implementation of the measures described in Article 5.6.4. in case of detection of illegal cross-border movement of *commodities* at a *border inspection post*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.8._1	Category: Proposed: To control the <i>risks</i> posed by illegal cross-border movement at <i>border inspection posts</i>, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>in coordination with</u> ~~other relevant Competent Authorities~~ should coordinate and cooperate closely with the customs authority to ensure that the official <u>controls inspection of for commodities</u> entering the country ~~are implemented~~ performed in accordance with the rules of this chapter and national legislation, <u>including when fraud is suspected</u>. For that purpose, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>in coordination with</u> ~~other relevant Competent Authorities~~ should ensure the timely exchange with the customs authority, including via electronic means, of information and decisions made relevant to the organisation and conduct of their respective activities for <i>commodities</i> entering the country. The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>in coordination with</u> ~~other relevant Competent Authorities~~ should collaborate with the customs authority to ensure immediate notification to the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>in coordination with</u> ~~other relevant Competent Authorities~~ ~~if of circumstances where a declaration is submitted to the customs authority for a consignment of those categories of commodities that should be subject to official inspection control~~ but with no evidence of an official <u>inspection control</u> having been conducted. The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>in coordination with</u> ~~other relevant Competent Authorities~~, in collaboration with <u>the</u> customs authorities, should have practical arrangements in place to ensure ~~the~~ implementation of the measures described in Article 5.6.4. in case of detection of illegal cross-border movement of <i>commodities</i> at a <i>border inspection post</i>. Rationale: As per previous comment. The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> within the Member Country should ultimately be responsible for implementing and meeting the requirements of international animal and animal health trade standards.	Comment addressed in comment (5.6.3._10)

Article 5.6.9.

General recommendations on measures to address identified informal or illegal movement of commodities outside border inspection posts

To control the *risks* posed by the illegal cross-border movement of *commodities* outside of *border inspection posts*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities should:

- 1) coordinate with border authorities (police, customs, transport, immigration) to provide technical support for identification of illegal cross border movement of *commodities*;
- 2) develop and implement practical mechanisms to address informal or illegal cross border movement of *commodities* ~~and implementation thereof~~ in close collaboration with border authorities.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6.9._1	Category: Deletion Proposed amended text: General recommendations on measures to address identified <u>informal or</u> illegal movement of commodities outside border inspection posts To control the <i>risks</i> posed by the illegal cross-border movement of <i>commodities</i> outside of <i>border inspection posts</i>, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant</u> <i>Competent Authorities</i> should: 1) coordinate with border authorities (police, customs, transport, immigration) to provide technical support for identification of illegal cross border movement of <i>commodities</i>; 2) develop <u>and implement</u> practical mechanisms to address <u>informal or</u> illegal cross border movement of <i>commodities</i> ~~and implementation thereof~~ in close collaboration with border authorities. Rationale: As per in comment comment: to ensure adequate biosecurity at the border of territories or countries the movement of commodities should be regulated for animal health purposes by the Veterinary Authority. Commodities should either legally be able to enter or not, dependent on the assessment of risk by the Veterinary Authority. The word 'informal' introduces new and undefined terminology that: i) makes expectations in the international trade environment less clear and unnecessarily complicated, and ii) incorrectly implies a third introduction pathway that is not illegal and not regulated for animal health risks is legitimate.	Comment addressed in comment (5.5.5._1)

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.7._1	Category: General Rationale: A Member supports the use of the term “disinsection” alongside “disinfection” and they are two different processes. Currently, “disinfection” has been used across Chapters 5.4 to 5.7. We note the considerations between the Code Commission and ad hoc Group around this matter. We also understand this matter will be considered further in conjunction with the revision of Chapter 4.14. General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection.	Comment addressed above (5.4._1)
5.7._2	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member agrees with the overall explanation regarding the requirements for border inspection posts and quarantine centers.	Noted
5.7._3	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member supports this draft revised chapter.	Noted

CHAPTER 5.7.

BORDER INSPECTION POSTS AND QUARANTINE CENTRES

Article 5.7.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides recommendations on *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* to support effective implementation of measures and procedures applicable to the exportation, transit and importation of *commodities*, in order to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents without creating unjustified trade restrictions.

Quarantine centres may be used for isolation of *animals* either pre-exportation in accordance with disease-specific chapters in the *Terrestrial Code* or post-arrival. The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that the application of *biosecurity* at *quarantine centres* is appropriate to the type of isolation being undertaken, and effectively mitigates risks in accordance with disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* (pre-export isolation) or via *risk analysis* (post-arrival quarantine).

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.7.1._1	Category: Change Proposed amended text: <i>Quarantine centres</i> may be used for isolation of <i>animals</i> either pre-exportation in accordance with disease-specific chapters in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> or post-arrival. The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> should ensure that the	Did not agree, as importing country requirements are established based on the Terrestrial Code and risk analysis. The Code Commission noted it is

	application of <i>biosecurity at quarantine centres</i> is appropriate to the type of isolation being undertaken, and effectively mitigates risks in accordance with disease-specific chapters of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>, importing country requirements, ~~(pre-export isolation)~~ or via <i>risk analysis</i> ~~(post-arrival quarantine)~~. Rationale: Pre-export isolation requirements are not related only to recommendations in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>, and may also be required on the basis of risk analysis. The reverse may also apply in the case of post-arrival quarantine. As passage relates to pre-export quarantine, the application of biosecurity at quarantine centres should also be in accordance with importing country requirements.	not necessary to include proposed text.
5.7.1._2	Category: Change Proposed: <i>Quarantine centres</i> may be used for isolation of <i>animals</i> either pre-exportation in accordance with disease-specific chapters in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> or post-arrival. The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> ~~or other relevant Competent Authorities~~ should ensure in coordination with other Competent Authorities when relevant that the application of <i>biosecurity at quarantine centres</i> is appropriate to the type of isolation being undertaken, and effectively mitigates risks in accordance with disease-specific chapters of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> (pre-export isolation) or via <i>risk analysis</i> (post-arrival quarantine). Rationale: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> within the Member Country should ultimately be responsible for implementing and meeting the requirements of international animal and animal health trade standards. The intent for the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> to coordinate with other agencies within their country where applicable to the content of the chapter could alternatively be described in the general considerations.	Comment addressed above (5.6.3._12)

Article 5.7.2.

General considerations

Appropriate legislation should be in place, in accordance with Chapter 3.4., to define the facilities, the resourcing and operation of *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres*, and for their approval.

Material and financial resources should be available at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* as necessary to undertake the relevant functions of the facility while managing official controls, *biosecurity*, health and safety risks and *animal welfare* associated with the type and volume of *commodities* presented for inspection.

Appropriate administration systems should be available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* as necessary for the functions of the facility, including record keeping and information and communication technology, to support decision-making and communication.

Biosecurity consistent with Chapter 4.X. is critical to fulfil the functions of *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres*.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.7.2._1	Category: Change Proposed: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> ~~or other relevant Competent Authorities~~ should ensure <u>in coordination with other Competent Authorities when relevant</u> that: Rationale: See previous comment. The Veterinary Authority within the Member Country should ultimately be responsible for implementing and meeting the requirements of international animal and animal health trade standards.	Comment addressed above (5.6.3._10)

- Operations at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* are supported by sufficient authorised personnel who are operating under the principles of Chapter 3.2., appropriately qualified with access to regular training, consistent with the intended use and the type and quantity of *commodities* presented.
- Operational details for *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* are made available to operators described in Chapters 5.4., 5.5. or 5.6., including the intended use and the categories of *commodities* for which they are designated, exact locations, contact details, hours of operation, booking requirements and costs.
- Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* describing the procedures undertaken there. Auditable records documenting the performance of these procedures should be kept, including the maintenance of *biosecurity*. Records should include the results of official controls, regular *surveillance* and *monitoring* in the facilities and the surrounding areas.
- *Border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* have access to *laboratories* and other *approved* service providers with SOPs as necessary to support the implementation of official controls and the measures described in Chapters 5.4., 5.5. and 5.6. consistent with Article 3.2.6.

Article 5.7.3.

Cooperation with other agencies

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should engage with other governmental authorities with responsibilities at international borders in the design and operation of *border inspection posts*, to ensure that official inspection and clearance of transit or import consignments is streamlined where possible. Co-use of facilities and equipment at international borders with other authorities could be considered as long as it does not hinder normal operations described in this chapter. Key principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement should be considered to facilitate importation and transit of *commodities*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.7.3._1	Category: Change Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> should engage with other governmental authorities with responsibilities at international borders in the design and operation of <i>border inspection posts</i>, to ensure that official inspection and clearance of transit or import consignments is streamlined where possible. Co-use of facilities and equipment at international borders with other authorities could be considered as long as it does not hinder normal operations described in this chapter <u>or impact biosecurity</u>. Key principles of the World Trade	Did not agree, as normal operation is clear that includes maintenance of biosecurity.

	Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement should be considered to facilitate importation and transit of <i>commodities</i>. Rationale: Co-use of equipment and facilities without adequate disinfection and controls may impact biosecurity.	
5.7.3._2	Category: Deletion Proposed: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> ~~or other relevant Competent Authorities~~ should engage with other governmental authorities with responsibilities at international borders in the design and operation of <i>border inspection posts</i>, to ensure for the purpose of animal health that... Rationale: The Veterinary Authority within the Member Country should ultimately be responsible for implementing and meeting the requirements of international animal and animal health trade standards.	Did not agree with deletion, as Competent Authority is defined as the authority which has responsibility in the whole or part of the territory for the implementation of certain standards of the Terrestrial Code. Did not agree with addition, as this purpose is obvious.

Article 5.7.4.

Requirements for a border inspection post

Design and operation of a *border inspection post* should be based on *risk analysis* and *biosecurity* including the following:

- 1) Separation between public areas and restricted areas for inspection of consignments.
- 2) Perimeter security of restricted areas to prevent entry of unauthorised people and *means of transport*, and unwanted animals, with access control for entry and exit of authorised personnel and *means of transport*.
- 3) Facilities and equipment suitable for the type and volume of *commodities* presented, necessary for implementation of the official control procedures described in Article 5.6.3, including secure unloading and loading, inspection, sampling and storage or detention of *commodities*, including adequate lighting and temperature control with surfaces appropriate for cleaning and *disinfection*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.7.4._1	Category: Change Proposed amended text: 3) Cleaned and disinfected Facilities and equipment suitable for the type and volume of <i>commodities</i> presented, necessary for implementation of the official control procedures described in Article 5.6.3, including secure unloading and loading, inspection, sampling and storage or detention of <i>commodities</i>, including adequate lighting and temperature control with surfaces appropriate for cleaning and <i>disinfection</i>. Rationale: Facilities and equipment should be cleaned and disinfected adequately to maintain biosecurity.	Did not agree, as considered it is covered by point below.

- 4) Facilities and equipment for cleaning and *disinfection* and elimination of arthropod *vectors of means of transport* and *containers* that have been used in transportation of *commodities*, consistent with Article 5.6.6.
- 5) Waste management for restricted areas with storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste, including discarded *feed*, rejected consignments, dead *animals* and used bedding, with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.7.4._2	Category: Deletion Proposed amended text: 5) Waste management for restricted areas with storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste, <u>including discarded feed, and</u> rejected consignments, <u>dead animals and used bedding,</u> with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste. Rationale: Deletions ensure this point is applicable to any commodity.	Agreed
5.7.4._3	Category: Addition Proposed: <u>6) Effective control of rodents and potential insect vectors.</u> Rationale: The control of rodents and insect vectors is important to mitigate the potential risk of disease transmission from imported animals that have not completed official veterinary import processes.	Agreed, text added differently.

Article 5.7.5.

Additional requirements for a border inspection post for animals

In addition to the principles described in Article 5.7.4., a *border inspection post* for consignments of *animals* should be designed and operate in accordance with *animal welfare* principles in Section 7 and should specifically include the following:

- 1) Separate access to restricted animal inspection areas via road infrastructure, to minimise delays.
- 2) Facilities necessary for the management of consignments of *animals* according to Article 5.6.3, including containment, feeding, watering, restraint and inspection, consistent with the type and number of *animals* presented.
- 3) Facilities for temporarily holding *animals*, with adequate space, light, ventilation and separation as appropriate between consignments and species.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.7.5._1	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: 4) <u>Waste management for restricted areas with storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste, including discarded feed, rejected consignments, dead animals and used bedding, with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste.</u>	Agreed, text added differently.

	Rationale: Addition of this point clarifies and complete requirements around waste management for animals.	

Article 5.7.6.

Facilities involved in official inspection other than border inspection post

When the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authority* defines that official inspection could be implemented at an appropriate place other than a *border inspection post*, the facilities involved should be *approved* following the principles outlined in Articles 5.7.4. and 5.7.5., and the consignment should remain under the control of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* until formal clearance.

Article 5.7.7.

Requirements for a quarantine centre

Design and operation of a *quarantine centre* should be based on consideration of the following:

- 1) The disease situation of the country, *zone* or area surrounding the *quarantine centre*.
- 2) Location of facilities at a distance from other *establishments*, sufficient to avoid transmission of diseases of concern.
- 3) Site topography, to minimise disease risks associated with the flow of contaminated water.
- 4) Perimeter security to prevent entry of unauthorised people and *means of transport*, and unwanted animals.
- 5) Controls, including sanitary requirements, for entry and exit of authorised personnel, and the facilities necessary to apply these controls including changing rooms and showers. Controls for exit of authorised personnel may not be necessary for the isolation of *animals* before exportation.
- 6) Controls, including sanitary requirements, for entry and exit of *means of transport* and equipment, including veterinary instruments and supplies, and the facilities necessary to apply these controls. Controls for exit of *means of transport* and equipment may not be necessary for the isolation of *animals* before exportation.
- 7) Controls for entry of supplies, including the sources, sanitary status and entry process for *feed* and bedding, and facilities necessary to handle and store these supplies.
- 8) Facilities and equipment for cleaning and *disinfection*, and removal of arthropod *vectors* including control of waste and effluent, for *means of transport* and *containers* that have been used in transportation of import consignments of *animals*.
- 9) Waste management. In the case of isolation of *animals* after arrival, waste management should be in accordance with a *biosecurity plan* including storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste, including discarded *feed*, rejected consignments, dead *animals* and used bedding, with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste.
- 10) Facilities for containment and management of consignments of *animals*, including as appropriate to the animal species separation between consignments, *unloading/loading*, housing, yards, restraint, isolation, *vector* control, and for undertaking interventions required by *risk analysis* and/or relevant disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including sample collection, testing, *vaccination*, treatment and veterinary inspection.
- 11) Equipment for cleaning and *disinfection* and removal of arthropod *vectors* in the facility between consignments

of *animals*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.7.7._1	Category: Addition Proposed: 12) Effective rodent control and prevention of contact with potential insect vectors. Rationale: The control of rodents and insect vectors is important to mitigate the potential risk of disease transmission from imported animals that have not completed official veterinary import processes.	Agreed, text added differently.

A *quarantine centre* for isolation of *animals* before exportation should be used to address the specific requirements in disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*. Unless specified in those chapters, isolation of *animals* before exportation may be performed in other facilities.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.7.7._2	Category: Addition Proposed: A <i>quarantine centre</i> for isolation of <i>animals</i> before exportation should be used to address the specific requirements in disease-specific chapters of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>. Unless specified in those chapters or the importing countries requirements, isolation of <i>animals</i> before exportation may be performed in other approved facilities. Rationale: i) The importing country may, based on a risk assessment, apply more stringent measures than the Code or as per Chapter 5.3 equivalent measures as the Code recommendations. ii) Any facility used for isolation for the purpose of international trade should be approved by the Veterinary Authority as fit-for-purpose.	Agreed

Article 5.7.8.

Planning for unexpected events

The management of consignments at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* that have failed clearance and have thus been refused transit or import is covered in Chapters 5.4. to 5.6.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that plans are available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* that support responses to foreseeable but uncommon events. The plans should address communication, *biosecurity*, health and safety, and *animal welfare* in each instance, and may cover:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

5.7.8._1	Category: General Proposed: The Veterinary Authority ~~or other relevant Competent Authorities~~ should ensure <u>in coordination with other Competent Authorities when relevant</u> that plans are available: Rationale: See previous comments.	Comment addressed above (5.6.3._10)

- Unexpected arrival of *commodities*.
- Evidence of a *listed disease* or a disease included in the *transit* or *importing country* requirements in a consignment of imported or transiting *animals* at a *border inspection post* or *quarantine centre*.
- Veterinary emergency in *animals* at a *border inspection post* or undergoing post-arrival isolation in a *quarantine centre*.
- Escape of *animals*.
- Evidence of *animal products* presenting a risk to animal or public health.
- Natural disasters and interruption of critical services threatening the operation of the *border inspection post* or *quarantine centre*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1._1	Category: General A Member thanks the Code Commission for taking on board all the previously submitted comments. A Member has no new comments and supports the adoption of this revised chapter.	Noted
7.1._2	Category: General A Member thanks WOAHA for its work in amending this chapter and can in general support the changes made. We do, however, have one specific comment as indicated below.	Noted
7.1._3	Comment Category: General A Member would like to thank the Code Commission for considering their comments submitted prior to the 2024 WOAHA General session. A Member is very happy with the chapter, however feels there needs to be clarification made with the terminology identified, as it can mean different things across the regions.	Noted
7.1._4	Comment Category: General A Member thanks the WOAHA for the opportunity to comment on the report of the September 2024 meeting of the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission. A Member supports the work programme and the proposed changes to all presented chapters. We do not have any specific comments.	Noted
7.1._5	Comment Category: General (Translation to Spanish) Texto modificado propuesto (o supresión sugerida): Revisar la traducción de la palabra inglesa “should”, versus su traducción en español y francés, ya que en este capítulo viene traducido como “debe”. Justificación: El término “should”, si se traduce como “debería” y no como “debe”, tiene otra intención. Esto porque “should” no implica una obligación estricta, sino que una recomendación o consejo. Luego, cuando se traduce en español como “debe”, aquí se entiende que es un mandato	Noted

7.1._6	A Member supports proposed changes. The Member agrees to the proposed changes as it ensures that farms comply with the 'five domains' and 'five freedoms' of animal welfare, allowing livestock to live normally while maintaining their natural behaviours during the assessment for animal welfare.	Noted
7.1._7	Category: general An IO commends the Commission for the significant effort invested in revising Chapter 7.1. The IO appreciates the comprehensive updates made to Chapter 7.1 and supports the changes introduced in Articles 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.1.4, and 7.1.5. The chapter contributes to the improvement of animal welfare by considering both ethical rules and the mental state and physiological needs of the animal during its life as well as the actions necessary for a peaceful death.	Noted
7.1._8	Category: general It's recommended to limit the range of animals to food animals, laboratory animals, stray dogs for animal welfare application. The section 7 of Terrestrial Code is animal welfare standard, specifically including animal welfare for food animals, laboratory animals, and stray dogs, but without pet. Chapter 7.1, as the opening overview chapter of Section 7, should clarify the specific animals related and avoid expanding and complicating animal welfare issues.	Noted The Code Commission noted that the recommendations included in this chapter apply to all of Section 7 of the Terrestrial Code

CHAPTER 7.1.

INTRODUCTION TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ANIMAL WELFARE

Article 7.1.1.

General considerations

Animal welfare means the physical and mental state of an *animal* in relation to the conditions in which it lives and dies.

An *animal* experiences good welfare if the *animal* is healthy, comfortable, well nourished, safe, is not suffering severely or for a long time from avoidable unpleasant states such as pain, fear and *distress*, and is able to express behaviours that are important for its physical and mental state. Good animal welfare is not only about avoiding

negative experiences ~~to~~ **for** animals, but also providing them with opportunities to have positive experiences.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.1._1	Categoría: Adición y editorial (Only Spanish versión) Adición propuesta: Un animal experimenta un buen bienestar si está sano, cómodo, bien ~~alimentado~~ nutrido, seguro, si no padece de sensaciones desagradables ~~evitables~~, como dolor, miedo y estrés, ~~de forma grave o durante mucho tiempo~~ y es capaz de expresar comportamientos importantes para su estado de bienestar físico y mental. <u>Un buen bienestar animal no consiste únicamente en evitarle a los animales experiencias negativas, sino también en procurarles experiencias positivas.</u> Justificación: para que los 5 dominios se cumplan los animales es necesario hacer énfasis en el domino mental. Esto se cubre añadiendo el estado mental descrito por Mellor como placentero. Nutrido está más acorde a los 5 dominios Evidencia documentada: Mellor, D.J. Updating Animal Welfare Thinking: Moving beyond the “Five Freedoms” towards “A Life Worth Living”. <i>Animals</i> 2016, 6, 21. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani6030021 Mellor, D.J. Moving beyond the “Five Freedoms” by Updating the “Five Provisions” and Introducing Aligned “Animal Welfare Aims”. <i>Animals</i> 2016, 6, 59. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani6100059 Secretariat Note: Yes; Only in the Spanish version	Agreed to amend the Spanish version
7.1.1._2	Category: Change/Editorial Proposed amended text: An <i>animal</i> experiences good welfare if the <i>animal</i> is healthy, comfortable, well nourished, safe, is not suffering ~~severely or for a long time~~ from avoidable unpleasant states such as pain, fear and <i>distress</i>, and is able to express agency-related behaviours that are important for its physical and mental state. <u>Good <i>animal welfare</i> is not only about avoiding negative experiences ~~for~~ to animals, but also providing them with opportunities to have positive experiences.</u>	Did not agree to add “agency related” as is not a clear and well-known concept among Members

	Rationale: Agency is an important part of behavioural based welfare considerations. It highlights the animals choice to perform behaviours.. Grammatical correction which also provides greater emphasis that animals experience negative and positive states, rather than use 'to' which is less direct. Supporting evidence, if relevant:: 'agency-related behaviours' is quoted extensively in: Mellor, D. J., Beausoleil, N. J., Littlewood, K. E., McLean, A. N., McGreevy, P. D., Jones, B., & Wilkins, C. (2020). The 2020 Five Domains Model: Including Human–Animal Interactions in Assessments of Animal Welfare. <i>Animals</i>, 10(10), 1870. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani10101870	
7.1.1._3	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Un animal experimenta un buen bienestar si está sano, cómodo, bien alimentado, seguro, si no padece de sensaciones desagradables evitables, como <i>dolor</i>, miedo y <i>distrés</i>, ~~de forma grave o durante mucho tiempo~~ y es capaz de expresar comportamientos importantes para su estado de bienestar físico y mental. Rationale: No todas las sensaciones desagradables para los animales, pueden ser evitables, ya que su aparición podría corresponder a un sin fin de posibilidades, mayoritariamente a factores externos, que sobrepasan la capacidad y compromiso de los propietarios y/o cuidadores para con el bienestar de los animales, y que como tal no deberían ser entendidas como falta o ausencia de condiciones o que éstas vayan en detrimento del bienestar. Supporting evidence, if relevant: None	In its September meeting, the Code Commission agreed to delete the word 'avoidable', due to potential misinterpretation, which could be detrimental to animal welfare. The Code Commission wished to note that unpleasant states may occur, such as hunger, without necessarily leading to suffering. Completely eliminating those natural states would be impossible and may not be synonymous with good welfare, minimising suffering is therefore most important.

Good *animal welfare* requires disease prevention and appropriate veterinary care, shelter, management and

nutrition, a **positively** stimulating, **comfortable** and safe environment, humane handling and humane *slaughter* or *killing*. ~~Good animal welfare is not only about avoiding negative experiences to animals, but also providing them with positive experiences.~~ While *animal welfare* refers to the state of the *animal*, the treatment that an *animal* receives is covered by other terms such as animal care, animal husbandry, and humane treatment.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.1._4	Categoría: Adición y editorial Adición propuesta: Un buen bienestar animal requiere prevenir enfermedades, recibir un cuidado veterinario, refugio, manejo y nutrición apropiados, un entorno estimulante, confortable, con espacio suficiente que permita conductas de locomoción, exploración y termorregulación, seguro y ser objeto de una manipulación correcta libre de dolor y miedo y de un sacrificio o matanza humanitarios una matanza ética. ~~Un buen bienestar animal no consiste únicamente en evitarle a los animales experiencias negativas, sino también en procurarles experiencias positivas.~~ Mientras que el concepto de bienestar animal se refiere al estado del animal, el tratamiento que recibe se designa con otros términos, como cuidado de los animales, cría de animales o trato compasivo. Razón fundamental/ Rationale : Para que los 5 dominios se cumplan los animales necesitan desplazarse, explorar y tener espacio suficiente y condiciones necesarias para poder termoregular. Queda más claro si se describe que la manipulación correcta es aquella que no ocasiona ni miedo ni angustia. Matanza ética: Este término enfatiza la importancia de considerar las implicaciones éticas de la matanza de animales y de buscar formas de minimizar su sufrimiento. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : Mellor, D.J. Updating Animal Welfare Thinking: Moving beyond the “Five Freedoms” towards “A Life Worth Living”. <i>Animals</i> 2016, 6, 21. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani6030021 Mellor, D.J. Moving beyond the “Five Freedoms” by Updating the “Five Provisions” and Introducing Aligned “Animal Welfare Aims”. <i>Animals</i> 2016, 6, 59. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani6100059 Mellor, D.J.; Beausoleil, N.J.; Littlewood, K.E.; McLean, A.N.; McGreevy, P.D.; Jones, B.; Wilkins, C. The 2020 Five Domains Model: Including Human–Animal Interactions in Assessments of Animal Welfare. <i>Animals</i> 2020, 10, 1870. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani10101870 Marek Špinka, How important is natural behaviour in animal farming systems?, Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 100, Issues 1–2, 2006, Pages 117-128, ISSN 0168-1591, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2006.04.006.	Did not agree with the first proposal as it was considered too much detail. The Code Commission did not agree to add a value qualification to an operation such as slaughter.

7.1.1._5	Categoría: Adición y editorial Adición propuesta: Un buen <i>bienestar animal</i> requiere prevenir <u>y controlar la presentación de</u> enfermedades, recibir un cuidado veterinario <u>oportuno</u>, refugio, manejo y nutrición apropiados, un entorno estimulante, <u>confortable y seguro</u> y ser objeto de <u>un manejo correcto una manipulación correcta</u> y de un <u>sacrificio o matanza</u> humanitarios. ~~Un buen bienestar animal no consiste únicamente en evitarle a los animales experiencias negativas, sino también en procurarles experiencias positivas. Mientras que el concepto de bienestar animal se refiere al estado del animal, el tratamiento~~ <u>manejo hace referencia al que recibe se designa con otros términos, como</u> cuidado de los animales, cría de <u>los animales</u> o trato <u>de los animales</u> ~~compasivo~~. Razón fundamental/ Rationale : Tanto la prevención como el control (cuando ya están presentes) son calves para la buena salud de los animales, y parte esencial de esto es el cuidado veterinario oportuno (a tiempo, algo muy importante para prevenir sufrimiento en los animales). La palabra “tratamiento” se sugiere cambiarla por “manejo”, ya que “tratamiento” se relaciona más con aplicación de tratamientos médicos, aplicación de medicamentos, y al leerlo genera confusión, sobre todo en otras secciones, como por ejemplo Artículo 7.1.4 numeral 1. Igualmente, se ajusta la redacción eliminando la palabra “compasivo” pues, así como el estado de un animal puedes ser bueno o malo (y eso no se especifica en el texto), el manejo o trato también, puede ser positivo/compasivo o negativo/cruel. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : Non	The Code Commission did not agree with the modification proposed, but requested that the Secretariat verify the Spanish translation of this Paragraph.
7.1.1._6	Category: change Proposed amended text: Good animal welfare requires disease prevention and appropriate veterinary care, shelter, management and nutrition, <u>a stimulating an enriched</u>, comfortable and safe environment, humane handling and humane slaughter or killing. Rationale: The use of the word “stimulating” does not distinguish whether positive or negative stimulation, and it is recommended that the word “stimulating” be changed to “enriched” to emphasize the positive stimulation Supporting evidence: not relevant	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposal; however, modified the text using the word ‘positively’ to characterise the stimuli.

Article 7.1.2.

Guiding principles for animal welfare

- 1) ~~That~~ There is a critical relationship between animal health and *animal welfare*.
- 2) ~~That~~ While the internationally recognised “five freedoms” (freedom from hunger, thirst and malnutrition; freedom from fear and *distress*; freedom from physical and thermal discomfort; freedom from pain, injury and disease; and freedom to express normal patterns of behaviour) provide valuable guidance in *animal welfare*, the ‘five domains’ (nutrition, environment, health, ~~behavioural interactions~~ behaviour, and mental state) support the systematic scientific assessment of *animal welfare*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.2._1	Categoría: Adición y editorial Adición propuesta: “Mientras que las «cinco libertades» mundialmente reconocidas (vivir libre de hambre, de sed y de desnutrición, libre de temor y de angustia, libre de molestias físicas y térmicas, libre de dolor, de lesión y de enfermedad, y libre para manifestar un comportamiento natural) son pautas que deben regir el bienestar de los animales, los «cinco dominios» (nutrición, entorno ambiente físico, salud, conducta interacciones comportamentales y estado mental) respaldan la evaluación científica sistemática del <i>bienestar animal</i>.” Razón fundamental/ Rationale : Asimismo, se cambia la palabra del dominio “entorno”, pues la traducción correcta basándose en el artículo de Mellor et al. (2020) es “ambiente físico”, así como “conducta” pues la última actualización de los dominios habla es de “interacciones comportamentales.” Likewise, the word of the domain “environment” is changed, since the correct translation based on the article by Mellor et al. (2020) is “physical environment”, as well as “behaviour” since the latest update of the domains speaks of “behavioural interactions.” Las Libertades en su idioma original son “free from [libre de]”, “Free to [libre para]”. Mellor et al. 2020. The 2020 Five Domains Model: Including Human–Animal Interactions in Assessments of Animal Welfare. <i>Animals</i>. 10, 1870)	The Code Commission did not agree with the modification proposed, but requested the Secretariat to verify the Spanish translation of this Paragraph.

- 3) ~~That~~ The internationally recognised “three Rs” (reduction in numbers of *animals*, refinement of experimental methods and replacement of *animals* with non-animal techniques) provide valuable guidance for the use of *animals* in ~~science~~ research and education.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.2._2	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: 3) That ~~the internationally recognised~~ “three Rs” (reduction in numbers of <i>animals</i>, refinement of experimental methods and replacement of <i>animals</i> with non-animal techniques) provide valuable guidance for the use of <i>animals</i> in ~~science~~ <u>research, testing, and education.</u> Rationale: Would suggest that testing is often considered separate from research in international legislation, and therefore may need to be included as a separate point.	Did not agree to include the word ‘testing’, as the Title of Chapter 7.8. is Use of animal in research and education. Research includes ‘testing’ for the purpose of the chapter.
7.1.2._3	Categoría: Adición y editorial (Only Spanish versión) Adición propuesta: ~~ES“Que las «tres erres» mundialmente reconocidas~~ (reducción del número de <i>animales</i>, <u>refinación</u> <u>refinamiento</u> de los métodos experimentales y reemplazo de los <i>animales</i> por técnicas sin animales) son pautas que deben regir la utilización de <i>animales</i> <u>en la investigación y la educación por la ciencia.”</u> Razón fundamental/ Rationale : El término “refinamiento” es la manera de mejorar el sufrimiento innecesario y según Martín et al., 2008 define el refinamiento como la modificación del cuidado y de los procedimientos para mejorar el bienestar de los animales desde su nacimiento. La palabra correcta a usar es “refinamiento” no “refinación”. Ya existen varios documentos oficiales en el mundo que utilizan la palabra “refinamiento”, se debe ser consistente con la terminología. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : A continuación, se muestran varios documentos en español donde el termino es “refinamiento”: https://ec.europa.eu/health/opinions/es/primates-no-humanos/glosario/pqrs/principio-tres-erres.htm https://www.mapa.gob.es/es/ganaderia/temas/produccion-y-mercados-ganaderos/bienestanimal/en-la-investigacion/Elprincipiodelas3erres.aspx https://secal.es/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/LA-2008-42-ES.pdf	Agreed for the Spanish version

- 4) ~~That t~~The scientific assessment of *animal welfare* involves diverse elements ~~which that~~ need to be considered together, and ~~that~~ selecting and ~~and~~ **balancing weighing** these elements often involves value-based assumptions which should be made as explicit as possible.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.2._4	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: 4) ~~That t~~The scientific assessment of <i>animal welfare</i> involves diverse elements ~~which that~~ need to be considered together, and ~~that~~ selecting and balancing weighing these elements often involves value-based assumptions which should be made as explicit as possible. Rationale: The term 'balancing' is suggested as an alternative to 'weighing' as it suggests the evaluation and consideration of multiple elements in relation to one another. This term provides a more comprehensive evaluation than implied by the word 'weighing'.	Agreed
7.1.2._5	Categoría: Adición y editorial (Only Spanish versión) Adición propuesta: ~~“Que l~~Las evaluación científica del <i>bienestar de los animales</i> abarca una serie de elementos características que deben considerarse conjuntamente como la viabilidad, validez, exactitud, repetibilidad y objetividad de los indicadores a evaluar. La selección y apreciación de estas características esos elementos mediciones objetivas a menudo juicios de valor que deben ser lo más explícitos explícitas posibles.” Razón fundamental/ Rationale : La redacción no plasmaba de manera clara y explícita la importancia de las características de los indicadores de una evaluación del bienestar animal. Según la ESFA, las evaluaciones científicas ayudan a los gestores del riesgo a encontrar métodos para reducir el dolor, la angustia y el sufrimiento incensario de los animales y aumentar su bienestar siempre que sea posible. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence :	The Code Commission did not agree with the modification proposed, but requested that the Secretariat verify the Spanish translation of this Paragraph.

	EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW); Statement on the use of animal-based measures to assess the welfare of animals. EFSA Journal 2012;10(6):2767. [29 pp.] doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2012.2767.	

- 5) ~~That t~~The use of *animals* in agriculture, education and research, and for companionship, recreation, work, culture cultural and entertainment purposes, makes a major contribution to the wellbeing of people.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.2._6	Category: Change Proposed amended text: ~~That t~~The use of <i>animals</i> in agriculture, education and research, and for companionship, recreation, <u>culture</u> <u>real purposes</u> and entertainment, makes a major contribution to the wellbeing of people. Rationale: We have suggested a small rewording that will help to make the sentence read more clearly.	Agreed with modifications
7.1.2._7	Category: Deletion Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): Annex 09 - Article 7.1.2 [...] 5) ~~That t~~The use of <i>animals</i> in agriculture, education and research, and for companionship, recreation, <u>culture</u> and entertainment, makes a major contribution to the wellbeing of people. Rationale: What does the term “culture” truly mean here? It’s a very broad term and hard to picture what practices are covered by it as well as which ones are not covered by it (e.g. branding, bull fighting, ritual slaughter, ...). Suggest removing “culture”, or adding clarification so it’s clear what is covered under the term as it can mean different things across the regions.	Comment addressed as above for comment (7.1.2._6).
7.1.2._8	Category: Addition and deleting Proposed addition and deletion: 5) ~~That t~~The use of animals in agriculture, education and research, and <u>provided that the welfare of the animals is not compromised</u>, for	Comment addressed as for comment (7.1.2._6).

	companionship, recreation, culture and entertainment, makes a major contribution to the wellbeing of people. Rationale: In various countries, animals are used in recreation and entertainment in ways that not only compromise animal welfare but are also very cruel, for example in Peru a condor is tied to the back of a bull, in various parts of Mexico piñatas are filled with live animals to break them with clubs, in addition to bullfighting, cock and dog fights. In some cases such activities are regarded as part of people's culture. Accordingly, we propose the deletion of 'culture'. The list of cruel recreation and entertainment situations that use animals is lengthy; it is important to establish that animals' contribution to human well-being through their use in recreation and entertainment must not entail mistreatment, otherwise this article could inadvertently protect animal abuse. Supporting evidence: https://cuencahighlife.com/animal-rights-activists-demand-an-end-to-perus-traditional-bull-vs-the-condor-ritual/ https://www.hsi.org/news-resources/bullfighting_cruelty_052113/ https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2014/09/23/inenglish/1411483320_523650.html	
7.1.2._9	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: 5) That ~~the~~ use of <i>animals</i> in agriculture, work, education and research, and for companionship, recreation, culture and entertainment, makes a major contribution to the wellbeing of people. Rationale: The Member suggests inclusion of 'work' to capture extent of animal use in society, including use for transport (such as draft or pack animals), the military and defence force and assistance animals. Notably, the use of assistance animals makes a major contribution to the wellbeing of people.	Agreed
7.1.2._10	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Delete 'culture'	Comment addressed as for comment (7.1.2._6).

	Rationale: The Terrestrial code states that “WOAH standards are based on the most recent scientific and technical information”. Culture can differ significantly between countries. We understand that culture is out of the scope of the terrestrial code.. Supporting evidence, if relevant: Rollin,B. E., J. K. Kirkwood, E. A. Roberts, S. Weddell, R. C. Hubrecht, S. M. Wickenseditors, 20113266907, English, Journal article Conference paper, UK, 0962-7286, 16, (Supplement), Wheathampstead, Animal Welfare, (129–133), Universities Federation for Animal Welfare (UFAW), Cultural variation, animal welfare and telos., (2007)	
7.1.2._11	Categoría: Adición y editorial Adición propuesta: ~~“Que eEl empleo de <i>animales</i> en la agricultura, la educación, la investigación, para compañía, recreo, cultura y espectáculos contribuye de manera decisiva al bienestar de las personas.~~ Razón fundamental/ Rationale : Se sugiere eliminar este ítem pues es una frase muy suelta, o si no se sugiere usar la definición de Un solo Bienestar (One Welfare), así: Existe una interconexión entre el bienestar animal, el bienestar humano y el medio ambiente (social y físico). Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : https://www.onewelfareworld.org/uploads/9/7/5/4/97544760/albeitar239onewelfare2.pdf	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposal to delete point 5), as it is considered of importance for the use of animals in some activities mentioned, which are regulated throughout Section 7 of the Code

- 6) That ~~t~~The use of *animals* carries with it an ethical responsibility to ~~ensure~~ optimise the welfare of such *animals* to the greatest extent practicable.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.2._12	Categoría: Adición y editorial (Only Spanish versión) Adición propuesta: ~~Que eEl~~ empleo de <i>animales</i> conlleva la responsabilidad ética de <u>velar por optimizar</u> su bienestar en la mayor medida posible. Razón fundamental/ Rationale :	The Code Commission did not agree with the modification proposed, but requested that the Secretariat verify the Spanish translation.

	Según la RAE, optimizar se define como “buscar la mejor manera de realizar una actividad”, y pues el Bienestar animal no es una actividad, es un estado inherente del animal. Por lo cual, consideramos que se debe dejar “velar por” ya que el humano vela porque los animales tengan un buen bienestar. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : Non	

- 7) That improvements in farm animal welfare in animal production systems can often improve productivity and food safety, and hence lead to economic benefits.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.2._13	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: 7) That Improvements in farm production animal welfare can often improve productivity, and food safety and hence lead to subsequent economic benefits. Rationale: We suggest replacing “farm” with “production” to match wording further along in the document.	The Code Commission agreed with the proposal with some modifications
7.1.2._14	Categoría: Adición y editorial (Only Spanish versión) 1) Que ~~la mejora de~~ las condiciones de vida de los animales en las explotaciones aumenta ~~a menudo~~ la productividad y la inocuidad de los alimentos, y se obtienen, por consiguiente, beneficios económicos. Modification proposal: Se solicita que la Comisión Científica y la Comisión del Código evalúen la modificación del término “explotaciones” (Establishment in English), el cual es utilizado ampliamente en los diferentes textos de la OMSA en español. Razón fundamental/ Rationale : Esta modificación se propone en busca de actualizar el marco conceptual que se ha venido utilizando en el Código. Cambios propositivos en la terminología van encaminados al conocimiento y avances de la ciencia	The Code Commission did not agree, as the word ‘explotaciones’ is an accepted term included in the Glossary of the Code

	relacionada con los dominios del bienestar animal. Se propone que dicho término se cambie por otro más amigable y adecuados (basándose en los procesos que realmente enmarca el término utilizado), y que genere menos rechazo por parte de defensores de los animales y del público en general. Las percepciones que generan términos como “explotación” son percepciones negativas que generan un sesgo perjudicial para la producción animal. Por lo cual se propone cambiar “explotación” por “sistemas de producción” o “establecimiento pecuario”. El cambio propuesto del término tiene además un soporte semántico, así como el objetivo de buscar de la estandarización y consistencia en la terminología que se utiliza a nivel global al hablar de bienestar animal. En cuanto al término “explotación”, la FAO en sus documentos más recientes habla de “producción animal” y “sistemas de producción pecuarios” (FAO, 2023). Asimismo, la Real Academia Española define el término “Explotar” como: “Utilizar abusivamente en provecho propio el trabajo o las cualidades de otra persona”, y aunque la definición no incluye la palabra “animales”, el término “explotación” tiene una connotación negativa. Todo esto se propone tratando de hacer alusión a los cambios positivos en pro de condiciones que aseguren el bienestar animal. Si esto se acepta por parte de las comisiones, tocaría hacer el ajuste a lo largo de todo el texto del Código. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : FAO. 2023. Producción animal. Disponible en: https://www.fao.org/animal-production/es	

- 8) That ~~the~~ The equivalent welfare outcomes based on performance criteria, rather than identical systems based on design criteria, ~~be~~ are the basis for comparison of *animal welfare* standards and recommendations.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.2._15	Category: Editorial Point 8) is difficult to interpret. The Member recommends rewording this point for clarity.	The Code Commission noted that Point 8) was adopted in 2004 to express the evolution in the development of animal welfare chapters. Therefore, it was not considered necessary to modify its wording.
7.1.2._16	Categoría/Category: Editorial (Only in the Spanish version) En el artículo 7.1.2, números 4 y 8 Texto modificado propuesto (o supresión sugerida):	The Code Commission requested that the Secretariat verify the Spanish translation

	4) ~~Que~~ <u>La</u> evaluación científica del <i>bienestar de los animales</i> abarca una serie de elementos que deben considerarse conjuntamente. La selección y apreciación de esos elementos implica a menudo juicios de valor que deben ser lo más explícitos posibles. [.....] 8) ~~Que~~ <u>Los</u> resultados equivalentes de bienestar animal basados en criterios de resultados, más que en sistemas idénticos basados en criterios de diseño, constituyen la base para la comparación de las normas y recomendaciones y normas en <i>bienestar animal</i>. Justificación: Correcciones por error de digitación. Evidencia documentada, si corresponde: No corresponde.	
7.1.2._17	Categoría: Adición y editorial (Only Spanish versión) Modification proposal: ~~Que~~ <u>Los resultados equivalentes de bienestar animal basados en criterios de resultados, mas que en sistemas idénticos basados en criterios de diseño, constituyen la base para la comparación de las normas y recomendaciones y normas en bienestar animal</u> Razón fundamental/ Rationale : No es muy clara la idea que se busca plasmar en esta frase, se recomienda eliminarla. No podemos proponer una nueva redacción pues no entendemos bien el significado de lo que se busca decir acá. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : Non	Comment addressed as above for comment (7.1.2._15).

Article 7.1.3.

Scientific basis for recommendations

- 1) ~~Welfare is a broad term which includes the many elements that contribute to an animal's quality of life, including its physical and mental states those referred to in the "five freedoms" listed above.~~
- 1)2) The **systematic** scientific assessment of *animal welfare* has progressed rapidly in recent years and forms the basis of the recommendations of the *Terrestrial Code* for animal welfare. Welfare assessment can be either at a point in time or over a period of time such as a lifetime. There is value in using both the 'five freedoms' and 'five domains' models. The 'five domains' model allows consideration to be given to of both the degree and cumulation of positive and negative experiences over the duration of the animal's life.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.3._1	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: The scientific assessment of <i>animal welfare</i> has progressed rapidly in recent years and forms the basis of the recommendations of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> for animal welfare. Welfare assessment can be either at a point in time or over a period of time such as a lifetime. There is value in using both the 'five freedoms' and 'five domains' models. The 'five domains' model recognises that an animal's welfare is influenced by both its physical and mental well-being. The model also encourages positive experiences for animals, rather than just preventing negative ones, allows consideration to be given to of both the degree and cumulation of positive and negative experiences over the duration of the animal's life. Rationale: Clarity	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposal as it's considered in the second paragraph of Article 7.1.1. General Considerations.
7.1.3._2	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: 1)2) The scientific systematic assessment of <i>animal welfare</i> has progressed rapidly in recent years and forms the basis of the recommendations of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> for animal welfare. Welfare assessment can be either at a point in time or over a period of time such as a lifetime. There is value in using both the 'five freedoms' and 'five domains' models. The 'five domains' model allows consideration to be given to of both the degree and cumulation of positive and negative experiences over the duration of the animal's life. Rationale: Change for consistency with wording within Article 7.1.2.2.	Agreed

- 2)3) Some measures of *animal welfare* involve assessing the degree of impaired functioning associated with injury,

disease and malnutrition. Other measures provide information on *animals'* needs and positive or negative affective states ~~such as hunger, pain and fear~~, often by measuring the strength of *animals'* preferences, motivations and aversions. Others assess the physiological, and behavioural and immunological changes or effects that *animals* show in response to various challenges.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.3._4	Category: Delete Proposed amended text: Some measures of <i>animal welfare</i> involve assessing the degree of impaired functioning associated with injury, disease and malnutrition. Other measures provide information on <i>animals'</i> needs and <u>positive or negative</u> affective states ~~such as hunger, pain and fear~~, often by measuring the strength of <i>animals'</i> preferences, motivations and aversions. Others assess the physiological, <u>and</u> behavioural <u>and immunological</u> changes or effects that <i>animals</i> show in response to various challenges. Rationale: Immunological falls within the umbrella of “physiological” and can be deleted for brevity and clarity.	Agreed with the proposals of modifications.
7.1.3._5	Categoría: Adición y editorial (Only Spanish versión) 2. Algunas medidas de bienestar de los animales comprenden la evaluación del grado de deterioro de las funciones asociado a una lesión, una enfermedad o a la desnutrición. Otras medidas proporcionan información sobre las necesidades de los animales y sobre sus estados <u>afectivos mentales</u> de ~~humor positivos o negativos~~, indicando si tienen hambre, ~~dolor~~ o miedo, gracias a la medición de a <u>menudo midiendo</u> la intensidad de sus preferencias, <u>motivaciones</u> ~~incentivos~~ y aversiones. Razón fundamental/ Rationale : Concordancia con la definición recientemente incluida en el Artículo 7.1.2 numeral 2 sobre los «cinco dominios» (nutrición, entorno, salud, conducta y estado mental) que respaldan la evaluación científica sistemática del bienestar animal. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : Non	The Code Commission did not agree to amend the text, but requested that the Secretariat verify the Spanish translation

3)4) Such measures can lead to criteria and indicators that help to evaluate how different methods of managing *animals* influence their welfare.

Article 7.1.4.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.4._1	Categoría: Editorial Modification proposal: Intercambiar orden de los artículos 7.1.4. y 7.1.5 Razón fundamental/ Rationale : El cambio proporciona mayor orden y entendimiento al documento. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : Non	The Code Commission did not agree to change the order of the Articles as the change would modify the meaning of the text.

Guiding principles for the use of measures to assess animal welfare

- 1) ~~the OIE WOA~~ the OIE WOA ~~animal welfare standards to be applicable globally, they should emphasise the favourable consequences that any treatments on of animals may have on their welfare and they should be applicable globally, outcomes for the animals, although, in some circumstances, it may include recommendations on be necessary to recommend specific conditions of the animals' environment and management. Outcomes are generally measured by assessing the extent to which animals experience the "five freedoms" described in Article 7.1.2.~~

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.4._2	Categoría: Editorial Modification proposal: ~~Para que las Las normas recomendaciones de bienestar animal de la OMSA deberán hacer hacen énfasis en prevenir las afectaciones del bienestar animal derivadas del manejo, la gestión y los recursos. las consecuencias que cualquier tratamiento manejo en los animales pueda tener en su bienestar y pueden incluir recomendaciones acerca de las se puedan aplicar ser aplicables a nivel mundial., deberán hacer énfasis en resultados favorables para los animales, pese a que en algunas circunstancias pueda ser necesario recomendar condiciones específicas sobre del entorno y la gestión de los animales. Los resultados generalmente se miden evaluando la forma cómo los animales experimentan las «cinco libertades» descritas en el Artículo 7.1.2.~~ Razón fundamental/ Rationale : La redacción no se entendía muy bien, no es claro a qué norma hacen referencia.	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposed amendment as the current text is clear enough.

	Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : Non	

- 2) For each principle listed in Article 7.1.5., the most relevant criteria (or measurable), ideally comprising animal-based measures, defined as an evaluation of a response of an *animal* or as an effect on an *animal* used to assess its welfare, should be included in the standard. Any given animal-based measure ~~may~~ should be linked to one or more of these than one principles.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.4._3	Categoría: Editorial Modification proposal: Para cada principio enumerado en el Artículo 7.1.5., se deberán incluir en el código ~~la norma~~ los criterios (o medidas) más importantes ~~medibles~~, que incorporen idealmente medidas basadas en el animal, <u>las cuales designan indicadores o variables que se evalúan directamente sobre los animales, son medidas tipo respuesta (consecuencias) a los efectos del entorno y manejo implementados en el sistema. definidas como una evaluación de la respuesta de un animal o como un efecto utilizado para evaluar su bienestar.</u> Cualquier medida basada en el animal puede estar asociada a <u>uno o</u> más de <u>estos un</u> principios. Razón fundamental/ Rationale : Se complementa el texto para mejorar su comprensión. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : EFSA. (2012). Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW) Statement on the use of animal-based measures to assess the welfare of animals. <i>EFSA Journal</i>. 10(6):2767.	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposed amendment as it would be adding unnecessary details. However the Code Commission asked the Secretariat to verify the Spanish translation.

- 3) Recommendations should, whenever possible, define explicit targets or thresholds that should be met for animal-based measures. Such target values should be based on relevant science and experience of experts.
- 4) In addition to animal-based measures, ~~one may use~~ resource-based measures, defined as an evaluation of a feature of the environment in which the *animal* is kept or to which it is exposed and management-based measures, defined as an evaluation of what the *animal handler* does, and with which management processes or tools, may be used. ~~may be used and~~ The use of any of these three types of measures should be defined on the basis of science and expert experience showing that a welfare outcome is clearly linked to an *animal* as well as to a resource or ~~to~~ a management procedure.

7.1.4._4	Categoría: Editorial Modification proposal: Además de las medidas basadas en los animales, se pueden utilizar ~~y definir~~ medidas basadas en los recursos ~~y en la gestión~~. Las primeras designan ~~indicadores o variables relacionadas con definidas como una evaluación de una características~~ del entorno en el que se mantiene o al que se expone al animal. ~~y medidas~~ Las medidas basadas en la gestión, ~~designan indicadores o variables definidas como una evaluación de relacionadas con las prácticas de manejo implementadas por las personas relacionadas con el cuidado de los animales~~. ~~lo que hace el operario cuidador y con qué procesos o herramientas de gestión~~. El uso de uno ~~una de estas~~ estos tres tipos de medidas deberá definirse a partir de fundamentos científicos y de la experiencia de los expertos, que ~~muestren~~ evidencien ~~que los resultados de bienestar están claramente vinculados con un animal, al igual que con un recurso o con un procedimiento de manejo~~. Razón fundamental/ Rationale : Se complementa el texto para mejorar su comprensión. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : EFSA. (2012). Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW) Statement on the use of animal-based measures to assess the welfare of animals. EFSA Journal. 10(6):2767. Blokhuis et al. (eds.). (2013). Improving farm animal welfare: Science and society working together: The Welfare Quality Approach. Wageningen Academic Publishers. DOI 10.3920/978-90-8686-770-71.	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposed amendment as it would be adding unnecessary details.

- 5) ~~Users of the standard Members should select~~ **The most appropriate animal-based relevant measures from among those listed in the standards should be selected for their a given **farming animal production** system or environment, from among those listed in the standard. Welfare Outcomes can be measured by an assessment of individuals or animal groups, or a representative sample of those, using data from establishments, transport or slaughterhouses/abattoirs. Competent Authorities should collect all data relevant for the users to set target and threshold values.**

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.4._5	Categoría: Editorial (Spanish translations of 'explotación' and 'mataderos') Modification proposal: ~~Entre las medidas enunciadas en la norma, los usuarios~~ De las medidas enumeradas en	The Code Commission agreed to amend the text to replace 'farming systems' with 'animal production systems' to be consistent with the language used in the Code. However, did not agree with the other modifications as did not

	el <u>código</u> <u>las normas</u>, <u>los Miembros</u> se deberán elegir aquellas que resulten <u>basadas en el animal más relevantes</u> <u>apropiadas para su un determinado sistema</u> o entorno de producción. Los resultados <u>de bienestar</u> pueden medirse mediante una evaluación de los <i>animales</i> individuales o en grupos, o de una muestra representativa, empleando los datos de <u>los sistemas productivos las explotaciones</u>, del transporte o de <u>las plantas de beneficio los mataderos</u>. Las <i>autoridades competentes</i> deberán coleccionar todos los datos relevantes para <u>que los usuarios puedan definir metas y umbrales específicos</u>. Razón fundamental/ Rationale : Se solicita que la Comisión Científica y la Comisión del Código evalúen la modificación de los términos "matadero" y "matanza", los cuales son utilizados ampliamente en los diferentes textos de la OMSA en español. Esta modificación se propone en busca de actualizar el marco conceptual que se ha venido utilizando en el Código. Cambios propositivos en la terminología van encaminados al conocimiento y avances de la ciencia relacionada con los dominios del bienestar animal. Se propone que dichos términos se cambien por otros más amigables y adecuados (basándose en los procesos que realmente enmarca el término utilizado), y que generen menos rechazo por parte de defensores de los animales y del público en general. Las percepciones que generan términos como "matanza" son percepciones negativas que generan un sesgo perjudicial para la producción animal. Por lo cual se propone cambiar "matadero" por "planta de sacrificio o planta de beneficio" y matanza por "sacrificio". El cambio propuesto de términos tiene además un soporte semántico, así como el objetivo de buscar de la estandarización y consistencia en la terminología que se utiliza a nivel global al hablar de bienestar animal. Para los términos "matanza" y "matadero", el Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación de España (MAPA, sf) presenta una aclaración entre los términos "matanza" y "sacrificio" que da soporte al cambio solicitado en el presente documento: "La matanza puede tener como finalidad la obtención de alimentos para el consumo humano,	consider them necessary to add value to the current text.

	denominándose en este caso sacrificio. Por ello, habitualmente, se reserva el término matanza a aquellos casos en los que la muerte del animal no se produce para el consumo humano sino para otros fines tales como el vaciado sanitario de las explotaciones en caso de epizootias, para casos de animales heridos o afectados por una enfermedad cuando no exista otra posibilidad para aliviarlos o la producción de los animales de peletería", lo cual pone "matanza" como un término indicativo de producir la muerte a un ser vivo con fines distintos al consumo humano, cuyos sinónimos según RAE son masacre, carnicería, aniquilación y matazon, entre otros. Lo anterior, también da sustento al cambio solicitado de "matadero" por "planta de sacrificio".. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : EFSA. (2012). Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW) Statement on the use of animal-based measures to assess the welfare of animals. EFSA Journal. 10(6):2767. Blokhuis et al. (eds.). (2013). Improving farm animal welfare: Science and society working together: The Welfare Quality Approach. Wageningen Academic Publishers. DOI 10.3920/978-90-8686-770-71.	

- 6) Whatever the basis of the measure, if welfare outcomes are unsatisfactory, users Members relevant should consider what changes to resources or management are necessary should be applied to improve the welfare outcomes.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.4._6	Category: Addition - deletion Proposed amended text: 6) Whatever the basis of the measure, if <u>welfare</u> outcomes are unsatisfactory, <u>users Members relevant should consider what changes to resources and of management are necessary should be applied to improve the welfare outcomes.</u> Rationale: Suggest 'or' is changed to 'and' to capture that changes to resources and management may	The Code Commission did not agree with the amendment as it changed the meaning of the sentence. As the objective is to allow the use of one or the other.

	need to be applied. Note the use of the term 'relevant' does not require for both resource and management changes to be made if unnecessary.	

Article 7.1.5.

General principles for the animal welfare of animals in animal livestock production

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.5._1	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: General principles for the welfare of animals in livestock production systems Rationale: this comment was not addressed by the Code Commission, per Annex 3 of the Sept 2024 report. This chapter applies to animals including those beyond the scope of livestock, for example wildlife that are farmed. Livestock is not defined in the Code. The current wording limits the scope to only livestock animals. Wildlife welfare is considered in the WOAH Guidelines for Addressing Disease Risks in Wildlife Trade. WOAH's Wildlife Health Framework also highlights the need to protect wildlife health for One health, and therefore this chapter should inclusive of non-livestock production animals. The <u>Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework</u>, adopted in December 2022, includes targets to ensure the use of wild species is not only sustainable and legal, but also "safe". IIED, <u>TRAFFIC</u>, <u>IUCN SULi</u>, <u>Endangered Wildlife Trust</u> and <u>EPIC Biodiversity</u> – supported through the Member government's Darwin Initiative and under the guidance of a multidisciplinary expert advisory group, which included WOAH participation – recently developed a five-dimensional (wildlife use) sustainability assessment framework (5DSAF). The framework adds the dimensions of animal welfare and human health to the more conventional social, ecological and economic dimensions of sustainability and draws on resources such as WOAH's guidance on animal welfare standards and WOAH/IUCN guidelines on wildlife disease risk analysis.. Supporting evidence, if relevant:: IIED (2023) Five-dimensional sustainability assessment: developing and testing a new framework. https://www.iied.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2023/11/5DSAF_background_paper_Nov16.pdf World Organisation for Animal Health (2024). – <i>Guidelines for Addressing Disease Risks in Wildlife</i>	The Code Commission agreed in general with the proposal but modified it to be in line with the language used in the animal welfare and animal production systems chapters.

	<i>Trade</i>. Paris, 93 pp. https://doi.org/10.20506/woah.3368. Mellor, D.J., Hunt, S. and Gusset, M., 2015. Caring for wildlife: The world zoo and aquarium animal welfare strategy. WAZA Executive Office: Gland, Switzerland. https://www.waza.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/WAZA-Animal-Welfare-Strategy-2015_Portrait.pdf	

- 1) Genetic selection should always take into account the health and welfare of *animals*.

7.1.5._2	Categoría: Adición/Addition Adición propuesta: La selección y modificación genética siempre deberá tener en cuenta la sanidad y conllevar niveles positivos en el bienestar de los animales. Justificación: la selección y modificación genética ha traído problemas de bienestar en varias especies de animales, es importante remarcar que no solo se debe tener en cuenta el bienestar sino directamente que esto NO conlleve niveles negativos o malos de bienestar. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : Jones RB, Hocking PM. Genetic Selection for Poultry Behaviour: Big Bad Wolf or Friend in Need? <i>Animal Welfare</i>. 1999;8(4):343-359. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0962728600021977 Jensen, P., Buitenhuis, B., Kjaer, J., Zanella, A., Mormède, P., & Pizzari, T. (2008). Genetics and genomics of animal behaviour and welfare—Challenges and possibilities. <i>Applied Animal Behaviour Science</i>, 113(4), 383-403. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2008.01.012 Grandin, T., & Deesing, M. J. (2021). Genetics and animal welfare. <i>Genetics and the Behavior of Domestic Animals</i> (Third Edition), 507-548. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-85752-9.00013-5 Fox, M. W. (1989). Genetic engineering and animal welfare. <i>Applied Animal Behaviour Science</i>, 22(2), 105-113. https://doi.org/10.1016/0168-1591(89)90047-6 Ormandy, E. H., Dale, J., & Griffin, G. (2011). Genetic engineering of animals: Ethical issues, including welfare concerns. <i>The Canadian Veterinary Journal</i>, 52(5), 544. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3078015/ Dennis, M. B. (2001). Welfare Issues of Genetically Modified Animals. <i>ILAR Journal</i>, 43(2), 100-109. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar.43.2.100	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposal as the current wording was considered clear enough.

	Marek Špinka, How important is natural behaviour in animal farming systems?, Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 100, Issues 1–2, 2006, Pages 117-128, ISSN 0168-1591, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2006.04.006.	
7.1.5._3	Category: Adding Proposed amended text: 1) Genetic selection or modification should always take into account the health and lead to good levels of welfare of animals. Rationale: Genetic selection and modification has brought about welfare problems in several species of animals. It is important to emphasize that not only welfare must be taken into account, but also that this does NOT lead to negative or bad levels of welfare. Supporting evidence: n Jones RB, Hocking PM. Genetic Selection for Poultry Behaviour: Big Bad Wolf or Friend in Need? Animal Welfare. 1999;8(4):343-359. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0962728600021977 Jensen, P., Buitenhuis, B., Kjaer, J., Zanella, A., Mormède, P., & Pizzari, T. (2008). Genetics and genomics of animal behaviour and welfare—Challenges and possibilities. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 113(4), 383-403. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2008.01.012 Grandin, T., & Deesing, M. J. (2021). Genetics and animal welfare. Genetics and the Behavior of Domestic Animals (Third Edition), 507-548. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-85752-9.00013-5 Fox, M. W. (1989). Genetic engineering and animal welfare. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 22(2), 105-113. https://doi.org/10.1016/0168-1591(89)90047-6 Ormandy, E. H., Dale, J., & Griffin, G. (2011). Genetic engineering of animals: Ethical issues, including welfare concerns. The Canadian Veterinary Journal, 52(5), 544. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3078015/ Dennis, M. B. (2001). Welfare Issues of Genetically Modified Animals. ILAR Journal, 43(2), 100-109. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar.43.2.100 Marek Špinka, How important is natural behaviour in animal farming systems?, Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 100, Issues 1–2, 2006, Pages 117-128, ISSN 0168-1591, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2006.04.006	Comment addressed as above for comment (7.1.5._2).

- 2) *Animals* chosen for introduction into new environments should be suited to the local climate conditions, including their adaptability and ~~able to adapt~~ to local climate, diseases, ~~parasites~~ and nutrition.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.5._4	Categoría: Editorial (Spanish translations) Modification proposal: ~~Los~~ Las condiciones genéticas y fenotípicas de los animales escogidos seleccionados para ser introducidos en nuevos ambientes deberán permitirles su adaptación ~~adaptarse a las condiciones locales, lo que incluye pasar por un proceso de la adaptación al el clima, las instalaciones y ser capaces de adaptarse a las enfermedades, parásitos y a la alimentación disponible~~ nutrición del lugar. Razón fundamental/ Rationale : Se complementa el texto para mejorar su comprensión. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : Non	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposal as it was considered too detailed and did not improve clarity.

- 3) The physical environment, including the substrate (walking surface, resting surface, etc.), should be suited to the animal species and categories (such as type of production or life stage) so as to minimise risk of injury and transmission of diseases or parasitosis animals.

Reference	Comment	TASHC response
7.1.5._5	Categoría/category: Supresión, Adición y Editorial/ Deletion, Addition and Editorial Adición propuesta: 3) El entorno físico incluyendo las superficies (para caminar, descansar, etc.), deberá ser adecuadas a las <u>necesidades de cada a las especies y categorías de animales (tales como el tipo de producción o la etapa de vida)</u> con el fin de minimizar los riesgos de heridas o de transmisión de enfermedades, <u>y para que los animales vivan en un espacio confortable.</u> Justificación: no queda claro cuáles pueden ser categorías de animales, lo que se presta a interpretación. Sin embargo, si se habla de las necesidades de los animales, se considera el bienestar de cada individuo. Para que el artículo esté actualizado y se ajuste a los 5 dominios, es importante sumar el dominio mental, según lo mencionado por Mellor, que incluye el confort y el estado placentero. Evidencia documentada/ Supporting evidence: Mellor, D.J. Updating Animal Welfare Thinking: Moving beyond the “Five Freedoms” towards “A Life Worth	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposal as it was not considered relevant for this section.

	Living". <i>Animals</i> 2016, 6, 21. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani6030021 Mellor, D.J. Moving beyond the "Five Freedoms" by Updating the "Five Provisions" and Introducing Aligned "Animal Welfare Aims". <i>Animals</i> 2016, 6, 59. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani6100059 Mellor, D.J.; Beausoleil, N.J.; Littlewood, K.E.; McLean, A.N.; McGreevy, P.D.; Jones, B.; Wilkins, C. The 2020 Five Domains Model: Including Human–Animal Interactions in Assessments of Animal Welfare. <i>Animals</i> 2020, 10, 1870. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani10101870 Marek Špinka, How important is natural behaviour in animal farming systems?, Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 100, Issues 1–2, 2006, Pages 117-128, ISSN 0168-1591, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2006.04.006.	
7.1.5._6	Category: Addition - deletion Proposed amended text: 3) The physical environment, including the substrate (walking surface, resting surface, etc.), should be suited to the <u>animal species and categories (such as type of production or life stage)</u> so as to minimise risk of injury and <u>incidence transmission</u> of diseases or parasites to <u>animals</u>. Rationale: it is unclear why substrate has been specifically mentioned, but other elements of the physical environment have not been. Substrate tends to imply horizontal surfaces at floor level, and usually does not refer to artificial surfaces such as concrete). Alternate phrasing should be considered. Note 'incidence' captures the importance of physical environment in the management of transmissible and non-transmissible diseases that may occur or be exacerbated by poor environmental management. The importance of environmental management is evident in the case of specific diseases, such as equine asthma. Supporting evidence, if relevant:: IIED (2023) Five-dimensional sustainability assessment: developing and testing a new framework. https://www.iied.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2023/11/5_DSAF_background_paper_Nov16.pdf World Organisation for Animal Health (2024). – <i>Guidelines for Addressing Disease Risks in Wildlife Trade</i>. Paris, 93 pp. https://doi.org/10.20506/woah.3368. Mellor, D.J., Hunt, S. and Gusset, M., 2015. Caring for wildlife: The world zoo and aquarium animal welfare	Agreed with modifications.

	strategy. WAZA Executive Office: Gland, Switzerland. https://www.waza.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/WAZA-Animal-Welfare-Strategy-2015_Portrait.pdf	

- 4) The physical environment should allow comfortable ~~resting, and~~ safe ~~resting~~ and ~~comfortable~~ movement including normal postural changes, and the opportunity to perform ~~types of~~ **natural normal patterns of** behaviours ~~that animals~~ are motivated to perform.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.5._7	Category: Addition - deletion Proposed amended text: 4) The physical environment should allow comfortable ~~resting, and~~ safe ~~resting~~ and ~~comfortable~~ movement including normal postural changes, and the opportunity to perform agency-related ~~types of natural~~ normal patterns of behaviours ~~that animals~~ are motivated to perform. Rationale: as above Article 7.1.1. Agency is an important part of behavioural based welfare considerations. It highlights the animals choice to perform behaviours. If 'agency related' is added the rest of the sentence is no longer needed. Supporting evidence, if relevant:: 'agency-related behaviours' is quote extensively in: Mellor, D. J., Beausoleil, N. J., Littlewood, K. E., McLean, A. N., McGreevy, P. D., Jones, B., & Wilkins, C. (2020). The 2020 Five Domains Model: Including Human–Animal Interactions in Assessments of Animal Welfare. <i>Animals</i>, 10(10), 1870. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani10101870	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposal. The comment was addressed as above for comment 7.1.1._2.
7.1.5._8	Categoría: Editorial (Spanish translations) Modification proposal: El entorno físico deberá permitir un descanso confortable, y movimientos seguros, y cómodos, incluyendo los cambios en las posturas normales, y así como permitir que los animales expresen muestran un modelos normales de comportamientos naturales que están motivados para realizar. Razón fundamental/ Rationale : Se complementa el texto para mejorar su comprensión.	The Code Commission did not agree to modify the text as it did not add more clarity, but asked the Secretariat to verify the Spanish translation.

	Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : Non	

- 5) Social grouping of *animals* should be managed to ~~allow~~ promote positive social behaviour and minimise injury, *distress* and chronic fear.
- 6) For housed *animals*, air quality, air flow, temperature and humidity should ~~not be aversive-detrimental and should support good animal health and welfare and not be aversive. Where and when extreme weather conditions occur, animals should not be prevented from using their natural methods of thermo-regulation, especially where and when extreme weather conditions occur.~~

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.5._9	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: 6) For housed <i>animals</i>, air quality, <u>air flow</u>, temperature and humidity should ~~not cause the animal distress nor be aversive detrimental and should support good animal health and welfare and not be aversive.~~ <u>Where and when extreme weather conditions occur, animals should not be prevented from using their natural methods of thermo-regulation.</u> Rationale: We agree with the WOA member who requested that the word “aversive” be kept as not all episodes that impact the animal’s welfare negatively are detrimental to them there and then. The example mentioned by the member is certain levels of gas. This is a good example. The effect of gas on poultry welfare is also documented in recent EFSA opinions for poultry. We do however understand WOA’s point that aversive is a reaction rather than a consequence. We have for this reason proposed an alternative wording. Supporting evidence: EFSA - Welfare of laying hens on farm, published 21 February 2023 EFSA - Welfare of broilers on farm, published 21 February 2023 And as mentioned by the WOA member on page 33 of Annex 3 circulated to all this autumn.	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposal as it was already covered by the recommendation that the conditions mentioned should not be detrimental.
7.1.5._10	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: 6) For housed <i>animals</i>, air quality, <u>air flow</u>, temperature and humidity should <u>not be</u>	Agreed

	~~aversive detrimental and should support good animal health and welfare and not be aversive. Where and when extreme weather conditions occur, Animals should not be prevented from using their natural methods of thermo-regulation, including .when extreme weather conditions occur.~~ Rationale: We suggest housed animals should not be prevented from using their natural methods of thermos-regulation as a general principal, not just during extreme weather events.	
7.1.5._11	Categoría: Supresión, editorial/deletion, editorial Editorial propuesta: 6) En el caso de los animales estabulados, la calidad y la circulación del aire, la temperatura y la humedad no deberán ser perjudiciales y deberán contribuir a una buena sanidad y al bienestar de los animales. ~~Donde y cuando se presentan condiciones climáticas extremas, n~~No se debe impedir que los animales utilicen sus métodos naturales de Justificación: Estar libre de incomodidades térmicas y poder realizar las conductas naturales son dos de las libertades o dominios que se incumple con la redacción anterior si sólo se suscribe a lugares con condiciones climáticas extremas, en México gran parte del territorio no tiene climas extremos y no por eso se debe impedir a los animales termorregular, además de considerar la afectación al dominio mental al no poder realizar conductas básicas de termorregulación. Evidencia documentada: Mellor, D.J. Updating Animal Welfare Thinking: Moving beyond the “Five Freedoms” towards “A Life Worth Living”. <i>Animals</i> 2016, 6, 21. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani6030021 Mellor, D.J. Moving beyond the “Five Freedoms” by Updating the “Five Provisions” and Introducing Aligned “Animal Welfare Aims”. <i>Animals</i> 2016, 6, 59. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani6100059 Mellor, D.J.; Beausoleil, N.J.; Littlewood, K.E.; McLean, A.N.; McGreevy, P.D.; Jones, B.; Wilkins, C. The 2020 Five Domains Model: Including Human–Animal Interactions in Assessments of	Comment addressed as above for comment (7.1.5._10).

	Animal Welfare. <i>Animals</i> 2020, <i>10</i>, 1870. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani10101870 Marek Špinka, How important is natural behaviour in animal farming systems?, <i>Applied Animal Behaviour Science</i>, Volume 100, Issues 1–2, 2006, Pages 117–128, ISSN 0168-1591, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2006.04.006	
7.1.5._12	Category: Deletion Proposed amended text: 6) For housed animals, air quality, air flow, temperature and humidity should not be aversive detrimental and should support good animal health and welfare and not be aversive. ~~Where and when extreme weather conditions occur, a~~ animals should not be prevented from using their natural methods of thermo-regulation Rationale: Being free from thermal discomfort and being able to carry out natural behaviors are two of the freedoms or domains that are violated by the previous wording if it only subscribes to places with extreme climatic conditions. In all climatic conditions animals should have the possibility for thermoregulating, in addition to considering the impact on the mental domain by not being able to carry out basic thermoregulation behaviors. We must remember that in addition to the environmental conditions of the geographic area, the temperature conditions in the microenvironments can be extreme. The climatic conditions are not the only determining factors for the temperature of the space in which animals are housed. For example, in a country with a non-extreme temperature where a dog is in the sun in a car with the windows up in the summer. That dog, by not being able to thermoregulate, will not only have a poor welfare, but the animal could also die. Supporting evidence: Mellor, D.J. Updating Animal Welfare Thinking: Moving beyond the “Five Freedoms” towards “A Life Worth Living”. <i>Animals</i> 2016, <i>6</i>, 21. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani6030021 Mellor, D.J. Moving beyond the “Five Freedoms” by Updating the “Five Provisions” and Introducing Aligned “Animal Welfare Aims”. <i>Animals</i> 2016, <i>6</i>, 59. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani6100059 Mellor, D.J.; Beausoleil, N.J.; Littlewood, K.E.; McLean, A.N.; McGreevy, P.D.; Jones, B.; Wilkins, C. The 2020 Five Domains Model: Including Human–Animal Interactions in Assessments of	Comment addressed as above for comment (7.1.5._10).

	Animal Welfare. <i>Animals</i> 2020, 10, 1870. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani10101870 Marek Špinka, How important is natural behaviour in animal farming systems?, Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 100, Issues 1–2, 2006, Pages 117-128, ISSN 0168-1591, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2006.04.006	
7.1.5._13	Category: Deletion Where <u>and when</u> extreme <u>weather</u> conditions occur, <u>animals</u> should not be prevented from using their natural methods of thermo-regulation, <u>including during extreme weather conditions</u>. Rationale: Clarification point - Animals should not be prevented from using their natural thermos-regulation at any point	Comment addressed as above for comment (7.1.5._10).

- 7) *Animals* should have access to sufficient *feed* and water, suited to the *animals'* age and needs, to maintain normal health, behaviour and performance productivity and to prevent severe or prolonged hunger and, thirst, malnutrition and or dehydration.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.5._14	Category: Delete Proposed: 7) <i>Animals</i> should have access to sufficient <i>feed</i> and water, suited to the <i>animals'</i> age and needs, to maintain normal health, <u>behaviour</u> and <u>performance productivity</u> <u>and to prevent severe or prolonged hunger and</u>, thirst, malnutrition <u>and</u> or dehydration. Rationale: We suggest that the deleted text is subjective and not necessary. The wording 'and to prevent severe or prolonged hunger and, thirst, malnutrition and or dehydration' is not necessary if the first half of the sentence is met.	The Code Commission did not agree to modify the text as it was not considered necessary.
7.1.5._15	Categoría: Editorial (Spanish translations) Modification proposal: Los <i>animales</i> deberán tener acceso a suficientes <u>s alimento piensos</u> y agua, acorde con su edad y necesidades, para mantener una <u>buena</u> salud, <u>un comportamiento adecuado</u> y <u>productividad desempeño óptimo normales evitando y evitar</u> hambre, sed, malnutrición <u>y</u> o—deshidratación prolongadas <u>y graves</u>. Razón fundamental/ Rationale :	The Code Commission did not agree to modify the text as it did not add more clarity, but asked the Secretariat to verify the Spanish translation.

	Se complementa el texto para mejorar su comprensión. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : Non	

- 8) Diseases ~~and parasites~~ should be prevented and controlled as much as possible through good management practices, preventative health measures and biosecurity. *Animals* with serious health problems should be isolated and treated promptly or killed humanely if treatment is not feasible or recovery is unlikely.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.5._16	Category: Addition - deletion Proposed amended text: 8) Diseases ~~and parasites~~ should be prevented and controlled as much as possible through good management practices, <u>preventative health measures</u> , <u>and biosecurity</u> . <i>Animals</i> with serious health problems should be isolated and treated promptly or killed humanely if treatment is not feasible or recovery is unlikely. Rationale: preventative health measures are a key consideration in preventing diseases.	Agreed

- 9) Alternatives to painful procedures should be used. Where painful procedures cannot be avoided, the ~~resulting~~ pain should be managed to the extent that available methods allow.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.5._17	Category: Addition - deletion Proposed amended text: 9) <u>Alternatives to painful, uncomfortable or distressing procedures should be used</u> . Where <u>such painful</u> procedures cannot be avoided, the <u>resulting pain</u> should be managed to the extent that available methods allow. Rationale: Discomfortable and distress are also negative outcomes of certain procedures, and should be managed..	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposal as it was already covered in the specific animal production systems chapters.

- 10) The handling of *animals* should foster a positive relationship between humans and *animals* and should not cause injury, panic, lasting fear or avoidable stress ~~distress~~.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.5._18	Category: Addition - deletion Proposed amended text: 10) The handling of animals should foster a <u>an appropriate positive</u> relationship between humans and animals and should not cause injury, panic, lasting <u>or significant</u> fear or avoidable stress. Rationale: “Positive” relationships with humans can be problematic. The magnitude of fear should also be noted.	The Code Commission did not agree with the modification as considered that the literature supports the positive aspect of the human-animal interaction. The Code Commission also replaced the words ‘avoidable stress’ with ‘distress’ as this term better reflects what is intended by a positive relationship between humans and animals.

- 11) Owners and animal handlers should have sufficient training skills and knowledge through appropriate training or experience to ensure that *animals* are treated in accordance with these principles.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.1.5._19	Categoría: Editorial Editorial propuesta: 11- Los propietarios <u>y</u> operarios <u>y</u> cuidadores deberán contar con la formación, las habilidades y los conocimientos suficientes a través de formación o experiencia apropiadas para garantizar que los animales se tratan de acuerdo con estos principios. Justificación: La palabra "propietario" implica una relación de posesión y dominio, se recomienda separar operario de cuidador para tener un vocablo que refleje una relación más ética, respetuosa y responsable hacia los animales. Cuidador: Este término enfatiza la responsabilidad de cuidar y proteger el bienestar del animal. Secretariat Note: The Spanish translation for ‘animal handlers’ is ‘operario cuidador de animales’	The Code Commission asked the Secretariat to verify the Spanish version as ‘<i>animals handlers</i>’ ‘<i>operario cuidador de animales</i>’ is an adopted glossary term.
7.1.5._20	Categoría: Editorial (Spanish translations) Modification proposal: Los propietarios <u>y</u> ~~operarios~~ <u>cuidadores y demás personas relacionadas directamente con el</u>	The Code Commission did not agree with the modification, as it did not add new information.

	manejo y cuidado de los animales deberán contar con ~~la formación~~, las habilidades y los conocimientos suficientes <u>a través de formación o experiencia apropiadas</u> para garantizar que los <i>animales</i> se tratan de acuerdo con estos principios. Razón fundamental/ Rationale : Se complementa el texto para mejorar su comprensión. Evidencia documentada / Supporting evidence : Non	

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.1	Category : general 1. It is suggested that some terms should be explained. The terms killing, mass killing and depopulation are mentioned in many places in the text. These terms appear for the first time in the code, and the meaning is unclear, which are easy to be confused. It is suggested that the terms should be clearly defined to facilitate understanding and use. 2. It is suggested to clarify several issues. For the relevant content of "Animals are killed for a variety of reasons, including for contagious disease control, in case of natural or man-made disasters, when they are otherwise suffering from disease or injuries or for economic reasons" in Article 7.6.1, it is recommended to clarify the specific situation of disaster, economic reasons. And whether members must kill animals affected by the disaster, injuries or economy? 3. For the relevant content of "killing the animals on the affected location or premises; however, there may be circumstances where the animals may need to be moved to another location for killing; when the killing is conducted at a slaughterhouse/abattoir, the recommendations in Chapter 7.5. should be followed" in Article 7.6.6(b), it is recommended to clarify under what circumstances can be killed in slaughterhouses, and how to deal with bodies after killing, whether they can be utilized.	Noted. The Code Commission agreed to an expanded scope covering all scales of killing for purposes other than slaughter in all mammal and bird species. Killing of individuals to groups of all sizes were covered. The term large scale killing would cover bigger killing operations involving many animals The Code Commission indicated that the revisions made during the meeting clearly differentiated slaughter operations from other killing operations and methods.
7.6.2	Category:general The Member thanks the Code Commission for its work revising this chapter. As a general comment, the Member points out that the title, the introduction, and the scope of this chapter imply dealing exclusively with animal welfare. However, this is not the case, as Art. 7.6.4, for example, describes the general organisation of killings, whereby animal welfare is only one of many aspects (the focus is usually on effective animal disease control). Article 7.6.3. also addresses several other non-animal welfare aspects such as costs, biosecurity, occupational health and safety and the environment. Specific comments are inserted in the text below.	Noted The Code Commission agreed that in considering animal welfare other aspects or objectives need also to be factored in including disease control, costs, biosecurity, the environment etc and so it was appropriate to reference such considerations in this chapter.
7.6.3.	Category : general	Noted

	The Member thanks WOAHA for its work on this completely reworked chapter on killing of animals. We fully support that the scope of the chapter is broadened so that it now addresses the welfare of animals that are killed irrespective of the reason for killing and not only when they are killed for disease control purposes. We do however have several comments as indicated below.	
7.6.4.	Category: general Propose addition of text regarding appropriate animal handling practices, in line with Chapter 7.5, to ensure appropriate methods are used and inappropriate practices are prohibited. For example, Article 7.5.13 states, 'Personnel should be calm and patient, assisting animals to move using a soft voice and slow movements. They should not shout, kick, or use any other means that is likely to cause distress, fear or pain to the animals. Under no circumstances should animal handlers resort to violent acts to move animals.' Article 7.5.23 includes prohibitions such as the practice of crushing, twisting or breaking tails of animals, kicking, throwing or dropping animals, hitting animals with instruments such as large sticks, sticks with sharp ends, piping, stones, fencing wire or leather belts. These methods, procedures or practices relating to animal handling should be reflected in this Chapter as well. The intent and application of the Chapter should be more clearly communicated to ensure that readers understand the scenarios it applies to. In particular, whether the chapter is intended primarily for events where large numbers of animals are killed. Providing recommendations that are applicable to all scenarios is challenging, an alternative is to be clear in which scenarios the recommendations do not directly apply. Examples of events where mass killing may occur and may be relevant to this chapter are: • For exotic disease control, • In extreme events such as fire, flood, other weather events e.g., high wind causing shed collapse, • To end suffering due to disease or illness or exposure to toxins e.g., endemic disease outbreak, • When it is predicted that ongoing welfare cannot be maintained e.g., when there is insufficient housing, feed, water or shelter, when there is insufficient processing capacity or where prices mean it is uneconomical to send animals to slaughter e.g., end of lay, • For pest control or environment management e.g., wild dogs/cats, culling of feral horses, pigs or population control for marsupials, and,	Noted. The Code Commission agreed to add a section on handling.

	• For animals bred for scientific purposes once use is complete.	
7.6.5.	Category:general Chapter 7.6 – The Member recognises that only the first 8 Articles have been presented for comment and while we look forward to receiving the remaining Articles in the September report of the Commission we believe that measures for people handling animals should be included. Rationale: The Member notes that Chapter 7.5, Animal welfare during slaughter, details measures for people handling animals including that “Personnel should be calm and patient, assisting animals to move using a soft voice and slow movements.” The Member encourages WOA to consider including similar language in Chapter 7.6. Alternatively, WOA should consider expanding language in Chapter 7.1.5 (10) as a general principal, rather than duplicate language in Chapters 7.5 and 7.6.	Comment addressed as above for comment 7.6.4.
7.6.6.	Category:general Firstly, the Member extends its gratitude to the <i>ad hoc</i> Group and the Code Commission for their dedicated efforts in drafting this chapter. The Member kindly requests clarification on the decision to use the term "killing" instead of "humane killing" as is used in the current Chapter 7.6. Additionally, the Member seeks to understand the rationale behind the expanded scope of this chapter to include diverse scenarios such as 'natural or man-made disasters' and 'suffering from disease or injuries or for economic reasons.' One might say that an alternative approach could be to create separate chapters for each scenario.	The Code Commission, on advice from the <i>ad hoc</i> Group has been systematically replacing the term 'humane', as it is considered anthropomorphic. The Code Commission would like to note that the primary objective of Section 7 of the Terrestrial Code is the welfare of the animals.
7.6.7.	Category:general Proposed amended text: The addition of text relating to appropriate animal handling. Rationale: We encourage the addition of text regarding animal handling practices, in line with the content in Chapter 7.5, to ensure appropriate methods are used and inappropriate practices are prohibited. For example, Chapter 7.5 states, 'Personnel should be calm and patient, assisting animals to move using a soft voice and slow movements. They should not shout, kick, or use any other means that is likely to cause distress, fear or pain to the animals. Under no circumstances should animal handlers resort to violent acts to move animals.' Article 7.5.23 includes prohibitions such as the practice of	Comment addressed as above for comment 7.6.4.

	crushing, twisting or breaking tails of animals, kicking, throwing or dropping animals, hitting animals with instruments such as large sticks, sticks with sharp ends, piping, stones, fencing wire or leather belts. These methods, procedures or practices relating to animal handling should be reflected Chapter 7.6 as well, as the same animal welfare principles apply.	
7.6.8.	Category: general The Member supports the comments made by the another Member (published by the Member).	Noted
7.6.9.	Category: general We thank the working group for the review work and look forward to see the rest of this very important chapter. As part of this we hope it will retain the discussion of killing methods, alongside the pros and cons explained.	Noted

CHAPTER 7.6.

ANIMAL WELFARE AT THE TIME OF KILLING FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN SLAUGHTER

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
Title_1	Category: addition Concerning the title: ANIMAL WELFARE AT THE TIME OF KILLING We ask WOA to consider this alternative: <u>Ensuring the animal welfare of animals at time of killing</u> Rationale: To make it quite clear that the chapter provides provisions on how to ensure a better welfare for the animals when they are killed and to avoid common hazards that put the welfare of the animal at risk.	Following the advice of the <i>ad hoc</i> Group, the Code Commission proposed a modified title for the chapter to avoid any confusion with Chapter 7.5. Animal Welfare during slaughter.
Title_2	Category: addition Animal welfare at the time of <u>non-slaughter</u> killing Rationale: The IO considers that the change in title of this chapter from Killing of animals for disease control purposes to Animal welfare at the time of killing could lead to some confusion. The proposal to broaden the title to include reasons other than	Comment addressed as above.

	disease control is sensible and is encompassed in the new Article 7.6.1 “Animals are killed for a variety of reasons, including for contagious disease control, in case of natural or man-made disasters, when they are otherwise suffering from disease or injuries or for economic reasons. It is important to consider their welfare during this process.”. The IO suggests that the title should be Animal welfare at the time of non-slaughter killing. The word ‘killing’ is used in the recently revised Chapter 7.5 (7.5.13, 7.5.22, 7.5.26, 7.5.31, 7.5.34) specifically for this purpose when animals not fit for slaughter need to be killed.	

Article 7.6.1.

Introduction

Animals are killed for a variety of reasons, including those that may not make the transport for slaughter or the safe use of their products possible. Such reasons may include for contagious disease control, in cases where their welfare may be compromised due to of natural or man-made human-made disasters, when they are otherwise suffering from disease or injuries or for economic reasons. It is important to consider optimise their welfare during such killing for purposes other than slaughter this process.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.1._1	Category: Addition and editorial Animals are killed for a variety of reasons, including for contagious disease control, in case of natural or human-made man-made disasters or emergencies, when they are otherwise suffering from disease or injuries or for economic reasons. It is important to consider their welfare during this process and aim to prevent distress, fear, and suffering during the procedure. Rationale: The use of the term ‘man-made’ is outdated and exclusive language. The use of the term ‘human-made’ is inclusive language. In disaster management, emergencies are defined differently than disasters and both should be included here. To only “consider” welfare during the process is not enough. The wording should be strengthened to specify the full intention of the chapter. Supporting evidence: United Nations Gender-inclusive Language Guidelines, part 3.1. www.un.org/en/gender-inclusive-language/guidelines.shtml Glassey, S. (2022). Animal disaster management. In A. Knight, C. Phillips, & P. Sparks (Eds.), Routledge handbook of animal welfare (pp. 336–350). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003182351-30	Agreed to amend the text to replace the word ‘consider’ with ‘optimise’. Also replaced ‘man-made’ with ‘human-made’.

7.6.1._2	Category: addition The Member asks WOAHA to consider amending the first sentence as follows: Animals are killed for a variety of reasons, including for contagious disease control, in case of natural or man-made disasters, when they are otherwise suffering from disease or injuries, or for economic <u>or other reasons</u>. Rationale: Other reasons may occur that necessitates the killing of numerous animals, e.g. when the workforce at the abattoir is on strike and the farmer cannot keep the rapidly growing animals for much longer due to lack of space. This is just one example and there may be many more.	Did not agree as the proposed text does not provide additional clarity.
7.6.1._3	Category: addition/deletion <u>The animal welfare principles in Chapter 7.5 Slaughter of Animals should be followed unless these are not practical in certain circumstances, such as</u> ~~Animals are killed for a variety of reasons, including for contagious disease control, in case of natural or man-made disasters, when they are otherwise suffering from disease or injuries which prevent transport to slaughter, and~~ <u>or for economic reasons which may compromise animal welfare. It is important to maintain acceptable animal welfare outcomes consider their welfare</u> during this process. Rationale: Animal welfare principles outlined in Chapter 7.5: Animals at Slaughter should be followed unless in certain circumstances where routine slaughter procedures (including at abattoirs) are not possible. Suggested text clarifies that killing of animals could be undertaken if disease or injury prevents transport to an abattoir for slaughter. The rationale for culling animals for 'economic reasons' should be clarified as this is a new addition to the chapter. It is acknowledged that in certain circumstances such as natural disasters or contagious disease outbreaks, routine slaughter procedures may become unviable, and the devaluing of stock may exacerbate animal welfare risks. Acceptable animal welfare outcomes should be maintained, rather than considered. Animal Health Australia (2005). Operational procedures manual: Livestock welfare and management (Version 3.0). Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN), Edition 3, Primary Industries Ministerial Council, Canberra, ACT.	Did not agree as the proposed text does not provide additional clarity.
7.6.1._4	Category: general The Member suggests considering more concrete formulation than only "economic reasons" or if not possible	Agreed partially. However, the <i>ad hoc</i> Group proposed some new wording in the

	to add some examples on what is meant by economic reasons. Rationale: The scope of the chapter should be better defined.	scope to provide more clarity

Article 7.6.2.

Scope

This chapter identifies hazards to animal welfare during *killing for purposes other than slaughter* and provides recommendations for the appropriate procedures for *such* killing. It provides animal-based and other measures to assess the level of welfare during the process and recommends appropriate remedial actions to be applied.

This chapter applies to the killing of domestic and captive wild ruminants, equids, birds, pigs, rabbits, camelids and mustelids for all purposes, except for slaughter which is covered by Chapter 7.5. Animal welfare during slaughter mammals and birds (hereafter animals). Killing of reptiles is covered by Chapter 7.14. Killing of reptiles for their skin, meat and other products and killing of dogs for population management is covered by Chapter 7.7. The numbers of animals killed is situation dependent and could range from an individual to a large scale population.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.2._1	Category : addition In the “Report of the Meeting of WOA Health Standards Commission” page 63, the Commission noted “that the revised chapter appeared to focus on the welfare issues related to mass killing of animals”. It is however not immediately apparent from the scope, that this chapter is only supposed to target situations when it is necessary to kill numerous animals, i.e. mass killings. For example, article 7.6.3. could also be understood to apply when only one or a few animals in a flock or herd needs to be killed. Another issue is whether the chapter only concerns production animals i.e. animals kept for economic purposes. We ask WOA to consider amending as follows: This chapter applies to the killing of numerous domestic and captive wild ruminants, equids, birds, pigs, rabbits, camelids and mustelids for all purposes, except for slaughter which is covered by Chapter 7.5. Animal welfare during slaughter. Furthermore, it only applies to those animals kept for economic purposes. Rationale: If this chapter is indeed supposed to be limited to those situations where it is necessary to kill very many animals, this should be explicitly stated to avoid misunderstandings and for the sake of clarity. We would also like to highlight that the term “mass killing” seems to be linked to instances of genocide or other instances where very many humans are killed/murdered.	Agreed. The Code Commission amended to show that the chapter covers all types of large scale killing operations

	WOAH should consider looking into the terminology and try to find a word that is not so emotionally charged. Concerning the type of holding, for some of the species listed such as birds, equids and rabbits, even in non-commercial holdings the number of animals can be quite high. For this reason, it would be helpful to know whether companion animals or animals not kept for commercial purposes are outside of the scope.	
7.6.2._2	Category: addition/deletion This chapter applies to the killing of domestic and <i>captive wild</i> ruminants, equids, birds, pigs, rabbits, camelids and mustelids <u>in certain circumstances, such as contagious disease control, in case of natural or man-made disasters, when animals are otherwise suffering from disease or injuries which prevent transport to slaughter, and for economic reasons which may compromise animal welfare for all purposes, except for. The routine slaughter of animals for food and animal products slaughter which</u> is covered by Chapter 7.5. Animal welfare during slaughter.. Rationale: This chapter should only apply to killing in certain circumstances, as outlined in the introduction to this chapter. Under normal circumstances, such as the slaughter of animals for food and animal products, Chapter 7.5 Animal welfare during slaughter, should apply. Comment: The species which this applies depends on the scope, notable omissions in an Member context include marsupials, monotremes, reptiles, rodents, canids, felines and bats.	Did not agree as it's not the right place to include this text and it's covered elsewhere in the draft.
7.6.2._3	Category: Addition <u>Additional considerations for reptiles are provided in Chapter 7.14</u> Rationale: Some recommendations, particularly those in 7.6.8, are not appropriate for reptiles and might be mistakenly followed despite the statement in the second paragraph of this section. Supporting evidence, if relevant: Chapter 7.6.2	Agreed

This chapter should be read in conjunction with the guiding principles for *animal welfare* provided in Chapter 7.1.

Article 7.6.3.

General principles for the operations regarding the killing of animals

The decision as to whether to kill animals should not be delayed if there is any risk to the welfare of those animals. The recommendations in this Chapter are based on the premise that a decision to kill the animals has been made and they address the need to ensure the welfare of the animals until they are dead.

During decision making and prior to killing the animals, appropriate husbandry, especially supply of feed and water and thermal comfort, should be maintained until the animals are killed. Medical care should be provided if needed.

Advanced planning for various scenarios, including adverse events, should clearly identify operational procedures and responsibilities.

For large scale killing, specifics plans should be in place.

The decision maker should be clearly identified to ensure decision making is not delayed.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.3._1	Category: addition The decision as to whether to kill animals should not be delayed if there is any risk to the welfare of those animals. <u>The methods chosen for killing should consider the speed of killing as one of the criteria to be used in order to minimise welfare harm to the affected animals.</u> Rationale: The IO notes that Article 7.6.3 “General principles for the operations regarding the killing of animals” does not mention that animals should be killed as quickly as possible once a decision for mass-killing has been made.	Did not agree with the addition. This sentence is part of a recommendation.
7.6.3._2	Category: addition The Member asks WOA to consider moving one of the other sentences in this article here so that the above paragraph reads: The decision as to whether to kill animals should not be delayed if there is any risk to the welfare of those animals. The recommendations in this Chapter are based on the premise that a decision to kill the animals has been made and they address the need to ensure the welfare of the animals until they are dead. <u>It follows therefore, that during decision making and prior to killing the animals, normal husbandry, especially supply of feed and water, should, as far as possible, be maintained until the animals are killed.</u> Rationale: Maintaining normal husbandry practices should be part of the premise of the chapter, as normal husbandry practices is regulated in other chapters of the terrestrial code. In addition, it may not be possible in all situations to maintain normal husbandry practices. For example, in cases of	Did not agree with the addition, as it is already included in Article 7.6.4. regarding the organisation structure for the operations.

	disasters like flooding, the best option is to kill the animals as quickly and humanely as possible. See also comment on fifth paragraph below.	
7.6.3._3	Category: addition <u>Pre-emptive contingency planning for various scenarios, including adverse events, should clearly identify operational procedures and responsibilities. The decision maker should be clearly identified to ensure decision making isn't delayed.</u> Rationale: The preparation of plans prior to events occurring is the preferred method of increasing the chance of success.	Agreed, but included differently in the third and fifth paragraphs of this article.

All personnel involved in the killing of animals should have the relevant skills and competencies, acquired through training or experience.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.3._4	Category: General Regarding paragraph 2, the current chapter states that "Competence may be gained through formal training and/or practical experience." This statement is removed in the draft chapter. Considering the necessity of training and experience for appropriate killing, The Member wishes to understand the reason for its removal.	Agreed to add 'training' to 'competencies', when needed. This amendment will be applied throughout the draft.

7.6.3._5	The decision as to whether to kill animals should not be delayed if there is any risk to the welfare of those animals. The recommendations in this Chapter are based on the premise that a decision to kill the animals has been made and they address the need to ensure the welfare of the animals until they are dead. Training of personnel must ensure animal welfare is safeguarded during the killing of animals. Profound knowledge of animal welfare concerns is crucial but is often lacking not only by the animal handler staff, but also by the Competent Authority, the veterinarians involved and other responsible persons. The Chapter should state the frequency of the training to help ensure that animal welfare practices are followed. Supporting evidence: Galvin J.W., H. Blokhuis, M.C. Chimbombi, D. Jong and S. Wotton. Killing of animals for disease	Covered in comment 7.6.3._4 and in the modifications made in Article 7.6.5..

	control purposes. Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 2005, 24 (2), 711-722. https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=13e67c85a27e20ae59e81f8c2b22e328b9c9dea2 Hamid Khaneghahi Abyaneha, Atieh Dabaghianb, Mohammadreza Rezaeigolestania, and Davoud Amanollahic, 2020: Compliance with OIE animal welfare standards in slaughterhouses in Tehran Province, Iran: An introductory survey, Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science 2020, VOL. 23, NO. 1, 108–115 https://doi.org/10.1080/10888705.2019.1577735 Rudra KC, Mazumdar S, Shanta SA, Rahman AKMA and Islam MA (2019). Assessment of animal welfare status during transportation and slaughtering of ruminant animals at local slaughter houses in Bangladesh. J. Vet. Med. OH Res. 1 (1): 85-98. Independent Expert Panel. 2014. Pilot Badger Culls in Somerset and Gloucestershire. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7ebd49ed915d74e33f21d5/independent-expert-panel-report.pdf (this source covers issues around the need for appropriate training and monitoring of those involved in killing wild animals (both free living and captive) for disease control purposes).	
7.6.3._6	Category: addition All personnel involved in the killing of animals should have the relevant <u>training</u>, skills and competencies. <u>Training should be required annually at a minimum, and should cover animal behaviour; proper handling and restraint techniques; and humane methods of killing.</u> Rationale: A Member suggests that personnel must be trained appropriately to minimise animal welfare hazards during killing, as is noted later in this Chapter. The contents and frequency of this training should be stated clearly and rigorously to minimize negative impacts on animal welfare.	Covered in comment 7.6.3._4
7.6.3._7	Category: addition All personnel involved in the killing of animals should have the <u>relevant training</u>, skills and competencies <u>relevant to the species and the procedure being undertaken. Training should emphasise the importance of animal welfare and</u>	Covered in comment 7.6.3._4

	<u>ensure personnel are competent to perform the procedure. Personnel should understand animal behaviour, proper handling techniques, appropriate restraint techniques, and humane methods of killing to best suit the circumstances.</u> Rationale: Expertise specificity is highly relevant if the chapters encompass many species and contexts. Competency may involve use of specific infrastructure, equipment, or chemicals e.g., veterinary medicines. Training of personnel must be appropriate to ensure animal welfare hazards are minimised during the killing of animals.	
7.6.3._8	Category : addition Todo el personal que participe en la matanza de los animales deberá tener la destreza y la competencia necesarias. <u>El personal deberá ser capacitado anualmente, esta capacitación deberá incluir temas de etología, bienestar y técnicas de manejo adecuado.</u> Rationale: Poner requisitos que sean medibles y comprobables permite garantizar que el personal esté capacitado en temas de bienestar animal durante la matanza de animales.	Covered in comment 7.6.3._4

As necessary, operational procedures should be evidence-base adapted to the specific circumstances in the affected locations or on the premises and should address, apart from animal welfare, the cost, effectiveness, the speed of implementation of the method, operators' safety and mental health, biosecurity and environmental aspects relevant to the species.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.3._9	Category: Addition and deletion As necessary, <u>coordination with other competent authorities should assure that</u> operational procedures <u>should be are</u> adapted to the specific circumstances on the premises and should address, apart from animal welfare, the cost of the method, operators' safety and mental health, biosecurity and environmental aspects. Rationale:	Did not agree; in an emergency this could complicate the process and it would also depend on the administrative structure of the country.

	Several of these items are outside the scope of both the WOA and the Competent Veterinary Authority. While these are legitimate recommendations, they should be modified to reflect they are not all animal health, welfare or WOA issues.	
7.6.3._10	Category: Addition As necessary, operational procedures should be adapted to the specific circumstances on the premises and should address, apart from animal welfare, <u>the cost of the method</u>, operators' safety and mental health, biosecurity and environmental aspects. <u>Available resources, including cost should be taken into account when designing the operation/selecting the killing method, in balance with preserving animal welfare.</u> Rationale: • Art 7.6.5 2 a) under Veterinarian Responsibilities states 'determine and supervise the implementation of the most appropriate killing method'. Cost is also mentioned again at Article 7.6.6 d). There appears to be a potential conflict between a Veterinarian's responsibility in this chapter versus the killing method cost in determining the best animal welfare outcome for the animals in question. • It is best to create a separate line to flag that available resources, including cost should be taken into account when designing the operation/selecting the killing method, in balance with preserving animal welfare. This is consistent with article 7.6.4 reference to resources when drafting the emergency plan.	Did not agree, as this is not an animal welfare consideration.
7.6.3._11	Category: addition As necessary, operational procedures should be <u>evidence-based</u> adapted to the specific circumstances <u>in the affected locations or</u> on the premises and should address, apart from animal welfare, the cost <u>and effectiveness</u> of the method, operators' safety and mental health, biosecurity and environmental aspects <u>relevant to the species.</u> Rationale: The quality and specificity of the operational procedures is critical to ensure good outcomes.	Agreed
7.6.3._12	Category: Addition <u>The method chosen to kill the animals should prioritise animal welfare.</u> As necessary, operational procedures should be adapted to the specific circumstances on the premises and should address, apart from animal	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposal, the entire chapter prioritises animal welfare. The text is also already included in the fifth paragraph.

	welfare, the cost of the method, operators' safety and mental health, biosecurity and environmental aspects. Rationale: Animal welfare seems not to be prioritised here. Surely the first 'general principle' should be that the method chosen should prioritise animal welfare.	
7.6.3._13	Category: addition The Member suggests placing the cost aspect at the end of the list: "As necessary, operational procedures should be adapted to the specific circumstances on the premises and should address, apart from animal welfare, <u>the cost of the method</u>, operators' safety and mental health, biosecurity <u>and</u> environmental aspects <u>and the cost of the method</u>." Rationale: It seems inappropriate to mention the cost aspect immediately after animal welfare and before the other factors mentioned. It seems more appropriate to change the order of words, to emphasize the importance to consider operator's safety and health, biosecurity and environmental impact over cost.	Already covered by previous amendments.

During decision making and prior to killing the animals, normal husbandry, especially supply of feed and water, should be maintained until the animals are killed.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.3._14	Category: addition During decision making and prior to killing the animals, normal husbandry, especially supply of feed and water <u>and thermal comfort</u>, should be maintained until the animals are killed. <u>In the case of wild or feral animals, species and class appropriate care should be provided. Where injury or illness has occurred, medical care should be provided and maintained to ensure that animals under care are comfortable and stable until killing occurs. For animals housed or living in open locations, operators should minimise any potential stressful interactions including herding or corralling until necessary preparations are complete for the animals to be killed.</u> Rationale: Thermal comfort can be very important in adverse weather event scenarios. Animals must be maintained in a good welfare state until killing occurs. Stress should	The Code Commission partially agreed with the comment; the proposal is already covered in other parts of the chapter such as the Scope and in other chapters of section 7 of the Code.

	be minimised and handling is a key stressor for wild/feral animals.	
7.6.3._15	Category: deletion The Member asks WOA to consider changing and moving the above sentence to the second paragraph: ~~During decision making and prior to killing the animals, normal husbandry, especially supply of feed and water, should, as far as possible, be maintained until the animals are killed.~~ Rationale: See above.	Agreed and moved up, after the first paragraph of the Article.
7.6.3._16	Category: deletion and addition The Member suggests replacing “normal” by “appropriate” in the sentence above: “During decision making and prior to killing the animals, ~~normal~~ appropriate husbandry, especially supply of feed and water, should be maintained until the animals are killed”. Rationale: It seems more relevant to use the word “appropriate” rather than “normal”. Practices that are part of the “normal” routine for the animals may need to be adjusted depending on the situation.	Agreed and included in the second new paragraph of this article.

Animals might be killed on site or move to a dedicated place for killing. The handling and movement of animals should be minimised and carried out in accordance with the recommendations described below.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.3._17	Category: addition The Member notes that recommendations on movement are not provided and should be considered for inclusion.	Agreed and added at the beginning of the paragraph

When restraint is required ~~Animal restraint~~ it should be sufficient to facilitate effective killing, and in accordance with animal welfare and operator safety requirements. ~~When restraint is required, and~~ killing should follow with ~~out~~ minimal ~~delay.~~ The type and size of restraint deployed should be appropriate for the age, size and species of animal to be killed. When herding or corralling is applied, a low-stress method using appropriate apparatus to facilitate the safe and effective killing of animals should be used.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.3._18	Category: Addition “Animal restraint should be sufficient to facilitate effective killing, and in accordance with animal welfare and operator	Agreed

	safety requirements. When restraint is required, killing should follow <u>without with minimal</u> delay.” Rationale: ‘Minimal’ provides margin for delay and is unnecessarily permissive, the killing should be carried out as soon as the animal is successfully restrained.	
7.6.3._19	Category: deletion “L’immobilisation des animaux doit être suffisante pour faciliter une mise à mort efficace et en conformité avec les exigences en matière de bien-être animal et de sécurité des opérateurs. <u>Lorsqu’une immobilisation est nécessaire, il</u> la mise à mort doit suivre dans les plus brefs délais.” Rationale: Au début de ce point, présenté comme un principe général à respecter, il est précisé que “l’immobilisation des animaux doit être suffisante pour faciliter une mise à mort efficace”. Puis il est dit “Lorsqu’une immobilisation est nécessaire, la mise à mort doit suivre dans les plus brefs délais”, ce qui sous-entend que l’immobilisation n’est pas toujours nécessaire, ce qui peut paraître contradictoire avec le début du point.	Agreed but moved at the beginning of the paragraph.
7.6.3._20	Category: Addition/deletion Animal restraint should be sufficient to facilitate effective killing, and in accordance with animal welfare and operator safety requirements. When restraint is required, <u>animals should restrained for the shortest time period possible to ensure effective killing should follow with minimal delay and the animal should be released only after signs of unconsciousness have been verified.</u> Rationale: Clarify the language with more precise wording; “minimal delay” could be more widely interpreted than the “shortest period possible”. Animals must be restrained for the minimum time necessary to allow effective killing and prevent animals experiencing avoidable distress prior to death. To ensure that the animal is unconscious after the procedure, it is necessary to check for signs of returning sensibility immediately after the stunning process, and it will be more efficient to carry out this procedure when the animal is still immobilised, in case further stunning/killing procedures are necessary.	The first addition was addressed, but the second was not agreed as it is independent of the method.
7.6.3._21	Category: addition/deletion <u>Where appropriate, A</u> animal restraint should be sufficient to facilitate effective killing, and in accordance with animal welfare and operator safety requirements. <u>Animal restraint methods should be appropriate to the species and should be selected to minimise discomfort, pain and distress.</u> When restraint is required, <u>animals should be restrained for</u>	Agreed partially and included differently.

	the minimal time necessary to ensure effective killing should follow with minimal delay. The type and size of restraint deployed should be appropriate for the age, size and species of animal to be killed. Where restraint is not appropriate to the species, herding or corralling should be applied in a low-stress method using appropriate apparatus to facilitate the safe and effective killing of animals. Rationale: Restraint should be kept to a minimum to allow effective killing but also to minimise distress prior. Restraint may not be appropriate in some cases, and its use may increase biosecurity risks. Some species such as deer or marsupials may injure themselves in escape attempts. Poorly fitting restraint may cause additional injury or escape. For example, mist-netting is very effective for capturing in the environment small to medium birds that are flocked together however is quite stressful if they are left in the netting, so individual euthanasia would increase additional stress.	
7.6.3._22	Category: addition Where practical, stunning methods appropriate to the species should be applied before killing.	Did not agree, as the intention is to kill the animal
7.6.3._23	Category: addition/deletion La sujeción de los animales deberá ser suficiente para facilitar su matanza y cumplir los requisitos de bienestar de los animales y de seguridad de los operadores. Cuando sea necesario sujetar a los animales <u>deberá hacerse durante el menor periodo posible</u>, se les dará muerte <u>sin demora pronta</u>. Rationale: Es importante que los animales estén inmovilizados durante el tiempo mínimo necesario para permitir una matanza eficaz y evitar que experimenten miedo, angustia y en algunos casos incluso dolor antes de morir.	Agreed and already covered
7.6.3._24	Category: addition/deletion The Member suggests the following changes to the sentence above: “Animal restraint should be sufficient to facilitate effective killing, and in accordance with animal welfare and operator safety requirements. When <u>restraint an animal is restrained is required, killing should follow with minimal delay it should be promptly killed without delay.</u>” Rationale:	Agreed and already covered

	To emphasise that restraining causes stress and that the animal therefore should be killed as quickly as possible.	

Killing methods used should result in immediate death or loss of consciousness lasting until death. When loss of consciousness is not immediate, induction of unconsciousness ~~should involve as little aversion as possible and~~ should not cause avoidable distress, fear and pain. A backup procedure should be available and used to kill the animal if the first method does not result in death or unconsciousness.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.3._25	Category: deletion “Killing methods used should result in immediate death or loss of consciousness lasting until death. When loss of consciousness is not immediate, induction of unconsciousness ~~should involve as little aversion as possible and~~ should not cause avoidable distress, fear and pain“ Rationale: Aversion causes distress, fear and pain hence the text flagged is redundant.	Agreed
7.6.3._26	Category: deletion and addition “ Lorsque la perte de conscience n'est pas immédiate, l'induction de l'état d'inconscience doit être la moins ~~aversive~~ <u>traumatisante</u> possible et ne doit pas causer de détresse, de peur et de douleur évitables.” Rationale: Dans la phrase “Lorsque la perte de conscience n'est pas immédiate, l'induction de l'état d'inconscience doit être la moins aversive possible et ne doit pas causer de détresse, de peur et de douleur évitables.”, le terme “aversive” ne semble pas adapté en français.	The Code commission did not agree with the modification as it was considered covered with the existing wording.
7.6.3._27	Category: Addition/deletion Killing methods used should result in immediate death or loss of consciousness lasting until death. When loss of consciousness is not immediate, induction of unconsciousness ~~should~~ <u>must be rapid (i.e., occur within seconds or a few minutes)</u>, involve as little aversion as possible and should not cause avoidable distress, fear and pain. Rationale: It is important to specify that even when loss of consciousness is not immediate, it should still be rapid, and to define what is meant by “rapid”.	The Code commission did not agree with the modification as it was considered covered with the existing wording.
7.6.3._28	Category: addition	Agreed only with the second proposal and added at the end of the paragraph.

	Killing methods used should result in immediate death or loss of consciousness lasting until death <u>and be appropriate to age of the animal and the species</u>. When loss of consciousness is not immediate, induction of unconsciousness should involve as little aversion as possible and should not cause avoidable distress, fear and pain. <u>A secondary or terminal method should be available and used to kill the animal if the first method does not result in death or unconsciousness.</u> Rationale: Killing methods need to be appropriate to the species and age to be effective. Restraint methods for killing should be used appropriate to the species and the context. Stunning before killing, where practical and appropriate to the species, can improve animal welfare outcomes. If death or loss of consciousness is not immediate, a secondary 'back-up' method for induction of unconsciousness should be available and used. For example, penetrative captive bolt followed by a terminal procedure for adult sows and boars, or head-only electrical stunning followed by bleeding for all classes of pig. Hewitt, L. & Small, A. (2022) An independent animal welfare assessment of mass destruction methods for pigs on-farm that will be used to inform national standards and guidelines. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Canberra (unpublished). Animal Health Australia (2015). Operational manual: Destruction of animals (Version 3.2). Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN), Edition 3, Agriculture Ministers' Forum, Canberra, ACT Gerritzen MA, Raj MAB. Animal welfare and killing for disease control. In: Smulders FJM, Algers B, editors. Welfare of Production Animals: Assessment and Management of Risks. Food Safety Assurance and Veterinary Public Health. 52009. p. 191-203	
7.6.3._29	Category: addition Los métodos utilizados para la matanza deberán producir la muerte inmediata. <u>En caso de utilizar métodos de insensibilización previos, éstos deben provocar la</u> pérdida inmediata de conocimiento de los animales hasta su muerte. Cuando la pérdida de conocimiento no sea inmediata, su inducción deberá causar la menor reacción de aversión posible y no deberá provocar a los animales distrés, miedo ni dolor evitables. Rationale: A fin de mejorar la redacción en cuanto a los métodos utilizados es importante diferenciar cuanto el método produce la muerte inmediata de los que no, por ello se sugiere dividirlo en dos oraciones diferentes.	Did not agree as the objective is to kill the animal.

~~Young animals should be killed before older animals on which they are dependent to reduce potential distress.~~

Planning should take into account the order in which animals are killed. Where possible vulnerable animals should be killed as a matter of priority, which may include:

- groups with symptomatic animals,
- animals that are unable to obtain feed or water,
- animals that have compromised housing or are without shelter,
- young [REF] or unweaned animals should be killed before older animals on which they are dependent,
- potentially dangerous or aggressive animals, such as bulls, sows with litters, or boars,
- animals in late stage of pregnancy or in parturition, and
- animals in-utero may need to be humanely killed following the killing of the dam if the amniotic sac is ruptured.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.3._30	Category: addition “ <u>Planning should take into account the order in which animals are killed. Where possible:</u> Young animals should be killed before older animals on which they are dependent to reduce potential distress Rationale: Aversion causes distress, fear and pain hence the text flagged is redundant.	Agreed and covered already.
7.6.3._31	Category: deletion and addition Young animals should be killed before older animals on which they are dependent to reduce potential ~~distress~~ <u>negative mental stress.</u> Rationale: As commented for chapter 7.1, distress has no primary quality	Agreed and covered already.
7.6.3._32	Category: General In paragraph 8, the statement "Young animals should be killed before older animals on which they are dependent to reduce potential distress" is unclear. The Member requests clarification and scientific evidence supporting this point.	Agreed and covered already.
7.6.3._33	Category: deletion/addition ~~Young animals should be killed before older animals on which they are dependent to reduce potential distress.~~ <u>Some welfare situations should override disease control purposes and vulnerable animals should be killed as a matter of priority before healthy animals to reduce potential distress, which include:</u>	Agreed and added a more detailed list

	• <u>Sick and distressed animals.</u> • <u>Animals that are unable to obtain feed and/or water.</u> • <u>Animals that have compromised housing or are without shelter.</u> • <u>Young or unweaned animals should be killed before older animals on which they are dependent.</u> • <u>Potentially dangerous or aggressive animals, such as bulls, sows with litters, or boars.</u> • <u>Animals in late stage of pregnancy or in parturition, and</u> • <u>Animals in-utero may need to be humanely killed following the killing of the dam if the amniotic sac is ruptured.</u> Rationale In addition to young animals, there are a number of other vulnerable classes of animals that should be given special consideration and killed as a matter of priority because they may be at a higher risk of experiencing negative welfare consequences if death was delayed. Suggest deleting the sentence on young animals and include a more extensive list of vulnerable animals of which young animals are included. Animals in parturition or late pregnancy should also be given special consideration. Death of the foetus in utero, following the death of the dam, is not an animal welfare concern unless the amniotic sac is ruptured. However, a plan should be developed to ensure that animals that are born during the killing procedures are killed quickly and humanely. This is also referred to in Article 7.5.5. Management of foetuses during slaughter of pregnant animals. Animal Health Australia (2015) AUSVETPLAN: Operational manual destruction of animals, version 3.2. Agriculture Ministers' Forum, Canberra, ACT. RSPCA Australia (2022) Mass euthanasia – pigs. RSPCA Knowledgebase. Available online: https://kb.rspca.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/AFS-Mass-Euthanasia-Considerations-Pigs-2022-03-10.pdf RSPCA Australia (2022) Mass euthanasia – poultry. RSPCA Knowledgebase. Available online: https://kb.rspca.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/AFS-Mass-Euthanasia-Considerations-Poultry-2022-03-10.pdf AVMA (2019) AVMA Guidelines for the depopulation of animals. Available online: https://www.avma.org/sites/default/files/resources/AVMA-Guidelines-for-the-Depopulation-of-Animals.pdf Animal Health Australia (2005). Operational procedures manual: Livestock welfare and management (Version 3.0). Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN), Edition 3, Primary Industries Ministerial Council, Canberra, ACT. Animal welfare aspects in respect of the slaughter or killing of pregnant livestock animals (cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, horses) EFSA (europa.eu)	

7.6.3._34	Category: addition The Member asks WOA to consider inserting a few additional sentences: <u>When feasible, the order in which animals are killed should be based on an assessment of the welfare of the animals concerned, and those animals whose suffering is the greatest should be killed first. For instance, clinically sick animals before infected, animals with injuries before healthy ones and</u> young animals should be killed before older animals on which they are dependent to reduce potential distress. Rationale : The aim should be to minimise the suffering of those animals that are most heavily impacted by the situation. Depending on the situation and why it is necessary to kill numerous animals, there may be different causes for suffering. The proposed example only covers one type of suffering. In some situations, the animals will not be killed individually, and it is then not possible to kill first the sick and then the healthy animals. This may for instance be true if gas is used to kill all poultry in the shed.	Agreed and covered under comment 7.6.3._33.
7.6.3._35	Category: Addition Por razones profilácticas y de bioseguridad, se matarán primero los animales infectados, después los animales que hayan estado en contacto con ellos y, finalmente, los animales restantes. Se matarán primero los animales jóvenes y después los mayores de los que dependen, para minimizar su posible distrés. Rationale: En relación al orden en que están planteados estos principios, a los fines de salvaguardar la bioseguridad, lo primero que debe realizarse es el sacrificio de los animales infectados y dentro de esa subpoblación sacrificar primero los animales jóvenes y luego los adultos, por ello se sugiere invertir los párrafos 8 y 9.	Agreed and covered under comment 7.6.3._33.

For disease control purposes and for biosecurity considerations, infected animals should be killed first, followed by in contact animals, and then remaining animals.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.3._36	Category: Addition/deletion <u>Young animals should be killed before older animals on which they are dependent to reduce potential distress.</u>	Agreed and covered under comment 7.6.3._33.

	For disease control purposes and for biosecurity considerations, infected animals should be killed first, followed by <u>(if necessary)</u> in-contact animals, and then remaining animals. <u>Some animals should be killed as a matter of priority to reduce potential distress, which include:</u> • <u>Sick, suffering and distressed animals</u> • <u>Animals unable to obtain feed and/or water</u> • <u>Animals that have compromised housing or are without shelter</u> • <u>Young or un-weaned animals before older animals on which they are dependent</u> • <u>Potentially dangerous or aggressive animals, such as bulls, sows with litters, or boars</u> • <u>Animals in late stage of pregnancy or in parturition</u> Rationale: It's not only young animals, but other classes of vulnerable animals as well that should be given consideration for killing ahead of others because they may be at a higher risk of negative welfare impacts and experience more distress before killing. IO suggestion is to replace the sentence on young animals and include a more extensive list of vulnerable animals in which young animals are included. Further, it is important to allow for situations in which it may not be necessary to follow the killing of infected animals with additional animals by inserting the words "if necessary" in parentheses after "...infected animals should be killed first, followed by..." Supporting evidence: Animal Health Australia (2015) AUSVETPLAN: Operational manual destruction of animals, version 3.2. Agriculture Ministers' Forum, Canberra, ACT. RSPCA Australia (2022) Mass euthanasia – pigs. RSPCA Knowledgebase. Available online: https://kb.rspca.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/AFS-Mass-Euthanasia-Considerations-Pigs-2022-03-10.pdf RSPCA Australia (2022) Mass euthanasia – poultry. RSPCA Knowledgebase. Available online: https://kb.rspca.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/AFS-Mass-Euthanasia-Considerations-Poultry-2022-03-10.pdf AVMA (2019) AVMA Guidelines for the depopulation of animals. Available online: https://www.avma.org/sites/default/files/resources/AVMA-Guidelines-for-the-Depopulation-of-Animals.pdf	

7.6.3._37	Category: deletion/addition For disease control purposes and for biosecurity considerations, infected animals <u>are generally should be killed first, followed by in-contact animals, and then remaining animals. However, non-infected animals may need to be killed first for animal welfare reasons and this may not affect the outbreak response or duration. When it is unclear if animals are infected, those displaying adverse animal welfare outcomes should be killed first.</u> <u>For natural and man-made disasters, affected animals experiencing distress, fear, pain should be killed first.</u> Rationale: Priorities for killing order should be covered in the contexts to which the chapter applies. There may be additional contexts to cover depending on scope. In determining priorities for killing, some animal welfare requirements could override disease eradication considerations. It is sometimes prudent to cull infected animals at the same time as uninfected animals to prevent animal welfare problems arising due to overcrowding and other problems. For example, uninfected animals that cannot obtain feed or water, or whose shelter has been compromised, may be killed at the same time as infected stock. In a modelling exercise involving a foot and mouth disease outbreak in pigs, East et. al (2014) identified that assigning equal priority to all farms requiring culling, including infected farms and farms at risk of animal welfare concerns, and culling each as they arose, improved animal welfare outcomes without large increases in either the duration or the size of the outbreaks. East IJ, Roche SE, Wicks RM, de Witte K, Garner MG. Options for managing animal welfare on intensive pig farms confined by movement restrictions during an outbreak of foot and mouth disease. Prev Vet Med. 2014 Dec 1;117(3-4):533-41. doi: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2014.10.002. Epub 2014 Oct 12. PMID: 25457134. Animal Health Australia (2005). Operational procedures manual: Livestock welfare and management (Version 3.0). Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN), Edition 3, Primary Industries Ministerial Council, Canberra, ACT.	Agreed and covered under comment 7.6.3._33.
7.6.3._38	Category: deletion The Member suggests deleting above sentence: <u>"For disease control purposes and for biosecurity considerations, infected animals should be killed first, followed by in-contact animals, and then remaining animals."</u> Rationale: The procedure described can lead to additional handling and thus be detrimental to animal welfare. This hazard is	Agreed and deleted the paragraph.

	disproportionate to the added value for disease control/biosafety. In case if not possible to delete it to consider as compromise the following: “For disease control purposes and for biosecurity considerations, infected animals ~~should~~<u>may</u> be killed first, followed by in-contact animals, and then remaining animals. <u>In case infected animals are killed first, negative consequences to the welfare of other animals should be avoided as far as possible.</u>”	

There should be continuous monitoring of the operational procedures to ensure they are consistently effective regarding animal welfare, operator safety and mental health and, biosecurity and environmental aspects.

When large scale or disease control the operational procedures are concluded, there should be a debriefing session or written report describing the practices adopted and their effect on animal welfare, operator safety, *biosecurity and responsible personnel.*

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.3._39	Category: addition When the operational procedures are concluded, <u>in mass depopulation or disease control operations,</u> there should be a written report describing the practices adopted and their effect on animal welfare, operator safety, <i>biosecurity and responsible personnel.</i> Rationale: As the scope of this chapter includes injury there may be instances where only one single injured animal is killed. In such cases producing a full report may be excessive. Given the context in previous paragraphs we understand this provision is intended for cases of mass depopulation and disease control operations hence we have suggested a clarification	Agreed
7.6.3._40	Category: deletion/addition When the operational procedures are concluded, there should be a <u>debriefing session or</u> written report describing the practices adopted and their effect on animal welfare, operator safety, <i>biosecurity and responsible personnel.</i> <u>Operational procedures should be reviewed on a regular basis, even if they have not been utilised, to ensure they reflect contemporary animal welfare science and best-practice planning.</u> Rationale: In addition to monitoring, review of procedures should be covered here. In small scale events written reports may be less effective than a verbal team debriefing session.	The Code Commission agreed with the first proposal however the second part was considered too much detail.
7.6.3._41	Category addition/deletion	The Code Commission only agreed to add the

	The Member suggests adding “and environment impacts” at the end of the two sentences: “There should be continuous monitoring of the operational procedures to ensure they are consistently effective regarding animal welfare, operator safety, and biosecurity and environmental impacts.” “When the operational procedures are concluded, there should be a written report describing the practices adopted and their effect on animal welfare, operator safety, biosecurity and responsible personnel and environmental aspects.” Rationale: For consistency within art. 7.6.3. If operational procedures cover environmental aspects, then the environmental impacts should also be monitored.	environmental aspects in the second last paragraph.
7.6.3._42	Comment To whom should the report be addressed? Will this vary depending on whether the competent authority is involved or not? Is the report to be sent within the country, e.g. from regional level to national level. The purpose of this and the other reports mentioned in the other articles needs to be specified. The purpose of a report could be to generate statistics or to provide feedback and so improve the procedures next time. If the report is not used afterwards, it should not be required to write one.	The reporting after finalising the operations and their outcomes will depend on the organisation and administrative structure of the Competent Authority. Therefore, it was considered unnecessary to add such details.

Article 7.6.4.

Organisational structure for the operations **regarding the of large scale killing or killing for disease control of animals**

Plans for large scale killing or killing for disease control should contain details of responsibilities, management structure, contact details, disease control strategies, operational procedures and necessary equipment and resources. Animal welfare considerations should always be addressed as a priority in these plans. The plans should include a strategy to ensure that an adequate number of personnel competent in the killing of animals is available.

The personnel responsible for the handling, moving, restraining and killing the animals should follow the recommendations of this chapter.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC Group response
7.6.4._1	Category: General Concerning the term “mass killing” which is used here and in other articles, see our comment to article 7.6.2.	Agreed and modified through the draft Chapter. The focus of the draft is the killing of animals independently of the number of them.
7.6.4._2	Category: addition The term “mass killing” does not cover all situations of killing of animals.	Agreed and covered in comment 7.6.4_1

	It may be suitable in the context of killing for disease control purposes, but Art. 7.6.1. covers also some other reasons such as natural or man-made disasters <u>or</u> when they are otherwise suffering from disease or injuries or for economic reasons. At present, we are not sure if the structure of this Chapter intends to cover the other situations separately. <u>This should be the case, as the operational procedures/contingency plans may be different in relation to whether they concern killing for disease control purposes, natural or man-made disasters or other reasons.</u>	

In case of disease control, operational activities should be led by the *Competent authority* who has the authority to ensure the required *animal welfare* and *biosecurity* standards.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.4._3	Category: Addition The Member asks WOA to consider the following amendment of the above sentence: <u>When relevant</u> operational activities should be led by the Competent authority who has the authority to ensure the required animal welfare and biosecurity standards. Rationale: The Competent Authority will not be involved in all situations where it is required to kill the whole flock. In the Member it is most common to kill all the hens in a flock in-house at end of lay with gas. This proposed amendment also ties in with the last sentence in this article and may help to avoid confusion as to who is to lead the activities.	Did not agree, but amended the text to indicate that the Competent Authority is the relevant one in the disease control activities.
7.6.4._4	Category: Addition and deletion Operational activities should be <u>led by under the direction of</u> the <i>Competent authority</i> who has the authority to ensure the required <i>animal welfare</i> and <i>biosecurity</i> standards. Rationale: The Competent Veterinary Authority will not always be leading the depopulation activity. Those activities may be carried out by other agencies or even the producer. The need to ensure that animal welfare and biosecurity are maintained is important and should be under the direction of the Competent Veterinary Authority.	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposal as the Competent Authority is considered to lead the killing operations.
7.6.4._5	Category: addition Operational activities should be led by the Competent authority, <u>or the authority delegated as responsible by the Competent authority,</u> who	Did not agree as it was considered unnecessary to add new information.

	has the authority to ensure the required animal welfare and biosecurity standards. Rationale: The scope of the chapter will determine whether it is the competent authority, or the authority delegated the responsibility by the competent authority.	

The Competent authority should nominate a responsible agent for all activities across one or more affected locations or premises who should be supported by coordinators for planning operations and logistics to facilitate efficient operations.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.4._6	Category: addition The Competent authority should nominate a responsible agent for all activities across one or more affected locations or premises who should be supported by coordinators for planning operations and logistics to facilitate efficient <u>and effective</u> operations.	Did not agree as it was already covered in the text.
Rationale	Suggested addition of text for distinction.	

The nominated responsible agent of the Competent authority should provide overall guidance to personnel and logistic support for operations at all affected locations or premises to ensure consistency in adherence to the *Terrestrial Code's animal welfare* and animal health recommendations.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.4._7	Category: addition The <u>agent delegated as</u> responsible <u>by agent of</u> the <i>Competent authority</i> should provide overall guidance to personnel and logistic support for operations at all affected locations or premises to ensure consistency in adherence to the <i>Terrestrial Code's animal welfare</i> and animal health recommendations. Rationale: Suggested change to acknowledge that the responsible agent may be designated by the Competent authority but isn't always necessarily employed by it	The Code Commission agreed with the proposal but only with some modifications

A specialist team, led by a team leader answerable to the nominated responsible agent nominated by the Competent Authority, should be deployed to work on each affected location or premises. In some situations, When needed personnel may be required to fulfil more than one function. Each team should contain a competent *veterinarian* or have access to veterinary advice at all times.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.4._8	Category: Addition and deletion A specialist team, led by a team leader answerable to the responsible agent nominated by the <i>Competent Authority</i>, should be deployed to work on each affected location or premises, <u>or to educate the farmer in the event they would be conducting the depopulation under the direction of the Competent Authority</u>. In some situations, personnel may be required to fulfil more than one function. Each team should contain a <i>veterinarian</i> or have access to veterinary advice at all times. Rationale: In some cases, the producer themselves may be conducting the depopulation when the Competent Authority does not have the manpower to deploy teams.	Agreed but amended so not to be too restrictive.
7.6.4._9	Category: addition "A specialist team, led by a team leader answerable to the responsible agent nominated by the Competent Authority, should be deployed to work on each affected location or premises. In some situations, personnel may be required to fulfil more than one function. Each team should contain a veterinarian <u>with up-to-date competency</u> or have access to veterinary advice at all times". Rationale: Welfare at the time of killing skills are significantly different to small animal veterinary practice skills. It is important to highlight that veterinarians advising on killing operations should have relevant up to date competency.	Agreed but used different wording
7.6.4._10	Category: addition/deletion <u>An appropriately qualified specialist</u> team, led by a team leader answerable to the responsible agent nominated by the <i>Competent Authority</i>, should be deployed to work on each affected location or premises. In some situations, personnel may be required to fulfil more than one function <u>provided this is within their capability or expertise and does not compromise their health or safety</u>. Each team should contain a <i>veterinarian</i> or have access to veterinary advice at all times. Rationale: A specialist team doesn't always imply the personnel are appropriately qualified to carry out the relevant tasks. Where individuals are being tasked with extra functions, it is important that they can do this effectively and safely.	Did not agree.
7.6.4._11	Category: deletion and addition	Agreed

	The Member suggests replacing “in some situations” by “when needed”: <u>“In some situations, When needed, personnel may be required to fulfil more than one function. Each team should contain a <i>veterinarian</i> or have access to veterinary advice at all times.”</u> Rationale: If the formulation “in some situations” is kept, then it should be specified which are these situations.	

Emergency plans should be in place and contain details of responsibilities, management structure, disease control strategies, operational procedures and necessary equipment and resources. *Animal welfare* considerations should always be addressed in these emergency plans. The plans should include a strategy to ensure that an adequate number of personnel competent in the *killing* of animals is available.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.4._12	Category: Addition/deletion Emergency plans should be in place and contain details of responsibilities, management structure, disease control strategies, operational procedures and necessary equipment and resources. <u>Preparedness, including training, exercises, stockpiling, and contracts for sourcing supplies and equipment, are essential to ensure emergency plans can be effectively executed.</u> <i>Animal welfare</i> considerations should always be a <u>top priority addressed</u> in these emergency <u>plans</u> <u>plannings</u> <u>and preparedness</u>. The plans <u>and preparation</u> should include a strategy to ensure that an adequate number of <u>competent</u> personnel, <u>resources and appropriate equipment are available for competent in the killing of animals is available.</u> Rationale: This paragraph is vitally important for the welfare of animals at the time of killing and the whole of chapter 7.6. Both planning and preparation should be delineated thoroughly. Availability of competent personnel, resources and needed equipment should be included in the emergency plans and preparation to ensure they will be effective, humane, and quickly deployable	The Code Commission agreed partially with the suggestions. However, they moved the paragraph to the first part of this Article and also considered that the other suggestions could fit better in a specific chapter on emergency management.
7.6.4._13	Category: addition Emergency plans should be in place and contain details of responsibilities, management structure, disease control strategies, operational procedures and necessary equipment and resources. <i>Animal welfare</i> considerations should always be <u>addressed a top priority</u> in these emergency plans. The plans should include a strategy to ensure that an adequate number	Considered under comment 7.6.4._12

	of personnel competent in the killing of animals is available. Rationale: A Member suggests that animal welfare should be a key consideration in emergency planning on farms and other areas where animals are kept, rather than just being a topic to be “addressed”.	
7.6.4._14	Category: addition Emergency plans should be in place and contain details of responsibilities, <u>contact information</u>, management structure, disease control strategies, operational procedures and necessary equipment and resources <u>to support animal and human health and welfare</u>. <i>Animal welfare</i> considerations should always be addressed in these emergency plans. The plans should include a strategy to ensure that an adequate number of personnel competent in the <i>killing</i> of animals <u>and logistical or additional support</u> is available, <u>as well as resources and appropriate equipment</u>. Rationale: In addition to having the adequate number of competent personnel, it is also critical to ensure that there is the correct type and amount of equipment and resources needed so that the mass killing can be undertaken in an effective and timely manner. Excessive bystanders and personnel involved in the response can create a risk to health and safety and can complicate delegation of roles and responsibilities and effective communication. It is important to recognise that there is a balance to ensure an effective and efficient response.	Considered under comment 7.6.4._12
7.6.4._15	Category: Addition/deletion ~~Emergency plans~~ <u>Killing plans</u> should be in place and contain details of responsibilities, management structure, disease control strategies, operational procedures and necessary equipment and resources. Animal welfare considerations should always be addressed in these ~~emergency plans~~ <u>killing plans</u>. The plans should include a strategy to ensure that an adequate number of personnel competent in the killing of animals is available. Rationale: It is suggested to change "emergency plan" in Article 7.6.4 into "killing plan". Emergency plan is applicable to the prevention and control of animal diseases. According to the contents of this chapter, it is more appropriate to change it into killing plan.	Considered under comment 7.6.4._12

Depopulation under disease control emergency plans should be performed under the supervision of *Competent Authority* and address any *animal welfare* issues that may result from standstill or any other animal movement restriction.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.4._16	Category: Addition/deletion ~~Depopulation~~ The killing of animals under disease control emergency plans should be performed under the supervision of <i>Competent Authority</i> and address any <i>animal welfare</i> issues that may result from standstill or any other animal movement restriction. Rationale: Given that the document refers to the killing of animals throughout, for consistency replace “depopulation” with less euphemistic terminology “killing”, which is more accurate and clearer.	Did not agree and deleted the paragraph as its already included in the first paragraph of this Article.
7.6.4._17	Category: addition The mass killing of animals ~~Depopulation~~ under disease control emergency plans should be performed under the supervision of ~~the~~ <i>Competent Authority</i> and address any <i>animal welfare</i> issues that may result from standstill or any other animal movement restriction. Rationale: This is the first time in the document that the term depopulation is used. Given that the document refers throughout to the killing of animals, suggest that for consistency depopulation is deleted and replaced with a more accurate description of the act which is mass killing of animals for disease purposes.	Did not agree. Refer to 7.6.4._16.

In considering the *animal welfare* issues associated with *killing* animals, the key personnel, their responsibilities, and competencies required are described in Article 7.6.5.

In ~~other~~ situations that do not necessarily involve the *Competent Authority*, the personnel responsible should follow the recommendations of this chapter.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.4._18	Category: addition In other situations that do not necessarily involve the <i>Competent Authority</i>, the personnel responsible should closely follow all the recommendations of this chapter. Rationale: The Member suggests that this language be stronger.	Did not agree as considered unnecessary.
7.6.4._19	Category: addition	Did not agree. Refer to 7.6.4._18

	In other situations that do not necessarily involve the <i>Competent Authority</i>, the personnel responsible should follow all the recommendations of this chapter closely. Rationale: These additions help to strengthen the language.	
7.6.4._20	Category: deletion The Member suggests removing “other” before situations and to move the last sentence up as follows: “In other situations that do not necessarily involve the <i>Competent Authority</i>, the personnel responsible should follow the recommendations of this chapter. In considering the animal welfare issues associated with killing animals, the key personnel, their responsibilities, and competencies required are described in Article 7.6.5.” Rationale: If “other” is kept, then it should be specified which are these other situations. For the sake of consistency, it is proposed to change the order of sentences.	Agreed

Article 7.6.5.

Responsibilities **training** and competencies of the specialist team for the operations regarding the **mass** killing of animals

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._1	Category: general Same comment as above regarding the term “mass killing”.	The Code Commission agreed to delete the word ‘mass’ as the scope of the chapter is for any number of animals.
Rationale		

All personnel have a crucial role to play in ensuring good animal welfare conditions through to the killing. Training for all personnel should emphasise the importance of animal welfare and their responsibility in contributing to the welfare of the animals.

Competencies may be gained through a combination of formal training and practical experience. These competencies should be assessed by the Competent Authority or by an independent body recognised by the Competent Authority

1. Team leader

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._2	Category: general	Agreed and modified the text to clarify the characteristic of the team leader.

	Les responsabilités et compétences du chef d'équipe décrites dans ce point semblent très étendues et il paraît difficile de trouver la personne adaptée.	

a) Responsibilities

- (i) plan overall operations on affected location or premises;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._3	Category: addition (i) plan overall operations on affected location or premises <u>appropriate to the age and species</u>; Rationale: The age and species of animals should be a key consideration and this influences the nature of any operational activities, particularly animal handling, restraint and killing procedures.	The Code Commission did not agree as already included in Article 7.6.3. General principles
7.6.5._4	Category: addition <u>(ii) engage with veterinarian advice in planning, executing and concluding killing operations</u>; Rationale: Team leaders should also consult with veterinarians as they may not necessarily possess these capabilities.	Did not agree as already included in number (vi) of the responsibilities of the Team leader.

- (ii) determine and address requirements for *animal welfare*, operator safety and *biosecurity*;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._5	Category: addition The Member suggests adding “and environment aspects” at the end of the sentences: “(ii) determine and address requirements for animal welfare, operator safety and biosecurity <u>and environmental aspects</u>.” Rationale: In order to be consistent with art. 7.6.3 also “environmental aspects” should be mentioned.	Did not agree. This is not under the mandate and responsibilities of the team leader.

- (iii) organise and manage team of people to facilitate *killing* of the relevant animals on the location or premises in accordance with national regulations and these recommendations;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._6	Category: Addition/deletion (iii) organise and manage team of people to facilitate <i>killing and confirmation of the death</i> of the relevant animals on the location or premises in accordance with national regulations and these recommendations; Rationale: While the veterinarian below is in charge of ensuring that confirmation of death is carried out by competent persons, it should be the responsibility of the team leader to ensure that the team contains an adequate number of persons who are competent at both killing and confirming death of animals. Confirmation of death should also include in this point	Did not agree. This is already considered in the responsibilities of the veterinarian.
7.6.5._7	Category: addition (iii) organise and manage team of <i>competent</i> people to facilitate <i>killing and confirmation of death</i> of the relevant animals on the location or premises in accordance with national regulations and these recommendations; Rationale: While the veterinarian (noted in the subsequent point 2 of this Article) oversees ensuring that confirmation of death is carried out by competent persons, it should be the responsibility of the team leader to ensure that the team involved contains an adequate number of persons that are competent at both killing and confirming death in animals. Suggest that confirmation of death is also included in this point.	Did not agree. Refer to comment 7.6.5._6

(iv) determine logistics required;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._8	Category: addition iv) determine logistics required <i>including biocontainment after conclusion of operations</i>; Rationale: Biocontainment is an important consideration to minimise further risks to animal health and welfare, and human health.	Did not agree to add the suggested text as this is not within the scope of the chapter.

(v) monitor operations to ensure *animal welfare*, operator safety and *biosecurity* requirements are met;

(vi) *seek and use veterinary advice*;

(vii) report upwards on progress and problems;

(viii) provide a written report at the conclusion of the *killing* operation, describing the practices adopted and their effect on *animal welfare*, operator safety, efficacy of *biosecurity* and environmental impact.

b) **Training and Competencies**

i) **knowledge understanding of and experience with** relevant animal husbandry practices;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._9	Category: addition i) knowledge of and experience with relevant animal husbandry practices; Rationale: A Member suggests that the team leader responsible for mass killing should also have direct experience with animals; knowledge alone is not enough.	Agreed with modifications.
7.6.5._10	Category: addition ii) knowledge of and experience with relevant animal husbandry practices; Rationale: It is important for the team leader to be knowledge and experienced with the animals involved when responsible for mass killings.	Agreed. Refer to comment 7.6.5._9
7.6.5._11	Category: addition i) knowledge of and experience with relevant animal husbandry, handling and biosecurity practices; Rationale: It is important for the team leader to be knowledgeable and experienced with the animals and practices involved when responsible for mass killings.	Agreed. Refer to comment 7.6.5._9

ii) **knowledge understanding of animal welfare, impact of , different killing methods, and the details, planning and implementation of the killing operation; and the underpinning behavioural, anatomical and physiological processes involved in the killing operation;**

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._12	Category: addition ii) knowledge of <i>animal welfare</i> , the impact of different killing methods , and the underpinning behavioural, anatomical and physiological processes involved in the	Agreed with the comment, but the Code Commission added some modifications.

	<u>killing and confirmation of death</u> operation <u>of the target species</u>; Rationale: The team leader should have a good understanding of the impact of various killing methods and how they impact the welfare of the animals. This can assist them with their decision on the most humane and effective method to use. Confirmation of death of the relevant animals by the team leader and their team is also important to help reduce negative welfare outcomes.	
7.6.5._13	Category: addition ii) knowledge of <u>the impact that different killing methods have on animal welfare</u> and the underpinning behavioural, anatomical and physiological processes involved in the <i>killing</i> operation; Rationale: The Member suggests the key understanding that those responsible for advanced planning need to have is the impact of different killing methods on animal welfare, so that they can plan for and prepare to use the most humane and effective options. Clarify that animal welfare knowledge is not enough—it must be specific to the task.	Agreed. Refer to comment 7.6.5._12.
7.6.5._14	Category: addition/deletion The Member suggests replacing “underpinning” by “underlying”: “ii) knowledge of animal welfare and the <u>underpinning</u> <u>underlying</u> behavioural, anatomical and physiological processes involved in the killing operation;” Rationale: “Underlying” is considered a better and more appropriate wording in this context.	Agreed, but using the text of comment 7.6.5._12.

iii) leadership and ability to skills to manage all activities on the location or premises and deliver outcomes on time;

iv) awareness of psychological effects on farmer, team members or person(s) in charge of animals [AVMA, 2019], and general public;

~~iv)~~ v) awareness of fatigue effects on those carrying out repeated killing of large numbers of animals and on the effectiveness of the procedure [AVMA, 2019].

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._15	Category: addition	Agreed, with modification to better express its role.

	iv) awareness of psychological effects on farmer <u>or person(s) in charge of animals</u>, team members and general public; v) <u>awareness of physical effects on those carrying out repeated killing of large numbers of animals</u>; Rationale: Better capture the range of roles that a person may have when in charge of animals. It may not be a “farmer”, but for example, someone with a backyard flock, that needs depopulation assistance, so it’s important to widen the terminology for who might be psychologically impacted by killing of the animals. Alternatively, use the terms in Article 7.6.5.6 below in this document (e.g., breeder, owner, keeper, manager). Killing animals can have a physical toll (e.g., operator fatigue) on the person performing the killing, especially with manual methods, which can reduce their ability to perform the killing effectively and ultimately impact animal welfare. Supporting evidence: American Veterinary Medical Association (2019). AVMA Guidelines for Depopulation of animals. Section 3.3.4, Potential human physical and psychological impacts and section 10.3.3 Personnel Considerations www.avma.org/sites/default/files/resources/AVMA-Guidelines-for-the-Depopulation-of-Animals.pdf EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare. (2020). Welfare of cattle at slaughter. EFSA Journal, 18(11), Article e06275. https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6275	

~~iv) vi)~~ ability to communicate effectively with different audiences ~~communication skills~~;

~~vi)~~ vii) capacity to evaluate the environmental impacts caused by their operation.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._16	Category: addition v) <u>effective</u> communication skills; vi) <u>capacity ability</u> to evaluate the environmental impacts caused by their operation. Rationale: Suggested changes to strengthen text. In the event of mass killing events outside of emergency disease, the team leader may not necessarily have animal welfare expertise, this responsibility/role may be better delegated to a veterinarian or other responder with animal welfare competencies. e.g., skills better	Agreed with the addition added some additional aspects to vi) to better explain its role

	suited to logistics, people management, communications, etc.	
7.6.5._17	General The Member understands and supports that there is someone present who has one or all these competencies. However, we are not sure that it is realistic to expect one person, i.e. the team leader to have all the above skills. The team leader should be able to have personnel to support him/her in areas where competence is lacking. We do not believe that all of our staff for example have competencies related to “psychological effects on farmers” or “capacity to evaluate environmental impact”. In many situations we believe that several authorities will be involved, and they will all have their responsibilities. However, it will be necessary to have someone, a leader, to coordinate and have the overall responsibility. This article should better reflect the reality of many of these situations, which can be quite complex.	Agreed. Refer to comment 7.6.5._16.

2. Veterinarian

a) Responsibilities

- i) advise on determine and supervise the implementation of the most appropriate *killing* method to ensure that animals are killed without avoidable pain and distress minimising pain, fear and suffering;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._19	Category: addition i) <u>determine</u> and supervise the implementation of the most appropriate <i>killing</i> method to ensure that animals are killed without avoidable pain, <u>suffering</u> and distress, <u>with the welfare of the animals being the top priority</u>. Rationale: The Member suggests that the inclusion of “avoidable” leaves room for interpretation and implies that a level of pain and distress is acceptable. Killing methods should ensure the animals are either killed instantly or rendered insensible until death ensues, without pain, suffering or distress to the animals.	Agreed and modified the proposal to follow up the wording used in other chapters when referring to pain, fear and suffering. However, did not agree to add the last sentence as it is implicit in the new wording.
7.6.5._20	Category: addition i) <u>advise on</u> <u>determine</u> and supervise the implementation of the most appropriate <i>killing</i> method <u>for the target species</u> to ensure that animals are killed without avoidable pain, <u>suffering</u> and distress, <u>with animal welfare continuing to be a top priority</u>;	Agree. Refer to comment 7.5.6_19.

	Rationale: The term ‘avoidable’ means there is room for interpretation because it implies that a level of pain, suffering and distress would be acceptable. Methods of killing should ensure the animals are either killed instantaneously or rendered insensible until death ensures, without pain, suffering or distress to the animals. Some killing methods are unacceptable and should never be considered. Reyes-Illg G, Martin JE, Mani I, Reynolds J, Kipperman B (2023) The Rise of Heatstroke as a Method of Depopulating Pigs and Poultry: Implications for the US Veterinary Profession. <i>Animals</i> 13(1):140. https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/13/1/140 McKeegan D. 2018. Mass Depopulation. <i>Advances in Animal Welfare</i>. In: (Mench A, ed.) <i>Advances in Poultry Welfare</i>. Woodhead Publishing Series in Food Science, Technology and Nutrition, pp. 351-372.	

- ii) determine and implement **any necessary** the additional requirements for *animal welfare*, including the order of *killing*;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.4._21	Category: editorial “determine and implement the any necessary additional requirements for <i>animal welfare</i>, including the order of killing; Rationale: It is not clear what ‘the additional requirements’ are. We have suggested wording that provides flexibility but makes clear that these are welfare requirements to be determined, rather than pre-existing.	Agreed
7.6.5._22	Category: addition/deletion iii) advise on Determine and implement the additional requirements for <i>animal welfare</i>, including the order of <i>killing</i>; Rationale: Suggest change to ‘advise on’ rather than determine noting that the veterinarian should ultimately report to the team leader who has the responsibility to organise and manage people to facilitate killing and confirmation of death. This is reflected in the suggested additional text for the responsibilities of the team leader, in point 1. a) ii. as suggested by the Member.	The Code Commission did not agree with the modification proposed, as it did not add clarity to the current text.

7.6.5._23	Category: addition ii) determine and supervise the implementation of the most appropriate <i>killing</i> method to ensure that animals are killed without avoidable pain, suffering and distress, and animal welfare must continue to be a top priority. Any form of ventilation shutdown (VSD) is inhumane and should never be used to kill animals; Rationale: The term 'avoidable' leaves room for interpretation because it implies that a level of pain, suffering and distress would be acceptable. Methods of killing should ensure the animals are either killed instantaneously or rendered insensible until death ensures, without pain, suffering or distress to the animals. Some killing methods are unacceptable and should never be considered. For instances, heatstroke-based killing methods may result in prolonged suffering and may not achieve 100 percent mortality. Supporting evidence: Reyes-Illg G, Martin JE, Mani I, Reynolds J, Kipperman B (2023) The rise of heatstroke as a method of depopulating pigs and poultry: implications for the US veterinary profession. <i>Animals</i> 13(1):140. www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/13/1/140 McKeegan D. 2018. Mass Depopulation. <i>Advances in Animal Welfare</i>. In: (Mench JA, ed.) <i>Advances in Poultry Welfare</i>. Woodhead Publishing Series in Food Science, Technology and Nutrition, pp. 351-372.	Agreed. Refer to comment 7.5.6_19.

- iii) ensure that confirmation of the *death* of the animals is carried out by competent persons as soon as possible at appropriate times after the *killing* procedure;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._24	Category: addition iii) ensure that confirmation of the <i>death</i> of the animals is carried out by competent persons at appropriate times as soon as possible after the <i>killing</i> procedure; Rationale: Suggesting stronger language to specify the urgency of confirmation of death to help prevent unnecessary pain, suffering and distress of the animals.	Agree as it provided additional clarity.
7.6.5._25	Category: addition iii) ensure that confirmation of the <i>death</i> of the animals is carried out by competent persons at	Agree. Refer to comment 7.6.5._24

	~~appropriate times~~ as soon as possible after the <i>killing</i> procedure; Rationale: The Member suggests that the wording should be more specific regarding the urgency of checking that animals are dead and not continuing to suffer after a method was applied unsuccessfully.	
7.6.5._26	Category: addition/deletion iii) ensure that confirmation of the <i>death</i> of the animals is carried out by competent persons as soon as possible ~~at appropriate times~~ after the <i>killing</i> procedure; Rationale: Suggesting stronger language to specify the urgency of confirmation of death to help prevent unnecessary pain, suffering and distress of the animals.	Agree. Refer to comment 7.6.5._24

iv) minimise the risk of disease spread within and from the location or premises through the supervision of *biosecurity*;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._27	Category: addition <u>iv)</u> minimise the risk of disease spread within and from the location or premises through the supervision of <i>biosecurity</i> measures; Rationale: Suggested change for clarity.	Did not agree as it does not improve the readability.

v) **continuously monitor** **ensuring** *animal welfare* and *biosecurity* during killing process;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._28	Category: general The Member carefully assessed point v) on "continuously monitoring". We consider it is important to keep "continuously" as we see its deletion as a substantial lowering of the level of animal welfare.	Agree with modifications
7.6.5._29	Category: general Given that a team leader may not necessarily be a veterinarian and a veterinarian may not always be present, the Member notes that v), 'continuously monitor', is contradictory to the section above which suggests that a team does not need to have a	The wording was changed, therefore the comment is no longer relevant.

	veterinarian so long as they are receiving veterinary advice (Paragraph 4 of Article 7.6.4).	

vi) collaborate with the team leader on the written report at the conclusion of the *killing*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._30	Category: addition vii) “Understanding of the different available killing methods and their impacts on animal welfare.” Rationale: A key responsibility of veterinarians is to “determine and supervise the implementation of the most appropriate killing method to ensure that animals are killed without avoidable pain and distress”. For this it is crucial to have understanding of the different killing methods so the best one can be selected in a fully informed manner.	The Code Commission did not agree to add a new point as it is covered in point b) training and competencies.

b) **Training and c** Competencies

i) **Understanding of** ability to assess animal welfare **and ability to assess it;**

ii) Understanding of **especially** the effectiveness of **the killing process** and **the ability** to correct any deficiencies;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._31	Category: deletion “capacité de manipuler des animaux dans des situations d'urgence et en situation de confinement étroit est requise ;” Rationale: Pourquoi préciser que cette compétence est requise alors que cela n'est pas précisé pour les autres compétences ? Le Membre propose de supprimer cette mention.	Agree. Only in the French version
7.6.5._32	Category: addition iii) ability to assess <i>animal welfare</i>, especially the effectiveness of killing for the target species and to correct any deficiencies in processes based on scientific understanding; Rationale: Suggested change for clarity and to ensure best practice using evidence-based knowledge.	The Code Commission did not agree to add the proposed modifications as it is too detailed and is also covered by the changes made to point b).
7.6.5._33	Category: addition	Agreed, but covered by the word 'ability' in point ii)

	i) <u>extensive knowledge of and experience with</u> animal handling in emergency situations and in close confinement is required; Rationale: A Member suggests that this language be clearer and require that those involved be knowledgeable about and familiar with animal handling in such circumstances.	

iii) ability to assess *biosecurity* risks.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._34	Category: addition ii) <u>ability to assess biosecurity risks and advise of appropriate mitigation measures;</u> Rationale: It is also important to ensure that risks are minimised and tactics to do so are effectively communicated.	Did not agree as this is not the scope of this chapter.
7.6.5._35	Category: addition iii) <u>effective communication skills to ensure processes minimise risk to animal health and welfare.</u> Rationale: It is important that veterinarians have effective communication skills to advocate for animal health and welfare in the response. Effective communication has been recognised as a required competency for the team leader, but should also be included for all members of the specialist team for the operations regarding the mass killing of animals	The Code Commission did not agree to add this new point as it provides too much detail, and it is also in the introductory part of this Article.

3. Animal handlers

a) Responsibilities

- i) review on-site facilities in terms of their appropriateness;
- ii) design temporary animal handling facilities, when required;
- iii) move and restrain animals;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._36	Category: addition iii) <u>move and restrain animals using techniques that prioritize animal welfare;</u>	Did not agree. This is an animal welfare chapter. Therefore is a given and the proposed sentence becomes redundant.

	Rationale: Some movement and restraint techniques cause poor animal welfare, so it's important to specify that only those techniques that protect animal welfare should be used.	

iv) report *animal welfare* and *biosecurity* issues to the *veterinarian*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._37	Category: General The current chapter includes the responsibility of animal handlers to "continuously monitor animal welfare and biosecurity procedures," but this text is omitted in the draft chapter. Given the importance of continuous monitoring, the Member requests the rationale for this omission.	Agreed. It was modified with the addition of new wording regarding the understanding of animal welfare indicators.
7.6.5._38	Category: addition i) review on-site facilities in terms of their appropriateness <u>and effectiveness for smooth operations</u> ; ii) design <u>or modify</u> temporary animal handling facilities, when required; iii) move and restrain animals <u>in a low-stress manner</u> ; iv) report <i>animal welfare</i> and <i>biosecurity</i> issues to the <i>veterinarian</i> <u>and team leader</u> . Rationale: Suggested change for clarity and to strengthen language or point. Determining and addressing requirements for animal welfare and biosecurity are responsibilities of Team leader per point 1. a) ii). Therefore any relevant issues should also be reported to the team leader.	Did not agree. The additions did not add clarity.

b) Training and cCompetencies

- i) understand the species-specific behavioural patterns of the animals they are working with and the underlying principles for carrying out the required tasks;
- ii) animal handling in emergency situations and in close confinement is required; capable to identify signs of distress, fear, and pain and to take preventive and corrective actions;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response

7.6.5._39	Comment i) <u>Knowledge of, and ability to, recognize animal welfare indicators and signs of stress, fear, pain, and suffering;</u> ii) <u>extensive knowledge and experience with</u> animal handling in emergency situations and in close confinement is required; iii) <u>effective training in protecting animal welfare in the relevant species;</u> Rationale: More detail is needed on the competencies of animal handlers. Animal handlers should have advanced knowledge and relevant experience to handle animals in emergency situations and when closely confined. If the Animal handler has a responsibility to report animal welfare, then they should be able to recognize indicators of welfare. Animal handlers should be effectively trained, and their training should be species specific. This will help ensure that animal welfare is treated as a priority.	Agreed, but only with the second proposal with some modifications.
7.6.5._40	Category: addition i) <u>understanding of species-specific behaviour and how to identify signs of fear, distress etc.</u> Rationale: People who are in direct contact with animals play an important role. Their knowledge of animal behaviour and attitudes towards animals will impact on the animal's welfare. This is clearly demonstrated in EFSA reports where animal handlers are one of the hazards identified. For this reason, it should be the first point. Supporting evidence: EFSA Welfare of pigs during killing for purposes other than slaughter, published 20 July 2020: "The main hazards are associated with lack of staff skills and training, and poor-designed and constructed facilities." EFSA Killing for purposes other than slaughter: poultry, adopted 26 September 2019. "In fact, most of the hazards (26) had staff as origin and 24 hazards could be attributed to lack of appropriate skill sets needed to perform tasks or due to fatigue."	Agreed and included in the text.

	These are just examples from a few of the EFSA opinions.	
7.6.5._41	Category: addition i) <u>extensive knowledge and experience with animal handling in emergency situations appropriate to the situation and in close confinement is required;</u> Rationale: Stronger language to require that animal handlers have advanced knowledge and relevant experience to handle animals in across various emergency situations. This will help ensure that animal welfare is a priority. Not all scenarios will involve close confinement	The Code Commission did not agree as it was considered too detailed.

iii) understanding of *biosecurity*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._42	Comment The Member suggests adding: <u>“iii) understanding of species-specific behaviour.”</u> Rationale: For being able to report animal welfare issues, handlers should be able to recognise changes in behaviour that could mean there is a welfare issue.	Agreed, but already covered in the revised text.
7.6.5._43	Category: addition ii) <u>understanding of <i>biosecurity</i> and its application in a range of settings;</u> iii) <u>effective communication skills.</u> Rationale: The ability to apply knowledge of biosecurity to an array of settings is an important distinction to make. The ability to communicate effectively is a key skill required and included for consistency with other roles.	Did not agree as the Commission considered the additions not necessary.

4. Personnel in charge of killing animals

a) Responsibilities

- i) *killing* of the animals using an appropriate method;

ii) when applicable confirm the unconsciousness of the animals;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._44	Category: addition i) <i>killing</i> of the animals using an appropriate method determined for the situation; Rationale: Suggested change for clarity and strength of language.	Did not agree as it was covered previously, such as the veterinarian

iii) confirm the death of the animals.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._45	Comment ii) confirm the death of the animals by verifying multiple indicators (as described in Article 7.6.8); iii) report animal welfare and biosecurity issues to the veterinarian. Rationale: Add stronger language to require that animal handlers have advanced knowledge and relevant experience to handle animals in emergency situations and when closely confined. This will help ensure that animal welfare is a priority. Also, clarify reporting responsibilities for animal welfare and biosecurity.	Did not agree. The Commission considered that the language used is quite direct and considered that is too much detail.
7.6.5._46	Category: addition/editorial ii) confirming the death of the animals by verifying multiple indicators (as described in Article 7.6.8). Rationale: Editorial change around the tense of “confirm” for consistency. Stronger language to require that animal handlers have advanced knowledge and relevant experience to handle animals in emergency situations and when closely confined. This will help ensure that animal welfare is a priority.	Did not agree. Refer to comment 7.6.5._45
7.6.5._47	Category: addition ii) confirm the death of the animals, by verifying multiple indicators (see Article 7.6.8).	Did not agree. Refer to comment 7.6.5._45

	Rationale: The Member suggests that wording should be clear throughout this Chapter that personnel in charge of killing animals should use specific indicators to verify animals are dead, as is outlined later in the Chapter.	

b) **Training and competencies**

- i) Safely and correctly use and maintain ~~equipment~~ **equipment for** the species involved;
- ii) **Operate** ~~familiarity with the techniques of~~ restraining and killing **equipment for** the species involved;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._48	Category: addition/editorial ii) ~~experience or training in familiarity with~~ the techniques of restraining and killing the species involved; iii) knowledge and ability to assess effective <i>killing</i> . Rationale: Training and experience are more directly relevant to effective restraint and killing, than just being familiar.	Agreed but modified.
7.6.5._49	Category: deletion and addition ~~familiarity with the techniques of~~ <u>Competent to operate</u> restraining and killing equipment for the species involved; Rationale: A key responsibility of veterinarians is to “determine and supervise the implementation of the most appropriate killing method to ensure that animals are killed without avoidable pain and distress”. For this it is crucial to have understanding of the different killing methods so the best one can be selected in a fully informed manner.	Comment covered by the modifications made on comment 7.6.5._48
7.6.5._50	Comment ii) ~~familiarity~~ proficiency with the techniques of restraining and killing the species involved; iii) knowledge to assess effective <i>killing</i> , to recognize signs of recovery of consciousness, and the skill to take immediate corrective action ;	Agreed and modified the text accordingly, in particular letter iii) regarding the recognition of recovery of consciousness signs.

	iv) <u>effective training in protecting animal welfare in the relevant species and ability to identify signs of stress, fear, pain and suffering.</u> Rationale: More detail is needed on the competencies of those killing animals. Personnel in charge of killing animals should be trained and highly skilled, and their training should be species specific. They should be more than just “familiar” with techniques of restraining and killing, they should be “proficient” with the techniques. The term “familiarity” does not indicate the ability to apply the technique. These wording changes will help ensure that animal welfare is safeguarded during the process of killing. Supporting evidence: American Veterinary Medical Association. (2019). AVMA Guidelines for the depopulation of animals. Section 0.9. www.avma.org/sites/default/files/resources/AVMA-Guidelines-for-the-Depopulation-of-Animals.pdf	
7.6.5._51	Addition The Member asks WOA to amend the two first points as follows: i) safe <u>and correct</u> use and maintenance of relevant equipment; ii) familiarity with the techniques of restraining, <u>stunning</u> and killing the species involved. Rationale: Some elements that may have a tremendous impact on animal welfare are not satisfactorily covered. Some methods both stun and kill, but not all.	Agreed and already considered in the text.

iii) knowledge ability to assess effective killing, to recognize signs of recovery of consciousness, and the skill to take immediate corrective action.

5. Personnel in charge of disposal of dead animals

a) Responsibilities

i) An ensuring efficient dead animal disposal so that (to ensure killing operations are not hindered) should be ensured

ii) understanding of biosecurity and ensuring compliance with Chapter 4.13

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._52	Category: editorial	The Code Commission agreed to delete point 5 of this Article

	i) <u>ensuring</u> An efficient dead animal disposal <u>so that</u> ~~(to ensure killing operations are not hindered)~~ <u>should be ensured.</u> Rationale: Suggested change for brevity	as is not relevant to the Animal welfare section
7.6.5._53	Category: editorial i) <u>assurer</u> une élimination efficace des animaux morts (afin de veiller à ce que les opérations de mise à mort ne soient pas entravées) <u>doit être assurée.</u> Rationale: Le Membre propose de reformuler cette responsabilité pour harmoniser avec l'ensemble des autres responsabilités citées dans cet article	Already covered by modification after comments 7.6.5._52.
7.6.5._54	Category : addition <u>ii) Ensure biosecurity to prevent the risk of disease spread within and from the location.</u> <u>iii) Immediately report any remaining live animals to the veterinarian to ensure immediate euthanasia.</u> Rationale: When disposing of dead animals there are significant risks of disease spread from the location to other properties with animals, so an understanding of these risks and the appropriate measures to take to reduce further spread of disease are important. Also, clarify reporting responsibilities.	Already covered by modification after comments 7.6.5._52.
7.6.5._55	Comment The Member suggests adding "and spreading of disease is avoided/minimised" after hindered: "i) An efficient dead animal disposal (to ensure killing operations are not hindered '<u>and spreading of disease is avoided/minimised</u>') should be ensured." Rationale: 'dead animal disposal' is also part of biosecurity procedures	Already covered by modification after comments 7.6.5._52.
7.6.5._56	Category: addition <u>ii) application of effective biosecurity and biocontainment processes within and from the location or premises.</u>	Already covered by modification after comments 7.6.5._52.

	Rationale: When disposing of dead animals there are significant risks of disease spread from the location to other properties with animals, so an understanding of these risks and the appropriate measures to take to reduce further spread of disease are important.	

b) Training and Competencies

i) The personnel should be competent to safely use and maintain available equipment and apply techniques for the species involved.

ii) Recognise signs of life.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._57	Category: deletion i) <u>le personnel doit avoir les compétences en matière d'utilisation et d'entretien des équipements disponibles ainsi que pour l' et application des techniques en lien avec les espèces concernées."</u> Rationale : Le Membre propose de reformuler cette responsabilité pour harmoniser avec l'ensemble des autres responsabilités citées dans cet article	Already covered by modification after comments 7.6.5._52.
7.6.5._58	Category : addition i) The personnel should be competent to <u>safely</u> use and maintain available equipment and apply techniques for the species involved. ii) <u>Knowledge to identify animals who may have survived the killing;</u> iii) <u>An understanding of biosecurity measures to minimise risk of disease spread.</u> Rationale: The competencies for personnel in charge of disposing dead animals should be further delineated. Those in charge of disposal activities should be able to identify signs of consciousness and surviving animals. When disposing of dead animals there are significant risks of disease spread from the location to other properties with animals, so an understanding of these risks and	Already covered by modification after comments 7.6.5._52.

	the appropriate measures to take to reduce further spread of disease are important additions	
7.6.5._59	Category: addition The Member suggests adding “and should understand the principles of biosecurity and worker safety” after involved: “i) The personnel should be competent to use and maintain available equipment and apply techniques for the species involved <u>“and should understand the principles of biosecurity and worker safety”.</u>” Rationale: For consistency on attention for these aspects further up in the chapter.	Already covered by modification after comments 7.6.5._52.
7.6.5._60	Category: addition i) <u>competent and safe</u> ~~The personnel should be competent~~ to use and <u>maintenance of maintain</u> available equipment and apply techniques for the species involved. ii) <u>knowledge and ability to apply biosecurity and biocontainment techniques for the species involved;</u> iii) <u>effective communication skills.</u> Rationale: Those disposing dead animals should also understand biosecurity to prevent disease spread therefore suggest that in addition to the responsibility of being aware of biosecurity requirements the personnel should have a competency requirement that they understand and are able to follow relevant biosecurity requirements. Again, recommend that effective communication skills are included as a competency for all members of the specialist team for the operations regarding the mass killing of animals	Already covered by modification after comments 7.6.5._52.

6. Breeder, owner, farmer or keeper ~~or manager~~

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._61	Category: General	Agreed

	This title should include 'farmer' to match that used above.	

a) Responsibilities

- i) assist when requested.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._62	Category: General i) assist when requested by personnel employed by the competent authority. Rationale: Suggested change for clarity and distinction of who they are required to assist.	The Code Commission did not agree. The current text is clear enough.

b) Training and Competencies

- i) specific knowledge of his/her the animals that are responsible for and their environment premises.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.5._63	Category: General i) specific knowledge of and ability to communicate about his/her their animals and their environment. Rationale: It is important that these individuals can communicate their knowledge effectively to ensure good welfare. Editorial change to ensure consistency with language conventions with the Terrestrial Code.	Did not agree. It's considered that this point is related not to communication but to the animals under their responsibility.
7.6.5._64	Category: editorial i) specific knowledge of his/her target animals and their environment. Rationale: Language Point – his / hers implies ownership, however this is not always the case where individuals may be employed to run the business for someone else who is the actual owner.	Agreed
7.6.5._65	Category: Addition	Did not agree. This is an animal welfare chapter. It's

	A Member asks WOA to amend the above point as follows: i) specific knowledge, <u>especially relating to animal welfare</u>, of his/her animals and their environment. Rationale: As this chapter is about ensuring the welfare of animals when they are killed, competence on animal welfare is relevant and should be particularly mentioned.	considered an unnecessary addition.

Article 7.6.6.

Considerations in the planning of the operations regarding the mass large scale killing of animals

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.6._1	Category: General Same comment as above regarding the term “mass killing”.	Agreed and modified accordingly through the draft

Many activities will need to be conducted on affected location or premises, including the *killing* of animals. The team leader should develop a plan and prepare for large scale *killing of* animals on the location or premises which should include consideration of:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.6._2	Category: addition Considerations in the planning <u>and preparation</u> of the operations regarding the mass killing of animals Many activities will need to be conducted on affected location or premises, including the <i>killing</i> of animals. The team leader should develop a plan <u>and prepare</u> for <i>killing</i> animals on the location or premises which should include consideration of: Rationale: The Members suggests that the section includes both planning and preparation already, so the Article title could better reflect its content. The availability of effective depopulation equipment will depend on advanced preparations. Depopulation methods that both safeguard the welfare of the animals and effectively prevent the spread of disease may require the stockpiling of equipment and the arrangement of contractual relationships with gas or foaming equipment suppliers. It will also require logistics and training. Without preparation, the available methods could be very limited and the options less effective, thus emphasizing preparation is important. The critical need for advanced logistical planning and preparation cannot be overstated in a chapter about welfare. Lack of preparation to use a depopulation method	Agreed, but not to include in the subtitle.

	that better safeguards animal welfare has led to ventilation shut down in some countries with added heat becoming the default method for depopulation of most laying hen facilities, and often in broiler chicken, turkey, duck facilities too. As improved methods (e.g., high expansion nitrogen foam and whole house nitrogen gassing) for mass depopulation become more widely available, it will be critical to encourage their uptake with language regarding the need to prepare for and use these better options.	
7.6.6._3	Category: addition Considerations in the planning <u>and preparation</u> of the operations regarding the mass killing of animals Many activities will need to be conducted on affected location or premises, including the <i>killing</i> of animals. The team leader should develop a plan <u>in conjunction with veterinary advice, and prepare</u> for <i>killing</i> animals on the location or premises which should include consideration of: Rationale: It is important to have provisions in place for the preparation of the operation as well as planning, and this Article includes both so it would be appropriate to include 'preparation' in the title. The importance of appropriate preparation to help ensure better welfare is paramount. The lack of preparation during outbreaks can lead to practices with severe consequences for animal welfare. It is crucial to encourage the uptake of improved methods for mass depopulation of animals with advanced planning to help ensure facilities are well prepared to provide these more humane options. This preparation and planning should occur alongside veterinary advice to ensure good welfare practices. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. 2004. 2022-2023 HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA OUTBREAK. United States Department of Agriculture.	Did not agree. Planning covers the preparation.
7.6.6._4	Category: editorial "De nombreuses activités doivent être menées sur le site ou dans les locaux touchés, <u>en plus de</u> la mise à mort d'animaux <u>y compris</u>." Rationale: Le Membre propose de reformuler la première phrase du second alinéa pour faciliter la compréhension	Agreed. Only for the French Version

- a) minimising handling, restraint and movement of animals;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.6._5	Category: addition a) minimising handling <u>restraint</u> and movement of animals; Rationale: Suggested to include restraint to recognise that restraint is stressful to animals, and that when restraint is required animals should be restrained for the minimal time necessary to ensure effective killing. This addition is consistent with Member's recommended text for Article 7.6.3.	Agreed

- b) *killing* the animals on the affected location or premises; however, there may be circumstances where the animals may need to be moved to another location for *killing*; when the *killing* is conducted at a *slaughterhouse/abattoir*, the recommendations in Chapter 7.5. should be followed;
- c) the species, number, age and size of animals to be killed, and the order of *killing* them;
- d) methods of *killing* the animals, and their cost;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.6._6	Category: editorial Is there a reason for combining the consideration of the method of killing with the cost of the animal? Or should they be independent considerations? Rationale: It is unclear if these two factors are closely linked or independent considerations.	Agreed to delete the reference to the cost of the methods, with replacement text provided by the Group as this is an important aspect to be considered.
7.6.6._7	Category: editorial d) methods of killing the animals, <u>and their cost</u>; <u>e) Available resources, including cost, staff numbers, and any other practical elements</u> Rationale: Selection of the killing methods should be based on welfare impacts, availability, staff numbers and other practical aspects. The last three aspects may be conditioned by costs, hence it would be best to include a separate line as suggested under the paragraph above, in relation to consideration for resources.	Agreed. See comment 7.6.6._6

e) available resources, including cost, staff numbers, and any other practical elements

f) description of the assessment of state of consciousness and signs of life;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.6._8	Category : addition <u>e) methods of confirmation of death, including in whole house/shed killing for poultry</u> Rationale: Add a new point “e” in the list to include a plan for confirmation of death. In the event of mass killing, some of the methods that may be used will kill whole sheds of animals in-situ without the individual handling or restraint of animals, for example whole shed gassing for poultry. A plan for confirming all animals in the shed are killed should be in place.	Agreed
7.6.6._9	Category: addition g) <u>methods of confirmation of death, and the minimum number of animals that require confirmation of death to be representative of all animals, where confirming death of each individual is not possible (such as in whole shed killing of poultry);</u> Rationale: In the event of mass killing, some of the methods that may be used will kill whole sheds of animals in-situ without the individual handling or restraint of animals, for example whole shed gassing for poultry. Where large numbers of animals are killed at the same time, such as a whole shed of poultry, it may not be possible to confirm the death of each individual animal. To ensure that the killing method has been effective it is critical that a sample size representative of all animals has death confirmed prior to disposal of all the animals. Suggest that a point is included here that consideration must also be given to the methods that will be used to confirm death and whether the death of each individual animal will be confirmed. If not then the appropriate number of animals that must have death confirmed to ensure the killing method has been effective.	Agreed. See comment 7.6.6._8

g) housing, husbandry, location of the animals as well as accessibility of the farm or the place they are situated;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.6._10	Category: addition f) housing, husbandry, location of the animals as well as accessibility of ~~the farm~~ or the place they are situated;	Agreed

	Rationale: Suggested edit for brevity.	

- h) the availability and effectiveness of equipment needed for *killing* of the animals, as well as the time necessary to kill the required number of animals using such methods;
- i) the availability on the location s or premises of facilities that will be used to assist with the *killing*, and the necessity of any additional facilities;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.6._11	Comment The Member suggests the following change: “g) the availability on the location or premises of facilities that will <u>be used to</u> assist with the killing, and the necessity of any additional facilities;” Rationale: Linguistic and editorial.	Agreed

- j) potential *biosecurity* and environmental impact of the operations;
- k) the health and safety of personnel conducting the *killing*;
- ~~l) any legal issues that may be involved, for example where restricted veterinary drugs may be used, or where the process may impact on the environment;~~
- ~~m) the presence of other nearby premises holding animals;~~
- ~~n) possibilities for removal and disposal of dead animals.~~

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.6._12	Category: addition m) <u>the possibilities for removal and disposal of dead animals including safe disposal of hazardous material.</u> Rationale: The removal and disposal in a safe way of deceased animals and hazardous material is a significant operation and should be considered during planning..	The Code Commission agreed to delete points l), m) and n) of this Article as they are not relevant to an animal welfare section.

The plan should minimise the negative animal welfare impacts of the *killing* by taking into account the different phases of the procedures to be applied for *killing*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.6._13	Category: addition The plan should minimise the negative animal welfare impacts of the <i>killing</i> by <u>advanced preparation to use a method that leads to rapid unconsciousness and death. If it is not possible to use a method causing immediate death or immediate loss of unconsciousness lasting until death, then a method that causes the least pain, distress, fear and suffering as possible.</u> taking into account the different phases of the procedures to be applied for <i>killing</i>, should be prepared. Rationale: The Member suggests that the idea in the sentence is incomplete. The method used takes precedence over the different phases of the procedures and further clarification is needed.	Did not agree as it was considered too much detail
7.6.6._14	Category : addition The plan should minimise the negative animal welfare impacts of the <i>killing</i> <u>by advanced preparation to ensure the use of methods leading to rapid unconsciousness and death causing the least pain, suffering, distress and fear as possible.</u> taking into account the different phases of the procedures to be applied for <i>killing</i>. Rationale: It is important to ensure that advanced plans are made to ensure the most humane method is used if mass killing is required, with the appropriate equipment available to ensure the least possible pain or suffering to the animals.	Did not agree as it was considered too much detail

Competences and skills of the personnel handling and *killing* animals should be included in the operational plan.

Article 7.6.7.

Hazards to animal welfare

For the purpose of this chapter, *hazards to animal welfare* means a factor with the potential to adversely affect *animal welfare*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.7._1	Comment The Member suggests the following editorial change: “For the purpose of this chapter, <i>hazards to animal welfare</i> means a factor with the potential to adversely affect animal welfare.” Rationale:	The Code Commission did not agree with the proposal and deleted the first paragraph as there is no need to develop a definition in this case.

	Linguistic and editorial.	

When killing animals, they may be exposed to different **hazards to animal welfare hazards** including improper **restraining restraint**, rough handling, forced movement, absence of or improper design **of premises**, inadequate construction and maintenance of premises, adverse weather conditions, unexpected loud noise and ineffective *killing* methods.

Exposure to multiple hazards to *animal welfare* can have a negative cumulative effect on the animals [Moberg and Mench, 2000].

Hazards to animal welfare can be minimised mainly by appropriate design of premises and choice of equipment, **method of killing and through**, good management, training and competency of personnel.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.7._2	Category: deletion / additions When killing animals, they may be exposed to different animal welfare hazards including improper restraining~~ing~~, rough handling, forced movement, absence of or improper design, inadequate construction and maintenance of premises, adverse weather conditions, unexpected loud noise and ineffective killing methods. Exposure to multiple hazards to animal welfare can have a negative cumulative effect on the animals [Moberg and Mench, 2000]. Minimisation of hazards can occur through Hazards to animal welfare can be minimised mainly by appropriate design of premises, and choice of equipment, method of killing, and through good management, training and competency of personnel. Rationale: Suggested changes for clarity and brevity. The method of killing is the most important way to minimise the hazards to animal welfare so it should be added to this paragraph.	Agreed partially with the inclusion of the importance of the killing method and the design of the premises to minimise the welfare issues when killing animals.
7.6.7._3	Category : addition When killing animals, they may be exposed to different animal welfare hazards including improper restraining, rough handling, forced movement, absence of or improper facility design or equipment, inadequate construction and maintenance of premises, adverse weather conditions, unexpected loud noise and ineffective or improperly executed killing methods, resulting in prolonged duration of negative affective states such as pain, fear, over-heating, frustration, and helplessness. Exposure to multiple hazards to animal welfare can have a negative cumulative effect on the animals [Moberg and Mench, 2000]. Hazards to animal welfare can be minimised mainly by appropriate design of premises and choice of equipment, adequate preparedness, the method of killing, and through good management, training and competency of personnel. Rationale: This important paragraph could be further detailed and clarified. Advanced preparation of an effective method of killing	Did not agree; Covered with the modification made to comment 7.6.7._2 and also the <i>ad hoc</i> Group considered this too much detail

	is the most important way to minimise the hazards to animal welfare so it should definitely be added.	
7.6.7._4	Category: addition When killing animals, they may be exposed to different <i>animal welfare</i> hazards including improper restraining, rough handling, forced movement, absence of or improper design, inadequate construction and maintenance of premises, adverse weather conditions, unexpected loud noise and ineffective <i>killing</i> methods. Exposure to multiple hazards to <i>animal welfare</i> can have a negative cumulative effect on the animals [Moberg and Mench, 2000]. Hazards to animal welfare can be minimised mainly by appropriate design of premises and choice of equipment, method of killing, and through good management, training and competency of personnel. Rationale: The Member suggests that the paragraph is missing the most important way to minimize the hazards (the method of killing). References Moberg, G.P. and Mench, J.A. 2000. The biology of animal stress: basic principles and implications for animal welfare. https://www.cabidigitallibrary.org/doi/book/10.1079/9780851993591.0000	Agreed
7.6.7._5	Category: addition The Member suggests the following changes: “When killing animals, they may be exposed to different <i>animal welfare</i> hazards including improper restraining, rough handling, forced movement, absence of or improper design <u>of premises</u>, inadequate construction and maintenance of premises, adverse weather conditions, unexpected loud noise and ineffective <u>stunning and/or killing</u> methods. Rationale: There is a need to specify the absence of or improper design of what is meant. The ineffective stunning methods and in particular the prolonged stun-to-kill interval is a serious animal welfare hazard (EFSA)	Agreed

Article 7.6.8.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._1	Comment The Member points out that there is a large overlap with Chapter 7.5 with regard to indicators. The Member suggests examining the extent to which it would be preferable to replace the text in Art. 7.6.8 with references to Chapter 7.5.	Did not agree, as the reference of Chapter 7.5. refers to stunning operations.

	The current version of Chapter 7.6 does not deal with indicators. Indicators are a complex issue and, in the opinion of the Member, should preferably be described depending on the stun/kill method, in order to promote comprehensibility and avoid misunderstandings. If a list of indicators is retained, it should be added that multiple indicators need to be considered simultaneously and that insufficient stunning should be assumed in the event of conflicting results. Please see below for some of the Member specific difficulties with the text.	

Measures to assess animal welfare at the time killing **for purposes other than slaughter**

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._2	Category: general Suggest that this section may be best set out as a table including a column for the measure; description of the measure; and the applicable methods of killing. There are several occasions within this Article referring to signs that relate to effective stunning, but they should instead refer to signs of effective killing in line with the subject matter of the entire Chapter. It would therefore be more suitable for this Article to refer to signs as they relate to when killing methods are ineffective. The Member suggests this Article is reviewed for distinction between killing and stunning in line with the Chapter.	Did not agree. The current chapter uses tables and they prove to be difficult to understand by Members.
7.6.8._3	Category : general This section may be best set out as a table including a column for the measure; description of the measure; and the applicable species and methods of killing.	Did not agree.
7.6.8._4	Category : general Chapter 7.6 refers to the killing of animals therefore it would be more suitable for this section to refer to signs as they relate to killing methods, rather than stunning. The wording seems as if it comes from a source on the slaughter of animals, rather than to mass killing techniques.	Agree. The <i>ad hoc</i> Group reviewed the text to avoid including the use of wording concerning stunning procedures

Hazards to – Animal welfare at the time of killing **for purposes other than slaughter** should be assessed using animal-based measures. However, consideration should be given to the resources provided as well as the design and management of the method.

Measures to assess welfare during handling and restraint in Chapter 7.5 are applicable to this chapter.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._5	Category: editorial	The typo is addressed in the final document.

	Hazards to animal welfare at the time of killing should be assessed using animal-based measures. <u>However cost</u>. Rationale: Typo	
7.6.8._6	Category: addition <u>Animal welfare hazards for handling and restraining in Chapter 7.5 are also applicable to this chapter.</u> Rationale: We note this section includes indicators to assess unconsciousness and death but there are no indicators or hazards for handling or restraint which are prior steps. Given that these are also relevant for killing it would be helpful to have them included or cross-referenced to chapter 7.5.	Agreed

These animal-based measures should be routinely used in the monitoring of the state of consciousness and death, with the most appropriate to use in relation to the method applied.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._7	Category: Addition The Member asks WOA to amend the above sentence as follows: These animal-based measures should be routinely used in the monitoring of the state of consciousness and death, <u>whichever are most appropriate to use in relation to the stunning/killing method applied.</u> Rationale: Some indicators may not be relevant to use depending on the killing method chosen. For example, electrical stunning may impact on certain measures making them unreliable.	Agreed
7.6.8._8	Addition Additional considerations for reptiles are provided in Chapter 7.14. Rationale: Some recommendations, particularly those in 7.6.8, are not appropriate for reptiles and might be mistakenly followed despite the statement in the second paragraph of this section. Supporting evidence, if relevant: Chapter 7.6.2	Agreed and indicated in the Article 7.6.2. Scope

1. The following animal-based measures can be useful indicators of animal welfare. These measures can be considered as tools to monitor the efficiency of design and management, given that they can affect animal welfare. Multiple indicators should be used to determine effectiveness of the method.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._9	Category : addition 1. The following animal-based measures can be useful indicators of animal welfare. These measures can be considered as tools to monitor the efficiency of design and management, given that they can affect animal welfare. <u>Note that the combination of several indicators is desirable to determine the effectiveness of the procedure. In addition, useful indicators are not limited to these measures.</u> Rationale: The animal-based measures outlined in this article are useful indicators, but a single indicator is not always sufficient to assess hazards to animal welfare. Furthermore, it should be noted that useful indicators are not limited to those described in this article.	Agreed, but amended.
7.6.8._10	Rationale: These indicators should not be used in isolation, but as part of a wholistic assessment, because indicators may not all agree. It is important not to use several indicators together to make an accurate assessment. Supporting evidence: Verhoeven M.T.W., Gerritzen M.A., Hellebrekers L.J., Kemp B. Indicators used in livestock to assess unconsciousness after stunning: A Review. <i>Animal</i>. 2015; 9:320–330. doi: 10.1017/S1751731114002596. Grandin T., Cockram M. In: <i>The Slaughter of Farmed Animals: Practical Ways of Enhancing Animal Welfare</i>. Grandin T., Cockram M., editors. CABI; Wallingford, UK: 2020.	Agreed and covered by comment 7.6.8._9
7.6.8._11	Comment The Member suggests the following changes: “Hazards to animal welfare at the time of killing should be assessed using animal-based measures. However, consideration should be given to the resources provided as well as the design <u>of the equipment</u> and management of the method <u>for stunning and killing</u>.” These animal-based measures should be routinely used in the monitoring of the state of consciousness and death. 1. The following animal-based measures can be useful indicators of animal welfare. These measures can be considered as tools to monitor the efficiency of design <u>of</u>	Did not agree, as it is obvious, method include equipment and there is no need to add text.

	<u>the equipment and management of the method for stunning and killing</u>, given that they can affect animal welfare. Rationale: There is a need to specify design of what is meant. We suppose that it is of the equipment. Therefore, there is a need to specify which method is meant. The ineffective stunning methods and in particular the prolonged stun-to-kill interval is a serious animal welfare hazard (EFSA)	

a) Immediate collapse

Effective stunning loss of consciousness can be recognised from the immediate loss of posture leading to collapse of the animal. Ineffectively stunned Conscious animals, on the other hand, will fail to collapse or will attempt to regain posture after collapse. Some ineffectively stunned animals, may occur, for example, if captive bolt shooting position is wrong or electrically immobilised animals lose posture, but remain conscious. The absence of immediate collapse is always indicative of consciousness.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._12	Category: addition / deletion Effective <u>killing</u> <u>stunning</u> can be recognised from the immediate loss of posture leading to collapse of the animal. Ineffectively <u>killed</u> <u>stunned</u> animals, on the other hand, will fail to collapse or will attempt to regain posture after collapse. Some ineffectively <u>killed</u> <u>stunned</u> animals, may occur, for example, if <u>the</u> captive bolt shooting position is wrong <u>or electrically immobilised</u> animals <u>may</u> lose posture, but remain conscious. The absence of immediate collapse is always indicative of consciousness. Rationale: Electrical immobilisation is not a method that should be used in the event of mass killing so should be removed as an example.	Agreed. The main purpose of the processes described in this chapter is to kill the animal.
7.6.8._13	Category : addition <u>When a stunning method is used prior to killing, e</u>Effective stunning can be recognised from the immediate loss of posture leading to collapse of the animal. Ineffectively stunned animals, on the other hand, will fail to collapse or will attempt to regain posture after collapse. Some ineffectively stunned animals, may occur, for example, if captive bolt shooting position is wrong animals lose posture, or electrically immobilised but remain conscious. The absence of immediate collapse is always indicative of consciousness. <u>Unacceptable methods, such as those relying on induction of heatstroke, may result in an animal that is recumbent but still conscious.</u>	Agreed with the first proposal and covered with comment 7.6.8._12. Did not agree with the proposal to add a sentence at the end of this point regarding unacceptable killing methods as this will be part of a last article of this draft, which is still to be developed.

	Rationale: Article 7.6.8 makes reference to signs of effective stunning but many emergency depopulation methods do not include a stunning step. Article 7.6.8 should clarify that stunning is only used with certain killing methods and instead focus on signs of effective killing in line with the wider chapter topic. For consistency and thoroughness, it is important to clarify situations where this method may not be effective, as is done for some indicators below (e.g., corneal reflex). Some depopulation methods cause the animal to collapse but do not indicate unconsciousness, for example heatstroke (ventilation shut down). The inclusion of electrical immobilization under the category of immediate collapse seems out of place, but it may just need further clarification. Supporting evidence: Reyes-Illg G, Martin JE, Mani I, Reynolds J, Kipperman B (2023) The rise of heatstroke as a method of depopulating pigs and poultry: implications for the US veterinary profession. <i>Animals</i> 13(1):140. www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/13/1/140	
7.6.8._14	Comment The text does not take into account that appropriate immobilisation may prevent collapse. Rationale: To illustrate the opening remark to the article	Did not agree. It is already considered in the general part of the text

b) Tonic-clonic seizures

Effective electrical and in some cases captive bolt methods stunning often results in the presence of tonic-clonic seizures. Tonic seizures can be recognised by an arched back and rigidly flexed legs under the body and will last for several seconds. It is followed by clonic seizures lasting for seconds and manifested as leg kicking or paddling. The absence of tonic-clonic seizures may be indicative of consciousness [Van der Wal, 1971].

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._15	Category: addition / deletion Effective <u>electrical and in some cases captive bolt methods stunning often</u> results in the presence of tonic-clonic seizures. Tonic seizures can be recognised by an arched back and rigidly flexed legs under the body and will last for several seconds. It is followed by clonic seizures lasting for seconds and manifested as leg kicking or paddling. The absence of tonic-clonic seizures may be indicative of consciousness [Van der Wal, 1971].	Agreed. The purpose of the chapter is to kill the animals not to stun them.

	Rationale: Tonic-clonic seizures as a sign is mostly relevant to electrical stunning methods and in some cases similar behaviours may occur after captive bolt stunning, however, is not applicable to killing methods such as firearms, gas, or foam killing. Suggest that 'stunning often' is replaced by specific reference to electrical and captive bolt methods. Alternatively, the section could be deleted if it is referring to stunning methods as in the event of mass killing then ideally killing methods should be used, whereas if electrical or non-penetrating captive bolt stunning methods were used then a secondary method to kill animals would be required.	
7.6.8._16	Category : addition and deletion Effective <u>electrical and in some cases captive bolt methods stunning often</u> results in the presence of tonic-clonic seizures. Tonic seizures can be recognised by an arched back and rigidly flexed legs under the body and will last for several seconds. It is followed by clonic seizures lasting for seconds and manifested as leg kicking or paddling. The absence of tonic-clonic seizures may be indicative of consciousness [Van der Wal, 1971]. Rationale: Tonic-clonic seizures as a sign is mostly relevant to electrical stunning methods and in some cases similar behaviours may occur after captive bolt stunning, however, is not applicable to killing methods such as firearms, gas, or foam killing. Suggest that 'stunning often' is replaced by specific reference to electrical and captive bolt methods. Alternatively, perhaps the section could be deleted if it is referring to stunning methods as in the event of mass killing then ideally killing methods should be used, whereas if electrical or non-penetrating captive bolt stunning methods were used then a secondary method to kill animals would be required.	Already covered in comment 7.6.8._15

- c) Righting reflex [Atkinson et al, 2013; Terlow et al, 2016]

The righting reflex refers to any reflex that tends to bring the body into its normal upright position. Ineffectively For example effectively stunned-killed animals and those recovering consciousness will not attempt to raise their heads or shake their heads after stunning, which is referred to as righting reflex.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._17	Category: addition / deletion	Agreed. The purpose of the chapter is to kill the animals not to stun them

	Ineffectively killed stunned animals and those recovering consciousness will attempt to raise their heads or shake their heads after stunning, which is referred to as righting reflex. Rationale: As above, this chapter refers to the killing of animals therefore it would be more suitable for this section to refer to signs as they relate to when killing methods are ineffective. Suggest that it refers to when animals have been ineffectively killed rather than stunned.	
7.6.8._18	Category: deletion and addition Ineffectively stunned animals and those recovering consciousness will attempt to raise their heads or shake their heads after stunning, which is referred to as due to a righting reflex. The righting reflex refers to any reflex that tends to bring the body into its normal upright position. Rationale: This is the correct use of the term righting reflex. Supporting evidence: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/animal/article/indicators-used-in-livestock-to-assess-unconsciousness-after-stunning-a-review/C1C4C0143DBBA502F72D7C5D080BD6F1	Agreed
7.6.8._19	Category : addition and deletion Animals who have been ineffectively killed stunned animals and those recovering consciousness will attempt to raise their heads or shake their heads after stunning, which is referred to as righting reflex. Rationale: As above, this chapter refers to the killing of animals therefore it would be more suitable for this section to refer to signs as they relate to when killing methods are ineffective. Suggest that it refers to when animals have been ineffectively killed rather than stunned.	Agreed. See comment 7.6.8._17
7.6.8._20	Category: deletion and addition "Ineffectively stunned animals and those recovering consciousness ~~will~~ may attempt to raise their heads or shake their heads after stunning, which is referred to as righting reflex." Rationale: To illustrate the opening remark to the article	Addressed by modifications proposed.

d) Rhythmic breathing [Atkinson et al, 2013; Kamenik et al, 2019, Vecerek et al, 2020]

Effective **stunning** **killing** will result in immediate onset of apnoea (absence of breathing). Ineffectively **stunned** **killed** animals and those recovering consciousness will start to breathe in a pattern commonly referred to as rhythmic breathing, which may begin as gagging and lead to respiratory cycles of **inspiration** **inhalation** and **expiration** **exhalation**. Breathing can be recognised from the regular flank **and/or** mouth and nostril movements. Recovery of breathing, if not visible through these movements, can be checked by holding a small mirror in front of the nostrils or mouth to look for the appearance of condensation due to **expiration** **exhalation** of moist air. **Rhythmic breathing is not to be confused with agonal breaths.**

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._21	Category: addition / deletion Effective killing stunning will result in immediate onset of apnoea (absence of breathing). Ineffectively killed stunned animals and those recovering consciousness will start to breathe in a pattern commonly referred to as rhythmic breathing, which may begin as gagging and lead to respiratory cycles of inspiration and expiration. Breathing can be recognised from the repeated and regular flank and/or mouth and nostril movements. Recovery of breathing, if not visible through these movements, can be checked by holding a small mirror in front of the nostrils or mouth to look for the appearance of condensation due to expiration of moist air. Rhythmic breathing is not to be confused with agonal breaths which are involuntary muscle contractions that may occur when an animal is unconscious and close to death. Rationale: To assess whether rhythmic breathing is occurring a person should observe repeated regular breaths, whereas a single breath may not necessarily indicate return to consciousness, such as is the case with an agonal breath. Suggest the word 'repeated' is included in the description of rhythmic breathing to highlight that multiple regular breaths should be observed. Agonal breaths may occur following a method of killing when an animal is unconsciousness and close to death. Agonal breaths may be confused with rhythmic breathing and therefore when assessing unconsciousness, it is important to differentiate between the two. Grandin, T (2015) How to determine insensibility (unconsciousness) in cattle, pigs, and sheep in slaughter plants. As above comments, this chapter refers to the killing of animals therefore it would be more suitable for this section to refer to signs as they relate to when killing methods are ineffective. Suggest that it refers to when animals have been ineffectively killed rather than stunned.	Agreed and amended the text accordingly as this chapter is focused on the killing of animals.
7.6.8._22	Category: addition Rhythmic breathing shall not be confused with agonal breathing, a random gasping (not rhythmic) which may occur some time after stunning and pithing/bleeding, especially in pigs. Rationale: Agonal breathing can be alarming to the uninitiated but is indicative of a dying brainstem rather than an animal recovering and it should not be confused with normal rhythmic breathing. Supporting evidence:	Partially agreed and addressed.

	https://www.hsa.org.uk/downloads/on-farm-killing-of-new-born-livestock-november-2020.pdf	
7.6.8._23	Category : General Point d) states, "Recovery of breathing, if not visible through these movements, can be checked by holding a small mirror in front of the nostrils or mouth to look for the appearance of condensation due to expiration of moist air." It is unclear if a small mirror is always necessary for this check or if it is just an example. The Member believes that various situations should be considered and that this statement should be clarified accordingly.	Did not agree. The <i>ad hoc</i> Group considered the text clear in signs to not confuse with rhythmic breathing.
7.6.8._24	Category : addition and deletion Effective killing stunning will result in immediate onset of apnoea (absence of breathing). Animals who have been ineffectively killed stunned animals and those recovering consciousness will start to breathe in a pattern commonly referred to as rhythmic breathing, which may begin as gagging and lead to respiratory cycles of inspiration and expiration. Breathing can be recognised from the repeated and regular flank and/or mouth and nostril movements. Recovery of breathing, if not visible through these movements, can be checked by holding a small mirror in front of the nostrils or mouth to look for the appearance of condensation due to expiration of moist air. Rhythmic breathing is not to be confused with agonal breaths, which are involuntary muscle contractions that may occur when an animal is unconscious and close to death. Rationale: As above comments, this chapter refers to the killing of animals therefore it would be more suitable for this section to refer to signs as they relate to when killing methods are ineffective. Refer to when animals have been ineffectively killed rather than stunned. To assess whether rhythmic breathing is occurring a person should observe repeated regular breaths, whereas a single breath may not necessarily indicate return to consciousness, such as is the case with an agonal breath. Include the word 'repeated' in the description of rhythmic breathing to highlight that multiple regular breaths should be observed. Agonal breaths may occur following a method of killing when an animal is unconsciousness and close to death. Agonal breaths may be confused with rhythmic breathing and therefore when assessing unconsciousness, it is important to differentiate between the two. Supporting evidence: Grandin, T (2015) How to determine insensibility (unconsciousness) in cattle, pigs, and sheep in slaughter plants.	Agreed. Covered by comment 7.6.8._21
7.6.8._25	Category: addition	Did not agree. The Group considered the

	“Brief gasping/gagging may also occur following proper electrical stunning. Rationale: To illustrate the opening remark to the article	current text clear enough.
7.6.8._26	Change The Member asks WOA to correct some words in the above paragraph: “Effective stunning will result in immediate onset of apnoea (absence of breathing). Ineffectively stunned animals and those recovering consciousness will start to breathe in a pattern commonly referred to as rhythmic breathing, which may begin as gagging and lead to respiratory cycles of <u>inhalation inspiration</u> and <u>exhalation expiration</u>. Breathing can be recognised from the regular flank and/or mouth and nostril movements. Recovery of breathing, if not visible through these movements, can be checked by holding a small mirror in front of the nostrils or mouth to look for the appearance of condensation due to <u>exhalation expiration</u> of moist air.” Rationale: Linguistic	Agree. Linguistic amendment

e) Corneal reflex:

The corneal reflex is elicited by touching or tapping the cornea. ~~ineffectively stunned~~ Conscious animals and those recovering consciousness will blink in response to the stimulus. Effectively ~~stunned~~ killed and ~~stuck (bled)~~ animals show the absence of the corneal reflex ~~during any key stage. On the other hand, ineffectively or poorly stunned animals and those recovering consciousness prior to sticking or during bleeding are expected to show the presence of the corneal reflex at any key stage. It is worth noting that placement of electrical stunning tongs (electrodes) over the eyes of animals may render this indicator invalid.~~

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._27	Category: addition / deletion The corneal reflex is elicited by touching or tapping the cornea. Ineffectively <u>killed</u> <u>stunned</u> animals and those recovering consciousness will blink in response to the stimulus. Effectively <u>killed</u> <u>stunned</u> and stuck (bled) animals show the absence of the corneal reflex during any key stage. On the other hand, ineffectively <u>killed</u> or poorly stunned animals and those recovering consciousness prior to sticking or during bleeding are expected to show the presence of the corneal reflex at any key stage. <u>Random eye movements or blinking can occur in some animals that are unconscious and should not be confused with animals having a corneal reflex.</u> It is worth noting that placement of electrical stunning tongs (electrodes) over the eyes of animals may render this indicator invalid.	Agreed. The main purpose of the chapter is to kill the animals. Also agreed to delete the last part of the paragraph which could create confusion regarding the presence or not of corneal reflex.

	Rationale: Animals may still blink or show random eye movements even though they have been effectively stunned, especially after electrical stunning methods. Random eye movements or a single blink should not be confused with a positive corneal reflex in which a coordinated blink is elicited by touching the eye to assess unconsciousness and death. Suggest that a sentence is included to differentiate random blinking with spontaneous blinking and a positive corneal reflex. EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (2019). Slaughter of animals: Poultry. EFSA Journal 17(11), e05849. EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (2020). Welfare of cattle at slaughter. EFSA Journal 18(11), e06275. EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (2020). Welfare of pigs at slaughter. EFSA Journal 18(6), e06148. EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (2021) Welfare of Sheep and Goats at Slaughter. EFSA Journal 19, e06882. Verhoeven MT, Gerritzen MA, Hellebrekers LJ, Kemp B (2015) Indicators used in livestock to assess unconsciousness after stunning: A review. Animal 9(2):320-30. As above, this chapter refers to the killing of animals therefore it would be more suitable for this section to refer to signs as they relate to when killing methods are ineffective. Suggest that it refers to when animals have been ineffectively killed rather than stunned.	
7.6.8._28	Category: editorial “...Les animaux pour lesquels l'étourdissement a été efficace ~~et qui ont été accrochés (saignés)~~ ne présentent aucun réflexe cornéen, ~~à toutes les étapes essentielles~~. Il est en revanche attendu que les animaux pour lesquels l'étourdissement a été inefficace ou insuffisant et ceux qui présentent un retour à l'état de conscience ~~avant l'accrochage ou durant la saignée~~ aient un réflexe cornéen à toutes les étapes essentielles.” Rationale: Pourquoi est-il fait mention de saignée et d'accrochage, notions typiques d'une mise à mort en abattoir dans ce chapitre, alors qu'il est précisé au 3ième alinéa de l'article 7.6.2. qu'en cas de mise à mort dans un abattoir, il faudra se référer au chapitre 7.5 ?	Agreed. Modifications were included according to comment 7.6.8._27
7.6.8._29	Category : addition and deletion The corneal reflex is elicited by touching or tapping the cornea. Ineffectively ~~killed stunned~~ animals and those recovering consciousness will blink in response to the stimulus. Effectively ~~killed stunned and stuck (bled)~~ animals show the absence of the corneal reflex during any key stage. On the other hand, ineffectively ~~killed or poorly stunned~~ animals and	Did not agree as the mention is related with sticking or bleeding, not to shackling or hanging the animals. Agreed. Modifications were included according to comment 7.6.8._27

	those recovering consciousness prior to sticking or during bleeding are expected to show the presence of the corneal reflex at any key stage. <u>Random eye movements or blinking can occur in some animals that are unconsciousness and should not be confused with animals having a corneal reflex.</u> It is worth noting that <u>incorrect</u> placement of electrical stunning tongs (electrodes) <u>ever such that they contact</u> the eyes of animals may render this indicator invalid. Rationale: As above, this chapter refers to the killing of animals therefore it would be more suitable for this section to refer to signs as they relate to when killing methods are ineffective. Suggest that it refers to when animals have been ineffectively killed rather than stunned. Animals may still blink or show random eye movements even though they have been effectively stunned, especially after electrical stunning methods. Random eye movements or a single blink should not be confused with a positive corneal reflex in which a coordinated blink is elicited by touching the eye to assess unconsciousness and death. Suggest that a sentence is included to differentiate random blinking with spontaneous blinking and a positive corneal reflex. Supporting evidence: EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (2019). Slaughter of animals: Poultry. EFSA Journal 17(11), e05849. EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (2020). Welfare of cattle at slaughter. EFSA Journal 18(11), e06275. EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (2020). Welfare of pigs at slaughter. EFSA Journal 18(6), e06148. EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (2021) Welfare of Sheep and Goats at Slaughter. EFSA Journal 19, e06882. Verhoeven MT, Gerritzen MA, Hellebrekers LJ, Kemp B (2015) Indicators used in livestock to assess unconsciousness after stunning: A review. Animal 9(2):320-30.	
7.6.8._30	Category: general During epileptiform activity induced by electric stunning, the indicator is always invalid. A captive bolt shot may disable the corneal reflex without the animal being unconscious. Both aspects also apply to (f), (g) and (2)(b). Rationale: To illustrate the opening remark to the article	Did not agree. The Group did not consider it a necessary addition

f) Palpebral reflex

The palpebral reflex is elicited by touching or tapping a finger on the inner/outer eye canthus or eyelashes. Correctly stunned animals will not show a palpebral reflex. Ineffectively stunned Conscious animals and those recovering consciousness will blink in response to the stimulus at any key stage. It is worth noting that placement of electrical stunning tongs (electrodes) over the eyes of animals may render this indicator invalid. Effectively killed animals will not show a palpebral reflex.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._31	Category: addition / deletion f) The palpebral reflex is elicited by touching or tapping a finger on the inner/outer eye can thus or eyelashes. Correctly stunned animals will not show a palpebral reflex. Ineffectively <u>killed stunned</u> animals and those recovering consciousness will blink in response to the stimulus at any key stage. It is worth noting that placement of electrical stunning tongs (electrodes) over the eyes of animals may render this indicator invalid. Rationale: As above, this chapter refers to the killing of animals therefore it would be more suitable for this section to refer to signs as they relate to when killing methods are ineffective. Suggest that it refers to when animals have been ineffectively killed rather than stunned.	Agreed. The main purpose of the chapter is to kill the animals. Therefore, agreed to delete the references to any stunning procedure. Unless the killing method consider it necessary.
7.6.8._32	Category: deletion The palpebral reflex is elicited by touching or tapping a finger on the inner/outer eye <u>can thus</u> or eyelashes. Rationale: This sub-article has either missing text or a typographical error as corrected above.	Agreed partially. There is a typo. It's one word: "canthus", which is either of the angles formed by the meeting of an eye's upper and lower eyelids
7.6.8._33	Category: deletion and addition "The palpebral reflex is elicited by touching or tapping a finger on the inner/outer eye <u>can thus canthus</u> or eyelashes."	Same as comment response 7.6.8._32

g) Eye movement

Eye movements and the position of the eyeball can be recognised from close examination of eyes after stunning. Conscious animals and those recovering consciousness will show eye movements. Correctly stunned Effectively killed animals will show fixed eyes, and this can be recognised from wide open and glassy eyes with clearly visible iris/cornea in the middle. Eyeballs may be obscured in some animals owing to rotation into the eye socket following effective stunning. Ineffectively stunned Conscious animals and those recovering consciousness will show eye movements [EFSA AHAW Panel, 2013, Kamenik et al, 2019]

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._34	Category: addition / deletion Eye movements and the position of the eyeball can be recognised from close examination of eyes after <u>the application of a killing method stunning. Animals that have had a killing method c</u>~~Correctly applied stunned animals~~ will show fixed eyes, and this can be recognised from wide open and glassy eyes with clearly visible iris/cornea in the middle <u>and dilated pupils</u>. Eyeballs may be obscured in some animals owing to rotation into the eye socket following effective stunning. Ineffectively <u>killed stunned</u> animals and those recovering consciousness will show eye movements [EFSA AHAW Panel, 2013, Kamenik et al, 2019] Rationale: In addition to glassy eyes when an animal has been effectively stunned or killed, they should have fixed dilated pupils. Suggest that dilated pupils are specifically stated as a sign that indicates that an animal has been effectively killed. As above, this chapter refers to the killing of animals therefore it would be more suitable for this section to refer to signs as they relate to when killing methods are ineffective. Suggest that it refers to when animals have been ineffectively killed rather than stunned.	Agreed. The main purpose of the chapter is to kill the animals. Therefore, agreed to delete the references to any stunning procedure. Unless the killing method considers it necessary.
7.6.8._35	Category : addition and deletion g)<u>Palpebral reflex</u> The palpebral reflex is elicited by touching or tapping a finger on the inner/outer eye can thus or eyelashes. Correctly stunned animals will not show a palpebral reflex. Ineffectively <u>killed stunned</u> animals and those recovering consciousness will blink in response to the stimulus at any key stage. It is worth noting that placement of electrical stunning tongs (electrodes) <u>ever such that they contact</u> the eyes of animals may render this indicator invalid. h)<u>Eye movement</u> Eye movements and the position of the eyeball can be recognised from close examination of eyes after <u>the application of a killing method stunning. Animals who have had a killing method c</u>~~Correctly applied stunned animals~~ will show fixed eyes, and this can be recognised from wide open and glassy eyes with clearly visible iris/cornea in the middle <u>and dilated pupils</u>. Eyeballs may be obscured in some animals owing to rotation into the eye socket following effective stunning. Ineffectively <u>killed stunned</u> animals and those recovering consciousness will show eye movements. <u>Birds will show movement of the third eyelid (i.e., nictitating membrane)</u> [EFSA AHAW Panel, 2013, Kamenik et al, 2019]. Rationale: As above, this chapter refers to the killing of animals therefore it would be more suitable for this section to refer to signs as they relate to when killing methods are ineffective. Suggest that it refers to when animals have been ineffectively killed rather than stunned.	Agreed. The main purpose of the chapter is to kill the animals. Therefore, agreed to delete the references to any stunning procedure. Unless the killing method considers it necessary.

	In addition to glassy eyes when an animal has been effectively stunned or killed, they should have fixed dilated pupils. Suggest that dilated pupils are specifically stated as a sign that indicates that an animal has been effectively killed. Movement of the nictitating membrane is indicative of poultry that are ineffectively stunned. This is different than a palpebral or corneal reflex which is elicited with touching or tapping. Supporting evidence: European Food Safety Authority (2013). Scientific opinion on monitoring procedures at slaughterhouses for poultry. https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.2903/j.efsa.2013.3521	

2. The following animal-based measures can be used as indicators of consciousness but are not sensible to indicate unconsciousness. Therefore, they can be use in addition to the previously mentioned animal-based measures:

a) Response to painful stimuli

Poor stunning can be recognised from the response to painful stimulus. The absence of response to a painful stimulus indicates unconsciousness following stunning. [Terlow et al, 2016. Kemenik et al, 2018]

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._36	Category : deletion ~~a) Response to painful stimuli. Poor stunning can be recognised from the response to painful stimulus. The absence of response to a painful stimulus indicates unconsciousness following stunning. [Terlow et al, 2016. Kemenik et al, 2018]~~ Rationale: The 'Response to painful stimuli' section implies that animals can be subjected to painful stimuli in order to confirm loss of consciousness or death. This section should be removed because it would have a negative impact on their welfare and should not be considered. The other indicators can be used instead.	Agreed

b) Spontaneous blinking

Conscious animals may show spontaneous blinking and therefore this sign can be used to recognise ineffective stunning killing or recovery of consciousness after stunning. However, not all the conscious animals may show spontaneous blinking. Spontaneous blinking can be used as an indicator at all key stages of monitoring. It is worth noting that placement of electrical stunning tongs (electrodes) over the eyes of animals may render this indicator invalid. [Gregory et al, 2007; Terlow et al, 2016, Kamenik et al, 2018]

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._37	Category : addition Conscious animals may show spontaneous blinking and therefore this sign can be used to recognise ineffective stunning or recovery of consciousness after stunning. However, not all the conscious animals may	Did not agree with the addition, but deleted the sentence to avoid confusion.

	show spontaneous blinking. Spontaneous blinking can be used as an indicator at all key stages of monitoring. It is worth noting that placement of electrical stunning tongs (electrodes) over the eyes of animals can cause random eye movement and may render this indicator invalid. [Gregory et al, 2007; Terlouw et al, 2016, Kamenik et al, 2018] Rationale: Eye movements such as nystagmus may occur following electrical methods. Suggest it is worth including specific mention that the presence of nystagmus does not necessarily indicate that an animal has not been effectively stunned and is unconscious.	

c) Vocalisation

Vocalisation is expected only in conscious animals **and can be used as an indicator in all key stages of monitoring**. However, not all conscious animals will vocalise, and hence the absence of vocalisation does not always mean that the animal is unconscious. [Atkinson et al, 2013; Kamenik et al., 2018]

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._38	Category : addition Vocalisation is expected only in conscious animals and can be used as an indicator in all key stages of monitoring. However, not all conscious animals will vocalise, and hence the absence of vocalisation does not always mean that the animal is unconscious. Animals may occasionally show gasping or respiratory signs when unconscious, which should be differentiated from conscious vocalization. [Atkinson et al, 2013; Kamenik et al., 2018] Rationale: Animals may show gasping and have respiratory signs following the effective application of some killing methods, such as gas killing, therefore must be differentiated between conscious vocalization signs that indicate a return to consciousness. Suggest that gasping and respiratory signs are specifically mentioned to highlight that they should be differentiate from conscious vocalization when assessing that animals are unconsciousness. Supporting evidence: EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (2019). Slaughter of animals: Poultry. EFSA Journal 17(11), e05849.	Did not agree, as this addition will not add value to the text as drafted.

	EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (2020). Welfare of cattle at slaughter. EFSA Journal 18(11), e06275. EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (2020). Welfare of pigs at slaughter. EFSA Journal 18(6), e06148. EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (2021) Welfare of Sheep and Goats at Slaughter. EFSA Journal 19, e06882. Verhoeven MT, Gerritzen MA, Hellebrekers LJ, Kemp B (2015) Indicators used in livestock to assess unconsciousness after stunning: A review. Animal 9(2):320-30.	

3. The following animal-based measures can be used as the confirmation of death before carcass disposal:

a) Muscle tone

Immediately after killing, dead animals will lose muscle tone, which can be recognized from the completely relaxed legs, floppy ears, relaxed tongue and relaxed jaws.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._39	Category : addition Immediately after killing, dead animals will lose muscle tone, which can be recognized from the completely relaxed legs, floppy ears, <u>tongue</u>, and relaxed jaws. Rationale: The relaxation of the tongue is also a reliable way to assess death in an animal and therefore suggest that it should also be included here as something that can be assessed.	Agreed and included the characteristics of the tone of the tongue.
7.6.8._40	Category : addition Immediately after killing, dead animals will lose muscle tone, which can be recognized from the completely relaxed legs, floppy ears, <u>relaxed tongue</u>, and relaxed jaws. Rationale: Relaxation of the tongue is also a readily observable and reliable way to assess death of an animal and therefore it should also be included.	Covered by comment 7.6.8_39

b) Heartbeat

Onset of death leads to permanent loss of heartbeat, which can be ascertained physically by using a stethoscope or by palpation, where possible. [Vogel et al., 2011]

c) Dilated pupils

Dilated pupils (mydriasis) are an indication of death.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.8._41	Category : addition Dilated pupils (mydriasis) are an indication of death <u>in unmedicated animals</u>. Rationale: some drugs which acts locally on smooth muscles within the eye can cause mydriasis and therefore is not reliable as a single indicator to confirm death.	Did not agree. It was considered that this did not add additional information
7.6.8._42	Category : addition Dilated pupils (mydriasis) <u>are an indicator of can indicate</u> death. Rationale: There are other causes of dilated pupils besides death	Did not agree. The current text currently reads well.

Article 7.6.[...].

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.6.[...].	Category : General Unacceptable killing methods [...] The current Chapter 7.6 contains Article 7.6.5-7.6.18 which should be reviewed and included with details on available killing methods and animal welfare considerations. The chapter should also include a section on killing methods that are not considered acceptable on welfare grounds.	Agreed. To be developed.

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Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.13._1	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member in general supports this draft chapter provided the comments below are addressed.	Noted

CHAPTER 8.13.

INFESTATION WITH CHRYSOMYA BEZZIANA (OLD WORLD SCREWORM) AND NEW WORLD SCREWORM (INFESTATION WITH COCHLIOMYIA HOMINIVORAX (NEW WORLD SCREWORM) AND OLD WORLD SCREWORM (CHRYSOMYA BEZZIANA))

Article 8.13.1.bis

General provisions

New World screwworm and Old World screwworm can infest a wide variety of mammals, including humans and birds.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.13.1bis_1	Category: Addition and editorial. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): New World screwworm and Old World screwworm are obligate parasites which can infest a wide variety of mammals, including humans, and birds. Rationale: Recommend addition to emphasize the rationale for inclusion as a disease risk to birds and mammals, including humans. The comma is added to distinguish birds from being categorized as mammals.	Agreed.
8.13.1bis_2	Category: (deletion) Proposed amended text: Suggested deleting the para above. Rationale: does not bring new information compared to the rest of this article. Describing that these infestations are zoonotic goes beyond the purpose of the Terrestrial Code. This is duplication of what is already included in Chapter 3.1.15. of the Terrestrial Manual. In this context, reference is made to the last sentence of this article.	Did not agree, as this text is provided to explain the general context and the below definition of the listed disease including animal hosts. The Commission disagreed that highlighting the zoonotic potential of a listed disease is out of the purpose of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> , whose purpose can

		include mitigation of risks for human health.
8.13.1bis_3	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: New World screwworm and Old World screwworm can infest a wide variety of mammals, including humans, and birds. Rationale: Grammatical correction	Agreed.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, New World screwworm is defined as an *infestation* of mammals and birds (hereafter 'animal hosts') with *Cochliomyia hominivorax*, and Old World screwworm is defined as an *infestation* of animal hosts with *Chrysomya bezziana*.

The occurrence of *infestation* with *Cochliomyia hominivorax* or *infestation* with *Chrysomya bezziana* is defined by the following: *Cochliomyia hominivorax* or *Chrysomya bezziana* has been observed and identified as such in a sample from an animal host.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.13.1bis_4	Category: editorial. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): ~~Old New~~ World screwworm and ~~Old New~~ World screwworm can infest a wide variety of mammals, including humans and birds. For the purposes of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> , ~~Old New~~ World screwworm is defined as an infestation of mammals and birds (hereafter 'animal hosts') with ~~Cochliomyia hominivorax~~ <i>Chrysomya bezziana</i> , and ~~Old New~~ World screwworm is defined as an infestation of animal hosts with <i>Cochliomyia hominivorax</i> . The occurrence of infestation with ~~Cochliomyia hominivorax~~ <i>Chrysomya bezziana</i> or infestation with ~~Chrysomya bezziana~~ <i>Cochliomyia hominivorax</i> is defined by the following: ~~Cochliomyia hominivorax~~ <i>Chrysomya bezziana</i> or ~~Chrysomya bezziana~~ <i>Cochliomyia hominivorax</i> has been observed and identified as such in a sample from an animal host. Rationale: Order of the "old and new" screwworm should reflect the order in which it appears in the text ie New first, then Old. Supporting evidence: not relevant.	The Code Commission agreed to change the title to align with the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i> .

Standards for diagnosis and information on the epidemiology are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

[...]

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.X._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member supports new chapter on CCHF from the One Health perspective.	Noted.
8.X._2	“The Commission noted that, while it considered that it was not relevant to provide recommendations for international trade or animal health status, it may be relevant to consider developing recommendations for Veterinary Services’ activities to prevent the spread of the disease to humans, such as precautions at slaughterhouses or when working with animals or animal products in infected areas, and encouraged Members to consider this proposal and provide comments on its relevance.” Category: General Comment As WOAHA is part of the Quadripartite, a Member supports cross referencing of the Codex and international health regulations for public health measures to be consistent with a One Health approach.	Noted.
8.X._3	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member supports this draft chapter.	Noted.

CHAPTER 8.X.

INFECTION WITH CRIMEAN-CONGO HAEMORRHAGIC FEVER VIRUS

Article 8.X.1.

General provisions

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.X.1._1	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: The main objective of this chapter is to mitigate the animal and public health risks associated with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF). Rationale: Recommend beginning this section with a sentence about the main objective of the chapter since it is a different focus from many of the	Agreed, text amended differently for clarity.

	other chapters. A similar practice was done in the Rift Valley Fever chapter and this objective was noted by the Code Commission in their September 2024 report wherein the Commission highlighted that the main objective of this chapter is to support notification by Members due to the public health risks associated with this disease. Supporting evidence: In their September 2024 report, the Code Commission requested comment on this chapter regarding the following: The Commission noted that, while it considered that it was not relevant to provide recommendations for international trade or animal health status, it may be relevant to consider developing recommendations for Veterinary Services' activities to prevent the spread of the disease to humans, such as precautions at slaughterhouses or when working with animals or animal products in infected areas, and encouraged Members to consider this proposal and provide comments on its relevance.--If the main focus of this chapter is public health, we support including "recommendations for Veterinary Services' activities to prevent the spread of the disease to humans, such as precautions at slaughterhouses or when working with animals or animal products in infected areas." As example, the WOAHP Manual, with primary purpose of describing diagnostics for listed diseases includes basic risk mitigation statements in their introductory content.	

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever is defined as an *infection* of ruminants, dromedary camels and ostriches (hereafter 'animal hosts') with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV).

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.X.1._2	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever can infect a wide variety of vertebrates, including mammals, birds and reptiles. For the purposes of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever is defined as an <i>infection</i> of mammals, birds and reptiles, particularly ruminants, dromedary camels and ostriches (hereafter 'animal hosts') with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV). Rationale: Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever is not limited to ruminants, dromedaries and ostriches. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever has been found in a wide range of mammalian, avian and reptile species. The risk to humans is highest with contact with large free-ranging domestic animals such as ruminants, dromedaries and ostriches but the host range is much wider. The initial format has been copied to align with the general provisions section of Chapter 8.13 (screwworm).	Agreed, the text amended for clarity to align with the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i>.

	Supporting evidence: Spengler, Bergeron & Rollin, 2016, Seroepidemiological Studies of Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever Virus in Domestic and Wild Animals, PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases - https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0004210	
8.X.1._3	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: For the purposes of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> , Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever is defined as an <i>infection</i> of ruminants, dromedary camels and ostriches (hereafter 'animal hosts') with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV). CCHFV may also cause infection in humans. Rationale: Suggest including the fact that "CCHFV may also cause infection in humans" in this introductory paragraph to prepare for the statements that follow. Supporting evidence: Points 2 and 3 below include "human infected with CCHFV." Also, here is one of several WOAHP Manual references: "Humans acquire infection from tick bites, or from contact with infected blood or tissues from livestock or human patients. After incubation humans can develop a severe disease with a prehaemorrhagic phase, a haemorrhagic phase, and a convalescence period" (Hawman & Feldmann, 2023).	Agreed, comment addressed above (A_1 & A_2).
8.X.1._4	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: For the purposes of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> , Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever is defined as an <i>infection</i> of ruminants, dromedary camels, hares, hedgehogs, and ostriches and certain rodents (hereafter 'animal hosts') with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV). Rationale: The animals hosts added here (hares, hedgehogs and certain rodents) are given in the <i>Terrestrial manual</i> and also confirmed in the literature. CCHF in dromedary camels is reported in the literature but is not mentioned in the <i>T. manual</i> .	Agreed, comment addressed above (A_1 & A_2).

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with CCHFV:

- 1) CCHFV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or
- 2) nucleic acid specific to CCHFV has been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with CCHFV; or

- 3) antibodies specific to CCHFV have been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association with or exposure to CCHFV.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.X.1._5	Categoría: edición y general. Texto modificado propuesto (o supresión sugerida): la detección de ácido nucleico específico del virus de la fiebre hemorrágica de Crimea–Congo en una muestra procedente de un animal hospedador que esté relacionado epidemiológicamente con un caso confirmado o ~~sospechoso-presunto~~, o con un ser humano infectado por el virus de la fiebre hemorrágica de Crimea–Congo, o que haya dado motivo para sospechar una asociación o un contacto previos con el virus de la fiebre hemorrágica de Crimea–Congo; o la detección de anticuerpos específicos del virus de la fiebre hemorrágica de Crimea–Congo en una muestra procedente de un animal hospedador que esté relacionado epidemiológicamente con un caso confirmado o ~~sospechoso-presunto~~, o con un ser humano infectado por el virus de la fiebre hemorrágica de Crimea–Congo, o que haya dado motivo para sospechar una asociación o un contacto previos con el virus de la fiebre hemorrágica de Crimea–Congo. Justificación: OMSA tiene en su plan de trabajo, la incorporación en el Glosario, de una definición para “caso sospechoso (<i>suspected case</i>)”. En consecuencia, se propone usar este término en vez de presunto. A su vez, se sugiere que la Comisión del Código Terrestre proponga el reemplazo de la palabra “presunto” por “sospechoso” en todos los capítulos. Evidencia documentada: no corresponde.	Agreed, text amended in Spanish version. Acknowledged this comment, the Commission agreed to apply this text throughout the Code chapters once the new Glossary definition for ‘suspected case’ will be adopted.
8.X.1._6	Category: Deletion Proposed amended text: The following defines the occurrence of <i>infection</i> with CCHFV: 1) CCHFV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or 2) nucleic acid specific to CCHFV has been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, ~~or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with CCHFV~~; or 3) antibodies specific to CCHFV have been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, ~~or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with CCHFV~~. Rationale: The deleted text is not necessary as is already covered by ‘epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case’.	Did not agree, as there is a possibility for association with other susceptible animals that are not included in the list of animal hosts, thus not ‘cases’. The wording was modified to take into account the possible vectorial transmission.

Standards for diagnosis and information on the epidemiology are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

NOT FOR COMMENT

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.Y._1	Category: General Comment rationale: It is important to differentiate the detection of antibodies arising from vaccination versus infection. This reference was removed however Annex 3 of the Sept 2024 report did not outline the rationale behind this. If no vaccines are currently available for Nipah virus, this text should be reassessed if the situation changes in the future.	Noted.
8.Y._2	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member in general supports the proposed new chapter provided the comments below are considered.	Noted.

CHAPTER 8.Y.

INFECTION WITH NIPAH VIRUS

Article 8.Y.1.

General provisions

Nipah virus can infect a wide range of species, including fruit bats (reservoir) and humans, but only domestic pigs and horses are considered to play a significant role in the epidemiology of the disease in the domestic population. For the *Terrestrial Code*, infection with Nipah virus is defined as an infection of domestic pigs and horses and pigs (hereafter 'susceptible animal host') with Nipah virus.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.Y.1._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member agrees to specifying infection with Nipah virus to the 'animal host' and the defined occurrences of infection, including seroconversion as defined in the glossary.	Noted.
8.Y.1._2	Category: Deletion. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): <u>Nipah virus can infect a wide range of species, including fruit bats (reservoir) and humans, but only domestic pigs and horses are considered to play a significant role in the epidemiology of the disease in the domestic population.</u> For the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> , infection with Nipah virus is defined as an infection of <u>domestic pigs and horses</u> and pigs (hereafter ' <u>susceptible animal host</u> ') with Nipah virus. Rationale: It is unclear what "the domestic population" is being referred to. Supporting evidence:	Partially agreed and amended for clarify.

	Not applicable.	
8.Y.1._3	Category: (deletion, addition) Proposed amended text: The following text should be deleted: “~~Nipah virus can infect a wide range of species, including fruit bats (reservoir) and humans, but only domestic pigs and horses are considered to play a significant role in the epidemiology of the disease in the domestic population.~~”; and “<u>For the purposes of the</u> Terrestrial Code, infection with Nipah virus is defined as” Rationale: This description goes beyond the scope of the Terrestrial Code and should not aim at explaining the epidemiology of the diseases (there are textbooks that address this aspect, or the Terrestrial Manual where information on the epidemiology is described, as indicated in the last sentence of this article). Leaving the sentence quoted above could bring confusion on what should be (or not be) the host species for which the Code Standards apply. This is relevant e.g. for notification obligations. The added text is to harmonise with the usual wording for case definitions used throughout the Code.	Did not agree with the deletion, as this text is provided to explain the context of the chapter and explain the definition of the disease, including animal hosts. Editorial proposal agreed.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with Nipah virus:

- 1) Nipah virus has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal hostsusceptible animal; or
- 2) antigen or nucleic acid specific to Nipah virus has been detected in a sample from an animal hostsusceptible animal showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with Nipah virus, epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with Nipah virus; or
- 3) seroconversion specific to Nipah virus, which is not the consequence of vaccination, has been detected in an animal hostsusceptible animal; or

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.Y.1._4	Category: (deletion) Proposed amended text: ~~“seroconversion specific to Nipah virus, has been detected in an animal host; or”~~ Rationale: While the definition of seroconversion, as defined in the Terrestrial Manual, is noted, the issue the member wishes to raise is that it is important that the competent authority needs to be at the centre of the decision process when dealing with indirect diagnostics. The competent authority has the needed knowledge to assess the information it has received with the ongoing epidemiological information and make an informed decision if an outbreak is confirmed. Keeping point 3 above would imply that the competent authority cannot factor in the epidemiological situation.	Did not agree, comment was addressed in the September 2024 Code Commission report. Whatever the definition, it is always the responsibility of the Veterinary Authority to decide how to confirm a case. Point 3 does not preclude the ability of the Veterinary Authority to conduct its epidemiological investigation and select

	In addition, point 3 appears to be not in line with other case definitions where the presence of antibodies should be epidemiologically linked to other Nipah occurrences or suspicious.	the test methodology of their choice.

- 4) antibodies specific to Nipah virus, ~~which are not the consequence of vaccination~~, have been detected in a sample from an ~~animal hostsusceptible animal~~ epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with Nipah virus.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.Y.1._5	Category: Change Proposed Amended text: 3) <u>Sero-conversion or antibodies specific to Nipah virus has been detected in a sample from an animal host with history of clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with infection with Nipah virus, epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with Nipah virus.</u> ~~seroconversion specific to Nipah virus, which is not the consequence of vaccination, has been detected in an animal hostsusceptible animal; or~~ 4) ~~antibodies specific to Nipah virus, which are not the consequence of vaccination, have been detected in a sample from an animal hostsusceptible animal epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with Nipah virus.~~ Rationale:: Detection of specific antibodies will be of diagnostic significance for Nipah, but to define the occurrence of infection with Nipah Virus, this detection should additionally take into account an epidemiological link, clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with the disease. The proposed change also keeps it consistent with the approach taken to define the occurrence of infection due to the detection of antigen or nucleic acid specific to Nipah Virus in the sample.	Did not agree, comment was addressed in the September 2024 Code Commission report. Seroconversion as defined in the Manual implies two samples with the specific objective to confirm recent infection. Depending on the disease, this method is an option given to Veterinary Authority, which is responsible of the choice of the methodology to confirm the case. The Code Commission considered the draft Glossary definition for 'seroconversion'. Refer to item [6.1.] of the report.
8.Y.1._6	Category: Deletion Proposed amended text: 2) antigen or nucleic acid specific to Nipah virus has been detected in a sample from an ~~animal hostsusceptible animal~~ showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with <i>infection</i> with Nipah virus, epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, ~~or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with Nipah virus;~~ or 3) ~~seroconversion specific to Nipah virus, which is not the consequence of vaccination, has been detected in an animal hostsusceptible animal; or~~ 4) ~~antibodies specific to Nipah virus, which are not the consequence of vaccination, have been detected in a sample from an animal hostsusceptible animal epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with Nipah virus.~~ Rationale:	Did not agree, as there could be an association with an infected animal from reservoir species, or other infected animals that are not animal hosts, thus not considered 'case'.

	The deleted text is unnecessary as is already covered by the text “epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case”.	
8.Y.1._7	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: “antibodies specific to Nipah virus, which are not the consequence of vaccination , have been detected in a sample from an animal ...” Rationale: It should be possible to exclude vaccinated animals from the case definition.	Did not agree, as there is currently no vaccine available.

Standards for diagnosis ~~and vaccines~~, ~~as well as~~ and information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.Y.1._8	Category: Addition Rationale: Can the Code Commission confirm that ‘seroconversion’ in point 3, should be interpreted as per the definition of <i>Seroconversion</i> in the glossary of the Terrestrial Manual, as was stated in Annex three, item 8.Y.1._7 . This would mean that at least two tests would need to be completed in the Member Country, and showing at least a four-fold rise in antibodies, or a change from a seronegative to a seropositive test result. To remove ambiguity when reading the Terrestrial Code, we recommend the definition of seroconversion is also included in the glossary of the Terrestrial Code.	The Code Commission considered the draft Glossary definition for ‘seroconversion’. Refer to item [6.1.] of the report.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
10.X._1	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member in general supports this draft new chapter provided the comments below are addressed.	Noted

CHAPTER 10.X.

INFECTION WITH AVIAN METAPNEUMOVIRUS (TURKEY RHINOTRACHEITIS AND SWOLLEN HEAD SYNDROME OF CHICKENS)

Article 10.X.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, *infection* with avian metapneumovirus is defined as an *infection* of *poultry* with avian metapneumovirus.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with avian metapneumovirus:

- 1) Avian metapneumovirus has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from *poultry*; or
- 2) nucleic acid specific to avian metapneumovirus, which is not the consequence of *vaccination*, has been detected in a sample from *poultry*; or

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
10.X.1._1	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: “nucleic acid specific to avian metapneumovirus, which is not the consequence of vaccination, has been detected in a sample from poultry <u>showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with infection with avian metapneumovirus or is epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case</u> ; or”; Rationale: The added text tries to harmonise with the usual wording for case definitions used throughout the Code.	Agreed. The text added is in line with the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i> . The original text was based on the expert's opinion, but not all Members have access to the best available tests and technology, therefore the suggested added text was accepted. A question was also forwarded to the Scientific Commission and the Biological Standards Commission to seek their opinion in general on the power of

		test for nucleic acids alone for case definition, compared with combined criteria.

3) seroconversion specific to avian metapneumovirus has been detected in *poultry*; or

10.X.1._2	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: 3) seroconversion specific to avian metapneumovirus has been detected in <u>unvaccinated</u> poultry; or Rationale: Since seroconversion in 3) can occur not only due to infection but also as a result of vaccination, it needs to be limited to seroconversion in unvaccinated farms.	Agreed. The text was amended accordingly, in line with the conventions of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> .
10.X.1._3	Category: General Comment Rationale: Can the Code Commission confirm the definition of 'seroconversion' in point 3. Please refer to a similar comment on the Nipah virus chapter. 8.Y.1._X_A Member's comment on Chapter 8.Y. Nipah Category: Addition Rationale: Can the Code Commission confirm that 'seroconversion' in point 3, should be interpreted as per the definition of <i>Seroconversion</i> in the glossary of the Terrestrial Manual, as was stated in Annex three, item 8.Y.1._7 . This would mean that at least two tests would need to be completed in the Member Country, and showing at least a four-fold rise in antibodies, or a change from a seronegative to a seropositive test result. To remove ambiguity when reading the Terrestrial Code, we recommend the definition of seroconversion is also included in the glossary of the Terrestrial Code.	The Code Commission considered the draft Glossary definition for 'seroconversion'. Refer to item [6.1.] of the report.
10.X.1._4	Comment category: Deletion Proposed amended text: Remove criteria #3.	Did not agree, comment was addressed in the

	The following defines the occurrence of <i>infection</i> with avian metapneumovirus: 1) Avian metapneumovirus has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from <i>poultry</i>; or 2) nucleic acid specific to avian metapneumovirus, which is not the consequence of <i>vaccination</i>, has been detected in a sample from <i>poultry</i>; or 3) ~~seroconversion specific to avian metapneumovirus has been detected in <i>poultry</i>; or~~ 4) antibodies specific to avian metapneumovirus, which are not the consequence of <i>vaccination</i>, have been detected in a sample from <i>poultry</i> showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with <i>infection</i> with avian metapneumovirus, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case. Rationale: This criteria is not applicable, is very vague and it is already included in criteria #4.	September 2024 Code Commission report. Seroconversion as defined in the Manual implies two samples with the specific objective to confirm recent infection. Depending on the disease, this method is an option given to Veterinary Authorities. The Code Commission considered the draft Glossary definition for 'seroconversion'. Refer to item [6.1.] of the report.
10.X.1._5	Category: Deletion. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): 3) ~~seroconversion specific to avian metapneumovirus has been detected in <i>poultry</i>; or~~ Rationale: Recommend to strike point 3, as seropositive status is covered more thoroughly in point 4, including explicit exclusion of detections resulting from vaccine response.	Did not agree, comment addressed above [10.X.1_4].
10.X.1._6	Category: (deletion) Proposed amended text: It is proposed to delete point 3). Rationale: While the definition of seroconversion, as defined in the Terrestrial Manual, is noted, point 3 appears to be not in line with other case definitions where the presence of antibodies should be epidemiologically linked to other occurrences or suspicious of avian metapneumovirus. In practical terms a seroconversion needs to be contextualised anyway and this is already covered in point 4 with a better formulation.	Did not agree, comment addressed above [10.X.1_4].

- 4) antibodies specific to avian metapneumovirus, which are not the consequence of *vaccination*, have been detected in a sample from *poultry* showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with avian metapneumovirus, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
10.X.1._7	Category: Addition and deletion Proposed amended text: 1. Avian metapneumovirus <u>which is not related to vaccination</u> has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from poultry, or 2. nucleic acid specific to avian metapneumovirus, which is not the consequence of vaccination, has been detected in a sample from poultry; or 3. seroconversion specific to avian metapneumovirus, <u>not attributable to vaccination and regardless of the presence of clinical signs</u> has been detected in poultry; 4. ~~antibodies specific to avian metapneumovirus, which are not the consequence of vaccination, have been detected in a sample from poultry showing~~ clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with infection with avian metapneumovirus, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, <u>confirmed by one of the above diagnostic methods or by seroconversion consistent with virulent infection.</u> Rationale: International Organisation further encourages the Commission to consider that vaccination alone could also cause seroconversion (not considered in the original text) and that non-vaccinal aMPV seroconversion without clinical signs is not clearly addressed in the original text.	Agreed, the text was amended accordingly in line with the conventions of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>. Agreed, comment addressed above [10.X.1_2]. Did not agree, comment addressed above [10.X.1_4].

Standards for diagnosis and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.1._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees to the proposed changes in the definition of infection following the change of nomenclature of the causative agent of CBPP.	Noted.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5._1	Category: General Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member thanks the WOAHA for the work done on this chapter and would like to contribute with the comments below. Supporting evidence: not relevant	Noted.
11.5._2	Category: General Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member commends the Commission for the significant effort invested in revising Chapter 11.5 on <i>Infection with Mycoplasma mycoides subsp. mycoides</i> SC (contagious bovine pleuropneumonia).	Noted.
11.5._3	Category: General Proposed amended text: Rationale:	Noted.

	A Member in general supports this revised chapter, provided the comments below are considered.	

CHAPTER 11.5.

INFECTION WITH *MYCOPLASMA MYCOIDES* SUBSP. *MYCOIDES* SC (CONTAGIOUS BOVINE PLEUROPNEUMONIA)

Article 11.5.1.

General provisions

~~1) For the purposes of this chapter, susceptible animals means domestic bovines (*Bos indicus*, *B. taurus*, *B. grunniens* and *Bubalus bubalis*).~~

~~124) For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, the incubation period for contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP) shall be six months.~~

~~For the purpose of this chapter, is defined as an animal infected of susceptible animals bovines (*Bos indicus*, *B. taurus*, *B. grunniens* and *Bubalus bubalis*) with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subspecies *mycoides* SC (*Mmm*-SC), and freedom from CBPP means freedom from *Mmm* SC infection.~~

~~For the purpose of this chapter, susceptible animals include bovids (*Bos indicus*, *B. taurus* and *B. grunniens*) and water buffaloes (*Bubalus bubalis*).~~

~~23) For the purposes of international trade~~ This chapter deals not only with the occurrence of clinical signs caused by *Mmm*SC, but also with the presence of *infection* with *Mmm*SC in the absence of clinical signs.

~~34) The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with *Mmm*SC infection:~~

- ~~4a) *Mmm*SC has been isolated and identified as such in from an animal, embryos, oocytes or semen a sample from a susceptible animal bovine; or; or~~
- ~~2b) *Mmm* deoxyribonucleic acid specific to *Mmm* has been detected in a sample from a susceptible animal bovine showing pathological lesions consistent with an *infection* with *Mmm*SC, and or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed case; or~~
- ~~c) antibodies specific to *Mmm*SC antigens, which are not the consequence of vaccination, have been detected in a sample from a susceptible animal bovine showing pathological lesions consistent with an *infection* with *Mmm*, and or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed case or *Mmm*SC deoxyribonucleic acid have been identified in one or more animals showing pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with *Mmm*SC with or without clinical signs, and epidemiological links to a confirmed outbreak of CBPP in susceptible animals.~~

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.1._2	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Points b) and c) should include a link to suspected cases: “or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case” Rationale: Provides with more flexibility for the Veterinary Authorities and allows to align with other case disease chapters in the Code.	Did not agree, as it is consistent with the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i> .
11.5.1._3	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: Both points b) and c) should include the link to suspected cases: “or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case ” Rationale: Provides with more flexibility for the Veterinary Authorities and allows to align with other case disease chapters in the Code.	Did not agree, as above [11.5.1._2].

45) For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the incubation period shall be six months.

~~When authorising import or transit of the commodities listed in this chapter, with the exception of those listed in Article 11.5.2., Veterinary Authorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the CBPP status of the domestic bovids and water buffalo population of the exporting country, zone or compartment.~~

56) Standards for diagnosis diagnostic tests and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 11.5.2.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.2._1_	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.
11.5.2._2_	Category: General Proposed amended text: No text proposed. Documents provided by international organisation and member countries regarding safe commodities in Annex 3 are not accessible. Therefore, we would like to request WOAHP to provide detailed information or references of supporting evidence for assessing safe commodities to be accessible to member countries. Rationale: To ensure mutual understanding among WOAHP member countries Supporting evidence: -	The Code Commission requested the Secretariat to ask the international organisation (WRO) to publish the document on its webpage .

Safe commodities

When authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities, Veterinary Authorities should not require any CBPP-related conditions, regardless of the CBPP animal health status of the domestic bovids bovine and water buffalo population of the exporting country, zone or compartment.

- 1) *milk and milk products*;
- 2) *hides and skins*;
- 3) *meat and meat products* (excluding lung);

4) protein meal;

5) rendered fat.

Article 11.5.3.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.3._1_	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.

Country or zone free from CBPP free country or zone

A country or zone may be considered free from CBPP when the relevant provisions in point 2 of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with, and when within the proposed free country or zone for at least the past 24 months:

- 1) there has been no case of infection with Mmm;
- 2) the Veterinary Authority has current knowledge of, and authority over, all herds of susceptible animals bovines;
- 3) appropriate surveillance has been implemented in accordance with:
 - a) Article 1.4.6. where historical freedom can be demonstrated; or
 - b) Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. where historical freedom cannot be demonstrated;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.3._2	Category: addition Proposed amended text: <u>appropriate surveillance has been implemented in accordance with:</u> a) <u>point 2 b) of Article 1.4.6. where historical freedom can be demonstrated; or</u> Rationale: Clarity. To demonstrate historical freedom, the whole of article 1.4.6 does not apply. For example, Article 1.4.6. item 2.c. applies for countries that cannot demonstrate historical freedom in addition to any disease specific chapter requirements. Moreover, the wording would be consistent with the African horse sickness chapter.	Agreed.

- 4) measures to prevent the introduction of the infection have been in place: in particular, the importations or movements of bovine commodities into the country or zone have been carried out in accordance with this chapter and other relevant chapters of the Terrestrial Code;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.3._3	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: Point 4 above should be amended as follows: “<u>measures to prevent the introduction of the infection have been in place: in particular, the importations or movements of bovine commodities into the country or zone have been carried out in accordance with procedures at least as strict as the ones described in this chapter and other relevant chapters of the Terrestrial Code;</u>” Rationale: This clarifies that other procedures are possible as well, as long as they result in the same level of protection as the ones described in this chapter (principle of equivalence). Such changes are required in other relevant disease-specific chapters as well.	Did not agree, however the text was revised, in agreement with the Scientific Commission for clarity. Refer to the body of the report.

5) no vaccination or treatment against CBPP has been carried out;

6) no animal vaccinated or treated against CBPP have has been introduced since the cessation of vaccination.

To qualify for inclusion in the existing list of CBPP free countries and zones, a Member Country should:

1) have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting;

2) send a declaration to WOAHA stating that:

a) there has been no outbreak of CBPP during the past 24 months;

b) no evidence of CBPP infection has been found during the past 24 months;

c) no vaccination against CBPP has been carried out during the past 24 months, and supply documented evidence that surveillance for CBPP in accordance with this chapter is in operation and that regulatory measures for the prevention and control of CBPP have been implemented;

3) not have imported since the cessation of vaccination any animals vaccinated against CBPP.

The country or zone will be included in the list of countries or zones free from CBPP in accordance with Chapter 1.6. only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by WOAHA.

Retention on the list requires annual reconfirmation of compliance with all points above and the relevant provisions under point 4 of Article 1.4.6. that the information in points 2 a), 2 b), 2 c) and 3 above be re-submitted annually and Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for points 1 to 4 above. Any changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be reported notified to WOAHA in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.3._4	Category: Deleted Proposed amended text: The following text should be deleted: “<u>Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for points 1 to 4 above.</u>” Rationale: The annual reconfirmation process needs to be simplified to reduce the administrative burden on Member Countries. Such changes could also be required in other relevant	Did not agree. The Code Commission, in agreement with the Scientific Commission, acknowledged that the annual reconfirmation process can be perceived as burdensome for some

	disease-specific chapters and/or in chapter 1.6 on procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control program, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOA. H.	Members and is currently working to review the procedure. The Code Commission noted that this is an issue of procedure and that by principle the text should be maintained.
11.5.3._5	Category: (deletion) Proposed amended text: The following text should be deleted: “ ~~Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for points 1 to 4 above.~~ ” Rationale: With reference to a Member comments on Chapter 1.6., the annual reconfirmation process needs be simplified. Therefore, the sentence above should be deleted or significantly amended to reduce the administrative burden on Member Countries. Such changes are required in other relevant disease-specific chapters as well.	Comment addressed above [11.5.3._4].

Article 11.5.46.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.4._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.

Compartment free from CBPP free compartment

The bilateral recognition of a CBPP free ~~compartment~~ should follow the principles laid down in this chapter and in Chapters 4.3. and 4.4.

A compartment free from CBPP can be established in any country or zone. In defining such a compartment the principles of Chapters 4.4. and 4.5. should be followed. Susceptible animals-Bovines in the compartment should be separated from any other susceptible animals-bovines by the effective application of a biosecurity plan.

A Member Country wishing to establish a compartment free from CBPP should:

- 1) have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting and, if not free, have an official control programme and a surveillance system for CBPP in place in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. that allows knowledge of the prevalence, distribution and characteristics of CBPP in the country or zone;
- 2) declare for the free compartment that:
 - a) there has been no case of CBPP during the past 24 months;
 - ba) no infection with Mmm has been detected occurred during the past 24 months;
 - eb) vaccination against CBPP is prohibited;

dc) no animal vaccinated or treated against CBPP within the past 24 months is in the *compartment*.

ed) animals, semen and embryos may only enter the *compartment* in accordance with relevant articles in this chapter.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.4._2	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: A Member proposes that this same condition in article 11.5.4 d) should also apply to Article 11.5.3 Country or Zone free from CBPP Rationale: The proposed change reflects current scientific understanding and best practices, recognizing that semen and embryos can play a significant role in the possible transmission of contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP). Including specific provisions for the movement of animals, semen, and embryos into a CBPP-free compartment aligns with the relevant articles in this chapter and ensures consistency in application across country, zones and compartments. This approach will enhance biosecurity measures and minimize the risk of disease introduction.	Did not agree, as it is already covered in the text.

fe) documented evidence shows that *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. is in operation.

gf) an *animal identification and traceability* system in accordance with Chapters 4.1. and 4.2. is in place.

3) describe in detail:

a) the animal *subpopulation* in the *compartment*.

b) the *biosecurity plan* to mitigate the risks identified by the *surveillance* carried out in accordance with point 1 notably to prevent the aerosol transmission of CBPP.

The *compartment* should be approved by the *Veterinary Authority*.

Article 11.5.5.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.5._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.

Country of or zone infected with *Mmm* CBPP infected country or zone

A country or *zone* shall be considered as infected with *Mmm* ~~When the requirements for acceptance as a CBPP free country or zone free from CBPP are not fulfilled, a country or zone shall be considered as infected.~~

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.5._2	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text:	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended

	The following sentence should be added: “This cannot be equated to absence of official disease status recognised by WOAH.” Rationale: This sentence clarifies that a country that does not have an official status recognised by WOAH is not automatically to be considered infected. Such changes are required in other relevant disease-specific chapters as well.	differently for clarity, in point 4 of Article 11.5.3. Refer to the body of report.

Article 11.5.5bis.

Establishment of a containment zone within a country or zone previously free from CBPP

In the event of outbreaks of CBPP infection with *Mmm* within a country or zone previously free from CBPP, including within a protection zone, a containment zone, which includes all epidemiologically linked outbreaks, can may be established, in accordance with Article 4.4.7., to minimise the impact on the rest of the country or zone.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.5bis._1	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: The following should be added at the beginning of the paragraph above: “Without prejudice to other possible disease control measures including other types of zoning, in the event of outbreaks ...” Rationale: This is to clarify that a country may also establish other types of zones to control and eradicate an outbreak, in line with Chapter 4.4. This is not only relevant for countries that do not have an officially recognised disease status. Such changes are required in other relevant disease-specific chapters as well.	The Code Commission acknowledged the concern and emphasised, in agreement with the Scientific Commission, that Article 11.5.5bis refers to containment zone and not to any other types of zones under Chapter 4.4. Acknowledging the ongoing revision of <i>Terrestrial Code</i> Chapter 4.4. ‘Zoning and compartmentalisation’, the Commission noted that it was always possible to establish other types of zones, as Chapter 4.4. applies horizontally to the whole Code.
11.5.5bis._2	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: The following should be added at the beginning of the paragraph above: “Without prejudice to other possible disease control measures including other types of zoning, in the event of outbreaks ...” Rationale: This is to clarify that a country may also establish other types of zones to control and eradicate an outbreak, in line with Chapter 4.4. This is not only relevant for countries that do not have an officially recognised disease status. Such changes are required in other relevant disease-specific chapters as well.	Comment addressed above [11.5.5bis._1].

For this to be achieved and for the Member Country to take full advantage of this process, the Veterinary Authority should submit as soon as possible to WOA, in addition to the requirements of Article 4.4.7., in support of the application, documented evidence that:

- 1) on suspicion, a strict standstill has been imposed on the suspected establishments, and in the country or zone animal movement control has been imposed and effective controls on the movement of animals and other relevant commodities are in place in the country or zone;
- 2) the infection has been confirmed and notified in accordance with Chapter 1.1.;
- 32) on confirmation, an the additional standstill and movement of susceptible animals has been imposed controls described in point 1 have been reinforced in the entire containment zone and the movement controls described in point 1 have been reinforced;
- 43) epidemiological investigations into the likely source of the outbreaks have been carried out;
- 54) a slaughter policy, with or without the use of emergency vaccination, has been applied;
- 65) surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. is in place in the containment zone and in the rest of the country or zone;
- 76) measures that prevent the spread of CBPP to the rest of the country or zone, taking into consideration physical and geographical barriers, are in place.

The free status of the areas outside the containment zone is suspended while the containment zone is being established. The free status of these areas outside the containment zone may be reinstated irrespective of the provisions of Article 11.5.4., once the containment zone has been approved by WOA as complying with Article 4.4.7. and points 1 to 6 7 above.

In the event of recurrence of infection with Mmm in the containment zone, established in accordance with point 4 a) of Article 4.4.7., the approval of the containment zone is withdrawn and the CBPP-free status of the whole country or zone is suspended until the relevant requirements of Article 11.5.46. are fulfilled.

In the event of occurrence of infection with Mmm in the outer zone of a containment zone established in accordance with point 4 b) of Article 4.4.7., the approval of the containment zone is withdrawn and the free status of the whole country or zone is suspended until the relevant requirements of Article 11.5.46. are fulfilled.

The recovery of the CBPP-free status of the containment zone should follow the provisions of Article 11.5.46.

Article 11.5.64.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.6._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.

Recovery of free status

Should an outbreak of CBPP occur in a previously free country or zone, its status may be recovered when surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. has been carried out with negative results, and 12 months after:

- 1) the disinfection of the last affected establishment, provided that a slaughter policy without vaccination has been implemented; or

- 2) the disinfection of the last affected establishment and the slaughter of all vaccinated animals, provided that a slaughter policy with emergency vaccination and slaughter of vaccinated animals has been implemented.

When a CBPP outbreak occurs in a CBPP free country or zone, one of the following waiting periods is required to regain the status of CBPP free country or zone:

- 1) 12 months after the last case where a ~~stamping-out~~ policy and serological ~~surveillance~~ and strict movement control are applied in accordance with this chapter;
- 2) if ~~vaccination~~ was used, 12 months after the ~~slaughter~~ of the last vaccinated animal.
- 1) 12 months after the slaughter of the last case where a slaughter policy, without emergency vaccination, and surveillance are applied in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14.; or
- 2) 12 months after the slaughter of the last case and of all vaccinated animals, whichever occurred last, where a slaughter policy, emergency vaccination and surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. are applied.

The country or zone will regain the status of CBPP free country or zone only after the submitted evidence, based on the provisions of Chapter 1.10., has been accepted by WOA.

Where a ~~stamping-out slaughter~~ policy is not practised, the above waiting periods do not apply but Article 11.5.3. applies.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.6._2	Category: (editorial) Proposed amended text: Member proposes the following minor change: Where a ~~stamping-out~~ slaughter policy is not practised, the above waiting period ~~does~~ not apply but Article 11.5.3. applies. Rationale: There is only one waiting period being proposed in Article 11.5.6.	Agreed.

Article 11.5.7.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.7._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.

Recommendations for importation of susceptible animals bovines from CBPP free countries, or zones, or compartments free from CBPP free compartments

For domestic bovids and water buffaloes

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of shipment;
- 2) were kept in a CBPP free country, zone or compartment since birth or for at least the past six months.

Article 11.5.8.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.8._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.

Recommendations for importation of susceptible animals bovines from CBPP infected countries or zones infected with *Mmm* for immediate slaughter

For domestic bovids and water buffaloes for slaughter

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of shipment;
- 2) originate from an establishment in which surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. demonstrates that ~~where~~ no case of CBPP had-has occurred ~~was officially reported for~~ during the past six months; and
- 3) are transported ~~directly~~ under the supervision of the Veterinary Authority in a vehicle/vessel, which was subjected to disinfection before loading, directly from the establishment of origin to the slaughterhouse/abattoir place of shipment ~~in sealed vehicles without coming into contact with other susceptible animals bovines.~~

Article 11.5.9.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.9._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.

Recommendations for importation of bovine semen from CBPP free countries, or zones, or compartments free from CBPP free compartments

For bovine semen

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the semen;
 - b) were kept in a CBPP free country, *zone* or *compartment* since birth or for at least the past six months;
- 2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 11.5.10.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.10._1	Category: General comment	Noted.

	Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	

Recommendations for importation of bovine semen from CBPP infected countries or zones infected with Mmm

For bovine semen

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) were kept since birth, or for the past six months, in an establishment in which surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. demonstrates that no case of infection with Mmm has occurred during that period;
 - ab) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the semen;
 - bc) were subjected to ~~the complement fixation~~ a serological test for CBPP with negative results, on two occasions, with an interval of not less than 21 days and not more than 30 days between ~~each sampling tests~~, the second sampling test being performed within 14 days prior to collection;
 - ed) were isolated from other ~~domestic bovids and water buffaloes susceptible animals~~ bovines that did not meet the same health requirements from the day of the first ~~the complement fixation~~ serological test until collection;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.10._2	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: 1) Donor animals: d) were isolated from other ~~domestic bovids and water buffaloes susceptible animals~~ <u>bovines that did not meet the same health requirements</u> from the day of the first ~~the complement fixation~~ <u>serological test sampling for serological testing</u> until collection; Rationale: Suggest change from 'serological test' to 'sampling for serological testing' as per change in Article 11.5.10 1) c) which modifies intervals between 'tests' to 'samplings'. Testing may occur after sampling and isolation would be required from the sampling date not the date the sample is then serologically tested.	Agreed.
11.5.10._3	Category: change Proposed amended text: d) were isolated from other <u>bovines that did not meet the same health requirements</u> from the day of the first <u>serological test sampling</u> until collection; Rationale: To be consistent with article c), serological test results represent the status of the animal when it was being sampled, and sampling time is more accurate here. Same with Article 11.5.12.	Agreed, the comment covered as [11.5.10._2].

	Supporting evidence: not relevant	

d) ~~were kept since birth, or for the past six months, in an establishment in which surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. demonstrates that where no case of CBPP was reported had occurred during that period, and that the establishment was not situated in a CBPP infected zone;~~

e) AND EITHER:

i) have not been vaccinated against CBPP;

OR

ii) were vaccinated using a vaccine complying with the standards described in the *Terrestrial Manual* not more than four months prior to collection; in this case, the condition laid down in point (bc) above is not required;

2) the semen:

a) was collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.56. and 4.67.;

b) ~~was subjected to a test for the identification-detection of the agent.~~

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.10._4	Category: Deletion Proposed amended text: <u>b) was subjected to a test for the identification detection of the agent.</u> Rationale: Could the Scientific Commission share the information demonstrating that the semen testing is necessary in addition to serological testing, and the validity of semen testing as an additional test?	Did not agree. The Code Commission agreed to keep the current text, in agreement with the Scientific Commission, noting the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i> states individual testing for serology is not sufficient to guarantee the absence of infectivity of semen from a potentially infected donor. The detailed rationale was described in the SCAD February 2016 report.

Article 11.5.11.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.11._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.

Recommendations for importation of in vivo derived or in vitro produced oocytes or embryos of susceptible animals-bovines from CBPP-free countries, or zones, or compartments free from CBPP free compartments

~~For *in vivo* derived or *in vitro* produced oocytes or embryos of domestic bovids and water buffaloes~~

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the oocytes or embryos;
 - b) were kept in a ~~CBPP free~~ country, *zone* or *compartment* free from CBPP since birth or for at least the past six months;
- 2) the oocytes were fertilised with semen meeting the conditions of Articles 11.5.9. or 11.5.10.;
- 3) the oocytes or embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8., 4.9. and 4.10., as relevant.

Article 11.5.12.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.12._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.

Recommendations for importation of *in vivo* derived or *in vitro* produced oocytes or embryos of susceptible animals-bovines from CBPP infected countries or zones infected with *Mmm*

~~For *in vivo* derived or *in vitro* produced oocytes or embryos of domestic bovids and water buffaloes~~

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) were kept since birth, or for the past six months, in an *establishment* in which *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. demonstrates that no case of *infection* with *Mmm* has occurred during that period;
 - a~~b~~) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the embryos or oocytes;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.12._2	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: 1) Donor animals: b) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the ~~embryos or oocytes~~ <u>oocytes or embryos</u> ; Rationale: Minor syntax change for consistency in order of words aligned to other clauses with oocytes listed as the former and embryos the latter.	Agreed.

- b~~c~~) were subjected to the ~~complement fixation~~ a serological test for CBPP with negative results, on two occasions, with an interval of not less than 21 days and not more than 30 days between ~~each~~ samplingtests, the second samplingtest being performed within 14 days prior to collection;

- ed) were isolated from other domestic bovids and water buffaloes bovines that did not meet the same health requirements from the day of the first the complement fixation serological test until collection;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.12._3	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: 2) Donor animals: d) were isolated from other domestic bovids and water buffaloes bovines that did not meet the same health requirements from the day of the first the complement fixation serological test sampling for serological testing until collection; Rationale: Suggest change from 'serological test' to 'sampling for serological testing' as per change in Article 11.5.10 1) c). which modifies intervals between 'tests' to 'samplings'. Testing may occur after sampling and isolation would be required from the sampling date not the date the sample is then serologically tested.	Agreed.

- d) ~~were kept since birth, or for the past six months, in an establishment in which surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. demonstrates that where no case of CBPP was reported had occurred during that period, and that the establishment was not situated in a CBPP infected zone;~~

- e) AND EITHER:

- i) have not been vaccinated against CBPP;

OR

- ii) were vaccinated using a vaccine complying with the standards described in the *Terrestrial Manual* not more than four months prior to collection; in this case, the condition laid down in point (bc) above is not required;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.12._4	Category: change Proposed amended text: ~~ii) were vaccinated not more than four months prior to collection; in this case, the condition laid down in point (bc) above is not required;~~ Rationale: The safety of vaccines remains a concern. The attenuated strains T1/44 are now recommended for vaccine production by WOA. As a widely used vaccine for CBPP, studies have shown that T1/44 vaccine still retains some virulence, and may produce different CBPP lesions depending on the way of vaccination. Therefore, it is recommended that donor animals come from a zone free from CBPP and cannot be vaccinated against CBPP. Supporting evidence:	Did not agree, as it is in accordance with the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i> .

	  Contagious Bovine and Capribovine pleuropn	

- 2) the oocytes were fertilised with semen meeting the conditions of Articles 11.5.9. ~~and or~~ 11.5.10.;
- 3) the oocytes or embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8., 4.9. and 4.10., as relevant.

Article 11.5.13.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.13._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.

Introduction to surveillance-General principles of surveillance

Surveillance aims at identifying infection in bovines. Articles 11.5.13. to and 11.5.14. define the principles and provide a guide for the surveillance of CBPP in accordance with Chapter 1.4. notably point 2(h)-3 of Article 1.4.3. concerning quality assurance. They are applicable to Member Countries seeking establishment of freedom from CBPP. Guidance is provided for Member Countries seeking reestablishment, maintenance or recovery of freedom from CBPP for at the entire country, or for a zone, following an outbreak or compartment level or seeking endorsement by WOA of their official control programme for CBPP, in accordance with Article 11.5.13. Surveillance aims at identifying infection in bovines susceptible species as indicated in Article 11.5.1.

1. Early detection

A surveillance system for early detection should be in place in accordance with Chapter 1.4. under the responsibility of the Veterinary Authority.

2. Demonstration of freedom

The impact and epidemiology of CBPP differ widely in different regions of the world and therefore it is impossible to provide specific recommendations for all situations. *Surveillance* strategies employed for demonstrating freedom from CBPP at an acceptable level of confidence should be adapted to the local situation. It is incumbent upon the applicant Member Country to submit a dossier to WOA in support of its application that not only explains the epidemiology of CBPP in the region concerned but also demonstrates how all the risk factors are managed. This should include provision of science-scientific based supporting data. Therefore, there is therefore considerable latitude available to Member Countries to provide a well-reasoned argument to prove that the absence of CBPP-infection with *Mmm* is assured at an acceptable level of confidence.

Surveillance for CBPP should be in the form of a continuing programme designed to establish that the whole territory or part of it is free from CBPP-infection.

A Member Country wishing to substantiate freedom from CBPP should demonstrate absence of infection with *Mmm* in bovines.

Article 11.5.14.

General conditions and methods for surveillance

3. WOAH endorsed official control programme

Surveillance strategies employed in support of a WOAH endorsed official control programme should demonstrate evidence of the effectiveness of any control strategy used and of the ability to rapidly detect all outbreaks of infection with Mmm-CBPP.

Considerable latitude exists for Member Countries to design and implement surveillance to establish that the whole country or a zone is free from CBPP and to understand the epidemiology of CBPP as part of the official control programme.

The Member Country should submit an application dossier to WOAH in-supported by a dossier of its application that explains the epidemiology of CBPP in the region concerned and demonstrates how all the risk factors are identified and managed. This should include provision of scientifically-science-based supporting data.

The entire investigative process should be documented within the surveillance programme. All the epidemiological information should be substantiated, and the results should be collated in the final report.

The entire investigative process should be documented within the surveillance system in accordance with Chapter 1.4. should be under the responsibility of the Veterinary Authority. A procedure should be in place for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspect cases of CBPP to a laboratory for CBPP diagnoses.

2) The CBPP surveillance programme should:

- a) include an early warning system throughout the production, marketing and processing chain for reporting suspicious cases. Farmers and workers (such as community animal health workers) who have day to day contact with livestock, meat inspectors as well as laboratory diagnosticians, should report promptly any suspicion of CBPP. They should be integrated directly or indirectly (e.g. through private veterinarians or veterinary para-professionals) into the surveillance system. All suspect cases of CBPP should be investigated immediately. Where suspicion cannot be resolved by the epidemiological and clinical investigation, samples should be taken and submitted to a laboratory. This requires that sampling kits information should be substantiated, and other equipment are available for those responsible for surveillance. Personnel responsible for surveillance should be able to call for assistance from a team with expertise in CBPP diagnosis and control;
- b) implement, when relevant, regular and frequent clinical inspection and testing of high risk groups of animals, such as those adjacent to a CBPP infected country or zone (for example, areas of transhumant production systems);
- c) take into consideration additional factors such as animal movement, different production systems, geographical and socio-economic factors that may influence the risk of disease occurrence.

An effective surveillance system will periodically identify suspicious cases that require follow up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is CBPP. The rate at which such suspicious cases are likely to occur will differ between epidemiological situations and cannot therefore be predicted reliably. Applications for freedom from CBPP infection should, in consequence, provide details of the occurrence of suspicious cases and how they were investigated and dealt with. This should include the results of laboratory testing and the control measures to which the animals concerned were subjected during the investigation (quarantine, movement stand still orders, etc.) should be collated in the final report.

Article 11.5.15.

4. Surveillance strategies

1- Introduction

The target population for surveillance aimed at identifying disease and infection should cover all the susceptible species (*Bos taurus*, *B. indicus*, *B. grunniens* and *Bubalus bubalis*) within the country or zone.

~~Given the limitations of the diagnostic tools available, the interpretation of serological surveillance results should be at the herd level rather than at the individual animal level.~~

Randomised *surveillance* may not be the preferred approach given the epidemiology of the disease (usually uneven distribution and potential for occult foci of *infection* in small populations) and the limited sensitivity and specificity of currently available tests. ~~Targeted Risk-based surveillance~~ (e.g. based on the increased likelihood of *infection* in particular localities or species, focusing on *slaughter* findings, and active clinical *surveillance*) may be the most appropriate strategy. The applicant Member Country should justify the *surveillance* strategy chosen as adequate to detect the presence of ~~CBPP-infection with Mmm~~ in accordance with Chapter 1.4. ~~and the epidemiological situation.~~

~~Targeted Risk-based surveillance~~ may involve testing of the entire target subpopulation or a sample from it. In the latter case the sampling strategy should incorporate an epidemiologically appropriate design prevalence. The sample size selected for testing should be large enough to detect *infection* if it were to occur at a predetermined minimum rate. The sample size and expected disease prevalence determine the level of confidence in the results of the survey. The applicant Member Country should justify the choice of design prevalence and confidence level based on the objectives of *surveillance* and the epidemiological situation, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Selection of the design prevalence in particular should be clearly based on the prevailing or historical epidemiological situation.

Regular and frequent clinical inspection and testing of high-risk groups of animals, such as those adjacent to a country or zone infected with Mmm (for example, areas of transhumant production systems), should be implemented when relevant.

Additional factors such as animal movement, different production systems, geographical and socio-economic factors that may influence the risk of disease introduction and occurrence should be taken into consideration.

Irrespective of the survey design selected, the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests employed are key factors in the design, sample size determination and interpretation of the results obtained. ~~Ideally, the sensitivity and specificity of the tests used should be validated.~~

5. Follow-up of suspected cases and interpretation of results

An effective surveillance system will identify suspected cases that require immediate follow-up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is an infection with Mmm. Samples should be taken and submitted for diagnostic testing, unless the suspected case can be confirmed or ruled out by epidemiological and clinical investigation. Details of the occurrence of suspected cases and how they were investigated and dealt with should be documented. This should include the results of diagnostic testing and the measures applied to the animals concerned during the investigation.

~~Irrespective of the surveillance system employed, the design should anticipate the occurrence of false positive laboratory results-reactions. If the characteristics of the testing system are known, the rate at which these false positives are likely to occur can be calculated in advance. There should be an effective procedure for following-up positives to ultimately determine, with a high level of confidence, whether or not they are indicative of infection or not. This should involve follow-up with supplementary tests, clinical and follow-up investigation and post-mortem examination in to collect diagnostic material from the original sampling epidemiological unit as well as and herds which may be epidemiologically linked to it.~~

Laboratory results should be examined in the context of the epidemiological situation.

Article 11.5.14.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.14._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.

Methods of surveillance

1. Clinical surveillance

Clinical *surveillance* aims at detecting clinical signs of CBPP in a *herd* by ~~close a thorough~~ physical examination of ~~susceptible animals~~ bovines. Clinical inspection is an important component of CBPP *surveillance* contributing to reaching the desired level of confidence of detection of disease if a sufficiently large number of ~~clinically susceptible animals~~ bovines ~~is are~~ examined.

~~Clinical surveillance and laboratory testing should always be applied in series to clarify the status of CBPP suspects detected by either of these complementary diagnostic approaches. Laboratory testing and post-mortem examination may contribute to confirm clinical suspicion, while clinical surveillance may contribute to confirmation of positive serology. Any sampling unit within which suspicious animals are detected should be classified as infected until contrary evidence is produced.~~

3. Pathological surveillance

Systematic pathological *surveillance* for CBPP is the most effective approach and should be conducted at ~~slaughterhouses/abattoirs and other slaughter facilities~~. Suspect pathological findings should be confirmed by agent identification. Training courses for *slaughter* personnel and *meat* inspectors are highly recommended.

4. Serological 3. Laboratory testing

Serological *surveillance* is not the preferred strategy for CBPP. However, in the framework of epidemiological investigations, serological testing may be used.

The limitations of available serological tests for CBPP make the interpretation of results difficult and useful only at the *herd* level. Positive findings should be followed up by clinical and pathological investigations and agent identification.

Clustering of seropositive reactions should be expected in CBPP ~~infections~~ and is usually accompanied by clinical signs. As clustering may signal field strain *infection*, the investigation of all instances should be incorporated into the *surveillance* strategy.

Following the identification of a CBPP infected *herd*, contact *herds* should be tested serologically. Repeated testing may be necessary to reach an acceptable level of confidence in *herd* classification.

5. Agent surveillance

Agent *surveillance* should be conducted to ~~follow up and~~ confirm or exclude *infection with Mmm* ~~suspect cases~~. Isolates should be typed to confirm ~~MmmSC~~.

Article 11.5.16.

Countries or zones applying for recognition of freedom from CBPP

In addition to the general conditions described in this chapter, a Member Country applying for recognition of CBPP freedom for the country or a *zone* should provide evidence for the existence of an effective *surveillance* programme. The strategy and design of the *surveillance* programme depend on the prevailing epidemiological circumstances and should be planned and implemented in accordance with general conditions and methods in this chapter, to demonstrate absence of CBPP *infection*, during the preceding 24 months in susceptible populations. This requires the support of a national or other *laboratory* able to undertake identification of CBPP *infection*.

Article 11.5.17.

Countries or zones re-applying for recognition of freedom from CBPP following an outbreak

In addition to the general conditions described in this chapter, a Member Country re-applying for recognition of country or zone freedom from CBPP should show evidence of an active *surveillance* programme for CBPP, following the recommendations of this chapter.

Two strategies are recognised by WOAH in a programme to eradicate CBPP *infection* following an *outbreak*:

- 1) *slaughter* of all clinically affected and in contact susceptible animals;
- 2) *vaccination* used without subsequent *slaughter* of vaccinated animals.

The time periods before which an application can be made for re-instatement of freedom from CBPP depends on which of these alternatives is followed. The time periods are prescribed in Article 11.5.4.

Article 11.5.1548.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.5.15._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees with the proposed amendments.	Noted.

WOAH endorsed official control programme for CBPP

The overall objective of a WOAH endorsed *official control programme* for CBPP is for Member Countries to progressively improve their situation and eventually attain CBPP free status. The *official control programme* should be applicable to the entire country even if certain measures are directed towards defined subpopulations.

A Member Country~~ies~~ may, on a voluntary basis, apply for endorsement of ~~their~~ its *official control programme* for CBPP in accordance with Chapter 1.6., when ~~they have~~ it has implemented measures in accordance with this article.

For an *official control programme* for CBPP to be endorsed by WOAH, the Member Country should provide a detailed official control programme for the control and eventual eradication of CBPP in the country or zone. This document should address and provide documented evidence on the following:

- 1) epidemiology:
 - a) the detailed epidemiological situation of CBPP in the country, highlighting the current knowledge and gaps;
 - b) the main production systems and movement patterns of susceptible animals- bovines and their products within and into the country and, where applicable, the specific zone;
- 2) surveillance and diagnostic capabilities:
 - a) CBPP surveillance in place, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14.;
 - b) diagnostic capability and procedures, including regular submission of samples to a laboratory that performs diagnostic testing and further characterisation of strains in accordance with the *Terrestrial Manual* including procedures to isolate and identify *Mmm*;
- 3) vaccination (if practised as part of the official control programme for CBPP):
 - a) vaccination is in accordance with Chapter 4.18. and compulsory in the target population;
 - b) detailed information on vaccination campaigns, in particular:
 - i) the strategy that is adopted for the vaccination campaign;

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- ii) target populations for vaccination;
 - iii) target geographical area for vaccination;
 - iv) monitoring of vaccination coverage, including serological monitoring of population immunity;
 - v) the strategy to identify vaccinated animals;
 - vi) technical specification of the vaccines used and description of the vaccine licensing procedures in place;
 - vii) use of vaccines fully compliant with the standards and methods described in the *Terrestrial Manual*;
 - viii) the proposed strategy and work plan including the timeline for transition to the cessation of vaccination;
- 4) the measures implemented to prevent the introduction of the pathogenic agent and to ensure the rapid detection of all CBPP outbreaks;
 - 5) an emergency preparedness plan and an emergency response plan to be implemented in case of CBPP outbreaks;
 - 6) work plan and timelines of the official control programme;
 - 7) performance indicators for assessing the effectiveness of the control measures to be implemented;
 - 8) monitoring, evaluation and review of the official control programme to demonstrate the effectiveness of the strategies.
- 1) ~~have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1.;~~
 - 2) ~~submit documented evidence of the capacity of Veterinary Services to control CBPP; this evidence can be provided by countries following the WOAH PVS Pathway;~~
 - 3) ~~submit a detailed plan of the programme to control and eventually eradicate CBPP in the country or zone including:~~
 - a) ~~the timeline;~~
 - b) ~~the performance indicators for assessing the efficacy of the control measures to be implemented;~~
 - c) ~~submit documentation indicating that the official control programme for CBPP has been implemented and is applicable to the entire territory;~~
 - 4) ~~submit a dossier on the epidemiology of CBPP in the country describing the following:~~
 - a) ~~the general epidemiology in the country highlighting the current knowledge and gaps;~~
 - b) ~~the measures to prevent introduction of infection, the rapid detection of, and response to, all CBPP outbreaks in order to reduce the incidence of CBPP outbreaks and to eliminate CBPP in at least one zone in the country;~~
 - c) ~~the main livestock production systems and movement patterns of CBPP susceptible animals and their products within and into the country;~~
 - 5) ~~submit evidence that CBPP surveillance is in place;~~
 - a) ~~taking into account provisions in Chapter 1.4. and the provisions on surveillance of this chapter;~~
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- b) ~~have diagnostic capability and procedures, including regular submission of samples to a laboratory that carries out diagnosis and further characterisation of strains in accordance with the *Terrestrial Manual* including procedures to isolate and identify *M. mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* SC as opposed to *M. mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* LC;~~
- 6) ~~where vaccination is practised as a part of the official control programme for CBPP, provide:~~
- a) ~~evidence (such as copies of legislation) that vaccination of selected populations is compulsory;~~
- b) ~~detailed information on vaccination campaigns, in particular on:~~
- i) ~~target populations for vaccination;~~
- ii) ~~monitoring of vaccination coverage;~~
- iii) ~~technical specification of the vaccines used and description of the licensing procedures in place;~~
- iv) ~~the proposed timeline and strategy for the cessation of vaccination;~~
- 7) ~~provide an emergency preparedness and contingency response plan to be implemented in case of CBPP outbreaks.~~

~~The Member Country's official control programme for CBPP will be included in the list of programmes endorsed by WOAHP only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by WOAHP.~~

~~The country will be included in the list of countries having a WOAHP endorsed official control programme for CBPP in accordance with Chapter 1.6.~~

~~Retention on the list requires an annual update on the progress of the official control programme and information on significant changes concerning the points above. Changes in the epidemiological situation and other significant events should be reported to WOAHP in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1.~~

~~WOAHP may withdraw the endorsement of the official control programme if there is evidence of:~~

- ~~– non-compliance with the timelines or performance indicators of the programme; or~~
 - ~~– significant problems with the performance of the Veterinary Services; or~~
 - ~~– an increase in the incidence of CBPP that cannot be addressed by the programme.~~
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Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.X._1	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member commends the Commission for its efforts in aligning the New Chapter 11.X, <i>Infection with Bovine Pestiviruses (Bovine Viral Diarrhoea)</i> , with terminology that reflects current scientific literature. A Member support the change done in Article 11.X.1: General provisions	Noted.
11.X._2	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member thanks the TAHSC for taking on board some of the previously submitted comments. However, a Member cannot support the currently proposed case definition and seeks its re-evaluation. Important comments are inserted in the text below.	Noted.

CHAPTER 11.X.

INFECTION WITH BOVINE PESTIVIRUSES (BOVINE VIRAL DIARRHOEA)

Article 11.X.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, bovine viral diarrhoea is defined as an *infection* of bovines (*Bos taurus*, *Bos indicus* and *Bubalus bubalis*) (hereafter ‘susceptible animals’) with bovine viral diarrhoea virus type 1 (~~pestivirus A, *Pestivirus*~~ *bovis*), type 2 (~~pestivirus B, *Pestivirus tauri*~~), and/or type 3 (~~pestivirus H, *Pestivirus brazilense*~~) (hereinafter ‘bovine pestiviruses’).

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with bovine pestiviruses:

- 1) ~~A~~ bovine pestivirus, excluding vaccine strains, has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from a ~~susceptible animal~~ bovine; or
- 2) antigen or ribonucleic acid specific to ~~a~~ bovine pestivirus, excluding vaccine strains, has been detected in a sample from a ~~susceptible animal~~ bovine.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
11.X.1._1	Category: (addition) Proposed amended text: A Member needs to reiterate its earlier comment for adding a new point 3, as follows: <u>“3) antibodies to bovine pestiviruses, that are not a consequence of vaccination, have been detected in a sample from a susceptible animal showing clinical signs consistent with bovine</u>	Did not agree, the comment was addressed previously in September 2024 Code Commission report. The Commission highlighted that the

	viral diarrhoea, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case of bovine viral diarrhoea." In addition, to make the article work correctly, we should add “; or” at the end of point 2 so that the case definition is met when fulfilling either point 1) or 2) or 3). Rationale: A Member thanks the Code Commission for considering the case definition in its 2024, 2023 and 2021 meetings. A Member takes note of the expert opinion reported in these reports. It is essential that the veterinary authorities are at the centre of the assessment when a case needs to be confirmed. The generic structure of the case definition used across chapters offers the necessary flexibility and responsibility to the veterinary authority and should be kept also for this chapter. Therefore, this case definition needs to be reviewed as it would not allow to consider as an outbreak the case when animals (maybe even sentinel animals) seroconverted to BVD. Acknowledging that these can be borderline scenarios, they should still be in the hands of the veterinary authorities to make the final decision. If this is not the case, veterinary authorities will lack flexibility to adapt their eradication programme to specific epidemiological situations. Furthermore, this is by no means an obligation for the veterinary authority to use, but rather a further possibility.	serology is not recommended for individual case confirmation in accordance with the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i>. The Commission explained that this is a definition for the purpose of notification to WOA, and the Veterinary Authorities could base their national programmes on all the relevant tests described in the <i>Manual</i>.

Standards for ~~diagnosis, diagnostic tests and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology,~~ are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1._1	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member supports the adoption of Chapter 12.1, Infection with African Horse Sickness Virus A Member appreciates the Commission's dedicated efforts in revising Chapter 12.1, Infection with African Horse Sickness Virus. By harmonizing the provisions for recognizing and maintaining free status and control programs with other disease chapters, the revisions bring much-needed clarity and consistency. The Member fully supports the adoption of this Chapter, as it provides practical guidance for managing African Horse Sickness and facilitates safe international trade.	Noted.
12.1._2	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member in general supports this revised chapter. Reference is made to the member comments in Annex 11 (CBPP chapter), that are relevant also for this chapter.	Noted.

CHAPTER 12.1.

INFECTION WITH AFRICAN HORSE SICKNESS VIRUS

Article 12.1.1.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.1._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees to the clarification of the definition of AHS infection, including the detection of AHSV-specific genes.	Noted.

General provisions

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, African horse sickness (AHS) is defined as an *infection* of equids with African horse sickness virus (AHSV).

The following defines the occurrence of an *infection* with AHSV:

- 1) AHSV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an equid ~~or a product derived from that equid;~~
or

- 2) ~~antigen or ribonucleic acid specific to AHSV has been identified-detected in a~~ samples from an equid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with AHS, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected or confirmed case; or
- 3) ~~serological evidence of active infection with AHSV by detection of seroconversion due to recent exposure to with production of antibodies against structural or nonstructural proteins of AHSV, that are which is not a the consequence of vaccination, have has been identified-detected in a paired samples from an equid that either showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with AHS, or is epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected or confirmed case.~~

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *infective period* for AHS is 40 days, ~~for domestic horses. Although critical information is lacking for some species, this chapter applies to all Equidae.~~

All countries or zones adjacent to a country or zone not having free status should determine their AHSV status from an ongoing surveillance programme. Throughout the chapter, *surveillance* is in all cases understood as being conducted as described in Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13.

Standards for diagnosis diagnostic tests and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 12.1.1bis.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.1bis_1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted.
12.1.1bis_2	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member supports the additions to Article 12.1.1bis on Safe Commodities, specifically Points 7 (protein meal) and 8 (rendered fat). Given that African Horse Sickness (AHS) is not a zoonotic disease, its epidemiology does not include protein meal or rendered fat as transmission pathways, making their classification as safe commodities scientifically appropriate.	Noted.

Safe commodities

When authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities, Veterinary Authorities should not require any AHS-related conditions regardless of the animal health status of the exporting country or zone:

- 1) milk and milk products;
- 2) meat and meat products;
- 3) hides and skins;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.1bis_3	Category: change	Did not agree, as these products meet the

	Proposed amended text: 2) ~~meat and meat products;~~ <u>skeletal muscle meat and skeletal muscle meat products;</u> 3) ~~treated~~ hides and skins; Rationale: Firstly, WOAHS defines “meat” to include both meat and offal. African horse sickness virus is found primarily in meat and offal. The fact that dogs can be infected with this virus after consuming meat and offal containing the virus, and mosquitoes can continue to transmit the virus after biting a dog, suggests that meat and offal pose a risk of transmission and that dogs have a meaningful epidemiological role in the transmission of African horse sickness. In contrast, skeletal muscle can kill the virus during carcass acidification and maturation, and it is recommended that the term “meat and meat product” be changed to “skeletal muscle meat and skeletal muscle meat products” in the safe commodity. Secondly, although African horse fever is a non-contact epidemic and raw hides and skins themselves do not transmit the virus, raw hides and skins that have not been sterilized may carry the vector. Once the vector enters the local ecosystem, it will be difficult to prevent, control and eradicate. With global warming, the survival period of the vectors is extended and even overwinter. This has been the case with the African horse sickness outbreaks in Spain, Portugal and Morocco. In summary, raw hides and skins do not meet the definition of WOAHS safe products, and only sterilized and processed hides and skins can be used as safe commodities. Supporting evidence:  A possible role for domestic dogsickness and  African horse presentation and  Clinical  EFS2-20-e07443.pdf	criteria for a safe commodity for the vector-borne disease of equids. The rationale was addressed previously in the TAHSC September 2023 report.

4) hooves:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.1bis_4	Category: (editorial) Proposed amended text: 4) ~~pezuñas;~~ <u>cascos</u> Rationale: El término correcto es casco, no pezuña. El casco es la cubierta cornea que cubre el extremo distal del pie de los equinos y se divide en tres partes: pared o tapa, palma o suela, ranilla y corion. Supporting evidence, if relevant:  Ch 12.1_Supporting evidence.pdf	Agreed, and amended the Spanish version.

5) gelatine and collagen;

6) sterile filtered horse serum;

7) protein meal;

8) rendered fat.

Article 12.1.2.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.2._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted.

AHS free ~~c~~Country or zone free from AHS

- 4) A country or zone may be considered free from AHS when the relevant provisions in point 2 a) of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with, and when within the proposed free country or zone: infection with AHSV is notifiable in the whole country, systematic vaccination is prohibited, importation of equids and their semen, oocytes or embryos are carried out in accordance with this chapter, and either:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.2._2	Category: Deletion Proposed amended text: A country or zone may be considered free from AHS when <u>the relevant provisions in point 2 a) of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with, and when within the proposed free country or zone:</u> Rationale: Clarity. Including 'relevant' makes the requirements unclear. i.e. are all the provisions or which provisions are required is not clear to the reader. We understand that all provisions are required. We note 'relevant' has been removed from the proposed point 2 of Article 12.1.2. provided below: Retention on the list requires <u>annual reconfirmation of compliance with all points above and relevant provisions under point 4 of Article 1.4.6. that</u>	Did not agree, as it applies depending on the disease and country.

- 1) for at least the past 24 months:

- a) the Veterinary Authority has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domestic and captive wild equids in the country or zone;
- b) the Veterinary Authority has current knowledge of the distribution, habitat and indication of disease occurrence through passive surveillance of wild and feral equids in the country or zone;
- c) either:

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- ~~i) there has been no case of infection with AHSV and the country or zone is not adjacent to an infected country or zone; or~~
 - ~~ii) a surveillance programme has demonstrated no evidence of *Culicoides* in accordance with Chapter 1.6.;~~
 - d) appropriate surveillance has been implemented in accordance with:
 - i) point 2 b) of Article 1.4.6. where historical freedom can be demonstrated; or
 - ii) Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13. where historical freedom cannot be demonstrated; or
 - iii) Chapter 1.5. where a surveillance programme has demonstrated no evidence of *Culicoides*.
 - e) if adjacent to an infected country or zone, includes an area in which surveillance is conducted in accordance with Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13.;
 - f) measures to prevent the introduction of the infection have been in place: in particular, the importations or movements of commodities into the country or zone have been carried out in accordance with this chapter and other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*;
- 2) no systematic vaccination against AHS has been carried out for at least the past 12 months.
- a) ~~historical freedom as described in Chapter 1.4. has demonstrated no evidence of AHSV in the country or zone; or~~
 - b) ~~the country or zone has not reported any case of AHS for at least two years and is not adjacent to an infected country or zone; or~~
 - c) ~~a surveillance programme has demonstrated no evidence of AHSV in the country or zone for at least two years; or~~
 - d) ~~the country or zone has not reported any case of AHS for at least 40 days and a surveillance programme has demonstrated no evidence of *Culicoides* for at least two years in the country or zone.~~
- 2) ~~An AHS free country or zone which is adjacent to an infected country or zone should include a zone in which surveillance is conducted in accordance with Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13., as relevant.~~
- 3) ~~An AHS free country or zone will not lose its free status through the importation of seropositive or vaccinated equids and their semen, oocytes or embryos from infected countries or zones, provided these imports are carried out in accordance with this chapter.~~
- 4) ~~To qualify for inclusion in the list of AHS free countries or zones, a Member Country should:~~
- a) ~~have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting;~~
 - b) ~~send a declaration to the OIE stating:~~
 - ~~i) the section under point 1) on which the application is based;~~
 - ~~ii) no routine vaccination against AHS has been carried out during the past year in the country or zone;~~
 - ~~iii) equids are imported in accordance with this chapter;~~
 - c) ~~supply documented evidence that:~~
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- i) ~~surveillance in accordance with Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13. is applied, unless historically free in accordance with Article 1.4.6.;~~
- ii) ~~regulatory measures for the early detection, prevention and control of infection with AHSV have been implemented.~~

5) ~~The Member Country will be included in the list only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by the OIE.~~

The country or zone will be included in the list of countries or zones free from AHS in accordance with Chapter 1.6.

Retention on the list requires annual reconfirmation of compliance with all points above and relevant provisions under point 4 of Article 1.4.6. that the information in points 4 b) ii) and iii) and 4 c) above be annually re-submitted and Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for point 1 above. Any changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be reported notified to WOAHA in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1., and in particular, formally state that:

- a) ~~there has been no outbreak of AHS during the past year in the country or zone;~~
- b) ~~no evidence of infection with AHSV has been found during the past year in the country or zone.~~

Article 12.1.3.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.3._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted.

AHS infected country or zone infected with AHSV

A country or zone shall be considered as infected with AHSV. For the purposes of this chapter, an AHS infected country or zone is one that does not fulfil when the requirements for acceptance as a country or zone free from AHS are not fulfilled to qualify as AHS free.

Article 12.1.4.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.4._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted.

Establishment of a containment zone within a country or zone previously free from AHS

In the event of limited outbreaks of AHS within an AHS free country or zone previously free from AHS, including within a protection zone, a single containment zone, which includes all epidemiologically linked outbreaks, can may be established, in accordance with Article 4.4.7., for the purpose of to minimising the impact on the entire rest of the country or zone. Such a zone should include all cases and can be established within a protection zone.

For this to be achieved and for the Member Country to take full advantage of this process, the Veterinary Authority should provide submit as soon as possible to WOAHA, in addition to the requirements of Article 4.4.7., in support of the application, documented evidence that:

- 1) the outbreaks have been contained ~~are limited~~ based on the following factors:
- a) ~~immediately on suspicion, a rapid response has been implemented, including notification reporting, standstill of movements of equids and effective controls of the movements of equine commodities has been made~~ on suspicion, a standstill has been imposed on the suspected *establishments* and effective controls on the movement of equids~~animals~~ and other equid-related *commodities* are in place in the country or zone;
- b) the infection has been confirmed and notified in accordance with Chapter 1.1.;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.4._2	Category: Deletion. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): <u>the infection has been confirmed and notified in accordance with Chapter 1.1.;</u> Rationale: There is no need for the Veterinary Authority to submit to WOAHS documented evidence that it has notified WOAHS.	Did not agree. Although correct notification is not a condition per se for zoning, it is a prerequisite for its acceptance.

- cb) ~~standstill of movements of equids has been imposed, and effective controls on the movement of equids and their products specified in this chapter are in place~~ on confirmation, the standstill and movement controls described in point 4(a) have been reinforced;
- c) ~~epidemiological investigation (trace-back, trace-forward) has been completed;~~
- ed) ~~the infection has been confirmed and notified in accordance with Chapter 1.1.;~~
- de) epidemiological investigations ~~on~~ into the likely source of the *outbreak* have been carried out;
- f) ~~all cases have been shown to be epidemiologically linked;~~
- eg) no new cases have been found in the *containment zone* within a minimum of two *infective periods* as defined in Article 12.1.1.;
- 2) ~~the equids within the containment zone are clearly identifiable as belonging to the containment zone;~~
- 2) increased passive and targeted *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13. in the rest of the country or zone has not detected any evidence of *infection*;
- 3) ~~animal health~~ measures are in place to effectively prevent the spread of AHSV *infection* to the rest of the country or zone, taking into consideration the establishment of a *protection zone* within the *containment zone*, the seasonal *vector* conditions and existing physical, geographical and ecological barriers;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.4._3	Category: Deletion. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): ~~animal health~~ measures are in place to effectively prevent the spread of AHSV <u>infection</u> to the rest of the country or zone, taking into consideration the establishment of a <i>protection zone</i> within the <i>containment zone</i> , the seasonal <i>vector</i> conditions and existing physical, geographical and ecological barriers;	Agreed.

	Rationale: AHS is defined as infection of equids with AHSV infection.	

4) ongoing *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13. is in place in the *containment zone*.

~~The free status of the areas outside the *containment zone* is suspended while the *containment zone* is being established in accordance with points 1) to 5) above. The free status of the areas of outside the *containment zone* is suspended while the *containment zone* is being established. The free status of these areas outside the *containment zone* may be reinstated irrespective of Article 12.1.5. once the *containment zone* has been approved is recognised by the-WOAH as complying with points 1 to 4 above.~~

In the event of the recurrence of *AHSV infection with AHSV* in the *containment zone*, established in accordance with point 4 a) of Article 4.4.7., the approval of the *containment zone* is withdrawn and the *AHS-free status* of the whole country or *zone* is suspended until the relevant requirements of Article 12.1.5. are fulfilled.

In the event of occurrence of *infection with AHSV* in the outer zone of a *containment zone* established in accordance with point 4 b) of Article 4.4.7., the approval of the *containment zone* is withdrawn and the free status of the whole country or *zone* is suspended until the relevant requirements of Article 12.1.5. are fulfilled.

The recovery of the *AHS* free status of the *containment zone* should follow Article 12.1.5.

Article 12.1.5.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.5._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted.

Recovery of free status

~~To regain free status when an *AHS outbreak* occurs in a country or *zone* previously free, Article 12.1.2. applies, irrespective of whether emergency *vaccination* has been applied or not.~~

Should an *outbreak* of *AHS* occur in a previously free country or *zone*, its status may be recovered in accordance with Article 12.1.2., irrespective of whether emergency *vaccination* has been applied or not.

The *AHS* free status of the country or *zone* will be reinstated only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by the-WOAH.

Article 12.1.6.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.6._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted.

Recommendations for importation of equids from *AHS* free countries or zones

For equids

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of AHS on the day of shipment;
- 2) have not been vaccinated against AHS within the last 40 days;
- 3) were kept in an AHS free country or *zone* since birth or for at least 40 days prior to shipment;
- 4) either:
 - a) did not transit through an infected *zone* during transportation to the *place of shipment*; or
 - b) were protected from *Culicoides* attacks at all times when transiting through an infected *zone*.

Article 12.1.7.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.7._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted.

Recommendations for importation of equids from AHS infected countries or zones

For equids

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of AHS on the day of shipment;
- 2) have not been vaccinated against AHS within the last 40 days;
- 3) were held in isolation in a *vector*-protected *establishment*:
 - a) for a period of at least 28 days and a serological test to detect antibodies against the AHSV-group, was carried out with a negative result on a blood sample collected at least 28 days after introduction into the *vector*-protected *establishment*; or
 - b) for a period of at least 40 days and serological tests to detect antibodies against AHSV were carried out with no significant increase in antibody titre on blood samples collected on two occasions, with an interval of not less than 21 days, the first sample being collected at least 7 days after introduction into the *vector*-protected *establishment*; or
 - c) for a period of at least 14 days and an agent identification test for the identification-detection of the agent was carried out with a negative result on a blood sample collected not less than 14 days after introduction into the *vector*-protected *establishment*; or
 - d) for a period of at least 40 days and were vaccinated, at least 40 days before shipment, against all serotypes whose presence in the source population has been demonstrated through a *surveillance* programme in accordance with Articles 12.1.12. and 12.1.13., and were identified in the accompanying certification as having been vaccinated;

- 4) were protected from *Culicoides* attacks at all times during transportation (including transportation to and at the place of shipment).

Article 12.1.8.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.8._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted.

Recommendations for the importation of equine semen

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the donor animals:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.8._2	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): <i>Veterinary Authorities of importing countries</i> should require the presentation of an <i>international veterinary certificate</i> attesting that the donor ~~animals~~ <u>equids</u> : Rationale: AHSV infection only applies to equids as defined at the beginning of the chapter, so attestations are only required for equids.	Did not agree, as written for consistency and in line with the 'Framework for Terrestrial Code standards (disease-specific chapters).

- 1) showed no clinical sign of AHS on the day of collection of the semen and for the following 40 days;
- 2) had not been ~~immunised~~ vaccinated against AHS with a live attenuated vaccine within 40 days prior to the day of collection;
- 3) were either:
 - a) kept in an AHS free country or zone for at least 40 days before commencement of, and during collection of the semen; or
 - b) kept in an AHS free *vector*-protected *artificial insemination centre* throughout the collection period, and subjected to either:
 - i) a serological test to detect antibodies against ~~the AHSV group~~, carried out with a negative result on a blood sample collected at least 28 days and not more than 90 days after the last collection of semen; or
 - ii) ~~agent identification tests for the identification-detection of the agent~~, carried out with negative results on blood samples collected at commencement and conclusion of, and at least every seven days, during semen collection for this consignment.

Article 12.1.9.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.9._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted.

Recommendations for the importation of *in vivo* derived equine oocytes or embryos

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

1) the donor animals:

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.9._2	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): the donor ~~animals~~ <u>equids</u> : Rationale: AHSV infection only applies to equids as defined at the beginning of the chapter, so attestations are only required for equids.	Did not agree, as addressed above [12.1.8._2].

- a) showed no clinical sign of AHS on the day of collection of the oocytes or embryos and for the following 40 days;
- b) had not been ~~immunised~~ vaccinated against AHS with a live attenuated vaccine within 40 days prior to the day of collection;
- c) were either:
 - i) kept in an AHS free country or *zone* for at least 40 days before commencement of, and during collection of the oocytes or embryos, or
 - ii) kept in an AHS free *vector-protected collection centre* throughout the collection period, and subjected to either:
 - a serological test to detect antibodies against the AHSV ~~group~~ carried out with a negative result on a blood sample collected at least 28 days and not more than 90 days after the last collection of oocytes or embryos; or
 - ~~agent identification tests for the identification-detection of the agent~~ carried out with negative results on blood samples collected at commencement and conclusion of, and at least every seven days during oocytes or embryos collection for this consignment;
- 2) the embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8. and 4.10., as relevant;
- 3) the semen used to fertilise the oocytes complies **at least** with the requirements in Article 12.1.8.

Article 12.1.10.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.10._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted.

Protecting animals from *Culicoides* attacks

1. Vector-protected establishment or facility

The *establishment* or facility should be approved by the *Veterinary Authority* and the means of protection should at least comprise the following:

- appropriate physical barriers at entry and exit points, for example double-door entry-exit system;
- openings of the building are *vector* screened with mesh of appropriate gauge impregnated regularly with an approved insecticide in accordance with the instructions of the manufacturer;
- vector surveillance* and control within and around the building;
- measures to limit or eliminate breeding sites for *vectors* in the vicinity of the *establishment* or facility;
- ~~S~~standard ~~O~~perating ~~P~~rocedure, including description of back-up and alarm systems, for operation of the *establishment* or facility and transport of equids to the place of *loading*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.10._2	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): - appropriate physical barriers at entry and exit points, for example, <u>a</u> double-door entry-exit system; <u>vector screening of</u> openings of the <u>establishment or facility</u> ~~building are vector screened~~ with mesh of appropriate gauge impregnated regularly with an approved insecticide in accordance with the instructions of the manufacturer; <i>vector surveillance</i> and control within and around the <u>building establishment or facility</u>; - measures to limit or eliminate breeding sites for <i>vectors</i> in <u>the</u> vicinity of the <i>establishment</i> or facility; <u>a</u> ~~S~~standard ~~O~~perating ~~P~~rocedure, including <u>a</u> description of back-up and alarm systems, for operation of the <i>establishment</i> or facility and transport of equids to the place of <i>loading</i>. Rationale: For grammar and readability. Also, the term establishment or facility is defined above, and should be used consistently throughout.	- Agreed. - Agreed. - Agreed. - Agreed.

2. During transportation

When ~~equids are transported~~ ~~equids~~ through AHS infected countries or zones, *Veterinary Authorities* should require ~~that they are strategies to protect~~ animals from *Culicoides* attacks ~~during transport~~, taking into account the local ecology of the *vector*.

a) Transport by ~~road~~ land

Potential *risk management* strategies include a combination of:

- i) treating animals with chemical repellents prior to and during transportation, in sanitized *vehicles* treated with appropriate residual contact insecticide;
- ii) *loading*, transporting and *unloading* animals at times of low *vector* activity (i.e. bright sunshine and low temperature);
- iii) ensuring *vehicles* do not stop en route during dawn or dusk, or overnight, unless the *animals* are held behind insect-proof netting;
- iv) darkening the interior of the *vehicle*, for example by covering the roof or sides of *vehicles* with shade cloth;
- v) surveillance for *vectors* at common stopping and offloading points to gain information on seasonal variations;
- vi) using historical, ongoing or modelling information on AHS to identify low-risk ports and transport routes.

b) Transport by air

Prior to *loading* the equids, the crates, *containers* or jet stalls are sprayed with an insecticide approved in the country of dispatch.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.10._3	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): Prior to <i>loading</i> the equids, the crates, <i>containers</i> or jet stalls are sprayed with an insecticide approved <u>for the control of <i>Culicoides</i> species</u> in the country of dispatch. Rationale: Suggestion to include "for the control of <i>Culicoides</i> species" to encourage effective vector control, since AHS is transmitted by some species of <i>Culicoides</i> and research suggests variation in the effectiveness of different insecticides against <i>Culicoides</i> species. Supporting evidence: https://resjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1365-2915.2008.00743.x Control techniques for <i>Culicoides</i> biting midges and their application in the U.K. and northwestern Palaeartic - CARPENTER - 2008 - Medical and Veterinary Entomology - Wiley Online Library	Agreed.

Crates, *containers* or jet stalls in which equids are being transported and the cargo hold of the aircraft should be sprayed with an approved insecticide when the doors have been closed and prior to take off. All possible insect harbourage should be treated. The insecticide sprayers containers should be retained for inspection on arrival.

In addition, during any stopover in countries or zones not free from infected with AHSV, prior to the opening of any aircraft door and until all doors are closed, netting of appropriate gauge impregnated with an approved insecticide should be placed over all crates, *containers* or jet stalls.

Article 12.1.11.

Introduction to surveillance

Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13. define the principles and provide guidance on *surveillance* for AHS, complementary to Chapter 1.4. and, for *vectors*, complementary to Chapter 1.5.

AHS is a *vector-borne infection* transmitted by a limited number of some species of *Culicoides* insects. Unlike the related bluetongue virus, AHSV is so far geographically restricted to sub-Saharan Africa with periodic excursions into North Africa, southwest Europe, the Middle East and adjacent regions of Asia. An important component of AHSV epidemiology is vectorial capacity which provides a measure of disease *risk* that incorporates *vector* competence, abundance, seasonal incidence, biting rates, survival rates and the extrinsic incubation period. However, methods and tools for measuring some of these *vector* factors remain to be developed, particularly in a field context.

According to this chapter, a Member Country demonstrating freedom from *infection* with AHSV for the entire country or a *zone* should provide evidence for the existence of an effective *surveillance* programme. The strategy and design of the *surveillance* programme will depend on the prevailing epidemiological circumstances and should be planned and implemented in accordance with general conditions and methods described in this chapter. This requires the support of a *laboratory* able to undertake identification of *infection* with AHSV through the virus detection tests for the detection of the agent and antibody detection tests.

Susceptible *captive wild*, *feral* and *wild* equine populations should be included in the *surveillance* programme.

The purpose of *surveillance* is to determine if whether a country or *zone* is free from AHS. *Surveillance* deals not only with the occurrence of clinical signs caused by AHSV, but also with evidence of *infection* with AHSV in the absence of clinical signs.

Article 12.1.12.

General conditions and methods for surveillance

- 1) A *surveillance* system should be under the responsibility of the *Veterinary Authority*. In particular the following should be in place:
 - a) a formal and ongoing system for detecting and investigating *outbreaks* of disease;
 - b) a procedure for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspected cases of AHS to a *laboratory* for diagnosis;
 - c) a system for recording, managing and analysing diagnostic, epidemiological and *surveillance* data.
- 2) In a free country or *zone*, the *surveillance* programme for AHS should include an *early warning system* for reporting suspected cases. Persons who have regular contact with equids, as well as diagnosticians, should report promptly any suspicion of AHS to the *Veterinary Authority*. An effective *surveillance* system will periodically identify suspected cases that require follow-up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is AHS. The rate at which such suspected cases are likely to occur will differ between among epidemiological situations and cannot therefore be predicted reliably. All suspected cases of AHS

should be investigated immediately and samples should be taken and submitted to a *laboratory*. This requires that sampling kits and other equipment be available to those responsible for *surveillance*.

- 3) In a free country or zone bordering adjacent to an infected country or zone, surveillance based upon taking into account geography, climate, history of *infection* and other relevant factors should be carried out over an appropriate distance of at least 100 kilometres from the border with the infected country or zone; a lesser distance could be acceptable if there are relevant ecological or geographical features likely to interrupt the transmission of AHSV.
- 4) In an AHS infected country or zone, random or targeted serological and virological *surveillance*, appropriate to the epidemiological situation, should be conducted in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

Article 12.1.13.

Surveillance strategies

The target population for *surveillance* aimed at identification of disease or *infection* should cover equids within the country or zone. Active and passive surveillance for *infection* with AHSV should be ongoing in all countries, while active surveillance should be ongoing in countries not having a free status or having identified specific risks of introduction. Surveillance should be composed of random or targeted approaches using virological, serological and clinical methods appropriate to the epidemiological situation.

A Member Country should justify the *surveillance* strategy chosen as appropriate to detect the presence of *infection* with AHSV in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and the prevailing epidemiological situation. It may, for example, be appropriate to target clinical *surveillance* at particular towards those species most likely to exhibit clinical signs (e.g. horses). Similarly, virological and serological testing may be targeted to towards species that rarely show clinical signs (e.g. donkeys).

In vaccinated populations serological and virological *surveillance* is necessary to detect the AHSV types circulating to ensure that all circulating types are included in the *vaccination* programme.

Serological or virological surveillance is also needed to detect subclinical infections in free countries or zones adjacent to countries or zones in which live attenuated AHS vaccines are used.

For random surveys, the design of the sampling strategy should incorporate epidemiologically appropriate design prevalence. The sample size selected for testing should be large enough to detect *infection* if it were to occur at a predetermined minimum rate. The sample size, expected prevalence and diagnostic sensitivity of the tests determine the level of confidence in the results of the survey. The Member Country should justify the choice of design prevalence and confidence level based on the objectives of *surveillance* and the epidemiological situation, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Selection of the design prevalence, in particular, should be based on the prevailing or historical epidemiological situation.

Irrespective of the survey approach selected, the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests employed are key factors in the design, sample size determination and interpretation of the results obtained. Ideally, the sensitivity and specificity of the tests used should be validated for the *vaccination* or *infection* history and the different species in the target population.

Irrespective of the testing system employed, *surveillance* system design should anticipate the occurrence of false positive reactions. If the characteristics of the testing system are known, the rate at which these false positives are likely to occur can be calculated in advance. There should be an effective procedure for following up positives to ultimately determine with a high level of confidence, whether they are indicative of *infection* or not. This should involve both supplementary tests and follow-up investigation to collect diagnostic material from the original sampling unit as well as those which may be epidemiologically linked to it.

The principles for *surveillance* for disease or *infection* are technically well defined. *Surveillance* programmes to prove the absence of AHSV *infection* or transmission, should be carefully designed to avoid producing results that are

insufficiently reliable to be accepted by WOAHP for official recognition of status. The design of any *surveillance* programme, therefore, requires inputs from professionals competent and experienced in this field.

1. Clinical surveillance

Clinical *surveillance* aims at the detection of clinical signs of AHS in equids particularly during a newly introduced *infection*. In horses, clinical signs may include pyrexia, oedema, hyperaemia of mucous membranes and dyspnoea.

Suspected cases detected by clinical *surveillance* should always be confirmed by *laboratory* testing.

2. Serological surveillance

Serological *surveillance* of equine populations is an important tool to confirm absence of AHSV transmission in a country or *zone*. The species tested should reflect the local epidemiology of *infection* with AHSV, and the equine species available. Surveillance plans should include consideration of species that display clinical signs less commonly, such as donkeys or zebra. Management variables that may reduce the likelihood of *infection*, such as the use of insecticides and animal housing, should be taken into account when selecting equids to be included in the *surveillance* system.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.13._1	Category: Editorial. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): Serological <i>surveillance</i> of equine populations is an important tool to confirm absence of AHSV transmission in a country or <i>zone</i>. The species tested should reflect the local epidemiology of <i>infection</i> with AHSV, and the equine species available. <u>Surveillance plans should include consideration of species that display clinical signs less commonly, such as donkeys or zebras.</u> Management variables that may reduce the likelihood of <i>infection</i>, such as the use of insecticides and animal housing, should be taken into account when selecting equids to be included in the <i>surveillance</i> system. Rationale: Grammar edit: Agreement with plural for donkey.	Agreed.

Samples should be examined for antibodies against AHSV. Positive AHSV antibody tests results can have four possible causes:

- a) natural *infection* with AHSV;
- b) *vaccination* against AHS;
- c) maternal antibodies;
- d) lack of specificity of the test.

Sera collected for other purposes may be used for AHSV *surveillance*. However, the principles of survey design described in these recommendations and the requirements for a statistically valid survey for the presence of *infection* with AHSV should not be compromised.

The results of random or targeted serological surveys are important in providing reliable evidence that no *infection* with AHSV is present in a country or *zone*. It is, therefore, essential that the survey is thoroughly documented. It is critical to interpret the results in light of the movement history of the animals being sampled.

Serological *surveillance* in a free *zone* should target those areas that are at highest risk of AHSV transmission, based on the results of previous *surveillance* and other information. This will usually be towards the boundaries of the free *zone*. In view of the epidemiology of AHSV, either random or targeted sampling is suitable to select *herds* or animals for testing.

~~Serological *surveillance* in a free country or *zone* should be carried out over an appropriate distance from the border with an infected country or *zone*, based upon geography, climate, history of *infection* and other relevant factors. The *surveillance* should be carried out over a distance of at least 100 kilometres from the border with that country or *zone*, but a lesser distance could be acceptable if there are relevant ecological or geographical features likely to interrupt the transmission of AHSV. An AHS free country or *zone* may be protected from an adjacent infected country or *zone* by a *protection zone*.~~

Serological *surveillance* in infected *zones* will identify changes in support the definition of the boundaries of the an infected zone, and can also be used to identify the AHSV types circulating. In view of the epidemiology of *infection* with AHSV, either random or targeted sampling is suitable.

3. Virological surveillance

Isolation and genetic analysis of AHSV from a proportion of infected animals is beneficial in terms of providing information on serotype and genetic characteristics of the viruses concerned.

Virological *surveillance* can be conducted:

- a) to identify virus transmission in ~~at-at-risk~~ populations;
- b) to confirm clinically suspected cases;
- c) to follow up positive serological results;
- d) to better characterise the genotype of circulating virus in a country or *zone*.

4. Sentinel animals

Sentinel animals **programmes** are a form of targeted *surveillance* with a prospective study design. They comprise groups of unexposed equids that have not been vaccinated and are managed at fixed locations and observed and tested regularly to detect new *infections* with AHSV.

The primary purpose of a sentinel **equid animal** programme is to detect *infections* with AHSV occurring at a particular place, for instance sentinel groups may be located on the boundaries of infected *zones* to detect changes in distribution of AHSV. In addition, sentinel equid programmes allow the timing and dynamics of *infections* to be observed.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.13. 2	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): The primary purpose of a sentinel equid animal programme is to detect <i>infections</i> with AHSV occurring at a particular place, for instance sentinel groups may be located on the boundaries of infected <i>zones</i> to detect changes in distribution of AHSV. In addition, sentinel equid animal programmes allow the timing and dynamics of <i>infections</i> to be observed. Rationale: Consistency with the rest of the section.	Agreed.

A sentinel **equine animal** programme should use animals of known source and history of exposure, control management variables such as use of insecticides and animal housing (depending on the epidemiology of AHSV in the area under consideration), and be flexible in its design in terms of sampling frequency and choice of tests.

Care is necessary in choosing the sites for the sentinel groups. The aim is to maximise the chance of detecting AHSV activity at the geographical location for which the sentinel site acts as a sampling point. The effect of secondary factors that may influence events at each location, such as climate, may also be analysed. To avoid confounding factors sentinel groups should comprise animals selected to be of similar age and susceptibility to *infection* with AHSV. The only feature distinguishing groups of sentinels should be their geographical location. Sera from sentinel animal programmes should be stored methodically in a serum bank to allow retrospective studies to be conducted in the event of new serotypes being isolated.

The frequency of sampling should reflect the equine species used and the reason for choosing the sampling site. In endemic areas virus isolation will allow monitoring of the serotypes and genotypes of AHSV circulating during each time period. The borders between infected and non-infected areas can be defined by serological detection of *infection*. Monthly sampling intervals are frequently used. Sentinels in declared free zones add to confidence that *infections* with AHSV are not occurring unobserved. Here sampling prior to and after the possible period of transmission is sufficient.

Definitive information on AHSV circulating in a country or zone is provided by isolation and identification of the viruses. If virus isolation is required sentinels should be sampled at sufficiently frequent intervals to ensure that some samples are collected during the period of viraemia.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.13._3	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): Definitive information on AHSV circulating in a country or zone is provided by isolation and identification of the viruses. If virus isolation is required, sentinels should be sampled at sufficiently frequent intervals to ensure that some samples are collected during the period of viraemia. Rationale: Addition of comma to separate clause.	Agreed.

5. Vector surveillance

AHSV is transmitted between equids **and hosts** by species of *Culicoides* which vary across the world. It is therefore important to be able to identify potential *vector* species accurately although many such species are closely related and difficult to differentiate with certainty.

Vector surveillance is aimed at demonstrating the absence of *vectors* or defining high, medium and low-risk areas and local details of seasonality by determining the various species present in an area, and their respective seasonal occurrence, and abundance. *Vector surveillance* has particular relevance to potential areas of spread. Long term *surveillance* can also be used to assess *vector* abatement measures or to confirm continued absence of *vectors*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.13._4	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): <i>Vector surveillance</i> is aimed at demonstrating the absence of <i>vectors</i> or defining high, medium and low-risk areas and local details	Did not agree, but the text was amended for clarity.

	of seasonality by determining the various species present in an area, <u>and</u> their respective seasonal occurrence, and <u>their</u> abundance. <i>Vector surveillance</i> has particular relevance to potential areas of spread. Long term <i>surveillance</i> can also be used to assess <u>the effectiveness of</u> vector abatement measures or to confirm continued absence of <i>vectors</i>. Rationale: Grammer edits for consistency. Suggestion to include "the effectiveness of" to clarify that the goal is successful vector abatement which long term surveillance helps us assess. Supporting evidence: Global vector control response: progress in planning and implementation The Role of Surveillance in Interventions Directed Against Vector-Borne Disease - Spielman - 1999 - Ecosystem Health - Wiley Online Library	

The most effective way of gathering this information should take account of the biology and behavioural characteristics of the local *vector* species of *Culicoides* and may include the use of Onderstepoort-type light traps or similar, operated from dusk to dawn in locations adjacent to equids.

Vector surveillance should be based on scientific sampling techniques. The choice of the number and types of traps to be used in *vector surveillance* and the frequency of their use should take into account the size and ecological characteristics of the area to be surveyed.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.1.13._5	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): <i>Vector surveillance</i> should be based on scientific sampling techniques. The choice of the number and types of traps to be used in <i>vector surveillance</i> and the frequency of their use should take into account the <u>biology of the target species and the</u> size and ecological characteristics of the area to be surveyed. Rationale: Suggestion to add "biology of the target species and the" when noting considerations for vector surveillance since research suggests effective capture techniques may vary for different species of <i>Culicoides</i>. Supporting evidence: https://parasitesandvectors.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13071-021-05059-9 https://academic.oup.com/jinsectscience/article/20/6/2/5948078	Agreed, but the text amended differently for clarity.

The operation of *vector surveillance* sites at the same locations as sentinel animals is advisable.

The use of a *vector surveillance* system to detect the presence of circulating viruses is not recommended as a routine procedure ~~as because~~ the typically low *vector infection* rates mean that such detections can be rare. Animal-based *surveillance* strategies are preferred to detect virus transmission.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3._1	Category: General Comment Proposed amended text: Not applicable. Rationale: We thank the Code Commission for its acknowledgement (Annex 3, reference 12.3.3._2.) that once the requirements to obtain freedom are met, a country may utilise Article 1.4.6. point 4 of the Code.	Noted
12.3._2	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member thanks the Code Commission for considering its earlier comments and in general supports this revised chapter provided the comments below are considered.	Noted

CHAPTER 12.3.

INFECTION WITH *TRYPANOSOMA EQUIPERDUM* (DOURINE)

Article 12.3.1.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.1._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member agrees to the proposed change of the incubation period to 90 days.	Noted

General provisions

Dourine is a disease of equids caused by *Trypanosoma equiperdum* of the subgenus *Trypanozoon* mainly transmitted directly from animal to animal during coitus. It may also be transmitted vertically and iatrogenically. Dourine may manifest in acute, chronic or clinically inapparent forms.

After a transient blood multiplication, *T. equiperdum* invades various tissues, especially genital organs ~~and may also invade the nervous system.~~

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, dourine is defined as an *infection* of domestic and captive wild horses, donkeys, mules and hinnies (hereafter 'animal host') ~~wild equids~~ with *T. equiperdum*.

The following defines the occurrence of infection with *Trypanosoma equiperdum*:

- 1) Trypanosomes with *Trypanozoon* morphology have been observed in a sample from an animal host ~~domestic and captive wild equids~~ showing clinical signs consistent with dourine and linked to a suspected *case of infection* with *T. equiperdum* or found in an area where surra is not known to occur; or
- 2) trypanosomes with *Trypanozoon* morphology have been observed in a sample from an animal host ~~domestic and captive wild equids~~ epidemiologically linked to a confirmed *case of infection* with *T. equiperdum*; or
- 3) nucleic acid specific to *Trypanozoon* has been detected in a sample from an animal host ~~equid~~ epidemiologically linked to a confirmed *case of infection* with *T. equiperdum*; or
- 4) antibodies have been detected in a sample from an animal host ~~domestic and captive wild equids~~ epidemiologically linked to a confirmed *case of infection* with *T. equiperdum*.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *incubation period of infection* with *T. equiperdum* shall be ~~six months~~ 90 days. *Infective period* shall be lifelong.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.1._2	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): For the purposes of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>, the <i>incubation period of infection</i> with <i>T. equiperdum</i> shall be ~~six months~~ <u>90 days six months</u>. <i>Infective period</i> shall be lifelong. Rationale: Recommend changing incubation period back to six months. The reason for this change was to align all trypanosome chapters. However, dourine has a different transmission route than most trypanosomes, and a less clearly established incubation period as other trypanosomes. Six months would be a more appropriate "middle ground" for an incubation period that could last well beyond 90 days. Supporting evidence: References say a few weeks to several years: https://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/dourine.pdf https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5432633/ William, B.L and Steven, H.S., 2007. Infectious diseases of breeding stallion in: <i>Current Therapy in Large Animal Theriogenology</i> (2nd Ed.), pp. 15–23. Ahmed Tibary, ... Cheryl L. Fite, in Equine Infectious Diseases (Second Edition), 2014	Did not agree Refer to item 5.9. of the report for more explanation on this point.

For the purposes of this chapter, a temporary importation of horses refers to the introduction of horses into a country or *zone*, for a defined period of time, not exceeding 90 days, during which the *risk* of transmission of the *infection* is mitigated through specific measures under the supervision of the *Veterinary Authority*. Temporarily imported horses are re-exported at the end of this period. The duration of the temporary importation period and the destination after this period, as well as the conditions required to leave the country or *zone*, should be defined in advance.

Standards for diagnosis and information on the epidemiology are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 12.3.2.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.2._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted

Safe commodities

When authorising the import or transit of the following *commodities*, *Veterinary Authorities* should not require dourine-related conditions regardless of the *animal health status* of the *exporting country or zone*:

- 1) pasteurised *milk* and pasteurised *milk products*;
- 2) hair, ~~wool and fibre~~;
- 3) gelatine and collagen;
- 4) hooves;
- 5) *meat* from animals that have been slaughtered in a *slaughterhouse/abattoir* and have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections with favourable results;
- 6) *meat products*;
- 7) hides and skins (except raw);
- 8) embryos or oocytes collected, processed, and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8. to 4.10.;
- 9) *protein meal*;
- 10) rendered fat.

Article 12.3.3.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.3._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted

Country or zone free from dourine

A country or *zone* may be considered free from ~~infection with *T. equiperdum*~~ dourine when:

- 1) ~~the infection with *T. equiperdum*~~ is notifiable in the entire country for at least the past two years;
- 2) appropriate biosecurity and sanitary measures to prevent the introduction of the *infection* have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of ~~equids animal hosts~~ and other *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter and other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.3._2	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: <u>appropriate biosecurity and sanitary measures</u> to prevent the introduction of the <i>infection</i> have been in place <u>for at least the last two years</u>; in particular, the importations or movements of ~~equids animal hosts~~ and other <i>commodities</i> into the country or <i>zone</i> have been carried out in accordance with this chapter and other relevant chapters of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>; Rationale: The current text is not clear that import measures are required to be in place in parallel with other measures for at least 2 years to prevent the introduction or reintroduction of <i>T. equiperdum</i>. The addition provides this clarity.	Agreed, text added differently

- 3) and either:
 - a) the country or zone is historically free as described relevant provisions in point 2)b) of Article 1.4.6. ~~have been complied with~~; or
 - b) for at least the past two years, ~~there has been no case in the country or zone and~~ specific surveillance in accordance with Articles 12.3.11. to 12.3.14. has been in place in the entire country or zone and there has been no case in the country or zone.

In order to maintain its free status, a country or zone should:

- 1) comply with points 1 and 2 above; and
- 2) conduct surveillance in accordance with Articles 12.3.11. to 12.3.13.

Article 12.3.4.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.4._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted

Compartment free from dourine

The establishment and bilateral recognition of a *compartment* free from ~~infection with *T. equiperdum*~~ dourine should follow the provisions laid down in this chapter and in Chapters 4.4. and 4.5.

Article 12.3.5.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.5._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted

Recovery of free status

Should a *case* of *infection* with *T. equiperdum* occur in a previously free country or *zone*, its status may be recovered after the following:

- 1) all infected ~~equids~~ animal hosts have been either isolated and slaughtered, or killed and appropriately disposed of;
- 2) ~~equids~~ animal hosts which have been in contact with infected ~~equids~~ animal hosts were tested and all positive ~~equids~~ animal hosts were isolated and slaughtered, or killed and appropriately disposed of; and,
- 3) For six months after the last *case* was slaughtered or killed:
 - a) the ~~equids~~ animal hosts in contact have undergone monthly repeated serological and agent detection tests with negative results in both tests;
 - b) *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 12.3.11. to 12.3.14. has been carried out with negative results;
 - c) appropriate *biosecurity* has been in place.

Otherwise, Article 12.3.3. applies.

Article 12.3.6.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.6._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted

Recommendations for importation of ~~equids~~ horses, donkeys, mules and hinnies from countries, zones or compartments free from dourine

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the ~~equids~~ animal hosts:

- 1) showed no clinical signs of ~~infection with *T. equiperdum*~~ dourine on the day of shipment;

- 2) were kept since birth or at least ~~six months~~ 90 days prior to shipment in the free country, *zone* or *compartment* of origin or were imported from a free country, *zone* or *compartment*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.6._2	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): were kept since birth or at least ~~six months~~ <u>90 days</u> ~~six months~~ prior to shipment in the free country, <i>zone</i> or <i>compartment</i> of origin or were imported from a free country, <i>zone</i> or <i>compartment</i>. Rationale: Same as Article 12.3.1. Supporting evidence: Same as Article 12.3.1.	Did not agree, as this period certifies the evidence of residency of the animal. The Code Commission explained that this article states as a prerequisite that the country, zone or compartment is free from the disease, and this requirement is about residency in the free country, zone or compartment. The duration of this period is in fact not based on the incubation period. Refer to comment above on 12.3.1._2 and to item 5.9. of the report for more explanation on this point.

Article 12.3.7.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.7._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted

Recommendations for importation of ~~equids~~ horses, donkeys, mules and hinnies from countries, zones or compartments not free from dourine

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the ~~equids~~ animal hosts:

- showed no clinical signs of dourine on the day of shipment;
- for at least 45 days prior to shipment were not used for breeding (including artificial insemination, semen collection, use as teasers) and did not have any direct or indirect sexual contact with other animal hosts ~~horses~~; and

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.7._2	Category: change Proposed amended text: 2) for at least <u>45-90</u> days prior to shipment were not used for breeding (including artificial insemination, semen collection, use as teasers) and did not have any direct or indirect sexual contact with other animal hosts; and Rationale: Dourine is mainly transmitted during coitus. The restriction on using breeding prior to shipment should be in line with its 90-days incubation period of infection. supporting evidence: not relevant	Did not agree, as this period is based on the testing protocol (point 3), not the incubation period.

- 3) during this period, all ~~equids-animals~~ from the same group were subjected to an antibody detection test on samples taken on two occasions, with an interval of 30 days, with negative results.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.7._3	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): 1) showed no clinical signs of dourine <u>for 90 days before</u> ~~on~~ the day of shipment; 2) for at least <u>45-90</u> days prior to shipment were not used for breeding (including artificial insemination, semen collection, use as teasers) and did not have any direct or indirect sexual contact with other <u>animal hosts</u> ~~horses~~; and 3) during this period, all ~~equids-animals~~ from the same group were subjected to an antibody detection test on samples taken on two occasions, with an interval of <u>30-45</u> days, with negative results. Rationale: As this Article addresses regions not free of dourine, animal hosts from these areas present a risk of disease, hence these requirements should be at least as stringent as shipment from free areas. In addition, the longest known incubation period is 6 months, and a 45-day history is inadequate to detect subclinical disease that could be a risk of importation to areas that are free of dourine.	Comment addressed above (12.3.6._2 and 12.3.7._2)

Article 12.3.8.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.8._1	Category: General comment	Noted

	Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	

Recommendations for the temporary importation of horses

When importing on a temporary basis ~~for purposes other than breeding and rearing~~ horses that do not comply with the recommendations in Article 12.3.6. or Article 12.3.7., for purposes other than breeding and rearing, *Veterinary Authorities* should:

- 1) require:
 - a) that the horses be accompanied by a passport in accordance with the model contained in Chapter 5.12. or be individually identified as belonging to a high health status *subpopulation* as defined in Chapter 4.17.;
 - b) if not belonging to a high health status subpopulation, the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the horses:
 - i) showed no clinical sign of *infection* with *T. equiperdum* on the days of shipments;
 - ii) ~~if not belonging to a high health status subpopulation~~, were negative in an antibody detection test within 15 days prior to departure from the country of origin;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.8._2	Category: Change Proposed amended text: b) <u>if not belonging to a high health status subpopulation</u>, the presentation of an <i>international veterinary certificate</i> attesting that the horses: i) showed no clinical sign of <i>infection</i> with <i>T. equiperdum</i> on the days of shipments; ii) ~~if not belonging to a high health status subpopulation~~, <u>if not belonging to a high health status subpopulation</u>, were negative in an antibody detection test within 15 days prior to departure from the country of origin; Rationale: Horses from high health status subpopulations should still certify they are showing no clinical signs of infection on the days of shipment. Clinical declarations are a key risk mitigation for importing countries should a high-health status bubble breakdown.	Agreed

- c) the duration of the temporary importation period, the destination after this period, and the conditions required to leave the country or *zone* be defined;
- 2) ensure that during their stay in the country or *zone*, the horses:

- a) are not used for breeding (including artificial insemination, semen collection, use as teasers) and do not have any direct or indirect sexual contact with other horses;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.8._3	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): are not used for breeding (including artificial insemination, semen collection, use as teasers) and do not have any direct or indirect sexual contact with other horses animal hosts; Rationale: Article 12.3.1. states that for the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, dourine is defined as an infection of domestic and captive wild horses, donkeys, mules and hinnies (hereafter 'animal host').	Agreed

- b) are not subjected to any practice that may represent a risk of transmission of *infection* with *T. equiperdum*.

Article 12.3.9.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.9._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted

Recommendations for importation of semen from countries, zones or compartments free from dourine

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor males:
 - a) showed no clinical signs of *infection* with *T. equiperdum* on the day of collection of the semen;
 - b) were kept for the six months prior to semen collection in a country, zone or compartment free from dourine;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.9._2	Category: (change) Proposed amended text: "were kept for the six months 90 days prior to semen collection in a country, zone or compartment free from dourine" Rationale: Point 1) b) should be aligned with the changes brought in Articles 12.3.1. and Article 12.3.6.	Agreed, as this period is for residency.

- 2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in a *semen collection centre* accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 12.3.10.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.10._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted

Recommendations for importation of semen from countries or zones not free from dourine

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor males:
- a) have been kept for at least six months prior to semen collection in an *establishment* in which *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 12.3.11. to 12.3. 14. demonstrates that no *case of infection with T. equiperdum* had occurred during that period;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.10._2	Category: Deletion. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): have been kept for at least six months prior to semen collection in an <i>establishment</i> in which <i>surveillance</i> in accordance with Articles 12.3.11. to ~~12.3. 14.~~ <u>12.3.14.</u> demonstrates that no <i>case of infection with T. equiperdum</i> had occurred during that period; Rationale: Removed a space between “3.” And 14.”	Agreed
12.3.10._3	Category: (change) Proposed amended text: “have been kept for at least ~~six months~~ <u>90 days</u> prior to semen collection ...” Rationale: Point 1) a) should be aligned with the changes brought in Articles 12.3.1. and Article 12.3.6.	Agreed

- b) showed no clinical sign of ~~dourine infection with T. equiperdum~~ during that period;

- c) were subjected, before collection, to an antibody detection test on a blood sample taken on two occasions, with an interval of 30 days, with negative results;

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.10._4	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): were subjected, <u>before collection</u>, to an antibody detection test on a blood sample taken on two occasions, with an interval of ~~30~~ <u>45</u> days, with negative results; Rationale: Same as Article 12.3.7.	Addressed above in comment 12.3.7._2

- 2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in a *semen collection centre* accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 12.3.11.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.11._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted

Introduction to surveillance

Articles 12.3.11. to 12.3.14. define the principles and provide guidance on *surveillance* for dourine ~~infection with *T. equiperdum*~~, complementary to Chapter 1.4.

The purpose of *surveillance* could be the demonstration of the absence of *infection*, the early detection of cases, or the measurement and monitoring of the *prevalence* and distribution of the *infection with T. equiperdum* in a country, zone or compartment.

The most important component of the epidemiology of dourine is sexual transmission, therefore sexually mature ~~equids~~ animal hosts are considered the target population. Notwithstanding, iatrogenic transmission should also be considered.

The impact and epidemiology of dourine widely differs between different regions of the world, and between different type of animal production systems. For instance considering the presence or absence of other trypanosomes and therefore, it is not appropriate to provide specific recommendations for all situations. Member Countries should provide scientific data explaining the epidemiology of the disease in the country or zone concerned, such as host susceptibility (e.g. horse, donkey, mule) and co-infections with other *Trypanosoma* spp., and adapt the *surveillance* strategies for defining their status to the local conditions. There is considerable latitude available to Member Countries to justify their status at an acceptable level of confidence.

Article 12.3.12.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.12._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted

Principles of surveillance for dourine

The following principles are complementary to Chapter 1.4. and should be applied by Member Countries seeking to achieve and demonstrate freedom from infection-dourine as well as being part for *official control programme* in countries where the disease is endemic.

In countries where other Trypanozoon ~~some~~ infections occur in equids ~~animal hosts~~, the diagnosis of dourine is challenging because the clinical signs are not pathognomonic, and diagnostic methods are not pathogen-species specific. As a consequence it is difficult to perform differential diagnosis between infection with T. equiperdum and other Trypanozoon infections.

Surveillance for dourine ~~infection with Trypanosoma equiperdum~~ should encompass not only clinical signs and relevant sampling and testing, but also information on animal husbandry practices and epidemiological context, including sexual contacts, breeding history of the equid ~~animal~~, international and other animal movements, contact patterns, presence of other trypanosomes, and vectors (biting flies including tsetse flies). The *Veterinary Services* should implement programmes to raise awareness among farmers, owners, breeders and workers, who have day to day contact with equids ~~animals~~, as well as *veterinarians*, *veterinary paraprofessionals* and diagnosticians. Those persons should observe and report promptly any suspicion of dourine ~~infection with T. equiperdum~~ to the *Veterinary Services*.

Under the responsibility of the *Veterinary Authority*, Member Countries should have in place a *surveillance* system in accordance with the Chapter 1.4. and, in particular:

- the formal and ongoing system for detecting and investigating cases should include all suspicions of Trypanozoon ~~infection with Trypanosomes~~;
- the procedure for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspected cases to a *laboratory* for diagnosis should include the relevant types and methods of sampling for dourine ~~infection with T. equiperdum~~ as described in the *Terrestrial Manual*;
- the *laboratory* is approved for diagnosis of dourine ~~infection with T. equiperdum~~.

Special attention is to be made to low-susceptible ~~animals~~ that are more resistant such as donkeys and mules that can act as healthy carriers and a ~~reservoir~~ of *Trypanosoma equiperdum*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.12._2	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): Special attention is to be made to <u>low-susceptible</u> ~~animals~~ <u>that are more resistant</u> such as donkeys and mules that can act as healthy carriers and <u>a</u> ~~reservoir~~ of <i>Trypanosoma equiperdum</i> . Rationale:	Agreed

	Grammar edit: Subject verb agreement	

Article 12.3.13.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.13._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted

Surveillance for early warning of dourine

- 1) An ongoing *surveillance* programme for dourine should be in place and be designed to detect the presence of ~~dourine-infection with *T. equiperdum*~~ in the country or zone in a timely manner.
- 2) The dourine *surveillance* programme should include the following.
 - a) An *early warning system* for reporting suspected animals described in Article 12.3.12., in accordance with Article 1.4.5.
 - b) Implementation, as relevant, of regular and frequent clinical inspection of individual ~~equids-animal hosts~~ at risk of dourine that could, for instance, include ~~equids-animals~~ that were imported from countries not free from dourine.

Article 12.3.14.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.14._1	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: not relevant Rationale: A Member supports proposed changes.	Noted

Surveillance for demonstrating freedom from dourine

1. Requirements for declaring freedom of the entire country, a zone or a compartment from dourine
 Transparency in the application of different methodologies is essential to ensure consistency in decision-making, ease of understanding, fairness and rationality. The assumptions made, the uncertainties, and the effect of these on the interpretation of the results, should be documented.

 The design of the *surveillance* programme will depend on the epidemiological circumstances and it should be planned and implemented in accordance with this chapter and Article 1.4.6. This requires the availability of demographic data on the ~~equids-animal host~~ population and the support of a *laboratory* able to undertake identification of ~~dourine-infection with *T. equiperdum*~~ through parasite detection and antibody tests.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.14._2	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion):	Agreed

	The design of the <i>surveillance</i> programme will depend on the epidemiological circumstances, and it should be planned and implemented in accordance with this chapter and Article 1.4.6. This requires the availability of demographic data on the ~~equids~~ <u>animal host</u> population and the support of a <i>laboratory</i> able to undertake identification of ~~dourine~~ <u>infection with <i>T. equiperdum</i></u> through parasite detection and antibody tests. Added a comma (,) after circumstances on the first line of the paragraph above. Rationale: Readability.	

Data from different *surveillance* activities can be included to increase the sensitivity of the *surveillance* system. If this is to be done, data from structured (e.g. surveys and active *surveillance*) and non-structured (e.g. passive *surveillance*) sources should be combined.

The *surveillance* programme should include *surveillance* of different ~~equids~~ animal host subpopulations (e.g. thoroughbred, saddle horses (riding horses), working horses, ponies, donkeys, mules).

Documentation of freedom from dourine should provide details of the ~~equids~~ animal hosts population, the occurrence of suspected *cases* and how they were investigated and dealt with. This should include the results of *laboratory* testing and the *biosecurity* and control measures to which the animals concerned were subjected during the investigation.

In order to maintain freedom of an establishment within an infected country or zone and to demonstrate no *case of infection with *T. equiperdum** has occurred, passive surveillance relying on clinical observation alone is insufficient. Depending on the prevailing epidemiological situation and assessed risk for the introduction of *T. equiperdum*, samples should also be collected on a routine basis for parasite detection and antibody tests. There should also be systematic screening of horses that are introduced into the establishment for the absence of ~~dourine~~ infection with *T. equiperdum*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.3.14._3	Category: Addition. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): In order to maintain freedom of an establishment within an infected country or zone and to demonstrate no <i>case of infection with <i>T. equiperdum</i></i> has occurred, passive surveillance relying on clinical observation alone is insufficient. Depending on the prevailing epidemiological situation and assessed risk for the introduction of <i>T. equiperdum</i>, samples should also be collected on a routine basis for parasite detection and antibody tests. There should also be systematic screening of ~~horses~~ <u>animal hosts</u> that are introduced into the establishment for the absence of ~~dourine~~ <u>infection with <i>T. equiperdum</i></u>. Rationale: Article 12.3.1. states that for the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, dourine is defined as an infection of domestic and captive wild horses, donkeys, mules and hinnies (hereafter ‘animal host’).	Agreed

2. Additional requirements for recovery of free status

In addition to the general conditions described in this chapter, a Member Country seeking recovery of country or *zone* free status, including a *containment zone* established in accordance with Article 4.4.7., should show evidence of an active *surveillance* programme (clinical inspection and serological surveillance) to demonstrate absence of ~~dourine~~ infection with *T. equiperdum*.

Populations under this *surveillance* programme should include:

- 1) *establishments* in the proximity of the *outbreak*;
 - 2) *establishments* epidemiologically linked to the *outbreak*;
 - 3) *animals* moved from or used to re-populate affected *establishments*.
-

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.4._1	Categoría: General. Texto modificado propuesto: No aplica. Justificación: Miembro remite comentarios al artículo 12.4.1 tanto en la versión en inglés como en la versión en español. Ambos comentarios van en este mismo documento, primero al documento en inglés; luego, al documento en español. Luego va un comentario al artículo 12.4.3 (en español) Evidencia documentada: No corresponde.	Noted
12.4._2	Categoría: General. Propuesta/Comentario: Programa de Trabajo: revisión del capítulo 12.4 Encefalopatía equina (del Este o del Oeste) Modificar el título del capítulo 12.4 de la siguiente forma: <u>Encefalomiелitis</u> <u>Encefalopatía</u> equina (del Este o del Oeste) Justificación: Alinearlo con el título en inglés, del capítulo 12.4 que dice: Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western). Adicionalmente, los artículos 1.3.1 y 1.3.5 en español hablan de "encefalomiелitis equina del este y EE del oeste, respectivamente. Finalmente, el término encefalopatía es genérico y se usa para cualquier enfermedad cerebral que altere la función o la estructura del cerebro, incluyendo causas infecciosas (por bacterias, virus, parásitos, protozoos) como no infecciosas (e.g., tumores, derrames cerebrales, intoxicaciones, degeneraciones, etc.). Evidencia documentada, si corresponde: <u>https://www.msdtvetmanual.com/es/sistema-nervioso/encefalomiелitis-arboviral-equina/encefalomiелitis-arboviral-equina?query=encefalomiелitis%20v%C3%ADrica%20equina%20(encefalitis)</u> <u>https://www.woah.org/es/que-hacemos/normas/codigos-y-manuales/acceso-en-linea-al-codigo-terrestre/?id=169&L=1&htmlfile=chapitre_oie_listed_disease.htm</u>	Agreed
12.4._3	Category: General comment Proposed amended text: Rationale: A Member supports the proposal to address those two viruses belonging to the same family and genus, including surveillance within a single chapter.	Noted

12.4._4	Category: (general) Proposed amended text: Rationale: The Member thanks the TAHSC for undertaking the review of this important Code chapter and supports this work.	Noted

CHAPTER 12.4.

INFECTION WITH EASTERN EQUINE ENCEPHALITIS VIRUS (EASTERN EQUINE ENCEPHALOMYELITIS) AND INFECTION WITH WESTERN EQUINE ENCEPHALITIS VIRUS (WESTERN EQUINE ENCEPHALOMYELITIS)

Article 12.4.1.

General provisions

Equids are dead-end hosts for eastern equine encephalitis (EEE) and western equine encephalitis (WEE) and therefore, equids and their products do not present a risk of transmission. However, equids are useful sentinels for the early detection of EEE or WEE to mitigate the animal and public health risks of these pathogenic agents.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.4.1._1	Categoría: editorial de la versión en inglés. Texto modificado propuesto (o supresión sugerida): General provisions Equids are dead-end hosts for eastern equine encephalomyelitis encephalitis (EEE) and western equine encephalomyelitis encephalitis (WEE) and therefore, equids and their products do not present a risk of transmission. However, equids are useful sentinels for the early detection of EEE or WEE to mitigate the animal and public health risks of these pathogenic agents. Justificación: A nuestro entender, el nombre de estas dos enfermedades es encefalomielitis equina (sea del Este o sea del Oeste), nombre que está dado por la forma en que normalmente cursa esta enfermedad y que es una afección tanto del cerebro como de la médula espinal (pudiendo presentarse otros signos). Incluso esta situación la recoge el Código Terrestre vigente en inglés, que nombra a estas enfermedades como: <i>Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern)</i> , artículo 1.3.1 y capítulo 12.4; y <i>Equine encephalomyelitis (Western)</i> , artículo 1.3.5 y capítulo 12.4; y también lo hace el Manual Terrestre vigente en inglés: capítulo 3.6.4: <i>Eastern, Western and Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis</i> .	Agreed

	Evidencia documentada: 1) Manual Merck de Veterinaria: https://www.msdsvetmanual.com/nervous-system/equine-arboviral-encephalomyelitis/equine-arboviral-encephalomyelitis 2) Cuadro de las encefalomiELITIS equinas por arbovirus: Equine Arboviral Encephalomyelitis - N	

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, EEE is defined as an *infection* of equids with eastern equine encephalitis virus (EEEV), and WEE is defined as an *infection* of equids with western equine encephalitis virus (WEEV).

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with EEEV or *infection* with WEEV:

- 1) EEEV or WEEV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an equid; or
- 2) nucleic acid or antigen specific to EEEV or WEEV has been detected in a sample from an equid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with EEE or WEE, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with EEEV or WEEV; or

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.4.1._2	Category: (change) Proposed amended text: Se sugieren dos propuestas de cambio Propuesta 1 2) la detección de ácido nucleico o antígeno específico del VEEE o del VEEV en una muestra procedente de un équido que haya manifestado signos clínicos o lesiones patológicas compatibles con la EEE o la EEO, o que esté relacionado epidemiológicamente con un caso confirmado o presunto, o que haya dado motivo para sospechar una asociación o ~~un contacto~~ previos con el VEEE o el VEEV; o Propuesta 2 2) la detección de ácido nucleico o antígeno específico del VEEE o del VEEV en una muestra procedente de un équido que haya manifestado signos clínicos o lesiones patológicas compatibles con la EEE o la EEO, o que esté relacionado epidemiológicamente con un caso confirmado o presunto, o que haya dado motivo para sospechar una asociación o <u>una exposición</u> ~~o un contacto~~ previos con el VEEE o el VEEV <u>a través del vector infectado</u>; o Rationale: La transmisión de la enfermedad no se da por contacto directo de equino a equino, es necesario que intervenga un vector, en éste caso un mosquito, por lo que la sugerencia es cambiar el termino	Agreed with replacement of 'contact' with 'exposure' as, notably because this disease is vector-borne, 'exposure' is more accurate. Did not agree with addition as the revised text (use 'exposure') is clear.

	“contacto” por “exposición” al medio ambiente que tiene al vector con la enfermedad. Supporting evidence, if relevant:	
12.4.1._3	Category: Deletion Proposed amended text: 2) nucleic acid or antigen specific to EEEV or WEEV has been detected in a sample from an equid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with EEE or WEE, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, ~~or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with EEEV or WEEV~~; or Rationale: The deleted text is not necessary as is already covered by ‘epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case’.	Did not agree as it may represent exposure to the vectors of these diseases.
12.4.1._4	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): nucleic acid or antigen specific to EEEV or WEEV has been detected in a sample from an equid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with EEE or WEE, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, ~~or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with EEEV or WEEV where the epidemiology suggests exposure to EEEV or WEEV due to vector activity~~; or Rationale: As noted by both the Code Commission and Ad Hoc Group tasked to revise this chapter, equids are dead-end hosts of EEE and WEE and do not transmit these diseases by direct contact. The revised language is meant to better clarify how the primary mode of disease transmission to equids--through vector activity--should be considered when EEEV or WEEV nucleic acid or specific antigen are detected in an equid sample. The proposed language could also be used when revising similar Code chapters where vectors serve as the primary mode of disease transmission.	Addressed above in comment 12.4.1._2

- 3) antibodies specific to EEEV or WEEV, which are not the consequence of *vaccination*, have been detected in a sample from an equid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with EEE or WEE, epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case .

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.4.1._5	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: 3) antibodies specific to EEEV or WEEV, which are not the consequence of <i>vaccination</i>, have been detected in a sample from an equid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with EEE or WEE, <u>or</u> epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected <u>case</u>.	Agreed

	Rationale: Clarity.	

Standards for diagnosis and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 12.4.2.

Safe commodities

When authorising the importation or transit of equids or their products, *Veterinary Authorities* should not require any EEE- or WEE-related conditions regardless of the *animal health status* of the country or *zone* of origin.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.4.2._1	Category: General Proposed amended text: No text proposed. 1) WOAHA has recently considered live equids and their products as safe commodities, noting that their import and export do not impact disease spread. We request WOAHA to review whether infection with eastern equine encephalitis virus and western equine encephalitis virus still meet the criteria for inclusion in the WOAHA list in point 1, Article 1.2.2 of Chapter 1.2 ("International spread of the pathogenic agent (via live animals or their products, vectors or fomites) has been proven."). 2) We would like to request WOAHA to provide the incubation period for these diseases, as this information is valuable for disease surveillance and ensuring consistency with other disease-specific chapters. Rationale: 1) To review whether these diseases still meet the criteria for inclusion in the WOAHA list in point 1, Article 1.2.2 of Chapter 1.2., considering that international trade of equid commodities poses no risk of disease spread. 2) For consistency with other disease-specific chapters, the incubation period should be given. Supporting evidence: -	Noted For point 1, the Code Commission reminded the conclusion of the Scientific Commission provided in its September 2023 report on the assessment of these diseases, which the Code Commission agreed. For point 2, the Code Commission reminded that this information is needed whenever the chapter requires recommendations for isolation or quarantine, other mitigating measures, or recovery of status. As this chapter does not include the relevant articles, the incubation period is not necessary for the purposes of this chapter.

Article 12.4.3.

Surveillance of EEE or WEE

The objective of surveillance of EEE and WEE is for the *Veterinary Authority* to coordinate in a timely manner with public health and other relevant *Competent Authorities* and share information to use the *surveillance* outcomes to prevent animal and human exposure. Although equids are dead-end hosts of EEE and WEE, they act as sentinels for the presence of *infection* with EEEV or WEEV in an area.

Surveillance of EEE or WEE should be carried out in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and with the following recommendations.

Veterinary Authority should develop *early warning systems* to detect VEE and WEE epidemic events, so as to promote awareness campaigns to sensitise the owners and keepers of equids, the *veterinarians* and the public health authorities. In such situations, *surveillance* should be conducted to define the extent of the epidemic area for the purpose of disease prevention and control.

Clinical *surveillance* to detect clinical signs of *infection* with EEEV or WEEV in equids should be the basis of the *early warning system*. Clinical disease in equids is characterised by fever, anorexia, and severe depression. In severe cases, it can progress to neurological signs and death. Clinical *surveillance* targeted at neurological signs in equids can provide reinforced evidence of the occurrence of an epidemic. However, clinical signs are not pathognomonic and suspected cases detected by clinical *surveillance* should always be confirmed by laboratory testing, taking into account the epidemiological situation. The rate at which such suspected cases are likely to occur can differ between epidemiological situations and cannot, therefore, be predicted reliably.

An epidemic should be suspected when ecological conditions favour the breeding of large numbers of mosquito *vectors* with the concurrent or consequent occurrence of an increased number of equids showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with EEEV or WEEV, or reports of infection in humans or *wild* birds. This is especially the case for countries or *zones* infected with EEEV or WEEV, or countries or *zones* adjacent to a country or *zone* in which epidemics have been reported. Ecological conditions can be assessed through sharing and analysis of meteorological data, data on precipitation and water levels, and monitoring of *vector* activity.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
12.4.3._2	Category: General comment Text: Ecological conditions can be assessed through sharing and analysis of meteorological data, data on precipitation and water levels, and monitoring of <i>vector</i> activity. Rationale: Should monitoring of the diseases in wild birds be included here? The mosquitos need to get infected somewhere.	Did not agree, as although wild birds can be infected, they tend not to show clinical signs. The Code Commission added explanation for clarification.

Detection of *infection* with EEEV or WEEV in an area is indicative of *vector* activity in this area and is a more sensitive approach to *monitoring* for EEEV or WEEV than *vector surveillance*. Findings of EEEV or WEEV in *vectors* is of low sensitivity and, therefore, is not a recommended *surveillance* method.

12.4.3._3	Category: Change. Proposed amended texts (or precise suggested deletion): The objective of surveillance of EEE and WEE is for the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> to coordinate in a timely manner with public health and other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> and share information to use the <i>surveillance</i> outcomes to prevent animal and human exposure. Although equids are dead-end hosts of EEE and WEE, they act as sentinels for the presence of ~~infection with~~ EEEV or WEEV in an area. [...] <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should develop <i>early warning systems</i> to detect ~~V~~EEE and WEE epidemic events, so as to promote awareness campaigns ~~to which~~ sensitise the owners and keepers of equids, the <i>veterinarians</i> and the public health authorities ~~to disease risks~~. In such situations, <i>surveillance</i> should be conducted to define the extent of the epidemic area for the purpose of disease prevention and control. [...] An epidemic should be suspected when ecological conditions favour the breeding of large numbers of mosquito <i>vectors</i> with the concurrent or consequent occurrence of an increased number of equids showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with <i>infection</i> with EEEV or WEEV, or reports of infection in humans or wild birds. This is especially the case for countries or ~~zones infected with where the presence of~~ EEEV or WEEV ~~infections have been detected~~, or countries or <i>zones</i> adjacent to a country or <i>zone</i> in which epidemics have been reported. Ecological conditions can be assessed through sharing and analysis of meteorological data, data on precipitation and water levels, and monitoring of <i>vector</i> activity. Detection ~~s~~ of ~~infection with~~ EEEV or WEEV ~~infections~~ in an area ~~is are~~ indicative of <i>vector</i> activity in this area and is a more sensitive approach to <i>monitoring</i> for EEV or WEEV than vector <i>surveillance</i>. Findings of EEEV or WEEV in <i>vectors</i> is of low sensitivity and, therefore, is not a recommended <i>surveillance</i> method. Rationale: Edits to Article 12.4.3. for clarity, and one typographical error.	Agreed with deletion of 'infection with'. Agreed with typo. Did not agree with replacement of 'to' with 'which' as considered the current text is clear. Agreed with addition of 'to disease risk'. Agreed, but text amended differently Did not agree as 'infection with pathogenic agent' is the standard wording in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>.
12.4.3._4	Category: General comment Text: Detection of <i>infection</i> with EEEV or WEEV in an area is indicative of <i>vector</i> activity Rationale: In which species do we have to make surveillance? Does it need to be specified?	Equid is obvious.

**WORK PROGRAMME FOR
THE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION**

Chapter	Issues	Summary of the work	Status - September 2024		Priority order *
			Stage of consideration	Remarks (Month when draft text first circulated for comment /# of rounds for comment) or last TAHSC report reference	
General	Wildlife Health	Overarching consideration on how wildlife animal health is addressed in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>	Preliminary discussions	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC report	2
	New chapter on emergency management	Develop a new chapter and potentially modify the existing chapters	Expert consultation	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report	2
	Commodities	Consideration to determine whether several types of highly processed products (such as blood meal, dried plasma, rendered fats, and hydrolysed protein) have a globally standardised production process and meet criteria to be considered safe commodities as regards specific diseases. Pet-food: Consider the inclusion of 'extruded dry pet food' and 'heat-treated meat products in a hermetically sealed container with an F0 value of 3 or above' in the list of safe commodities of chapters (when revised).	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC report Noted in Sep 2022 TAHSC report (pet-food commodities)	2
Use of terms	Use of terms: animal health status	- Consider the need to revise definition to incorporate 'herd', and avoid restrictive wording - Possible revision of the Glossary definition - Review use of the terms across the <i>Code</i> for consistency	Preparatory work	Refer to Feb 2020 TAHSC report	1

	Use of terms: notify / notifiable disease / report / reportable disease	Review use of the terms across the <i>Code</i> for consistency. Develop a policy for their use	Preparatory work	Refer to Feb 2019 TAHSC report	2
User's guide	Revision of the Users' guide (standing item)	Partial revision - to provide more explanation on disease-specific chapters - to develop a new point on terms referring to animals used in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> - work on introduction	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2023/4)	1
Glossary	1. New definition for 'swill', definitions for 'biosecurity' and 'biosecurity plan' 2. New definitions for 'isolation' and 'pathogenic agent', and definition for 'disinfection'	Swill: Review use of the term across the <i>Code</i> . Develop a policy for its use and consider developing a definition. (connected to biosecurity work)	Circulated for comments	1. Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2023/3) 2. Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/2)	1
	Definition for 'disinsection'	Develop a new definition	Circulated for comments	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/1)	1
	1. New definition for 'point of exit' and definitions for 'border post' and 'quarantine station' 2. New definition for 'point of entry' and definitions for 'transit country', 'container' and 'vehicle/vessel'	Review as a part of the work to revise Chs 5.4. to 5.7.	Circulated for comments	1. Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2023/3) 2. Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/2)	1
	New definition for 'veterinary medical use'	Move the definition from Ch 6.9.	Pending the work of AMRWG	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	3
	Definition of 'poultry'	(Not defined yet, related to revision of chapters in Section 10)	Preparatory work	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report	1

	Definition for 'laboratory'	Revision of definition (in collaboration with BSC)	Expert consultation	Noted in Feb 2024 TAHSC report	2
	New definition for 'seroconversion'	Develop a new definition (in coordination with BSC)	Circulated for comments	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/1)	1
	New definition for 'suspected case'	Consider a new definition	Not started	Noted in Feb 2024 TAHSC report	2
Section 1					
1.1.	Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information	Revision of relevant articles	Preparatory work	Refer to Feb 2025 TAHSC report	2
1.3.	Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA	Revision of disease names and place related to chapters to be proposed for adoption	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/1)	1
		Removal of 'Nairobi sheep disease'	Circulated for comments	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/1)	1
1.6.	Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOA	Partial revision: - New article to improve clarity on the ability for Members to hold pathogenic agents within laboratories without affecting their animal health status.	Circulated for comments	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/2)	2
1.7.- 1.12	Status Questionnaires	Deletion of chapters, to move their content to the WOA Website - introduce the possibility to host the questionnaires on the web.	Preparatory work	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report	2
Section 4					
4.4., 4.Y.	Zoning and compartmentalisation and new chapter on implementation of zoning	To address necessary points, as relevant, with the development of new Ch 4.4. and develop a full new chapter (taskforce by SCAD and TAHSC to work on this issue)	Expert consultation	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report	1

4.7.	Collection and processing of bovine, small ruminant and porcine semen	Comprehensive revision of chapter	Expert consultation	Refer to Feb 2025 TAHSC report	2
4.8.	Collection and processing of <i>in vivo</i> derived embryos from livestock and equids	Consider potential amendments as a consequence of the changes in the IETS Manual	Preparatory work	Pending progress of data collection	1
4.9.	Collection and processing of oocytes and <i>in vitro</i> produced embryos from livestock and horses	Consider potential amendments as a consequence of the changes in the IETS Manual	Preparatory work	Pending progress of data collection	1
4.13.	Disposal of dead animals	Consider including all potentially contaminated wastes/products/fomites	Preparatory work	Refer to Feb 2022 TAHSC report	2
4.14.	General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection	Comprehensive revision of chapter Consider question from AHG on biosecurity	Expert consultation	Refer to Feb 2025 TAHSC report	2
4.X.	New chapter on biosecurity	Develop a new chapter	Circulated for comments	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2023/3)	1
Section 5					
General	Revision of Section 5 Trade measures, import/export procedures and veterinary certification (especially Chs 5.4. to 5.7.)	Comprehensive revision of Chs 5.4., 5.5., 5.6. and 5.7.	Circulated for comments	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2023/3 for Chs 5.4. and 5.6., Sep 2024/2 for Chs 5.5. and 5.7.)	1
5.X.	Development of introductory chapter	New introductory chapter for Section 5 (task force, TAHSC and AAC)	Expert consultation	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report	2
5.1., 5.2., 5.10. to 5.13.	Certification procedures	Partial revision to review provisions on electronic certification and check model of certificate For Ch 5.12. Update the relevant chapters on equine diseases to take into account proposals made by the AHG on HHP Horses Veterinary Certificates	Expert consultation	Refer to Feb 2025 TAHSC report	2

5.8.	International transfer and laboratory containment of animal pathogenic agents	- Consider impact of holding PA in labs (and research facilities) - Align with corresponding <i>Manual</i> chapter (categories of PA) - Potential link with work with Nagoya protocol	Preparatory work Pending update of Manual Chapter 1.1.3	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	3
Section 6					
6.8.	Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes	Inclusion of definitions for monitoring and surveillance, as well as for active and passive surveillance and integrated surveillance	Expert consultation	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report	2
6.12.	Zoonoses transmissible from non-human primates	Consider possible inclusion of SARS-CoV-2 in this chapter, possible inclusion of Macacine Herpesvirus 1 and the revision of test schedule and animal species to be tested for tuberculosis (Origin Member requests)	Not started	Refer to Feb 2022 TAHSC report	4
Section 7					
7.1.	Introduction to the recommendations for animal welfare	Partial revision - to include 'five domains' concept - to clarify the meaning of the terms 'animal-based', 'resource-based' and 'management-based' measures etc.	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2023/4)	1
7.2., 7.3., 7.4.	Transport of animals by land, sea and air	Comprehensive revision of chapters	Expert consultation	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC report	1
7.5.	Animal welfare during slaughter	Article 7.5.30. Electrical water-bath stunning for poultry (points under study)	Circulated for comments	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/1)	2
7.6.	Killing of animals for disease control purposes	- Comprehensive revision of chapter	Circulated for comments	Refer to Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2024/2 for Articles 1 to 8, Feb 2025/1 for rest articles)	1
Section 8					
8.4.	Infection with <i>Brucella abortus</i> , <i>B. melitensis</i> and <i>B. suis</i>	Revision of provisions for free status	Not started	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC	3

8.8.	Infection with foot and mouth disease virus	Partial revision: development of an article with provision for safe trade of fetal bovine serum Consider safe commodities (rendered fat)	Expert consultation	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/1)	3
		Partial revision: consideration of recommendations for import of 'horns'	Not start	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC report	3
8.10.	Japanese encephalitis	Comprehensive revision of chapter (related to works on Chs 8.21., 12.4. and 12.11.)	Circulated for comments	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/1)	2
8.11.	Infection with <i>Mycobacterium tuberculosis</i> complex	Partial revision - to add recommendations for camelids and goats - to clarify point 1(b) of Article 8.11.4. provisions of free status	Not started	Refer to Feb 2022 TAHSC report	3
8.13.	New world screwworm and old world screwworm	Partial revision (case definition)	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/2)	1
8.15.	Infection with rabies virus	Partial revision - to add recommendations on wildlife-mediated rabies - revise recovery of free status	Preparatory work	Refer to Sep 2022 TAHSC report	3
8.18.	Infection with <i>Trichinella</i> spp.	Consider the role and risks associated with different animal hosts	Not started	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC report	4
8.20.	Tularemia	Partial revision (case definition and to align other articles without altering current contents)	Circulated for comments	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/1)	2
8.21.	West Nile fever	Comprehensive revision of chapter (related to works on Chs 8.10., 12.4. and 12.11.)	Expert consultation	Noted in Feb 2024 TAHSC report	2
8.X.	New Chapter on Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever	Develop a new chapter (case definition)	Circulated for comments	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/2)	2

		Consider need to develop recommendations for prevention.	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC report	3
8.Y.	New Chapter on Infection with Nipah virus	Develop a new chapter (case definition)	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2023/4)	1
Section 10					
General	Overall consideration of Section 10 Aves	Consider approach to risk management recommendations for different production sectors, species, commodities, structure of chapter (following latest adopted HAPI) across different diseases.	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	2
10.2.	Avian infectious bronchitis	Review trade articles for clarity.	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	3
10.3.	Avian infectious laryngotracheitis	Consider amendments to ensure alignment with recently revised <i>Manual</i> chapter	Not started	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	3
10.5.	Infection with <i>Mycoplasma gallisepticum</i> (Avian mycoplasmosis)	Full update of the chapter (content and structure) based on the recent update of the <i>Manual</i> Chapter. Consider inclusion of <i>M. synoviae</i> into a single chapter (and listed disease).	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	3
10.9.	Infection with Newcastle disease virus	Revision to align with recent revision of Ch 10.4. Provision on recovery of free status	Preparatory work	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report	3
10.X.	Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chicken)	Develop a new chapter (case definition)	Circulated for comments	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/2)	2
Section 11					
11.5.	Infection with <i>Mycoplasma mycoides</i> subsp. <i>mycoides</i> SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)	Harmonisation of chapters with official status recognition	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2022/5)	1
11.11.	Trichomonosis	Comprehensive revision of chapter	Not started	Refer to Feb 2022 TAHSC report (Sep 2020/2)	3

11.X.	New Chapter on Infection with bovine pestivirus (bovine viral diarrhoea)	Develop a new chapter (case definition)	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2022/6)	1
Section 12					
12.1.	African horse sickness	Harmonisation of chapters with official status recognition Proposals from AHG on AHS and SCAD	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2022/5)	1
12.3.	Dourine	Comprehensive revision of chapter	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Refer to Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2024/3)	1
12.4.	Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western)	Comprehensive revision of chapter (related to works on Chs 8.10., 8.21. and 12.11.)	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/2)	1
12.8.	Infection with equid herpesvirus-1 (Equine rhinopneumonitis)	For consistency of disease name	Preparatory work	Noted in Feb 2024 TAHSC report Manual chapter adopted at the last GS	3
12.11.	Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis	Comprehensive revision of chapter (related to works on Chs 8.10., 8.21. and 12.4.)	Expert consultation	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC report	2
Section 13					
13.2.	Rabbit haemorrhagic disease	Comprehensive revision of chapter	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	3
Section 14					
14.1. and 14.5.	Caprine arthritis/encephalitis and Maedi-visna	Comprehensive revision - include case definition - combine into one chapter	Preparatory work	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report	3

14.7.	Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus	Partial revision: - Reconsider susceptible animals targeted in the chapter (wild animals, pigs) - Review Article 14.7.19. and Article 14.7.25 to remove reference to Chapter 8.8. - New article on recommendations for importation of animals for direct slaughter - Apply new drafting conventions	Preparatory work	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report	2
14.8.	Scrapie	Comprehensive revision of chapter	Expert consultation	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report	2
14.9.	Sheep pox and goat pox	Comprehensive revision of chapter	Expert consultation	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report	3

*** Description of the consequence of priority order**

1	- active work for the TAHSC - identified as the priority to progress as soon as possible - to be put forward for next meeting agenda
2	- active work for the TAHSC - progression as time and resources allow - to be included in next meeting agenda
3	- not immediate work for the TAHSC - possible progression if time, resources allow - needs to progress before consideration for next meeting agenda
4	- not active - not to be immediately started

List of abbreviations			
AAC	Aquatic Animals Commission	HQ	WOAH Headquarters
AHG	Ad hoc Group	IETS	International Embryo Technology Society
BSC	Biological Standards Commission	SCAD	Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases
Ch	Chapter	TAHSC	Terrestrial Animal Health Standard Commission

USER'S GUIDE

A. Introduction

- 1) The WOA *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* (hereafter referred to as the *Terrestrial Code*) establishes standards for the improvement of terrestrial animal health and welfare and veterinary public health worldwide. The purpose of this guide is to advise the *Veterinary Authorities* of WOA Member Countries on how to use the *Terrestrial Code*.
- 2) *Veterinary Authorities* should use the standards in the *Terrestrial Code* notably to set up measures providing for early detection, internal reporting, notification, control or eradication of pathogenic agents, including zoonotic ones, in terrestrial *animals* (mammals, birds, reptiles and bees) and preventing their spread via *international trade* in *animals* and *animal products*, while avoiding unjustified sanitary barriers to trade. These measures may include the establishment and recognition of *animal health status* applied to countries, *zones*, *compartments* or *herds/flocks*.
- 3) WOA standards are based on the most recent scientific and technical information. Correctly applied, they protect animal health and welfare and veterinary public health during production of and trade in ~~animals and animal products~~ commodities, and in the use of animals.
- 4) The absence of chapters, articles or recommendations on particular pathogenic agents, surveillance strategies, *animal health status* or trade in commodities does not preclude the application of appropriate *sanitary measures* by the *Veterinary Authorities*, provided they are based on *risk analyses* conducted in accordance with the *Terrestrial Code*.
- 5) The year that a chapter was first adopted and the year of its last revision are noted at the end of each chapter.
- 6) The complete text of the *Terrestrial Code* is available on the WOA web-site and individual chapters may be downloaded from: <https://www.woah.org/>.

B. Terrestrial Code content

- 1) Key terms and expressions that are used in more than one chapter ~~in the *Terrestrial Code* and require precise interpretation for the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*~~ are defined in the Glossary, in the case where common dictionary definitions are not deemed to be adequate. The reader should be aware of the definitions given in the Glossary when reading and using the *Terrestrial Code*. Defined terms appear in italics. In the on-line version of the *Terrestrial Code*, a hyperlink leads to the relevant definition.
- 2) The term “(under study)” is found in some rare instances, with reference to an article or part of an article. This means that this part of the text has not been adopted by the World Assembly of Delegates and the particular provisions are thus not part of the *Terrestrial Code*, while they continue to be the subject of specific work, until they are amended or deleted.
- 3) The standards in the chapters of Section 1 are designed for the implementation of measures for the diagnosis, *surveillance* and *notification* of diseases, *infections* and *infestations*. The standards include procedures for *notification* to WOA and procedures for the recognition of the *animal health status* of a country, *zone* or *compartment*.
- 4) The standards in the chapters of Section 2 are designed to guide the *importing country* in conducting import *risk analysis* in the absence of WOA recommendations on particular pathogenic agents or *commodities*. The *importing country* should also use these standards to justify import measures which are more stringent than existing WOA standards.

- 5) The standards in the chapters of Section 3 are designed for the establishment, maintenance and evaluation of *Veterinary Services*, including *veterinary legislation* and communication. These standards are intended to assist the *Veterinary Services* and *Veterinary Authority* of Member Countries to meet their objectives of improving terrestrial animal health and welfare and veterinary public health, as well as to establish and maintain confidence in their *international veterinary certificates*.
- 6) The standards in the chapters of Section 4 are designed for the implementation of measures for the prevention and control of pathogenic agents. Measures in this section include *animal identification*, traceability, zoning, compartmentalisation, disposal of dead *animals*, *disinfection*, disinsection and general hygiene precautions. Some chapters address the specific *sanitary measures* to be applied for the collection and processing of semen and embryos of *animals*.
- 7) The standards in the chapters of Section 5 are designed for the implementation of general *sanitary measures* for trade. They address veterinary certification and the measures applicable by the *exporting, transit and importing countries*. A range of model veterinary certificates is provided to facilitate consistent documentation in *international trade*.
- 8) The standards in the chapters of Section 6 are designed for the implementation of preventive measures in animal production systems. These measures are intended to assist Member Countries in meeting their veterinary public health objectives. They include ante- and post-mortem inspection, control of hazards in *feed*, *biosecurity* at the animal production level, and the control of antimicrobial resistance in *animals*.
- 9) The standards in the chapters of Section 7 are designed for the implementation of *animal welfare* measures. The standards cover production, transport, and *slaughter or killing*, as well as the *animal welfare* aspects of free-roaming dog population control, *working equids*, and the use of *animals* in research and education.
- 10) The standards in each of the chapters of Sections 8 to 16, *i.e. disease-specific chapters*, are designed *mainly* to ~~prevent the pathogenic agents inform of the occurrence of~~ *WOAH listed diseases, infections or infestations* and to prevent the pathogenic agents from being introduced into an *importing country*, ~~or from spreading within a country or having harmful consequences~~, while facilitating safe trade. Some chapters include specific measures to prevent and control the *infections and infestations* of global concern. Sections 8 to 16 *each* relate to the categories of diseases, *infections and infestations of the host species of the pathogenic agent*; multiple species, ~~or species of~~ *Apinae, Aves, Bovinae, Equidae, Leporidae, Caprinae, Suidae and Camelidae respectively*. Although WOAHA aims to include a chapter for each *WOAH listed disease*, not all *WOAH listed diseases* have been covered yet by a specific chapter. This is work in progress, depending on available scientific knowledge and the priorities set by the World Assembly of Delegates.

The standards take into account the nature of the traded commodity, the animal health status of the exporting country, zone or compartment, and the risk measures applicable to each commodity.

A disease-specific chapter covers some or all of the following components:

- Chapter title and number:
- An introductory Article on general provisions, including definitions for the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code* of the disease and the animal hosts, which that play a significant role in the epidemiology of the disease, and definition of its occurrence ('case definition'), and the animal hosts that play a significant role in the epidemiology of the disease;
- Article on *safe commodities*:
- Articles on provisions for *animal health status* applied to countries, zones, compartments or herds/flocks:
- Articles on recommendations for *safe trade of commodities*:
- Articles on inactivation of the pathogenic agents present in specific *animal products*, materials or fomites: and
- Articles on *surveillance* of the disease.

Not all disease-specific chapters include all these components and some chapters may include only one the first article on the definition of occurrence for the purpose of *notification* to WOA. Each chapter includes only those provisions considered, at the time of adoption, relevant to address WOA Members' needs with regards to the specific disease; and that are supported by sound scientific and technical knowledge.

The recommendations in these chapters that are related to *international trade*. These standards assume that the *pathogenic* agent is either not present in the *importing country* or is the subject of a control or eradication programme. Sections 8 to 16 each relate to the host species of the pathogenic agent: multiple species or species of Apinae, Aves, Bovinae, Equidae, Leporidae, Caprinae, Suidae and Camelidae. Some chapters include specific measures to prevent and control the infections of global concern. Although WOA aims to include a chapter for each WOA listed disease, not all WOA listed diseases have been covered yet by a specific chapter. This is work in progress, depending on available scientific knowledge and the priorities set by the World Assembly of Delegates. The *sanitary measures* recommended in the standards take into account the nature of the moved or traded *commodity*, the *animal health status* of the *exporting country, zone or compartment* of origin, and the *risk* mitigation measures applicable to each *commodity*.

C. Specific issues

1) Notification

Chapter 1.1. describes Member Countries' obligations under Organic Statutes of the Office International des Epizooties. *Listed diseases* and *emerging diseases*, as prescribed in Chapter 1.1., are compulsorily notifiable. Member Countries are encouraged to also provide information to WOA on other animal health events of epidemiological significance.

Chapter 1.2. describes the criteria for the inclusion of a *disease, an infection or infestation* in the WOA List and Chapter 1.3. gives the current list. *Listed Diseases* are divided into *nine* categories based on the *animal hosts species of the aetiological agents*.

2) Diagnostic tests and vaccines

It is recommended that specified diagnostic tests and vaccines in *Terrestrial Code* chapters be used with a reference to the relevant section in the WOA *Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals* (hereafter referred to as the *Terrestrial Manual*). Experts responsible for facilities used for disease diagnosis and vaccine production should be fully conversant with the standards in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

3) Freedom from a disease, infection or infestation

Article 1.4.6. provides general principles for declaring a country or *zone* free from a disease, *infection or infestation*. This article applies when there are no and may be complemented by specific requirements in the listed disease-specific chapters.

4) Prevention and control

Chapters 4.4. and 4.5. describe the measures that should be implemented to establish *zones and compartments*. Zoning and compartmentalisation should be considered as some of the important tools to prevent and used to control diseases and to facilitate safe trade.

Chapters 4.6. to 4.12. describe the measures which should be implemented during collection and processing of semen and embryos of animals, including micromanipulation and cloning, in order to prevent animal health *risks*, especially when trading these *commodities*. Although the measures relate principally to WOA *listed diseases or infections*, general standards apply to all infectious disease *risks*. Moreover, in Chapter 4.8. diseases that are not listed are marked as such but are included for the information of Member Countries.

Chapter 4.15. addresses the specific issue of the prevention and control of bee diseases and some of its trade implications. This chapter should be read in conjunction with the specific bee disease chapters in Section 9.

Chapter 6.5. is designed for the implementation of general *biosecurity* measures in intensive *poultry* production. Chapters 6.6., 6.13. and 6.14. provide recommendations for some specific ~~on-farm~~ prevention and control plans for the unlisted foodborne pathogenic agent *Salmonella* in poultry, bovine and pig production systems as part of the *Veterinary Services* mission to prevent, eliminate or control food safety *hazards* in animal production.

Chapter 6.12. deals specifically with the zoonotic risk associated with the movements of non-human primates and gives standards for certification, transportation and import conditions for these *animals*.

5) Trade requirements

~~Animal health~~ Sanitary measures related to *international trade* should be based on WOAHS standards. A Member Country may authorise the importation of *animals* or *animal products* into its territory under conditions different from those recommended by the *Terrestrial Code*. To scientifically justify more stringent measures, the *importing country* should conduct a *risk analysis* in accordance with WOAHS standards, as described in Chapter 2.1. Members of the WTO should refer to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).

Chapters 5.1. to 5.3. describe the general obligations and ethical responsibilities of *importing* and *exporting countries* in *international trade*. *Veterinary Authorities* and all *veterinarians* directly involved in *international trade* should be familiar with these chapters. Chapter 5.3. also describes the WOAHS informal procedure for dispute mediation.

WOAHS aims to include an article listing the *commodities* that are considered safe for trade without the need for *risk mitigation* measures specifically directed against a particular *listed disease*, *infection* or *infestation*, regardless of the status of the country or *zone* of origin for the agent in question, at the beginning of each *listed disease*-specific chapter in Sections 8 to 16. This is work in progress and some chapters do not yet contain articles listing *safe commodities*. When a list of *safe commodities* is present in a chapter, *importing countries* should not apply trade restrictions to such *commodities* with respect to the agent in question. Chapter 2.2. describes the criteria for inclusion of a used to assess the safety of commodities in the list of safe commodities of a disease-specific chapter.

6) International veterinary certificates

An *international veterinary certificate* is an official document that the *Veterinary Authority* of an *exporting country* issues in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. It lists animal health requirements and, where appropriate, public health requirements for the exported *commodity*. The quality of the *exporting country's Veterinary Services* is essential in providing assurances to trading partners regarding the safety of exported *animals* and products. This includes the *Veterinary Authority's* ethical approach to the provision of veterinary certificates and their history in meeting their notification obligations.

International veterinary certificates underpin *international trade* and provide assurances to the *importing country* regarding the health status of the *animals* and products imported. The measures prescribed should take into account the animal health status of both *exporting* and *importing countries*, and *zones*, herds/flocks or *compartments* within them, and be based upon the standards in the *Terrestrial Code*.

The following steps should be taken when drafting *international veterinary certificates*:

- a) identify the diseases, *infections* or *infestations* from which the *importing country* is justified in seeking protection because of its own health status. *Importing countries* should not impose measures in regards to diseases that occur in their own territory but are not subject to *official control programmes*;
- b) for *commodities* capable of transmitting these diseases, *infections* or *infestations* through *international trade*, the *importing country* should apply the relevant articles in the *listed disease*-specific chapters. The application of the articles should be adapted to the ~~disease~~ animal health status of the country, ~~zone, or compartment~~ or herd/flock of origin. Such status should be established according to Article 1.4.6. except when articles of the relevant *listed disease* chapter specify otherwise;
- c) when preparing *international veterinary certificates*, the *importing country* should endeavour to use terms and expressions in accordance with the definitions given in the Glossary. *International veterinary certificates* should be kept as simple as possible and should be clearly worded, to avoid misunderstanding of the *importing country's* requirements;

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- d) Chapters 5.10. to 5.13. provide, as further guidance to Member Countries, model certificates that should be used as a baseline.

7) Guidance notes for importers and exporters

It is recommended that *Veterinary Authorities* prepare “guidance notes” to assist importers and exporters understand trade requirements. These notes should identify and explain the trade conditions, including the measures to be applied before and after export and during transport and unloading, and the relevant legal obligations and operational procedures. The guidance notes should advise on all details to be included in the health certification accompanying the consignment to its destination. Exporters should also be reminded of the International Air Transport Association rules governing air transport of *animals* and *animal products*.

[...]

D. Name of animal species

In the *Terrestrial Code*, common terms (in bold in the table below) referring to *animals* are based on scientific names as shown below. In each chapter of the *Terrestrial Code*, scientific names of the *animals* are provided when the vernacular names used in the chapter do not include all the species as described in the table below, e.g. 'bovines (*Bos indicus*, *B. taurus*, *B. grunniens*, *Bubalus bubalis* and *Syncerus caffer*)', which in that example does not include *animals* of genus bison, or when the list of *animals* is long, e.g. 'animals of the families *Suidae* and *Cervidae*, the subfamilies *bovinae*, *caprinae* and *antilopinae* of the family *Bovidae*, and *Camelus bactrianus*'.

Higher level terms	Terms based on Order or Sub-order	Terms based on Family	Terms based on Sub-Family	Terms based on Tribe	Terms based on Genus
<u>Class 'Insecta'</u>	=	<u>Family 'Apidae'</u>	<u>Sub-Family 'Apinae'</u> <u>'bees'</u> means <u>animals of Sub-Family 'Apinae'</u>	<u>Including animals of Tribe:</u> • <u>'Apini'</u>	<u>Including animals of Genus:</u> • <u>'Apis'</u> <u>'honey bees'</u> means animals of Genus <i>Apis</i> .
				<u>Including animals of Tribe:</u> • <u>'Bombini'</u>	<u>Including animals of Genus:</u> • <u>'Bombus'</u> <u>'bumble bees'</u> means animals of Genus <i>Bombus</i> .
				<u>Including animals of Tribe:</u> • <u>'Meliponini'</u> <u>'stingless bees'</u> means <u>animals for Tribe 'Meliponini'</u>	=
<u>Class 'Aves'</u> <u>'avian'</u> means <u>animals of class Aves</u>	<u>Order 'Galliformes'</u>	=	=	=	<u>Including animals of Genus:</u> • <u>'Gallus'</u> • <u>'Meleagris' etc.</u> <u>'chicken'</u> means <i>Gallus gallus domesticus</i> . <u>'turkey'</u> means <i>Meleagris gallopavo</i> .
	<u>Order 'Anseriformes'</u>	=	=	=	<u>Including animals of Genus:</u> • <u>'Anser'</u> • <u>'Branta'</u> • <u>'Anas' etc.</u> <u>'geese'</u> means animals of Genera <i>Anser</i> and <i>Branta</i> . <u>'ducks'</u> means <i>Anas platyrhynchos</i> .

					<u>('domestic ducks' means <i>Anas platyrhynchos domesticus</i>.)</u>
<u>'mammals'</u> means animals of Class 'Mammalia' <u>'ungulates'</u> means animals of Order 'Artiodactyla' (even-toed ungulates) and Order 'Perissodactyla' (odd-toed ungulates) <u>'artiodactyls'</u> means animals of Order 'Artiodactyla' (even-toed ungulates)	<u>'ruminants'</u> means animals of Sub-order 'Ruminantia'	<u>'bovids'</u> means animals of Family 'Bovidae'	<u>'bovines'</u> means animals of Sub- Family 'Bovinae'	=	Including animals of Genus: • 'Bos' • 'Bubalus' • 'Bison' • 'Syncerus' etc.
			<u>'caprines'</u> means animals of Sub- Family 'Caprinae'	=	Including animals of Genus: • 'Ovis' • 'Capra', etc. <u>'sheep'</u> means <i>Ovis aries</i> . <u>'goats'</u> means <i>Capra hircus</i> (domestic goats) and <i>Capra aegagrus</i> (wild goats).
			Sub-Family 'Antilopinae'	=	Including animals of Genus: • 'Gazella' • 'Antilope' • 'Dibatag', etc.
			Sub-Family 'Cervinae'	=	Including animals of Genus: • 'Cervus' • 'Dama', etc.
		<u>'cervids'</u> means animals of Family 'Cervidae'	Sub-Family 'Capreolinae'	=	Including animals of Genus: • 'Capreolus' • 'Odocoileus' • 'Rangifer', etc.
	Sub-Order 'Suina'	<u>'suids'</u> means animals of Family 'Suidae'	=	=	Including animals of Genus: • 'Sus' • 'Phacochoerus' • 'Hylochoerus', etc. <u>'pigs'</u> means <i>Sus scrofa</i> (domestic and wild).
	Sub-Order 'Tylopoda'	<u>'camelids'</u> means animals of Family 'Camelidae'	Sub-Family 'Camelinae'	=	Including animals of Genus: • 'Camelus' • 'Lama' • 'Vicugna' <u>'dromedary camels'</u> means <i>Camelus dromedarius</i> . <u>'bactrian camels'</u> means <i>Camelus bactrianus</i> . <u>'alpacos'</u> means <i>Lama guanicoe pacos</i> . <u>'llamas'</u> means <i>Lama guanicoe glama</i> .

					'New World camelids' means animals of Genus <u>alpaca</u> and <u>Lama</u> (including 'llamas', 'guanacos' and 'alpacas') and <u>Vicugna</u> .
	Sub-Order 'Hippomorpha'	'equids' means animals of Family 'Equidae'	'equines' means animals of Sub- Family 'Equinae'	=	Including animals of only Genus 'Equus' 'horses' means <u>Equus ferus caballus</u> . 'donkeys' means <u>Equus africanus asinus</u> . 'mules' means <u>Equus africanus asinus</u> (male) x <u>Equus ferus caballus</u> (female). 'hinnies' means <u>Equus ferus caballus</u> (male) x <u>Equus africanus asinus</u> (female). 'zebras' means animals of subgenus <u>Hippotigris</u> .
	'lagomorphs' means animals of Order 'Lagomorpha'	'leporids' means animals of Family 'Leporidae'	=	=	Including animals of Genus: • 'Oryctolagus' • 'Lepus' • 'Sylvilagus' 'rabbits' means animals of Genus <u>Oryctolagus</u> . 'hares' means animals of Genus <u>Lepus</u> . 'European hares' means <u>Lepus europaeus</u> .
	'carnivores' means animals of Order 'Carnivora'	'canids' means animals of Family 'Canidae'	Sub-Family 'Caninae'	=	Including animals of Genus: • 'Canis' 'dogs' means <u>Canis lupus familiaris</u> .
		'felids' means animals of Family 'Felidae'	=	=	Including animals of Genus: • 'Felis' 'cats' means <u>Felis catus</u> .
		Family 'Mustelidae'			Including animals of Genus: • 'Mustela' 'ferrets' means <u>Mustela furo</u> .
	'rodents' means animals of Family Order 'Rodentia'	=	=	=	=
	'bats' means of animals of Order 'Chiroptera'	=	=	=	=

	<u>'non-human primates' means animals of Order 'Primates' except for humans (Genus 'Homo')</u>	=	=	=	=

In each chapter of the *Terrestrial Code*, scientific names of the animals are provided when the vernacular names used in the chapter do not include all the species as described in this table, e.g. 'bovines (*Bos indicus*, *B. taurus*, *B. grunniens*, *Bubalus bubalis* and *Syncerus caffer*)', which in that example does not include animals of genus bison, or when the list of animals is very long, e.g. 'animals of the families *Suidae* and *Cervidae*, the subfamilies *bovinae*, *caprinae* and *antilopinae* of the family *Bovidae*, and *Camelus bactrianus*'.

CHAPTER 1.3.

DISEASES, INFECTIONS AND INFESTATIONS LISTED BY WOA

[...]

Article 1.3.1.

The following are included within the category of diseases, *infections* and *infestations* of multiple species:

- Anthrax
- Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever
- ~~Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern)~~
- Heartwater
- Infection with Aujeszky's disease virus
- Infection with bluetongue virus
- Infection with *Brucella abortus*, *Brucella melitensis* and *Brucella suis*
- Infection with *Coxiella burnetii* (Q fever)
- Infection with *Echinococcus granulosus*
- Infection with *Echinococcus multilocularis*
- Infection with epizootic hemorrhagic disease virus
- Infection with foot and mouth disease virus
- Infection with *Leishmania* spp. (Leishmaniosis)
- Infection with *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* complex
- Infection with Nipah virus
- Infection with rabies virus
- Infection with Rift Valley fever virus
- Infection with rinderpest virus
- Infection with *Trichinella* spp.
- Infection with *Trypanosoma brucei*, *Trypanosoma congolense*, *Trypanosoma simiae* and *Trypanosoma vivax*
- Infection with *Trypanosoma evansi* (Surra)
- Infestation with *Chrysomya bezziana* (Old World screwworm)
- Infestation with *Cochliomyia hominivorax* (New World screwworm)
- Japanese encephalitis

- ~~New World screwworm (*Cochliomyia hominivorax*)~~
- ~~Old World screwworm (*Chrysomya bezziana*)~~
- Paratuberculosis
- Tularemia
- West Nile fever.

[...]

Article 1.3.5.

The following are included within the category of diseases and *infections* of equidae:

- ~~Dourine~~
- ~~Equine encephalomyelitis (Western)~~
- Equine infectious anaemia
- Infection with African horse sickness virus
- Infection with *Burkholderia mallei* (Glanders)
- = Infection with Eastern equine encephalitis virus (Eastern equine encephalomyelitis)
- Infection with equid herpesvirus-1 (Equine rhinopneumonitis)
- Infection with equine arteritis virus
- Infection with equine influenza virus
- Infection with *Taylorella equigenitalis* (Contagious equine metritis)
- Infection with *Theileria equi* and *Babesia caballi* (Equine piroplasmosis)
- = Infection with *Trypanosoma equiperdum* (dourine)
- = Infection with Western equine encephalitis virus (Western equine encephalomyelitis)
- Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis.

[...]

Article 1.3.8.

The following are included within the category of diseases and *infections* of suidae:

- Infection with African swine fever virus
- Infection with classical swine fever virus
- Infection with porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus
- Infection with *Taenia solium* (Porcine cysticercosis)
- ~~Nipah virus encephalitis~~
- Transmissible gastroenteritis.

[...]

CHAPTER 7.1.

INTRODUCTION TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ANIMAL WELFARE

Article 7.1.1.

General considerations

Animal welfare means the physical and mental state of an *animal* in relation to the conditions in which it lives and dies.

An *animal* experiences good welfare if the *animal* is healthy, comfortable, well nourished, safe, is not suffering ~~severely or for a long time~~ from ~~avoidable~~ unpleasant states such as *pain*, fear and *distress*, and is able to express behaviours that are important for its physical and mental state. Good animal welfare is not only about avoiding negative experiences ~~to for animals~~, but also providing them with opportunities to have positive experiences.

Good *animal welfare* requires disease prevention and appropriate veterinary care, shelter, management and nutrition, a positively stimulating, comfortable and safe environment, humane handling and humane *slaughter* or *killing*. ~~Good animal welfare is not only about avoiding negative experiences to animals, but also providing them with positive experiences.~~ While *animal welfare* refers to the state of the *animal*, the treatment that an *animal* receives is covered by other terms such as animal care, animal husbandry, and humane treatment.

Article 7.1.2.

Guiding principles for animal welfare

- 1) ~~That~~ There is a critical relationship between animal health and *animal welfare*.
- 2) ~~That~~ While the internationally recognised “five freedoms” (freedom from hunger, thirst and malnutrition; freedom from fear and *distress*; freedom from physical and thermal discomfort; freedom from *pain*, injury and disease; and freedom to express normal patterns of behaviour) provide valuable guidance in *animal welfare*, the ‘five domains’ (nutrition, environment, health, behavioural interactions behaviour, and mental state) support the systematic scientific assessment of *animal welfare*.
- 3) ~~That~~ The internationally recognised “three Rs” (reduction in numbers of *animals*, refinement of experimental methods and replacement of *animals* with non-animal techniques) provide valuable guidance for the use of *animals* in ~~science~~ research and education.
- 4) ~~That~~ The scientific assessment of *animal welfare* involves diverse elements ~~which that~~ need to be considered together, and ~~that~~ selecting and weighing balancing these elements often involves value-based assumptions which should be made as explicit as possible.
- 5) ~~That~~ The use of *animals* in agriculture, education and research, and for companionship, recreation, work, culture cultural and entertainment purposes, makes a major contribution to the wellbeing of people.
- 6) ~~That~~ The use of *animals* carries with it an ethical responsibility to ~~ensure~~ optimise the welfare of such *animals* to the greatest extent practicable.
- 7) ~~That~~ Improvements in farm animal welfare in animal production systems can ~~often~~ improve productivity and food safety, and hence lead to economic benefits.
- 8) ~~That~~ The equivalent welfare outcomes based on performance criteria, rather than identical systems based on design criteria, ~~be~~ are the basis for comparison of *animal welfare* standards and recommendations.

Article 7.1.3.

Scientific basis for recommendations

- ~~1) Welfare is a broad term which includes the many elements that contribute to an animal's quality of life, including its physical and mental states those referred to in the "five freedoms" listed above.~~
- 1)2) The **systematic** scientific assessment of *animal welfare* has progressed rapidly in recent years and ~~forms~~ forms the basis of the recommendations of the *Terrestrial Code* for animal welfare. Welfare assessment can be either at a point in time or over a period of time such as a lifetime. There is value in using both the 'five freedoms' and 'five domains' models. The 'five domains' model allows consideration to be given to of both the degree and cumulation of positive and negative experiences over the duration of the animal's life.
- 2)3) Some measures of *animal welfare* involve assessing the degree of impaired functioning associated with injury, disease and malnutrition. Other measures provide information on *animals'* needs and positive or negative affective states ~~such as hunger, pain and fear~~, often by measuring the strength of *animals'* preferences, motivations and aversions. Others assess the physiological, **and** behavioural **and** **immunological** changes or effects that *animals* show in response to various challenges.
- 3)4) Such measures can lead to criteria and indicators that help to evaluate how different methods of managing *animals* influence their welfare.

Article 7.1.4.

Guiding principles for the use of measures to assess animal welfare

- 1) ~~the OIE WOAHP animal welfare standards to be applicable globally, they should emphasise the favourable consequences that any treatments on of animals may have on their welfare and they should be applicable globally. outcomes for the animals, although, in some circumstances, it may include recommendations on be necessary to recommend specific conditions of the animals' environment and management. Outcomes are generally measured by assessing the extent to which animals experience the "five freedoms" described in Article 7.1.2.~~
- 2) For each principle listed in Article 7.1.5., the most relevant criteria (or measurables), ideally comprising animal-based measures, defined as an evaluation of a response of an animal or as an effect on an animal used to assess its welfare, should be included in the standard. Any given animal-based measure may should be linked to one or more of these ~~than one~~ principles.
- 3) Recommendations should, whenever possible, define explicit targets or thresholds that should be met for animal-based measures. Such target values should be based on relevant science and experience of experts.
- 4) In addition to animal-based measures, ~~one may use~~ resource-based measures, defined as an evaluation of a feature of the environment in which the animal is kept or to which it is exposed and management-based measures, defined as an evaluation of what the animal handler does, and with which management processes or tools, may be used. ~~may be used and~~ The use of any of these three types of measures should be defined on the basis of science and expert experience showing that a welfare outcome is clearly linked to an animal as well as to a resource or ~~to a~~ management procedure.
- 5) ~~Users of the standard Members should select~~ The most appropriate animal-based relevant measures from among those listed in the standards should be selected for their a given farming animal production system or environment, from among those listed in the standard. Welfare Outcomes can be measured by an assessment of individuals or animal groups, or a representative sample of those, using data from establishments, transport or slaughterhouses/abattoirs. Competent Authorities should collect all data relevant for the users to set target and threshold values.
- 6) Whatever the basis of the measure, if welfare outcomes are unsatisfactory, ~~users Members relevant should consider what~~ changes to resources or management are necessary should be applied to improve the welfare outcomes.

General principles for the animal welfare of animals in animal livestock production systems

- 1) Genetic selection should always take into account the health and welfare of *animals*.
 - 2) *Animals* chosen for introduction into new environments should be suited to the local climate conditions, including their adaptability ~~and able to adapt to local climate,~~ diseases, ~~parasites~~ and nutrition.
 - 3) The physical environment, including the substrate (walking surface, resting surface, etc.), should be suited to the animal species and categories (such as type of production or life stage) so as to minimise risk of injury and ~~transmission of diseases or parasites to animals.~~
 - 4) The physical environment should allow comfortable ~~resting, and~~ safe resting and comfortable movement including normal postural changes, and the opportunity to perform ~~types of natural~~ normal patterns of behaviours that *animals* are motivated to perform.
 - 5) Social grouping of *animals* should be managed to ~~allow~~ promote positive social behaviour and minimise injury, *distress* and chronic fear.
 - 6) For housed *animals*, air quality, air flow, temperature and humidity should ~~not be aversive-detrimental and should~~ support good animal health and welfare ~~and not be aversive. Where and when extreme weather conditions occur, a~~ *Animals* should not be prevented from using their natural methods of thermo-regulation, especially where and when extreme weather conditions occur.
 - 7) *Animals* should have access to sufficient *feed* and water, suited to the *animals'* age and needs, to maintain normal health, behaviour and performance ~~productivity~~ and to prevent severe or prolonged hunger ~~and~~, thirst, malnutrition ~~and~~ or dehydration.
 - 8) Diseases ~~and parasites~~ should be prevented and controlled as much as possible through good management practices, preventative health measures and biosecurity. *Animals* with serious health problems should be isolated and treated promptly or killed humanely if treatment is not feasible or recovery is unlikely.
 - 9) Alternatives to painful procedures should be used. Where painful procedures cannot be avoided, the ~~resulting pain~~ should be managed to the extent that available methods allow.
 - 10) The handling of *animals* should foster a positive relationship between humans and *animals* and should not cause injury, panic, lasting fear or ~~avoidable stress~~ distress.
 - 11) Owners and animal handlers should have sufficient training, skills and knowledge through appropriate training or experience to ensure that *animals* are treated in accordance with these principles.
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CHAPTER 8.13.

~~INFESTATION WITH CHRYSOMYA BEZZIANA
(OLD WORLD SCREWORM) AND NEW WORLD
SCREWORM (INFESTATION WITH
COCHLIOMYIA HOMINIVORAX (NEW WORLD
SCREWORM) AND INFESTATION WITH
CHRYSOMYA BEZZIANA (OLD WORLD
SCREWORM) AND OLD WORLD SCREWORM
(CHRYSOMYA BEZZIANA)~~

Article 8.13.1.bis

General provisions

New World screwworm and Old World screwworm are obligate parasites which can infest a wide variety of mammals, including humans, and birds.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, New World screwworm is defined as an *infestation* of mammals and birds (hereafter 'animal hosts') with *Cochliomyia hominivorax*, and Old World screwworm is defined as an *infestation* of animal hosts with *Chrysomya bezziana*.

The occurrence of *infestation* with *Cochliomyia hominivorax* or *infestation* with *Chrysomya bezziana* is defined by the following: *Cochliomyia hominivorax* or *Chrysomya bezziana* has been observed and identified as such in a sample from an animal host.

Standards for diagnosis and information on the epidemiology are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

[...]

CHAPTER 8.Y.

INFECTION WITH NIPAH VIRUS

Article 8.Y.1.

General provisions

Nipah virus can infect a wide range of species, including fruit bats (reservoir) and humans, but only domestic pigs and horses are considered to play a significant role in the epidemiology of the disease in the domestic animals and humans population.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, *infection* with Nipah virus is defined as an *infection* of domestic pigs and horses and pigs (hereafter 'susceptible animal hosts') with Nipah virus.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with Nipah virus:

- 1) Nipah virus has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host~~susceptible animal~~; or
- 2) antigen or nucleic acid specific to Nipah virus has been detected in a sample from an animal host~~susceptible animal~~ showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with Nipah virus, epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with Nipah virus; or
- 3) seroconversion specific to Nipah virus, ~~which is not the consequence of vaccination~~, has been detected in an animal host~~susceptible animal~~; or
- 4) antibodies specific to Nipah virus, ~~which are not the consequence of vaccination~~, have been detected in a sample from an animal host~~susceptible animal~~ epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with Nipah virus.

Standards for diagnosis ~~and vaccines, as well as~~ and information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

CHAPTER 11.5.

INFECTION WITH *MYCOPLASMA MYCOIDES* SUBSP. *MYCOIDES* SC (CONTAGIOUS BOVINE PLEUROPNEUMONIA)

Article 11.5.1.

General provisions

~~1) For the purposes of this chapter, susceptible animals means domestic bovines (*Bos indicus*, *B. taurus*, *B. grunniens* and *Bubalus bubalis*).~~

~~121) For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, the incubation period for contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP) shall be six months.~~

~~For the purpose of this chapter, is defined as an animal infected of susceptible animals bovines (*Bos indicus*, *B. taurus*, *B. grunniens* and *Bubalus bubalis*) with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subspecies *mycoides* SC (Mmm-SC), and freedom from CBPP means freedom from Mmm SC infection.~~

~~For the purpose of this chapter, susceptible animals include bovids (*Bos indicus*, *B. taurus* and *B. grunniens*) and water buffaloes (*Bubalus bubalis*).~~

~~23) For the purposes of international trade~~ This chapter deals not only with the occurrence of clinical signs caused by MmmSC, but also with the presence of infection with MmmSC in the absence of clinical signs.

~~34) The following defines the occurrence of infection with MmmSC infection:~~

~~1a) MmmSC has been isolated and identified as such in from an animal, embryos, oocytes or semen a sample from a susceptible animal bovine; or; or~~

~~2b) Mmm deoxyribonucleic acid specific to Mmm has been detected in a sample from a susceptible animal bovine showing pathological lesions consistent with an infection with MmmSC, and or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed case; or~~

~~c) antibodies specific to MmmSC antigens, which are not the consequence of vaccination, have been detected in a sample from a susceptible animal bovine showing pathological lesions consistent with an infection with Mmm, and or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed case or MmmSC deoxyribonucleic acid have been identified in one or more animals showing pathological lesions consistent with infection with MmmSC with or without clinical signs, and epidemiological links to a confirmed outbreak of CBPP in susceptible animals.~~

~~45) For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, the incubation period shall be six months.~~

~~When authorising import or transit of the commodities listed in this chapter, with the exception of those listed in Article 11.5.2., Veterinary Authorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the CBPP status of the domestic bovids and water buffalo population of the exporting country, zone or compartment.~~

~~56) Standards for diagnosis diagnostic tests and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the Terrestrial Manual.~~

Article 11.5.2.

Safe commodities

When authorising the importation or transit of the following *commodities*, *Veterinary Authorities* should not require any CBPP-related conditions, regardless of the ~~CBPP *animal health* status of the domestic bovine, bovine and water buffalo population of the exporting country, zone or compartment:~~

- 1) *milk and milk products*;
- 2) *hides and skins*;
- 3) *meat and meat products* (excluding lung);
- 4) *protein meal*;
- 5) *rendered fat*.

Article 11.5.3.

Country or zone free from CBPP free country or zone

A country or zone may be considered free from CBPP when the relevant provisions in point 2 of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with, and when within the proposed free country or zone for at least the past 24 months:

- 1) there has been no case of infection with *Mmm*;
- 2) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of, and authority over, all herds of susceptible animals bovine;
- 3) appropriate surveillance has been implemented in accordance with:
 - a) point 2 b) of Article 1.4.6. where historical freedom can be demonstrated; or
 - b) Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. where historical freedom cannot be demonstrated;
- 4) measures to prevent the introduction of the infection have been in place: in particular, the importations or movements of bovine commodities into the country or zone have been carried out in accordance with this chapter and/or other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis'.
- 5) no vaccination or treatment against CBPP has been carried out;
- 6) no animal vaccinated or treated against CBPP have has been introduced since the cessation of vaccination.

~~To qualify for inclusion in the existing list of CBPP free countries and zones, a Member Country should:~~

- 1) ~~have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting;~~
- 2) ~~send a declaration to WOAHP stating that:~~
 - a) ~~there has been no outbreak of CBPP during the past 24 months;~~
 - b) ~~no evidence of CBPP infection has been found during the past 24 months;~~
 - c) ~~no vaccination against CBPP has been carried out during the past 24 months, and supply documented evidence that surveillance for CBPP in accordance with this chapter is in operation and that regulatory measures for the prevention and control of CBPP have been implemented;~~

- 3) ~~not have imported since the cessation of vaccination any animals vaccinated against CBPP.~~

The country or zone will be included in the list of countries or zones free from CBPP in accordance with Chapter 1.6. only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by WOA.

Retention on the list requires annual reconfirmation of compliance with all points above and the relevant provisions under point 4 of Article 1.4.6. that the information in points 2 a), 2 b), 2 c) and 3 above be re-submitted annually and Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for points 1 to 4 above. Any changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be reported notified to WOA in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1.

Article 11.5.46.

Compartment free from CBPP free compartment

The bilateral recognition of a CBPP free ~~compartment~~ should follow the principles laid down in this chapter and in Chapters 4.3. and 4.4.

A compartment free from CBPP can be established in any country or zone. In defining such a compartment the principles of Chapters 4.4. and 4.5. should be followed. Susceptible animals Bovines in the compartment should be separated from any other susceptible animals-bovines by the effective application of a biosecurity plan.

A Member Country wishing to establish a compartment free from CBPP should:

- 1) have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting and, if not free, have an official control programme and a surveillance system for CBPP in place in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. that allows knowledge of the prevalence, distribution and characteristics of CBPP in the country or zone;
- 2) declare for the free compartment that:
 - a) ~~there has been no case of CBPP during the past 24 months;~~
 - ba) no infection with Mmm has been detected occurred during the past 24 months;
 - eb) vaccination against CBPP is prohibited;
 - dc) no animal vaccinated or treated against CBPP within the past 24 months is in the compartment;
 - ed) animals, semen and embryos may only enter the compartment in accordance with relevant articles in this chapter;
 - fe) documented evidence shows that surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. is in operation;
 - gf) an animal identification and traceability system in accordance with Chapters 4.1. and 4.2. is in place;
- 3) describe in detail:
 - a) the animal subpopulation in the compartment;
 - b) the biosecurity plan to mitigate the risks identified by the surveillance carried out in accordance with point 1 notably to prevent the aerosol transmission of CBPP.

The compartment should be approved by the Veterinary Authority.

Article 11.5.5.

Country of or zone infected with *Mmm* CBPP infected country or zone

A country or zone shall be considered as infected with *Mmm* ~~When the requirements for acceptance conditions in points 1 to 6 of Article 11.5.3 as a CBPP free country or zone free from CBPP are not fulfilled met~~, a country or zone shall be considered as infected.

Article 11.5.5bis.

Establishment of a containment zone within a country or zone previously free from CBPP

In the event of outbreaks of CBPP infection with *Mmm* within a country or zone previously free from CBPP, including within a protection zone, a containment zone, which includes all epidemiologically linked outbreaks, can may be established, in accordance with Article 4.4.7., to minimise the impact on the rest of the country or zone.

For this to be achieved and for the Member Country to take full advantage of this process, the Veterinary Authority should submit as soon as possible to WOAHA, in addition to the requirements of Article 4.4.7., in support of the application, documented evidence that:

- 1) on suspicion, a strict standstill has been imposed on the suspected establishments, and in the country or zone animal movement control has been imposed and effective controls on the movement of animals and other relevant commodities are in place in the country or zone;
- 2) the infection has been confirmed and notified in accordance with Chapter 1.1.;
- 32) on confirmation, an the additional standstill and movement of susceptible animals has been imposed controls described in point 1 have been reinforced in the entire containment zone and the movement controls described in point 1 have been reinforced;
- 43) epidemiological investigations into the likely source of the outbreaks have been carried out;
- 54) a slaughter policy, with or without the use of emergency vaccination, has been applied;
- 65) surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. is in place in the containment zone and in the rest of the country or zone;
- 76) measures that prevent the spread of CBPP to the rest of the country or zone, taking into consideration physical and geographical barriers, are in place.

The free status of the areas outside the containment zone is suspended while the containment zone is being established. The free status of these areas outside the containment zone may be reinstated irrespective of the provisions of Article 11.5.4., once the containment zone has been approved by WOAHA as complying with Article 4.4.7. and points 1 to 6 7 above.

In the event of recurrence of infection with *Mmm* in the containment zone, established in accordance with point 4 a) of Article 4.4.7., the approval of the containment zone is withdrawn and the CBPP-free status of the whole country or zone is suspended until the relevant requirements of Article 11.5.46. are fulfilled.

In the event of occurrence of infection with *Mmm* in the outer zone of a containment zone established in accordance with point 4 b) of Article 4.4.7., the approval of the containment zone is withdrawn and the free status of the whole country or zone is suspended until the relevant requirements of Article 11.5.46. are fulfilled.

The recovery of the CBPP-free status of the containment zone should follow the provisions of Article 11.5.46.

Article 11.5.64.

Recovery of free status

Should an *outbreak* of CBPP occur in a previously free country or *zone*, its status may be recovered when *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. has been carried out with negative results, and 12 months after:

- 1) the *disinfection* of the last affected *establishment*, provided that a *slaughter* policy without *vaccination* has been implemented; or
- 2) the *disinfection* of the last affected *establishment* and the *slaughter* of all vaccinated animals, provided that a *slaughter* policy with emergency *vaccination* and *slaughter* of vaccinated animals has been implemented.

When a CBPP *outbreak* occurs in a CBPP free country or *zone*, one of the following waiting periods is required to regain the status of CBPP free country or *zone*:

- 1) ~~12 months after the last case where a *stamping-out* policy and serological *surveillance* and strict movement control are applied in accordance with this chapter;~~
- 2) ~~if *vaccination* was used, 12 months after the *slaughter* of the last vaccinated animal.~~
- 1) 12 months after the *slaughter* of the last case where a *slaughter* policy, without emergency *vaccination*, and *surveillance* are applied in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14.; or
- 2) 12 months after the *slaughter* of the last case and of all vaccinated animals, whichever occurred last, where a *slaughter* policy, emergency *vaccination* and *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. are applied.

The country or *zone* will regain the status of CBPP free country or *zone* only after the submitted evidence, based on the provisions of Chapter 1.10., has been accepted by WOA.

Where a *stamping-out slaughter* policy is not practised, the above waiting periods **do** not apply but Article 11.5.3. applies.

Article 11.5.7.

Recommendations for importation ~~of susceptible animals bovines~~ from CBPP free countries, or zones, or compartments free from CBPP free compartments

For domestic bovids and water buffaloes

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of shipment;
- 2) were kept in a CBPP free country, *zone* or *compartment* since birth or for at least the past six months.

Article 11.5.8.

Recommendations for importation ~~of susceptible animals bovines~~ from CBPP infected countries or zones infected with *Mmm* for immediate slaughter

For domestic bovids and water buffaloes for slaughter

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of shipment;

- 2) originate from an establishment in which surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. demonstrates that where no case of CBPP had has occurred was officially reported for during the past six months; and
- 3) are transported directly under the supervision of the Veterinary Authority in a vehicle/vessel, which was subjected to disinfection before loading, directly from the establishment of origin to the slaughterhouse/abattoir place of shipment in sealed vehicles without coming into contact with other susceptible animals bovines.

Article 11.5.9.

Recommendations for importation of bovine semen from CBPP free countries, or zones, or compartments free from CBPP free compartments

For bovine semen

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the semen;
 - b) were kept in a CBPP free country, *zone* or *compartment* since birth or for at least the past six months;
- 2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 11.5.10.

Recommendations for importation of bovine semen from CBPP infected countries or zones infected with Mmm

For bovine semen

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) were kept since birth, or for the past six months, in an establishment in which surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. demonstrates that no case of infection with Mmm has occurred during that period;
 - a~~b~~) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the semen;
 - b~~c~~) were subjected to the complement fixation a serological test for CBPP with negative results, on two occasions, with an interval of not less than 21 days and not more than 30 days between each sampling tests, the second sampling test being performed within 14 days prior to collection;
 - e~~d~~) were isolated from other domestic bovids and water buffaloes susceptible animals bovines that did not meet the same health requirements from the day of the first the complement fixation sampling for serological testing test until collection;
 - d) were kept since birth, or for the past six months, in an establishment in which surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. demonstrates that where no case of CBPP was reported had occurred during that period, and that the establishment was not situated in a CBPP infected zone;
 - e) AND EITHER:
 - i) have not been vaccinated against CBPP;

OR

- ii) ~~were vaccinated using a vaccine complying with the standards described in the *Terrestrial Manual* not more than four months prior to collection; in this case, the condition laid down in point (bc) above is not required;~~
- 2) the semen:
- a) ~~was collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.56. and 4.67.;~~
 - b) ~~was subjected to a test for the identification-detection of the agent.~~

Article 11.5.11.

Recommendations for importation of *in vivo* derived or *in vitro* produced oocytes or embryos of susceptible animals bovines from CBPP free countries, or zones, or compartments free from CBPP free compartments

~~For *in vivo* derived or *in vitro* produced oocytes or embryos of domestic bovids and water buffaloes~~

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the oocytes or embryos;
 - b) were kept in a ~~CBPP free~~ country, zone or compartment free from CBPP since birth or for at least the past six months;
- 2) the oocytes were fertilised with semen meeting the conditions of Articles 11.5.9. or 11.5.10.;
- 3) the oocytes or embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8., 4.9. and 4.10., as relevant.

Article 11.5.12.

Recommendations for importation of *in vivo* derived or *in vitro* produced oocytes or embryos of susceptible animals bovines from CBPP infected countries or zones infected with *Mmm*

~~For *in vivo* derived or *in vitro* produced oocytes or embryos of domestic bovids and water buffaloes~~

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) were kept since birth, or for the past six months, in an establishment in which surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. demonstrates that no case of infection with *Mmm* has occurred during that period;
 - ab) showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the oocytes or embryos ~~or oocytes~~;
 - bc) ~~were subjected to the complement fixation~~ a serological test for CBPP with negative results, on two occasions, with an interval of not less than 21 days and not more than 30 days between ~~each sampling tests~~, the second sampling test being performed within 14 days prior to collection;
 - ed) ~~were isolated from other domestic bovids and water buffaloes bovines that did not meet the same health requirements from the day of the first the complement fixation~~ sampling for serological testing test until collection;
 - d) ~~were kept since birth, or for the past six months, in an establishment in which surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14. demonstrates that where no case of CBPP was reported had occurred during that period, and that the establishment was not situated in a CBPP infected zone;~~
 - e) AND EITHER:

- i) have not been vaccinated against CBPP;

OR

- ii) were vaccinated ~~using a vaccine complying with the standards described in the Terrestrial Manual~~ not more than four months prior to collection; in this case, the condition laid down in point (bc) above is not required;
- 2) the oocytes were fertilised with semen meeting the conditions of Articles 11.5.9. ~~and or~~ 11.5.10.;
 - 3) the oocytes or embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8., 4.9. and 4.10., as relevant.

Article 11.5.13.

Introduction to surveillance **General principles of surveillance**

Surveillance aims at identifying infection in bovines. Articles 11.5.13. to and 11.5.14. define the principles and provide a guide for the surveillance of CBPP in accordance with Chapter 1.4. notably point 2(h)-3 of Article 1.4.3. concerning quality assurance. They are applicable to Member Countries seeking establishment of freedom from CBPP. Guidance is provided for Member Countries seeking reestablishment, maintenance or recovery of freedom from CBPP for at the entire country, or for a zone, following an outbreak or compartment level or seeking endorsement by WOAHP of their official control programme for CBPP, in accordance with Article 11.5.13. Surveillance aims at identifying infection in bovines susceptible species as indicated in Article 11.5.1.

1. Early detection

A surveillance system for early detection should be in place in accordance with Chapter 1.4. under the responsibility of the Veterinary Authority.

2. Demonstration of freedom

The impact and epidemiology of CBPP differ widely in different regions of the world and therefore it is impossible to provide specific recommendations for all situations. *Surveillance* strategies employed for demonstrating freedom from CBPP at an acceptable level of confidence should be adapted to the local situation. It is incumbent upon the applicant Member Country to submit a dossier to WOAHP in support of its application that not only explains the epidemiology of CBPP in the region concerned but also demonstrates how all the risk factors are managed. This should include provision of science scientifically based supporting data. Therefore, there is therefore considerable latitude available to Member Countries to provide a well-reasoned argument to prove that the absence of CBPP-infection with Mmm is assured at an acceptable level of confidence.

Surveillance for CBPP should be in the form of a continuing programme designed to establish that the whole territory or part of it is free from CBPP-infection.

A Member Country wishing to substantiate freedom from CBPP should demonstrate absence of infection with Mmm in bovines.

Article 11.5.14.

General conditions and methods for surveillance

3. WOAHP endorsed official control programme

Surveillance strategies employed in support of a WOAHP endorsed official control programme should demonstrate evidence of the effectiveness of any control strategy used and of the ability to rapidly detect all outbreaks of infection with Mmm-CBPP.

Considerable latitude exists for Member Countries to design and implement surveillance to establish that the whole country or a zone is free from CBPP and to understand the epidemiology of CBPP as part of the official control programme.

The Member Country should submit an application dossier to WOAHA in-supported by a dossier of its application that explains the epidemiology of CBPP in the region concerned and demonstrates how all the risk factors are identified and managed. This should include provision of scientifically science-based supporting data.

The entire investigative process should be documented within the surveillance programme. All the epidemiological information should be substantiated, and the results should be collated in the final report.

The entire investigative process should be documented within the surveillance system in accordance with Chapter 1.4. should be under the responsibility of the Veterinary Authority. A procedure should be in place for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspect cases of CBPP to a laboratory for CBPP diagnoses.

2) The CBPP surveillance programme should:

- a) include an early warning system throughout the production, marketing and processing chain for reporting suspicious cases. Farmers and workers (such as community animal health workers) who have day-to-day contact with livestock, meat inspectors as well as laboratory diagnosticians, should report promptly any suspicion of CBPP. They should be integrated directly or indirectly (e.g. through private veterinarians or veterinary para-professionals) into the surveillance system. All suspect cases of CBPP should be investigated immediately. Where suspicion cannot be resolved by the epidemiological and clinical investigation, samples should be taken and submitted to a laboratory. This requires that sampling kits information should be substantiated, and other equipment are available for those responsible for surveillance. Personnel responsible for surveillance should be able to call for assistance from a team with expertise in CBPP diagnosis and control;
- b) implement, when relevant, regular and frequent clinical inspection and testing of high-risk groups of animals, such as those adjacent to a CBPP infected country or zone (for example, areas of transhumant production systems);
- c) take into consideration additional factors such as animal movement, different production systems, geographical and socio-economic factors that may influence the risk of disease occurrence.

An effective surveillance system will periodically identify suspicious cases that require follow up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is CBPP. The rate at which such suspicious cases are likely to occur will differ between epidemiological situations and cannot therefore be predicted reliably. Applications for freedom from CBPP infection should, in consequence, provide details of the occurrence of suspicious cases and how they were investigated and dealt with. This should include the results of laboratory testing and the control measures to which the animals concerned were subjected during the investigation (quarantine, movement stand still orders, etc.). should be collated in the final report.

Article 11.5.15.

4. Surveillance strategies

1. Introduction

The target population for surveillance aimed at identifying disease and infection should cover all the susceptible species (*Bos taurus*, *B. indicus*, *B. grunniens* and *Bubalus bubalis*) within the country or zone.

Given the limitations of the diagnostic tools available, the interpretation of serological surveillance results should be at the herd level rather than at the individual animal level.

Randomised surveillance may not be the preferred approach given the epidemiology of the disease (usually uneven distribution and potential for occult foci of infection in small populations) and the limited sensitivity and specificity of currently available tests. Targeted Risk-based surveillance (e.g. based on the increased likelihood of infection in particular localities or species, focusing on slaughter findings, and active clinical surveillance) may be the most appropriate strategy. The applicant Member Country should justify the surveillance strategy chosen as adequate to detect the presence of CBPP infection with *Mmm* in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and the epidemiological situation.

Targeted Risk-based surveillance may involve testing of the entire target subpopulation or a sample from it. In the latter case the sampling strategy should incorporate an epidemiologically appropriate design prevalence. The sample size selected for testing should be large enough to detect *infection* if it were to occur at a predetermined minimum rate. The sample size and expected disease prevalence determine the level of confidence in the results of the survey. The applicant Member Country should justify the choice of design prevalence and confidence level based on the objectives of *surveillance* and the epidemiological situation, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Selection of the design prevalence in particular should be clearly based on the prevailing or historical epidemiological situation.

Regular and frequent clinical inspection and testing of high-risk groups of animals, such as those adjacent to a country or zone infected with *Mmm* (for example, areas of transhumant production systems), should be implemented when relevant.

Additional factors such as animal movement, different production systems, geographical and socio-economic factors that may influence the risk of disease introduction and occurrence should be taken into consideration.

Irrespective of the survey design selected, the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests employed are key factors in the design, sample size determination and interpretation of the results obtained. ~~Ideally, the sensitivity and specificity of the tests used should be validated.~~

5. Follow-up of suspected cases and interpretation of results

An effective *surveillance* system will identify suspected cases that require immediate follow-up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is an *infection* with *Mmm*. Samples should be taken and submitted for diagnostic testing, unless the suspected case can be confirmed or ruled out by epidemiological and clinical investigation. Details of the occurrence of suspected cases and how they were investigated and dealt with should be documented. This should include the results of diagnostic testing and the measures applied to the animals concerned during the investigation.

~~Irrespective of the surveillance system employed, the design should anticipate the occurrence of false positive laboratory results.~~ The surveillance system employed, the design should anticipate the occurrence of false positive reactions. If the characteristics of the testing system are known, the rate at which these false positives are likely to occur can be calculated in advance. There should be an effective procedure for following-up positives to ultimately determine, with a high level of confidence, whether or not they are indicative of *infection* or not. This should involve follow-up with supplementary tests, clinical and follow-up investigation and post-mortem examination in to collect diagnostic material from the original sampling epidemiological unit as well as and herds which may be epidemiologically linked to it.

Laboratory results should be examined in the context of the epidemiological situation.

Article 11.5.14.

Methods of surveillance

1. Clinical surveillance

Clinical *surveillance* aims at detecting clinical signs of CBPP in a herd by ~~close a thorough~~ physical examination of ~~susceptible animals bovines~~. Clinical inspection is an important component of CBPP *surveillance* contributing to reaching the desired level of confidence of detection of disease if a sufficiently large number of ~~clinically susceptible animals bovines~~ is/are examined.

~~Clinical surveillance and laboratory testing should always be applied in series to clarify the status of CBPP suspects detected by either of these complementary diagnostic approaches. Laboratory testing and post-mortem examination may contribute to confirm clinical suspicion, while clinical surveillance may contribute to confirmation of positive serology. Any sampling unit within which suspicious animals are detected should be classified as infected until contrary evidence is produced.~~

32. Pathological surveillance

Systematic pathological *surveillance* for CBPP is the most effective approach and should be conducted at ~~slaughterhouses/abattoirs and other slaughter facilities~~. Suspect pathological findings should be confirmed by agent identification. Training courses for *slaughter* personnel and *meat* inspectors are highly recommended.

4. ~~Serological~~ 3. Laboratory testing

Serological *surveillance* is not the preferred strategy for CBPP. However, in the framework of epidemiological investigations, serological testing may be used.

The limitations of available serological tests for CBPP make the interpretation of results difficult and useful only at the *herd* level. Positive findings should be followed up by clinical and pathological investigations and agent identification.

Clustering of seropositive reactions should be expected in CBPP *infections* and is usually accompanied by clinical signs. As clustering may signal field strain *infection*, the investigation of all instances should be incorporated into the *surveillance* strategy.

Following the identification of a CBPP infected *herd*, contact *herds* should be tested serologically. Repeated testing may be necessary to reach an acceptable level of confidence in *herd* classification.

5. Agent surveillance

Agent *surveillance* should be conducted to follow up and confirm or exclude *infection with Mmm*. ~~suspect cases. Isolates should be typed to confirm MmmSC.~~

~~Article 11.5.16.~~

~~Countries or zones applying for recognition of freedom from CBPP~~

~~In addition to the general conditions described in this chapter, a Member Country applying for recognition of CBPP freedom for the country or a zone should provide evidence for the existence of an effective *surveillance* programme. The strategy and design of the *surveillance* programme depend on the prevailing epidemiological circumstances and should be planned and implemented in accordance with general conditions and methods in this chapter, to demonstrate absence of CBPP *infection*, during the preceding 24 months in susceptible populations. This requires the support of a national or other *laboratory* able to undertake identification of CBPP *infection*.~~

~~Article 11.5.17.~~

~~Countries or zones re-applying for recognition of freedom from CBPP following an outbreak~~

~~In addition to the general conditions described in this chapter, a Member Country re-applying for recognition of country or zone freedom from CBPP should show evidence of an active *surveillance* programme for CBPP, following the recommendations of this chapter.~~

~~Two strategies are recognised by WOAHP in a programme to eradicate CBPP *infection* following an *outbreak*:~~

- ~~1) *slaughter* of all clinically affected and in contact susceptible animals;~~
- ~~2) *vaccination* used without subsequent *slaughter* of vaccinated animals.~~

~~The time periods before which an application can be made for re-instatement of freedom from CBPP depends on which of these alternatives is followed. The time periods are prescribed in Article 11.5.4.~~

~~Article 11.5.15-18.~~

WOAH endorsed official control programme for CBPP

The overall objective of a WOAHP endorsed *official control programme* for CBPP is for Member Countries to progressively improve their situation and eventually attain CBPP free status. The *official control programme* should be applicable to the entire country even if certain measures are directed towards defined subpopulations.

A Member Country~~ies~~ may, on a voluntary basis, apply for endorsement of ~~their~~ its official control programme for CBPP in accordance with Chapter 1.6., when ~~they have~~ it has implemented measures in accordance with this article.

For an *official control programme* for CBPP to be endorsed by WOA, the Member Country should provide a detailed official control programme for the control and eventual eradication of CBPP in the country or zone. This document should address and provide documented evidence on the following:

- 1) epidemiology:
 - a) the detailed epidemiological situation of CBPP in the country, highlighting the current knowledge and gaps;
 - b) the main production systems and movement patterns of ~~susceptible animals~~ bovines and their products within and into the country and, where applicable, the specific zone;
- 2) surveillance and diagnostic capabilities:
 - a) CBPP surveillance in place, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and Articles 11.5.13. and 11.5.14.;
 - b) diagnostic capability and procedures, including regular submission of samples to a laboratory that performs diagnostic testing and further characterisation of strains in accordance with the *Terrestrial Manual* including procedures to isolate and identify *Mmm*;
- 3) vaccination (if practised as part of the official control programme for CBPP):
 - a) vaccination is in accordance with Chapter 4.18. and compulsory in the target population;
 - b) detailed information on vaccination campaigns, in particular:
 - i) the strategy that is adopted for the vaccination campaign;
 - ii) target populations for vaccination;
 - iii) target geographical area for vaccination;
 - iv) monitoring of vaccination coverage, including serological monitoring of population immunity;
 - v) the strategy to identify vaccinated animals;
 - vi) technical specification of the vaccines used and description of the vaccine licensing procedures in place;
 - vii) use of vaccines fully compliant with the standards and methods described in the *Terrestrial Manual*;
 - viii) the proposed strategy and work plan including the timeline for transition to the cessation of vaccination;
- 4) the measures implemented to prevent the introduction of the pathogenic agent and to ensure the rapid detection of all CBPP outbreaks;
- 5) an emergency preparedness plan and an emergency response plan to be implemented in case of CBPP outbreaks;
- 6) work plan and timelines of the official control programme;
- 7) performance indicators for assessing the effectiveness of the control measures to be implemented;
- 8) monitoring, evaluation and review of the official control programme to demonstrate the effectiveness of the strategies.

- 1) ~~have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1.;~~
- 2) ~~submit documented evidence of the capacity of Veterinary Services to control CBPP; this evidence can be provided by countries following the WOAHPVS Pathway;~~
- 3) ~~submit a detailed plan of the programme to control and eventually eradicate CBPP in the country or zone including:~~
 - a) ~~the timeline;~~
 - b) ~~the performance indicators for assessing the efficacy of the control measures to be implemented;~~
 - e) ~~submit documentation indicating that the official control programme for CBPP has been implemented and is applicable to the entire territory;~~
- 4) ~~submit a dossier on the epidemiology of CBPP in the country describing the following:~~
 - a) ~~the general epidemiology in the country highlighting the current knowledge and gaps;~~
 - b) ~~the measures to prevent introduction of infection, the rapid detection of, and response to, all CBPP outbreaks in order to reduce the incidence of CBPP outbreaks and to eliminate CBPP in at least one zone in the country;~~
 - e) ~~the main livestock production systems and movement patterns of CBPP susceptible animals and their products within and into the country;~~
- 5) ~~submit evidence that CBPP surveillance is in place,~~
 - a) ~~taking into account provisions in Chapter 1.4. and the provisions on surveillance of this chapter;~~
 - b) ~~have diagnostic capability and procedures, including regular submission of samples to a laboratory that carries out diagnosis and further characterisation of strains in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual including procedures to isolate and identify *M. mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* SC as opposed to *M. mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* LC;~~
- 6) ~~where vaccination is practised as a part of the official control programme for CBPP, provide:~~
 - a) ~~evidence (such as copies of legislation) that vaccination of selected populations is compulsory;~~
 - b) ~~detailed information on vaccination campaigns, in particular on:~~
 - i) ~~target populations for vaccination;~~
 - ii) ~~monitoring of vaccination coverage;~~
 - iii) ~~technical specification of the vaccines used and description of the licensing procedures in place;~~
 - iv) ~~the proposed timeline and strategy for the cessation of vaccination;~~
- 7) ~~provide an emergency preparedness and contingency response plan to be implemented in case of CBPP outbreaks.~~

The Member Country's *official control programme* for CBPP will be included in the list of programmes endorsed by WOAHP only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by WOAHP.

The country will be included in the list of countries having a WOAHP endorsed *official control programme* for CBPP in accordance with Chapter 1.6.

Retention on the list requires an annual update on the progress of the *official control programme* and information on significant changes concerning the points above. ~~Changes in the epidemiological situation and other significant events should be reported to WOAH in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1.~~

~~WOAH may withdraw the endorsement of the *official control programme* if there is evidence of:~~

- ~~– non-compliance with the timelines or performance indicators of the programme; or~~
 - ~~– significant problems with the performance of the *Veterinary Services*; or~~
 - ~~– an increase in the incidence of CBPP that cannot be addressed by the programme.~~
-

CHAPTER 11.X.

INFECTION WITH BOVINE PESTIVIRUSES
(BOVINE VIRAL DIARRHOEA)

Article 11.X.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, bovine viral diarrhoea is defined as an *infection* of bovines (*Bos taurus*, *Bos indicus* and *Bubalus bubalis*) ~~(hereafter 'susceptible animals')~~ with bovine viral diarrhoea virus type 1 (~~pestivirus A, *Pestivirus bovis*~~), type 2 (~~pestivirus B, *Pestivirus tauri*~~), and/or type 3 (~~pestivirus H, *Pestivirus brazilense*~~) (hereinafter 'bovine pestiviruses').

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with bovine pestiviruses:

- 1) A bovine pestivirus, excluding vaccine strains, has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from a ~~susceptible animal~~ bovine; or
- 2) antigen or ~~ribonucleic acid~~ specific to a bovine pestivirus, excluding vaccine strains, has been detected in a sample from a ~~susceptible animal~~ bovine.

Standards for ~~diagnosis, diagnostic tests and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology~~, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

CHAPTER 12.1.

INFECTION WITH AFRICAN HORSE SICKNESS VIRUS

Article 12.1.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, African horse sickness (AHS) is defined as an *infection* of equids with African horse sickness virus (AHSV).

The following defines the occurrence of an *infection* with AHSV:

- 1) AHSV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an equid ~~or a product derived from that equid~~; or
- 2) ~~antigen or ribonucleic acid specific to AHSV has been identified~~ detected in a samples from an equid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with AHS, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected ~~or confirmed~~ case; or
- 3) ~~serological evidence of active infection with AHSV by detection of seroconversion due to recent exposure to with production of antibodies against structural or nonstructural proteins of AHSV, that are which is not a the consequence of vaccination, have has been identified~~ detected in a paired samples from an equid that either showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with AHS, or is epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected ~~or confirmed~~ case.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *infective period* for AHS is 40 days ~~for domestic horses. Although critical information is lacking for some species, this chapter applies to all Equidae.~~

All countries or ~~zones~~ adjacent to a country or ~~zone~~ not having free status should determine their AHSV status from an ongoing *surveillance* programme. Throughout the chapter, *surveillance* is in all cases understood as being conducted as described in Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13.

Standards for diagnosis diagnostic tests and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 12.1.1bis.

Safe commodities

When authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities, *Veterinary Authorities* should not require any AHS-related conditions regardless of the *animal health status* of the *exporting country or zone*:

- 1) milk and milk products;
- 2) meat and meat products;
- 3) hides and skins;
- 4) hooves;
- 5) gelatine and collagen;

~~6) sterile filtered horse serum;~~

~~76) protein meal;~~

~~87) rendered fat.~~

Article 12.1.2.

AHS-free ~~e~~Country or zone free from AHS

4) A country or zone may be considered free from AHS when the relevant provisions in point 2 a) of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with, and when within the proposed free country or zone: infection with AHSV is notifiable in the whole country, systematic vaccination is prohibited, importation of equids and their semen, oocytes or embryos are carried out in accordance with this chapter, and either:

1) for at least the past 24 months:

a) the Veterinary Authority has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domestic and captive wild equids in the country or zone;

b) the Veterinary Authority has current knowledge of the distribution, habitat and indication of disease occurrence through passive surveillance of wild and feral equids in the country or zone;

c) either:

i) there has been no case of infection with AHSV and the country or zone is not adjacent to an infected country or zone; or

ii) a surveillance programme has demonstrated no evidence of *Culicoides* in accordance with Chapter 1.5.;

d) appropriate surveillance has been implemented in accordance with:

i) point 2 b) of Article 1.4.6. where historical freedom can be demonstrated; or

ii) Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13. where historical freedom cannot be demonstrated; or

iii) Chapter 1.5. where a surveillance programme has demonstrated no evidence of *Culicoides*.

e) if adjacent to an infected country or zone, includes an area in which surveillance is conducted in accordance with Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13.;

f) measures to prevent the introduction of the infection have been in place: in particular, the importations or movements of commodities into the country or zone have been carried out in accordance with this chapter ~~or~~ and other relevant chapters of the Terrestrial Code, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis'.

2) no systematic vaccination against AHS has been carried out for at least the past 12 months.

a) historical freedom as described in Chapter 1.4. has demonstrated no evidence of AHSV in the country or zone; or

b) the country or zone has not reported any case of AHS for at least two years and is not adjacent to an infected country or zone; or

e) a surveillance programme has demonstrated no evidence of AHSV in the country or zone for at least two years; or

- d) ~~the country or zone has not reported any case of AHS for at least 40 days and a surveillance programme has demonstrated no evidence of *Culicoides* for at least two years in the country or zone.~~
- 2) ~~An AHS free country or zone which is adjacent to an infected country or zone should include a zone in which surveillance is conducted in accordance with Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13., as relevant.~~
- 3) ~~An AHS free country or zone will not lose its free status through the importation of seropositive or vaccinated equids and their semen, oocytes or embryos from infected countries or zones, provided these imports are carried out in accordance with this chapter.~~
- 4) ~~To qualify for inclusion in the list of AHS free countries or zones, a Member Country should:~~
 - a) ~~have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting;~~
 - b) ~~send a declaration to the OIE stating:~~
 - i) ~~the section under point 1) on which the application is based;~~
 - ii) ~~no routine vaccination against AHS has been carried out during the past year in the country or zone;~~
 - iii) ~~equids are imported in accordance with this chapter;~~
 - e) ~~supply documented evidence that:~~
 - i) ~~surveillance in accordance with Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13. is applied, unless historically free in accordance with Article 1.4.6.;~~
 - ii) ~~regulatory measures for the early detection, prevention and control of infection with AHSV have been implemented.~~
- 5) ~~The Member Country will be included in the list only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by the OIE.~~

The country or zone will be included in the list of countries or zones free from AHS in accordance with Chapter 1.6.

Retention on the list requires annual reconfirmation of compliance with all points above and relevant provisions under point 4 of Article 1.4.6. that the information in points 4 b) ii) and iii) and 4 c) above be annually re-submitted and Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for point 1 above. Any changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be reported notified to WOAHA in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1., and in particular, formally state that:

- a) ~~there has been no outbreak of AHS during the past year in the country or zone;~~
- b) ~~no evidence of infection with AHSV has been found during the past year in the country or zone.~~

Article 12.1.3.

AHS infected country or zone infected with AHSV

A country or zone shall be considered as infected with AHSV. For the purposes of this chapter, an AHS infected country or zone is one that does not fulfil when the requirements for acceptance as a country or zone free from AHS conditions in points 1 and 2 of Article 12.1.2 are not fulfilled met to qualify as AHS free.

Establishment of a containment zone within a an AHS free country or zone previously free from AHS

In the event of ~~limited outbreaks of AHS~~ within an ~~AHS free country or zone previously free from AHS~~, including within a protection zone, a single containment zone, which includes all epidemiologically linked outbreaks, ~~can may be established, in accordance with Article 4.4.7., for the purpose of to minimising the impact on the entire rest of the country or zone. Such a zone should include all cases and can be established within a protection zone.~~

For this to be achieved ~~and for the Member Country to take full advantage of this process~~, the Veterinary Authority should provide submit as soon as possible to WOAHP, in addition to the requirements of Article 4.4.7., in support of the application, documented evidence that:

- 1) the outbreaks have been contained ~~are limited~~ based on the following factors:
 - a) ~~immediately on suspicion, a rapid response has been implemented, including notification reporting, standstill of movements of equids and effective controls of the movements of equine commodities~~ has been made on suspicion, a standstill has been imposed on the suspected establishments and effective controls on the movement of equids animals and other equid-related commodities are in place in the country or zone;
 - b) the infection has been confirmed and notified in accordance with Chapter 1.1.;
 - ~~cb) standstill of movements of equids has been imposed, and effective controls on the movement of equids and their products specified in this chapter are in place on confirmation, the standstill and movement controls described in point 1(a) have been reinforced;~~
 - e) epidemiological investigation (trace-back, trace-forward) has been completed;
 - ~~cd) the infection has been confirmed and notified in accordance with Chapter 1.1;~~
 - de) epidemiological investigations on into the likely source of the outbreak have been carried out;
 - f) ~~all cases have been shown to be epidemiologically linked;~~
 - eg) no new cases have been found in the containment zone within a minimum of two infective periods as defined in Article 12.1.1.;
- 2) ~~the equids within the containment zone are clearly identifiable as belonging to the containment zone;~~
- 2) increased passive and targeted surveillance in accordance with Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13. in the rest of the country or zone has not detected any evidence of *infection*;
- 3) ~~animal health~~ measures are in place to effectively prevent the spread of **AHS AHSV infection** to the rest of the country or zone, taking into consideration the establishment of a protection zone within the containment zone, the seasonal *vector* conditions and existing physical, geographical and ecological barriers;
- 4) ongoing surveillance in accordance with Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13. is in place in the containment zone.

~~The free status of the areas outside the containment zone is suspended while the containment zone is being established in accordance with points 1) to 5) above. The free status of the areas of outside the containment zone is suspended while the containment zone is being established. The free status of these areas outside the containment zone may be reinstated irrespective of Article 12.1.5. once the containment zone has been approved is recognised by the WOAHP as complying with points 1 to 4 above.~~

In the event of the recurrence of AHSV infection with AHSV in the *containment zone*, established in accordance with point 4 a) of Article 4.4.7., the approval of the *containment zone* is withdrawn and the AHS free status of the whole country or zone is suspended until the relevant requirements of Article 12.1.5. are fulfilled.

In the event of occurrence of infection with AHSV in the outer zone of a *containment zone* established in accordance with point 4 b) of Article 4.4.7., the approval of the *containment zone* is withdrawn and the free status of the whole country or zone is suspended until the relevant requirements of Article 12.1.5. are fulfilled.

The recovery of the AHS free status of the *containment zone* should follow Article 12.1.5.

Article 12.1.5.

Recovery of free status

~~To regain free status when an AHS outbreak occurs in a country or zone previously free, Article 12.1.2. applies, irrespective of whether emergency vaccination has been applied or not.~~

Should an outbreak of AHS occur in a previously free country or zone, its status may be recovered in accordance with Article 12.1.2., irrespective of whether emergency vaccination has been applied or not.

The AHS free status of the country or zone will be reinstated only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by the WOA.

Article 12.1.6.

Recommendations for importation of equids from AHS free countries or zones

For equids

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of AHS on the day of shipment;
- 2) have not been vaccinated against AHS within the last 40 days;
- 3) were kept in an AHS free country or zone since birth or for at least 40 days prior to shipment;
- 4) either:
 - a) did not transit through an infected zone during transportation to the *place of shipment*; or
 - b) were protected from *Culicoides* attacks at all times when transiting through an infected zone.

Article 12.1.7.

Recommendations for importation of equids from AHS infected countries or zones

For equids

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of AHS on the day of shipment;
- 2) have not been vaccinated against AHS within the last 40 days;

- 3) were held in isolation in a *vector*-protected *establishment*:
 - a) for a period of at least 28 days and a serological test to detect antibodies against ~~the AHSV group~~, was carried out with a negative result on a blood sample collected at least 28 days after introduction into the *vector*-protected *establishment*; or
 - b) for a period of at least 40 days and serological tests to detect antibodies against AHSV were carried out with no significant increase in antibody titre on blood samples collected on two occasions, with an interval of not less than 21 days, the first sample being collected at least 7 days after introduction into the *vector*-protected *establishment*; or
 - c) for a period of at least 14 days and an ~~agent identification~~ test for the identification-detection of the agent was carried out with a negative result on a blood sample collected not less than 14 days after introduction into the *vector*-protected *establishment*; or
 - d) for a period of at least 40 days and were vaccinated, at least 40 days before shipment, against all serotypes whose presence in the source population has been demonstrated through a *surveillance* programme in accordance with Articles 12.1.12. and 12.1.13., and were identified in the accompanying certification as having been vaccinated;
- 4) were protected from *Culicoides* attacks at all times during transportation (including transportation to and at the *place of shipment*).

Article 12.1.8.

Recommendations for the importation of equine semen

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the donor animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of AHS on the day of collection of the semen and for the following 40 days;
- 2) had not been ~~immunised~~ vaccinated against AHS with a live attenuated vaccine within 40 days prior to the day of collection;
- 3) were either:
 - a) kept in an AHS free country or *zone* for at least 40 days before commencement of, and during collection of the semen; or
 - b) kept in an AHS free *vector*-protected *artificial insemination centre* throughout the collection period, and subjected to either:
 - i) a serological test to detect antibodies against ~~the AHSV group~~, carried out with a negative result on a blood sample collected at least 28 days and not more than 90 days after the last collection of semen; or
 - ii) ~~agent identification~~ tests for the identification-detection of the agent, carried out with negative results on blood samples collected at commencement and conclusion of, and at least every seven days, during semen collection for this consignment.

Article 12.1.9.

Recommendations for the importation of *in vivo* derived equine oocytes or embryos

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) showed no clinical sign of AHS on the day of collection of the oocytes or embryos and for the following 40 days;
 - b) had not been ~~immunised~~ vaccinated against AHS with a live attenuated vaccine within 40 days prior to the day of collection;
 - c) were either:
 - i) kept in an AHS free country or *zone* for at least 40 days before commencement of, and during collection of the oocytes or embryos, or
 - ii) kept in an AHS free *vector*-protected *collection centre* throughout the collection period, and subjected to either:
 - a serological test to detect antibodies against ~~the AHSV-group~~ carried out with a negative result on a blood sample collected at least 28 days and not more than 90 days after the last collection of oocytes or embryos; or
 - ~~agent identification tests for the identification-detection of the agent~~ carried out with negative results on blood samples collected at commencement and conclusion of, and at least every seven days during oocytes or embryos collection for this consignment;
- 2) the embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8. and 4.10., as relevant;
- 3) the semen used to fertilise the oocytes complies ~~at least~~ with the requirements in Article 12.1.8.

Article 12.1.10.

Protecting animals from *Culicoides* attacks

1. Vector-protected establishment or facility

The *establishment* or facility should be approved by the *Veterinary Authority* and the means of protection should at least comprise the following:

- a) appropriate physical barriers at entry and exit points, for example a double-door entry-exit system;
- b) vector screening of openings of the establishment or facility building ~~are vector screened~~ with mesh of appropriate gauge impregnated regularly with an approved insecticide in accordance with the instructions of the manufacturer;
- c) *vector surveillance* and control within and around the establishment or facility building;
- d) measures to limit or eliminate breeding sites for *vectors* in the vicinity of the *establishment* or facility;
- e) a ~~S~~standard ~~O~~perating ~~P~~rocedure, including a description of back-up and alarm systems, for operation of the *establishment* or facility and transport of equids to the place of *loading*.

2. During transportation

When ~~equids are transported~~ equids through AHS infected countries or *zones*, *Veterinary Authorities* should require that they are strategies to protect ~~animals from~~ *Culicoides* attacks ~~during transport~~, taking into account the local ecology of the *vector*.

- a) Transport by ~~road~~ land

Potential *risk management* strategies include a combination of:

- i) treating animals with chemical repellents prior to and during transportation, in sanitized *vehicles* treated with appropriate residual contact insecticide;
 - ii) *loading*, transporting and *unloading* animals at times of low *vector* activity (i.e. bright sunshine and low temperature);
 - iii) ensuring *vehicles* do not stop en route during dawn or dusk, or overnight, unless the *animals* are held behind insect-proof netting;
 - iv) darkening the interior of the *vehicle*, for example by covering the roof or sides of *vehicles* with shade cloth;
 - v) surveillance for *vectors* at common stopping and offloading points to gain information on seasonal variations;
 - vi) using historical, ongoing or modelling information on AHS to identify low-risk ports and transport routes.
- b) Transport by air

Prior to *loading* the equids, the crates, *containers* or jet stalls are sprayed with an insecticide approved for the control of *Culicoides* species in the country of dispatch.

Crates, *containers* or jet stalls in which equids are being transported and the cargo hold of the aircraft should be sprayed with an approved insecticide when the doors have been closed and prior to take off. All possible insect harbourage should be treated. The insecticide sprayers ~~containers~~ should be retained for inspection on arrival.

In addition, during any stopover in countries or ~~zones not free from infected with AHSV~~, prior to the opening of any aircraft door and until all doors are closed, netting of appropriate gauge impregnated with an approved insecticide should be placed over all crates, *containers* or jet stalls.

Article 12.1.11.

Introduction to surveillance

Articles 12.1.11. to 12.1.13. define the principles and provide guidance on *surveillance* for AHS, complementary to Chapter 1.4. and, for *vectors*, complementary to Chapter 1.5.

AHS is a *vector-borne infection* transmitted by ~~a limited number of some~~ species of *Culicoides* ~~insects~~. ~~Unlike the related bluetongue virus, AHSV is so far geographically restricted to sub-Saharan Africa with periodic excursions into North Africa, southwest Europe, the Middle East and adjacent regions of Asia. An important component of AHSV epidemiology is vectorial capacity which provides a measure of disease risk that incorporates vector competence, abundance, seasonal incidence, biting rates, survival rates and the extrinsic incubation period. However, methods and tools for measuring some of these vector factors remain to be developed, particularly in a field context.~~

According to this chapter, ~~a~~ Member Country demonstrating freedom from *infection* with AHSV for the entire country or a *zone* should provide evidence for the existence of an effective *surveillance* programme. The strategy and design of the *surveillance* programme will depend on the prevailing epidemiological circumstances and should be planned and implemented in accordance with general conditions and methods described in this chapter. This requires the support of a *laboratory* able to undertake identification of *infection* with AHSV through ~~the virus detection tests for the detection of the agent~~ and antibody detection tests.

Susceptible *captive wild*, *feral* and *wild* equine populations should be included in the *surveillance* programme.

The purpose of *surveillance* is to determine ~~if whether~~ a country or *zone* is free from AHS. *Surveillance* deals not only with the occurrence of clinical signs caused by AHSV, but also with evidence of *infection* with AHSV in the absence of clinical signs.

Article 12.1.12.

General conditions and methods for surveillance

- 1) A *surveillance* system should be under the responsibility of the *Veterinary Authority*. In particular the following should be in place:
 - a) a formal and ongoing system for detecting and investigating *outbreaks* of disease;
 - b) a procedure for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspected *cases* of AHS to a *laboratory* for diagnosis;
 - c) a system for recording, managing and analysing diagnostic, epidemiological and *surveillance* data.
- 2) In a free country or *zone*, the *surveillance* programme for AHS should include an *early warning system* for reporting suspected *cases*. Persons who have regular contact with equids, as well as diagnosticians, should report promptly any suspicion of AHS to the *Veterinary Authority*. An effective *surveillance* system will periodically identify suspected *cases* that require follow-up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is AHS. The rate at which such suspected *cases* are likely to occur will differ ~~between~~ among epidemiological situations and cannot therefore be predicted reliably. All suspected *cases* of AHS should be investigated immediately and samples should be taken and submitted to a *laboratory*. This requires that sampling kits and other equipment be available to those responsible for *surveillance*.
- 3) In a free country or *zone* bordering adjacent to an infected country or *zone*, *surveillance* based upon taking into account geography, climate, history of *infection* and other relevant factors should be carried out over an appropriate distance of at least 100 kilometres from the border with the infected country or *zone*; a lesser distance could be acceptable if there are relevant ecological or geographical features likely to interrupt the transmission of AHSV.
- 4) In an AHS infected country or *zone*, random or targeted serological and virological *surveillance*, appropriate to the epidemiological situation, should be conducted in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

Article 12.1.13.

Surveillance strategies

The target population for *surveillance* aimed at identification of disease or *infection* should cover equids within the country or *zone*. ~~Active and p~~Passive *surveillance* for *infection* with AHSV should be ongoing in all countries, –while active S*surveillance* should be ongoing in countries not having a free status or having identified specific risks of introduction. Surveillance should be composed of random or targeted approaches using virological, serological and clinical methods appropriate to the epidemiological situation.

A Member Country should justify the *surveillance* strategy chosen as appropriate to detect the presence of *infection* with AHSV in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and the prevailing epidemiological situation. It may, for example, be appropriate to target clinical *surveillance* ~~at particular towards those species most~~ likely to exhibit clinical signs (e.g. horses). Similarly, virological and serological testing may be targeted ~~to towards~~ species that rarely show clinical signs (e.g. donkeys).

In vaccinated populations serological and virological *surveillance* is necessary to detect the AHSV types circulating to ensure that all circulating types are included in the *vaccination* programme.

Serological or virological *surveillance* is also needed to detect subclinical *infections* in free countries or *zones* adjacent to countries or *zones* in which live attenuated AHS vaccines are used.

For random surveys, the design of the sampling strategy should incorporate epidemiologically appropriate design prevalence. The sample size selected for testing should be large enough to detect *infection* if it were to occur at a predetermined minimum rate. The sample size, expected prevalence and diagnostic sensitivity of the tests determine the level of confidence in the results of the survey. The Member Country should justify the choice of design prevalence and confidence level based on the objectives of *surveillance* and the epidemiological situation, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Selection of the design prevalence, in particular, should be based on the prevailing or historical epidemiological situation.

Irrespective of the survey approach selected, the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests employed are key factors in the design, sample size determination and interpretation of the results obtained. Ideally, the sensitivity and specificity of the tests used should be validated for the *vaccination* or *infection* history and the different species in the target population.

Irrespective of the testing system employed, *surveillance* system design should anticipate the occurrence of false positive reactions. If the characteristics of the testing system are known, the rate at which these false positives are likely to occur can be calculated in advance. There should be an effective procedure for following up positives to ultimately determine with a high level of confidence, whether they are indicative of *infection* or not. This should involve both supplementary tests and follow-up investigation to collect diagnostic material from the original sampling unit as well as those which may be epidemiologically linked to it.

The principles for *surveillance* for disease or *infection* are technically well defined. *Surveillance* programmes to prove the absence of AHSV *infection* or transmission, should be carefully designed to avoid producing results that are insufficiently reliable to be accepted by WOAHP for official recognition of status. The design of any *surveillance* programme, therefore, requires inputs from professionals competent and experienced in this field.

1. Clinical surveillance

Clinical *surveillance* aims at the detection of clinical signs of AHS in equids particularly during a newly introduced *infection*. In horses, clinical signs may include pyrexia, oedema, hyperaemia of mucous membranes and dyspnoea.

Suspected cases detected by clinical *surveillance* should always be confirmed by *laboratory* testing.

2. Serological surveillance

Serological *surveillance* of equine populations is an important tool to confirm absence of AHSV transmission in a country or *zone*. The species tested should reflect the local epidemiology of *infection* with AHSV, and the equine species available. Surveillance plans should include consideration of species that display clinical signs less commonly, such as donkeys or zebras. Management variables that may reduce the likelihood of *infection*, such as the use of insecticides and animal housing, should be taken into account when selecting equids to be included in the *surveillance* system.

Samples should be examined for antibodies against AHSV. Positive AHSV antibody tests results can have four possible causes:

- a) natural *infection* with AHSV;
- b) *vaccination* against AHS;
- c) maternal antibodies;
- d) lack of specificity of the test.

Sera collected for other purposes may be used for AHSV *surveillance*. However, the principles of survey design described in these recommendations and the requirements for a statistically valid survey for the presence of *infection* with AHSV should not be compromised.

The results of random or targeted serological surveys are important in providing reliable evidence that no *infection* with AHSV is present in a country or *zone*. It is, therefore, essential that the survey is thoroughly documented. It is critical to interpret the results in light of the movement history of the animals being sampled.

Serological *surveillance* in a free *zone* should target those areas that are at highest risk of AHSV transmission, based on the results of previous *surveillance* and other information. This will usually be towards the boundaries of the free *zone*. In view of the epidemiology of AHSV, either random or targeted sampling is suitable to select *herds* or animals for testing.

~~Serological *surveillance* in a free country or *zone* should be carried out over an appropriate distance from the border with an infected country or *zone*, based upon geography, climate, history of *infection* and other relevant factors. The *surveillance* should be carried out over a distance of at least 100 kilometres from the border with that country or *zone*, but a lesser distance could be acceptable if there are relevant ecological or geographical features likely to interrupt the transmission of AHSV. An AHS free country or *zone* may be protected from an adjacent infected country or *zone* by a *protection zone*.~~

~~Serological *surveillance* in infected *zones* will identify changes in support the definition of the boundaries of the an *infected zone*, and can also be used to identify the AHSV types circulating. In view of the epidemiology of *infection* with AHSV, either random or targeted sampling is suitable.~~

3. Virological surveillance

Isolation and genetic analysis of AHSV from a proportion of infected animals is beneficial in terms of providing information on serotype and genetic characteristics of the viruses concerned.

Virological *surveillance* can be conducted:

- a) to identify virus transmission in ~~at-at~~ risk populations;
- b) to confirm clinically suspected cases;
- c) to follow up positive serological results;
- d) to better characterise the genotype of circulating virus in a country or *zone*.

4. Sentinel animals

Sentinel animals programmes are a form of targeted *surveillance* with a prospective study design. They comprise groups of unexposed equids that have not been vaccinated and are managed at fixed locations and observed and tested regularly to detect new *infections* with AHSV.

The primary purpose of a sentinel equid animal programme is to detect *infections* with AHSV occurring at a particular place, for instance sentinel groups may be located on the boundaries of infected *zones* to detect changes in distribution of AHSV. In addition, sentinel equid animal programmes allow the timing and dynamics of *infections* to be observed.

A sentinel equid animal programme should use animals of known source and history of exposure, control management variables such as use of insecticides and animal housing (depending on the epidemiology of AHSV in the area under consideration), and be flexible in its design in terms of sampling frequency and choice of tests.

Care is necessary in choosing the sites for the sentinel groups. The aim is to maximise the chance of detecting AHSV activity at the geographical location for which the sentinel site acts as a sampling point. The effect of secondary factors that may influence events at each location, such as climate, may also be analysed. To avoid confounding factors sentinel groups should comprise animals selected to be of similar age and susceptibility to *infection* with AHSV. The only feature distinguishing groups of sentinels should be their geographical location. Sera from sentinel animal programmes should be stored methodically in a serum bank to allow retrospective studies to be conducted in the event of new serotypes being isolated.

The frequency of sampling should reflect the equine species used and the reason for choosing the sampling site. In endemic areas virus isolation will allow monitoring of the serotypes and genotypes of AHSV circulating during each time period. The borders between infected and non-infected areas can be defined by serological detection of *infection*. Monthly sampling intervals are frequently used. Sentinels in declared free *zones* add to confidence that *infections* with AHSV are not occurring unobserved. Here sampling prior to and after the possible period of transmission is sufficient.

Definitive information on AHSV circulating in a country or *zone* is provided by isolation and identification of the viruses. If virus isolation is required, sentinels should be sampled at sufficiently frequent intervals to ensure that some samples are collected during the period of viraemia.

5. Vector surveillance

AHSV is transmitted between equids ~~to hosts~~ by species of *Culicoides* which vary across the world. It is therefore important to be able to identify potential *vector* species accurately although many such species are closely related and difficult to differentiate with certainty.

Vector surveillance is aimed at demonstrating the absence of *vectors* or defining high, medium and low-risk areas and local details of seasonality by determining the various species present in an area, and their respective seasonal occurrence, and abundance. *Vector surveillance* has particular relevance to potential areas of spread. Long term *surveillance* can also be used to assess the effectiveness of *vector* abatement measures or to confirm continued absence of *vectors*.

The most effective way of gathering this information should take account of the biology and behavioural characteristics of the local *vector* species of *Culicoides* and may include the use of Onderstepoort-type light traps or similar, operated from dusk to dawn in locations adjacent to equids.

Vector surveillance should be based on scientific sampling techniques. The choice of the number and types of traps to be used in *vector surveillance* and the frequency of their use should take into account the biology and ecology of the target vector species and the size and ecological characteristics of the area to be surveyed.

The operation of *vector surveillance* sites at the same locations as sentinel animals is advisable.

The use of a *vector surveillance* system to detect the presence of circulating viruses is not recommended as a routine procedure ~~as because~~ the typically low *vector infection* rates mean that such detections can be rare. Animal-based *surveillance* strategies are preferred to detect virus transmission.

CHAPTER 12.3.

INFECTION WITH *TRYPANOSOMA EQUIPERDUM*
(DOURINE)

Article 12.3.1.

General provisions

Dourine is a disease of equids caused by *Trypanosoma equiperdum* of the subgenus *Trypanozoon* mainly transmitted directly from animal to animal during coitus. It may also be transmitted vertically and iatrogenically. Dourine may manifest in acute, chronic or clinically inapparent forms.

After a transient blood multiplication, *T. equiperdum* invades various tissues, especially genital organs and may also invade the nervous system.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, dourine is defined as an *infection* of domestic and captive wild horses, donkeys, mules and hinnies (hereafter 'animal hosts') ~~wild equids~~ with *T. equiperdum*.

The following defines the occurrence of infection with *Trypanosoma equiperdum*:

- 1) Trypanosomes with *Trypanozoon* morphology have been observed in a sample from an animal host ~~domestic and captive wild equids~~ showing clinical signs consistent with dourine and linked to a suspected case of *infection* with *T. equiperdum* or found in an area where surra is not known to occur; or
- 2) trypanosomes with *Trypanozoon* morphology have been observed in a sample from an animal host ~~domestic and captive wild equids~~ epidemiologically linked to a confirmed case of *infection* with *T. equiperdum*; or
- 3) nucleic acid specific to *Trypanozoon* has been detected in a sample from an animal host ~~equid~~ epidemiologically linked to a confirmed case of *infection* with *T. equiperdum*; or
- 4) antibodies have been detected in a sample from an animal host ~~domestic and captive wild equids~~ epidemiologically linked to a confirmed case of *infection* with *T. equiperdum*.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the incubation period of infection with *T. equiperdum* shall be six months ~~90 days~~. Infective period of infection with *T. equiperdum* shall be lifelong.

For the purposes of this chapter, a temporary importation of horses refers to the introduction of horses into a country or *zone*, for a defined period of time, not exceeding 90 days, during which the *risk* of transmission of the *infection* is mitigated through specific measures under the supervision of the *Veterinary Authority*. Temporarily imported horses are re-exported at the end of this period. The duration of the temporary importation period and the destination after this period, as well as the conditions required to leave the country or *zone*, should be defined in advance.

Standards for diagnosis and information on the epidemiology are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 12.3.2.

Safe commodities

When authorising the import or transit of the following *commodities*, *Veterinary Authorities* should not require dourine-related conditions regardless of the *animal health status* of the *exporting country or zone*:

- 1) pasteurised *milk* and pasteurised *milk products*;
- 2) hair, ~~wool and fibre~~;
- 3) gelatine and collagen;
- 4) hooves;
- 5) *meat* from animals that have been slaughtered in a *slaughterhouse/abattoir* and have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections with favourable results;
- 6) *meat products*;
- 7) hides and skins (except raw);
- 8) embryos or oocytes collected, processed, and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8. to 4.10.;
- 9) *protein meal*;
- 10) rendered fat.

Article 12.3.3.

Country or zone free from dourine

A country or *zone* may be considered free from ~~infection with *T. equiperdum*~~ dourine when:

- 1) ~~the infection with *T. equiperdum*~~ is notifiable in the entire country for at least the past two years;
- 2) appropriate biosecurity and sanitary measures to prevent the introduction of the *infection* have been in place for at least the past two years; in particular, the importations or movements of ~~equids animal hosts~~ and other *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter and other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*;
- 3) and either:
 - a) the country or zone is historically free as described relevant provisions in point 2)b) of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with; or
 - b) for at least the past two years, ~~there has been no case in the country or zone and~~ specific surveillance in accordance with Articles 12.3.11. to 12.3.14. has been in place in the entire country or zone and there has been no case in the country or zone.

In order to maintain its free status, a country or zone should:

- 1) comply with points 1 and 2 above; and
- 2) conduct surveillance in accordance with Articles 12.3.11. to 12.3.13.

Article 12.3.4.

Compartment free from dourine

The establishment and bilateral recognition of a *compartment* free from ~~infection with *T. equiperdum*~~ dourine should follow the provisions laid down in this chapter and in Chapters 4.4. and 4.5.

Article 12.3.5.

Recovery of free status

Should a case of *infection* with *T. equiperdum* occur in a previously free country or *zone*, its status may be recovered after the following:

- 1) all infected ~~equids-animal hosts~~ have been either isolated and slaughtered, or killed and appropriately disposed of;
- 2) ~~equids-animal hosts~~ which have been in contact with infected ~~equids-animal hosts~~ were tested and all positive ~~equids-animal hosts~~ were isolated and slaughtered, or killed and appropriately disposed of; and,
- 3) For six months after the last case was slaughtered or killed:
 - a) the ~~equids-animal hosts~~ in contact have undergone monthly repeated serological and agent detection tests with negative results in both tests;
 - b) *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 12.3.11. to 12.3.14. has been carried out with negative results;
 - c) appropriate *biosecurity* has been in place.

Otherwise, Article 12.3.3. applies.

Article 12.3.6.

Recommendations for importation of ~~equids~~ horses, donkeys, mules and hinnies from countries, zones or compartments free from dourine

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the ~~equids~~ animals ~~hosts~~:

- 1) showed no clinical signs of ~~infection with *T. equiperdum*~~ dourine on the day of shipment;
- 2) were kept since birth or at least ~~six months~~ 90 days prior to shipment in the free country, *zone* or *compartment* of origin or were imported from a free country, *zone* or *compartment*.

Article 12.3.7.

Recommendations for importation of ~~equids~~ horses, donkeys, mules and hinnies from countries or zones or compartments not free from dourine

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the ~~equids~~animals ~~hosts~~:

- 1) showed no clinical signs of dourine on the day of shipment;
- 2) for at least 45 days prior to shipment were not used for breeding (including artificial insemination, semen collection, use as teasers) and did not have any direct or indirect sexual contact with other animal hosts ~~horses~~; and
- 3) during this period, all ~~equids~~ animals from the same group were subjected to an antibody detection test on samples taken on two occasions, with an interval of 30 days, with negative results.

Article 12.3.8.

Recommendations for the temporary importation of horses

When importing on a temporary basis ~~for purposes other than breeding and rearing~~ horses that do not comply with the recommendations in Article 12.3.6. or Article 12.3.7. for purposes other than breeding and rearing, *Veterinary Authorities* should:

- 1) require:
 - a) that the horses be accompanied by a passport in accordance with the model contained in Chapter 5.12. or be individually identified as belonging to a high health status *subpopulation* as defined in Chapter 4.17.;
 - b) if not belonging to a high health status subpopulation, the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the horses:
 - i) showed no clinical sign of *infection* with *T. equiperdum* on the day~~s~~ of shipments;
 - ii) ~~if not belonging to a high health status subpopulation~~, if not belonging to a high health status subpopulation, were negative in an antibody detection test within 15 days prior to departure from the country of origin;
 - c) the duration of the temporary importation period, the destination after this period, and the conditions required to leave the country or *zone* be defined;
- 2) ensure that during their stay in the country or *zone*, the horses:
 - a) are not used for breeding (including artificial insemination, semen collection, use as teasers) and do not have any direct or indirect sexual contact with other animal hosts~~horses~~;
 - b) are not subjected to any practice that may represent a risk of transmission of *infection* with *T. equiperdum*.

Article 12.3.9.

Recommendations for importation of semen from countries, zones or compartments free from dourine

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor males:
 - a) showed no clinical signs of *infection* with *T. equiperdum* on the day of collection of the semen;

- b) were kept for the ~~six months~~ **90 days** prior to semen collection in a country, zone or compartment free from dourine;
- 2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in **a semen collection centre** accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 12.3.10.

Recommendations for importation of semen from countries or zones not free from dourine

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor males:
 - a) have been kept for at least ~~six months~~ **90 days** prior to semen collection in an *establishment* in which *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 12.3.11. to 12.3.14. demonstrates that no case of *infection with T. equiperdum* had occurred during ~~that period~~ **the past six months**;
 - b) showed no clinical signs of *dourine infection with T. equiperdum* during that period;
 - c) were subjected, before collection, to an antibody detection test on a blood sample taken on two occasions, with an interval of 30 days, with negative results;
- 2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in **a semen collection centre** accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 12.3.11.

Introduction to surveillance

Articles 12.3.11. to 12.3.14. define the principles and provide guidance on *surveillance* for *dourine infection with T. equiperdum*, complementary to Chapter 1.4.

The purpose of *surveillance* could be the demonstration of the absence of *infection*, the early detection of *cases*, or the measurement and monitoring of the *prevalence* and distribution of the *infection with T. equiperdum* in a country, *zone* or *compartment*.

The most important component of the epidemiology of dourine is sexual transmission, therefore sexually mature ~~equids~~ animal hosts are considered the target population. Notwithstanding, iatrogenic transmission should also be considered.

The impact and epidemiology of dourine widely differs between different regions of the world, and between different type of animal production systems. For instance considering the presence or absence of other trypanosomes, ~~and it~~ **and it** therefore, it is not appropriate to provide specific recommendations for all situations. Member Countries should provide scientific data explaining the epidemiology of the disease in the country or *zone* concerned, such as host susceptibility (e.g. horse, donkey, mule) and co-infections with other *Trypanosoma* spp., and adapt the *surveillance* strategies for defining their status to their local conditions. There is considerable latitude available to Member Countries to justify their status at an acceptable level of confidence.

Article 12.3.12.

Principles of surveillance for dourine

The following principles are complementary to Chapter 1.4. and should be applied by Member Countries seeking to achieve and demonstrate freedom from infection-dourine as well as being part for *official control programme* in countries where the disease is endemic.

In countries where other Trypanozoon ~~some infections~~ occur in equids~~animal hosts~~, the diagnosis of dourine is challenging because the clinical signs are not pathognomonic, and diagnostic methods are not pathogen-species specific. As a consequence it is difficult to perform differential diagnosis between infection with *T. equiperdum* and other *Trypanozoon infections*.

Surveillance for dourine infection with *Trypanosoma equiperdum* should encompass not only clinical signs and relevant sampling and testing, but also information on animal husbandry practices and epidemiological context, including sexual contacts, breeding history of the equid~~animal~~, international and other animal movements, contact patterns, presence of other trypanosomes, and vectors (biting flies including tsetse flies). The *Veterinary Services* should implement programmes to raise awareness among farmers, owners, breeders and workers, who have day to day contact with equids~~animals~~, as well as *veterinarians*, *veterinary paraprofessionals* and diagnosticians. Those persons should observe and report promptly any suspicion of dourine infection with *T. equiperdum* to the *Veterinary Services*.

Under the responsibility of the *Veterinary Authority*, Member Countries should have in place a *surveillance* system in accordance with the Chapter 1.4. and, in particular:

- the formal and ongoing system for detecting and investigating cases should include all suspicions of Trypanozoon infection with Trypanosomes;
- the procedure for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspected cases to a *laboratory* for diagnosis should include the relevant types and methods of sampling for dourine infection with *T. equiperdum* as described in the *Terrestrial Manual*;
- the *laboratory* is approved for diagnosis of dourine infection with *T. equiperdum*.

Special attention is to be made to low-susceptible animals that are more resistant such as donkeys, and mules and hinnies that are more resistant and that can act as healthy carriers and a reservoirs of *Trypanosoma equiperdum*.

Article 12.3.13.

Surveillance for early warning of dourine

- 1) An ongoing *surveillance* programme for dourine should be in place and be designed to detect the presence of dourine infection with *T. equiperdum* in the country or *zone* in a timely manner.
- 2) The dourine *surveillance* programme should include the following.
 - a) An *early warning system* for reporting suspected animals described in Article 12.3.12., in accordance with Article 1.4.5.
 - b) Implementation, as relevant, of regular and frequent clinical inspection of individual equids~~animal hosts~~ at risk of dourine that could, for instance, include equids~~animals~~ that were imported from countries not free from dourine.

Surveillance for demonstrating freedom from dourine

1. Requirements for declaring freedom of the entire country, a zone or a compartment from dourine

Transparency in the application of different methodologies is essential to ensure consistency in decision-making, ease of understanding, fairness and rationality. The assumptions made, the uncertainties, and the effect of these on the interpretation of the results, should be documented.

The design of the *surveillance* programme will depend on the epidemiological circumstances, and it should be planned and implemented in accordance with this chapter and Article 1.4.6. This requires the availability of demographic data on the ~~equids-animal host~~ population and the support of a *laboratory* able to undertake identification of ~~dourine-infection with *T. equiperdum*~~ through parasite detection and antibody tests.

Data from different *surveillance* activities can be included to increase the sensitivity of the *surveillance* system. If this is to be done, data from structured (e.g. surveys and active *surveillance*) and non-structured (e.g. passive *surveillance*) sources should be combined.

The *surveillance* programme should include *surveillance* of different ~~equids-animal host~~ subpopulations (e.g. thoroughbred, saddle horses (riding horses), working horses, ponies, donkeys, mules).

Documentation of freedom from dourine should provide details of the ~~equids-animal hosts~~ population, the occurrence of suspected cases and how they were investigated and dealt with. This should include the results of *laboratory* testing and the *biosecurity* and control measures to which the animals concerned were subjected during the investigation.

In order to maintain freedom of an establishment within an infected country or zone and to demonstrate no case of *infection with *T. equiperdum** has occurred, passive surveillance relying on clinical observation alone is insufficient. Depending on the prevailing epidemiological situation and assessed risk for the introduction of *T. equiperdum*, samples should also be collected on a routine basis for parasite detection and antibody tests. There should also be systematic screening of ~~horses-animal hosts~~ that are introduced into the establishment for the absence of ~~dourine-infection with *T. equiperdum*~~.

2. Additional requirements for recovery of free status

In addition to the general conditions described in this chapter, a Member Country seeking recovery of country or zone free status, including a *containment zone* established in accordance with Article 4.4.7., should show evidence of an active *surveillance* programme (clinical inspection and serological *surveillance*) to demonstrate absence of ~~dourine-infection with *T. equiperdum*~~.

Populations under this *surveillance* programme should include:

- 1) *establishments* in the proximity of the *outbreak*;
 - 2) *establishments* epidemiologically linked to the *outbreak*;
 - 3) *animals* moved from or used to re-populate affected *establishments*.
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CHAPTER 12.4.

INFECTION WITH EASTERN EQUINE ENCEPHALITIS VIRUS (EASTERN EQUINE ENCEPHALOMYELITIS) AND INFECTION WITH WESTERN EQUINE ENCEPHALITIS VIRUS (WESTERN EQUINE ENCEPHALOMYELITIS)

Article 12.4.1.

General provisions

~~Equids are dead-end hosts for e~~Eastern equine encephalomyelitis (EEE) and ~~w~~Western equine encephalomyelitis (WEE) are vector-borne diseases of importance to public health transmitted by mosquitoes, wild birds constituting the reservoir while equids are dead-end hosts, and tTherefore, equids and their products do not present a risk of transmission. However, equids are useful sentinels for the early detection of EEE or WEE to mitigate the animal health and public health risks of these pathogenic agents.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, EEE is defined as an *infection* of equids with eastern equine encephalitis virus (EEEV), and WEE is defined as an *infection* of equids with western equine encephalitis virus (WEEV).

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with EEEV or *infection* with WEEV:

- 1) EEEV or WEEV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an equid; or
- 2) nucleic acid or antigen specific to EEEV or WEEV has been detected in a sample from an equid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with EEE or WEE, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association with or exposure to contact with EEEV or WEEV; or
- 3) antibodies specific to EEEV or WEEV, which are not the consequence of *vaccination*, have been detected in a sample from an equid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with EEE or WEE, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected *case*.

Standards for diagnosis and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 12.4.2.

Safe commodities

When authorising the importation or transit of equids or other equid commodities~~their products~~, *Veterinary Authorities* should not require any EEE- or WEE-related conditions regardless of the *animal health status* of the country or *zone* of origin.

Article 12.4.3.

Surveillance of EEE or WEE

The objective of surveillance of EEE and WEE is for the *Veterinary Authority* to coordinate in a timely manner with public health and other relevant *Competent Authorities* and share information to use the *surveillance* outcomes to prevent animal and human exposure. Although equids are dead-end hosts of EEE and WEE, they act as sentinels for the presence of ~~infection with~~ EEEV or WEEV in an area.

Surveillance of EEE or WEE should be carried out in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and with the following recommendations.

Veterinary Authority should develop *early warning systems* to detect ~~V~~EEE and WEE epidemic events, so as to promote awareness campaigns to sensitise the owners and keepers of equids, the *veterinarians* and the public health authorities of the disease risks. In such situations, *surveillance* should be conducted to define the extent of the epidemic area for the purpose of disease prevention and control.

Clinical *surveillance* to detect clinical signs of *infection* with EEEV or WEEV in equids should be the basis of the *early warning system*. Clinical disease in equids is characterised by fever, anorexia, and severe depression. In severe cases, it can progress to neurological signs and death. Clinical *surveillance* targeted at neurological signs in equids can provide reinforced evidence of the occurrence of an epidemic. However, clinical signs are not pathognomonic and suspected cases detected by clinical *surveillance* should always be confirmed by laboratory testing, taking into account the epidemiological situation. The rate at which such suspected cases are likely to occur can differ between epidemiological situations and cannot, therefore, be predicted reliably.

An epidemic should be suspected when ecological conditions favour the breeding of large numbers of mosquito *vectors* with the concurrent or consequent occurrence of an increased number of equids showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with EEEV or WEEV, or reports of infection in humans or *wild* birds. This is especially the case for countries or *zones* where *infection* infected with EEEV or WEEV has occurred, or countries or *zones* adjacent to a country or *zone* in which epidemics have been reported. Ecological conditions can be assessed through sharing and analysis of meteorological data, data on precipitation and water levels, and monitoring of *vector* activity. Although birds are susceptible to EEE and WEE, they often do not exhibit clinical signs and have low mortality rates, therefore *surveillance* of birds is not worthwhile.

Detection of *infection* with EEEV or WEEV in an area is indicative of *vector* activity in this area and is a more sensitive approach to *monitoring* for EEEV or WEEV than *vector surveillance*. Findings of EEEV or WEEV in *vectors* is of low sensitivity and, therefore, is not a recommended *surveillance* method.
