

Report of the Meeting of WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission

Original: English (EN)

9 to 18 September 2025
Paris

Introduction and Members contribution

This report presents the work of the WOAHO Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (hereinafter 'Code Commission') which met in Paris, France from 9 to 18 September 2025.

The Commission wished to thank the following Members for providing written comments for the WOAHO *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* (hereinafter '*Terrestrial Code*'): Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China (People's Republic of), Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Germany, Japan, Korea (Republic of), Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA), the African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR) on behalf of African Members of WOAHO, the Members of the WOAHO Americas Region (Americas) and Member States of the European Union (EU). The Commission also wished to thank the following organisations for providing comments: the International Coalition for Animal Welfare (ICFAW), the World Renderers Organization (WRO), and to acknowledge the valuable advice and contributions from numerous experts from the WOAHO scientific network.

The Commission considered all comments that were submitted prior to the deadline and that were aligned with the [Guide for WOAHO Members and International Organisations on submitting comments during the process for the elaboration of WOAHO International Standards](#) (the 'Guide').

The Commission made amendments to draft texts, where relevant, in the usual manner by 'double underline' and 'strikethrough'. In relevant annexes, amendments proposed at this meeting are highlighted in yellow to distinguish them from those circulated previously.

Annexes

Annex 3 is presented for information only, and includes comments considered by the Commission, and its responses.

Texts in **Part A** (**Annexes 5 to 16**) are presented for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026. Texts in **Part B** (**Annexes 4 and 17 to 25**) are presented for comments only.

How to submit comments

The Commission strongly encourages WOAHO Members and International Organisations with a WOAHO Cooperative Agreement to participate in the development of WOAHO International Standards by submitting comments on relevant topics and annexes of this report.

Engagement of Members and partner organisations in the standard-setting process through the submission of comments is critical to ensure that standards are based on the latest scientific and technical data, reflect the different contexts of Member and stakeholders, and are feasible to implement. To ensure that comments are considered, they should be submitted in the format described in the [Guide for WOAHO Members and International Organisations on submitting comments during the process for the elaboration of WOAHO International Standards](#) (Guide) and the [Standard Operating Procedure for WOAHO](#)



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Members and International Organisations to submit comments during the process for the elaboration of WOAH International Standards (SOP) available on the Delegates' website and the WOAH public website.

Comments that are not correctly formatted as described in the Guide and SOP, including those that do not include a supporting rationale are not considered by the Commission. Any questions on the requirements for formatting and submission of comments should be sent to TCC.Secretariat@woah.org

Other relevant reports

The Code Commission reminded Members that its report may reference work and discussions of the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (the Scientific Commission), the Biological Standards Commission, a Working Group or an *ad hoc* Group when these groups have addressed specific topics, comments or questions requested by the Code Commission. In such cases, the responses or proposed amendments and their rationale are provided in the respective report of the relevant group. Members are therefore encouraged to review the relevant report together with the report of the Code Commission.

These reports are available on dedicated webpages on the WOAH website, e.g., for Specialist Commissions reports: [Standard-Setting Process - WOAH - World Organisation for Animal Health](#); for Working Group reports: [Working Groups - WOAH - World Organisation for Animal Health](#); for *ad hoc* Group reports:

<https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/standards/standards-setting-process/ad-hoc-groups/>

Deadline for comments

Comments on relevant texts in this report (Part A and B) must be received by **26 December 2025** to be considered by the Commission.

Where to send comments

All comments should be sent to TCC.Secretariat@woah.org

Date of the next meeting

The Commission noted that the dates for its next meeting: 3 to 13 February 2026.

1. Welcome	6
1.1. Director General	6
1.2. Deputy Director General-International Standards and Science	6
2. Adoption of the agenda.....	7
3. Cooperation with Other Specialist Commissions	7
3.1. Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases	7
3.2. Biological Standards Commission	8
3.3. Aquatic Animal Health Standards Commission.....	9
4. Work Programme.....	10
4.1. Ongoing priority topics (other than texts circulated for comments)	10
4.1.1. Glossary definition for 'poultry'.....	10
4.1.2. Wildlife health	11
4.1.3. Chapter 1.1. Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information	11
4.1.4. Revision of Chapter 4.4. Zoning and compartmentalisation.....	12
4.1.5. Revision of Chapter 4.14. General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection	13
4.1.6. Development of an introductory chapter of Section 5	14
4.1.7. Revision of Chapter 6.8. Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes.....	15
4.1.8. Revision of chapters on transport of animals (Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.)	16
4.1.9. Revision of Chapter 7.6. 'Killing for disease control purposes'	16
4.1.10. Revision of Chapter 11.5. 'Infection with <i>Mycoplasma mycoides</i> subsp. <i>mycoides</i> (CBPP)'	17
4.1.11. Infection with bovine pestiviruses (bovine viral diarrhoea) (new Chapter 11.X.)....	17
4.1.12. Revision of Chapter 14.8. Scrapie	18
4.1.13. Removal of questionnaire chapters from the Terrestrial Code	19
4.2. Items under consideration for inclusion in the work programme	19
4.3. New proposals or requests for inclusion in the work programme	20
4.4. Prioritisation of items on the work programme	20
5. Texts circulated for comments and to be proposed for adoption in May 2026	21
5.1. Glossary.....	21
5.2. Articles 1.3.1., 1.3.3. and 1.3.7. of Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAHP'	24
5.3. Biosecurity (new Chapter 4.X.).....	25
5.4. Measures and procedures applicable during 'exportation', 'transit' and 'importation' (Chapters 5.4. to 5.7.).....	26
5.5. Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. 'Animal welfare during slaughter'	27
5.6. Harmonisation of official status disease chapters Chapter 8.8. Infection with foot and mouth disease virus and Chapter 15.2. Infection with classical swine fever.....	27
5.7. Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (new Chapter 8.X.).....	28
5.8. Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens) (new Chapter 10.X.)	29

6. Texts circulated for comments.....	29
6.1. Glossary.....	29
6.2. Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOAHA (Chapter 1.6.).....	30
6.3. New draft Chapter 3.X. 'Emergency management'	31
6.4. Japanese encephalitis (Chapter 8.10.).....	32
6.5. Tularemia (Chapter 8.20.)	33
6.6. Revision of Chapter 12.11. Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis	33
6.7. Revision of Chapter 14.7. Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus	35
6.8. Revision of Chapter 14.9. Sheep pox and goat pox.....	36
7. Updates on WOAHA initiatives relevant to the Code Commission.....	38
7.1. Work of the Governance Review Committee	38
7.2. Animal Health Forum at the WOAHA General Session	38
7.3. 7th WOAHA Animal Welfare Global Forum	39
7.4. WOAHA Zoning Forum	39
7.5. <i>Terrestrial Code</i> content standardisation	39
7.5.1. Animal hosts to be targeted by WOAHA Standards for a listed disease	39
7.6. Updated WOAHA International Standards available on-line	40
7.7. WOAHA Observatory	40
7.8. Substandard and Falsified Veterinary Products	41
7.9. WOAHA Global Conference on Biothreat Reduction.....	41

List of Annexes

Annex 1. Adopted agenda

Annex 2. List of participants

Commission's response to circulated Annexes in its February 2025 report for information (PART C)

Annex 3.

Texts to be proposed for adoption (PART A)

Annex 5. Glossary

Annex 6. Articles 1.3.1., 1.3.3. and 1.3.7. of Chapter 1.3. Diseases, infections and infestations by WOA

Annex 7. Chapter 4.X. Biosecurity

Annex 8. Chapter 5.4. Measures and procedures applicable to the exportation of commodities

Annex 9. Chapter 5.5. Measures and procedures applicable to the transit of commodities

Annex 10. Chapter 5.6. Measures and procedures applicable to the importation of commodities

Annex 11. Chapter 5.7. Border inspection posts and quarantine centres

Annex 12. Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. Animal welfare during slaughter

Annex 13. Articles 8.8.3., 8.8.4. and 8.8.8. of Chapter 8.8. Infection with foot and mouth disease virus

Annex 14. Articles 15.2.3. and 15.2.5. of Chapter 15.2. Infection with classical swine fever virus

Annex 15. Chapter 8.X. Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus

Annex 16. Chapter 10.X. Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens)

Texts for comments (PART B)

Annex 4. Work programme

Annex 17. Glossary

Annex 18. Chapter 1.6. Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOA

Annex 19. Chapter 3.X. Emergency management

Annex 20. Chapter 8.10. Japanese encephalitis

Annex 21. Chapter 8.20. Tularemia

Annex 22. Chapter 12.11. Venezuela equine encephalomyelitis

Annex 23. Chapter 14.7. Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus

Annex 24. Chapter 14.9. Sheep pox and goat pox

Annex 25. Chapter 11.9. Infection with lumpy skin disease virus

1. Welcome

1.1. Director General

Dr Emmanuelle Soubeyran, the WOAAH Director General and Dr Baba Soumaré, WOAAH Deputy Director General for Global Frameworks and Capacity Building (DDG-GFCB) met with the Code Commission on 9 September 2025. Dr Soubeyran thanked the Commission members for their support and commitment to achieving WOAAH's objectives in standard-setting and extended these thanks to their employing institutions and national governments.

Dr Soubeyran shared some updates with the Commission, including the revised WOAAH organisational chart, highlighting the appointment of Dr Soumaré, DDG-GFCB, the development of WOAAH's 8th Strategic Plan for the period 2026 to 2030, and the ongoing work of the Governance Review Committee. The Director General clarified that these items would be presented in more detail to all Commissions at an extended virtual meeting in September and October 2025 given the heavy Commission meeting agendas.

1.2. Deputy Director General-International Standards and Science

Dr Montserrat Arroyo, WOAAH Deputy Director General for International Standards and Science (DDG-ISS) met with the Commission on 15 September 2025 and thanked the Commission members for their ongoing contributions to this important area of WOAAH work.

Dr Arroyo highlighted the importance of ensuring consistency across relevant horizontal chapters of both the *Aquatic* and *Terrestrial Codes*, as well as alignment between the *Terrestrial Code* and the *Terrestrial Manual*. Dr Arroyo further noted that Bureaux meetings between the Code Commission and the Aquatic Animals Commission, and between the Code Commission and the Biological Standards Commission, were planned during this meeting. Dr Arroyo emphasised that Bureaux meetings are an important mechanism for Commissions to share work programmes, exchange views and coordinate respective approaches to cross-cutting issues.

Dr Arroyo also noted the launch of the WOAAH Standards Online Navigation Tool which provides users with streamlined access to and navigation of WOAAH standards (see Item 7.6. in this report).

2. Transparency of commenting – phased approach

As originally communicated in the Commission's September 2023 report, the Director General had agreed to progressively implement a process to improve the transparency of the WOAAH process for the elaboration of Standards for better documentation and traceability.

The first step in this process was the anonymous publication on the Delegates' website of comments considered by the Commission at its February 2024 meeting.

The second step in this process was the anonymous publication on the Delegates' and public WOAAH websites of comments considered by the Commission at its September 2024 meeting. The Commission also included its responses to comments in Annex 3 for information only. As a result, the Commission's report was more concise and focused on providing a short background summary for each agenda item as well as key points discussed and agreed by the Commission.

The third and final step in this process will be to publish, in Annex 3, the name of the Member or partner organisation alongside the comment they submitted for consideration by the Commission at its February 2026 meeting.

These new processes aim to improve transparency of the standard-setting process and make the report more user-friendly. Together with the guidance documents (see 'How to submit comments' in this report) for submitting comments that are available for Members and partners, WOAAH and the Commission hope that providing such visibility of examples of comments and responses will encourage more Members to engage confidently in the process of development of WOAAH Standards.

2. Adoption of the agenda

The provisional agenda was adopted by the Commission. The agenda and the list of participants are presented in [Annexes 1 and 2](#), respectively.

The Commission wished to note that due to time constraints and a heavy agenda, it did not discuss the following items:

- amendments to the User's Guide,
- revision of chapters on certification procedures,
- a review of Chapter 10.9. 'Infection with Newcastle disease virus',
- Chapter 4.7. 'Collection and processing of bovine, small ruminant and porcine semen',
- a request for new Glossary definition for 'treatment',
- review of the Glossary definition for some specific highly processed commodities, and clarification of the term 'rendered fats' in Spanish
- review of Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with foot and mouth disease virus (article on fetal bovine serum)',
- review of the internal working document 'Framework for *Terrestrial Code* standards'.

The Commission agreed to consider these items at a future meeting.

3. Cooperation with Other Specialist Commissions

3.1. Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases

The Secretariat updated the Code Commission on relevant activities of the Scientific Commission. The Code Commission responded, where relevant, as noted below.

Assessments of pathogenic agents against the listing criteria in Chapter 1.2. 'Criteria for the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the WOAHA list'

- i) SARS-CoV-2. The Code Commission was informed that the Scientific Commission, at its February 2025 meeting, had conducted an assessment of SARS-CoV-2 against the listing criteria in Chapter 1.2., 'Criteria for the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the WOAHA list' and had concluded that SARS-CoV-2 did not meet the requirements for listing as animal infections play a minor role in the international spread of the disease. Consequently, SARS-CoV-2 has been removed from the WOAHA Register of Emerging Diseases. However, Members may still continue to notify animal cases in accordance with the provisions of Article 1.1.5.
- ii) Paratuberculosis. The Code Commission was informed that the Scientific Commission had reviewed its 2022 listing assessment for paratuberculosis, focusing on criteria 2 and 3 of Chapter 1.2 and concluded that paratuberculosis should be maintained in Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAHA' as a listed disease. The Scientific Commission also discussed the case definition developed by subject-matter experts with input from the Biological Standards Commission, which had been forwarded to the Code Commission for its consideration. Due to time constraints, the Code Commission did not discuss the proposed case definition for paratuberculosis during this meeting and postponed this item to its February 2026 meeting.

Assessments to determine whether diseases should be considered as 'emerging diseases'

The Code Commission was informed that the Scientific Commission had assessed infection of cattle (*Bos taurus*) with high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses in February 2025 and had agreed that it met the *Terrestrial Code* definition of an emerging disease and as such Members were requested to notify cases in accordance with Article 1.1.4.

The Code Commission reminded Members that its considerations of the Scientific Commission's responses to specific topics and comments are noted under the relevant agenda item of this report. The Code Commission encouraged Members to read the [Scientific Commission's report](#) for the details of relevant items.

3.2. Biological Standards Commission

A meeting of the Bureaux (i.e., the President and the two Vice-Presidents) of the Code Commission and the Biological Standards Commission was held on 11 September 2025 and chaired by WOAHH DDG-ISS. The purpose of this meeting was for the two Bureaux to update each other on the relevant work of each Commission on topics of common interest, and to discuss and agree on the planning and coordination on these topics.

The Bureaux discussed the following topics:

- The *Terrestrial Manual* chapters to be reviewed in the 2025/2026 review cycle;
- Progress in the development and revision of relevant *Terrestrial Code* chapters, including the revision of Chapter 14.8. 'Scrapie' of the *Terrestrial Code* (see Item 4.1.12. in this report);
- Proposed Glossary definitions for 'seroconversion' and 'laboratory' of the *Terrestrial Code* (see Items 5.1. and 6.1. in this report);
- Member comments on Chapter 11.5. 'Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* (CBPP)' (see Item 4.1.10. in this report);
- Member comments on Chapter 11.X. 'Infection with bovine pestiviruses (bovine viral diarrhoea)' (see Item 4.1.11. in this report);
- Animal hosts and other susceptible animals targeted by WOAHH Standards for a listed disease (see Item 7.5.1. in this report);
- Updates to standards concerning work on Substandard and Falsified Veterinary Products (SFVP) (see Item 7.8. in this report).

Regarding the revision of Chapter 14.8., the Bureau of the Code Commission informed the Bureau of the Biological Standards Commission that the *ad hoc* Group on Scrapie that met in April 2024 had proposed a revised chapter that incorporated genetic resistance to Scrapie as a risk mitigation measure, the basis for Members requesting a review of the chapter. For such a standard to be incorporated into the *Terrestrial Code*, the Bureau of the Code Commission noted that there had to be a standard methodology for genetic testing to use as a reference. The Bureau of the Biological Standards Commission considered that scrapie resistance is influenced by multiple factors and as a result it remains challenging to establish a reliable and universally applicable standard in the *Terrestrial Manual* with clearly defined criteria for resistance. Nevertheless, the Bureau of the Biological Standards Commission agreed to consult experts again to see if additional technological progress has been made to facilitate setting a standard methodology on genetic resistance in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

The Bureau of the Code Commission updated the Bureau of the Biological Standards Commission on Member comments received on the Glossary definition on 'seroconversion' and both Commissions agreed to propose replacing the word 'condition' with 'state' in the Glossary definition both in the *Terrestrial Code* and *Terrestrial Manual*. Both Bureaux also agreed on the draft Glossary definition for 'laboratory' proposed for the *Terrestrial Code*.

In relation to Chapter 11.5., the Bureau of the Biological Standards Commission noted Member comments that the testing of semen for CBPP may be unreliable and agreed to look into the suitability of diagnostic tests using specific samples such as germplasm in the disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Both Bureaux discussed Member comments received on Chapter 11.X. 'Infection with bovine pestiviruses (bovine viral diarrhoea)' and agreed to work with subject-matter experts on the case definition for bovine viral diarrhoea when diagnostic standards are reviewed in Chapter 3.4.7. of the *Terrestrial Manual*. They noted that the case definitions in the *Terrestrial Code* were essentially related to the need for notification to WOAAH, rather than national surveillance and control programmes and related reporting.

Both Bureaux were presented with an update on the work of WOAAH Headquarters on Substandard and Falsified Veterinary Products (SFVP) and how to incorporate this into the *Terrestrial Code* and *Terrestrial Manual*, so Members are better able to prevent, detect and respond to SFVP. Both Bureaux noted that subject-matter experts would be engaged to consider amendments to relevant standards and their deliberations would be presented to the Commissions at a future meeting.

The Code Commission reminded Members that its considerations of the Biological Standards Commission's responses to specific topics and comments are noted under the relevant agenda items of this report. The Code Commission encouraged Members to read the [Biological Standards Commission's report](#) for the details of relevant items.

3.3. Aquatic Animal Health Standards Commission

A meeting of the Bureaux of the Code Commission and the Aquatic Animals Commission was held on 18 September 2025 and chaired by WOAAH DDG-ISS. The purpose of this meeting was for the two Bureaux to update each other on the relevant work of each Commission on topics of common interest, and to discuss and agree on the planning and coordination on these topics, and to exchange experiences to harmonise approaches to horizontal chapters.

The Bureaux discussed the following topics:

- The approach taken by both Commissions in the planning and progress of their work programme and prioritisation of items,
- Coordination on the amendments to Chapter 1.1. 'Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information' of the *Aquatic Code* and *Terrestrial Code* (see Item 4.1.3. in this report),
- Progress of *Aquatic Code* Chapter 4.3. 'Application of Compartmentalisation' and plans to review Chapter 4.2. 'Zoning and compartmentalisation',
- Review of *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 4.4. 'Zoning and compartmentalisation' and a proposal for a new chapter on implementation of zoning (see Item 4.1.4. in this report),
- Development of *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 3.X. 'Emergency Management' and *Aquatic Code* Chapter 4.10. 'Emergency disease preparedness' and Chapter 4.11. 'Outbreak management' (see Item 6.3. in this report)
- Progress of *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity' and associated Glossary definitions (see Items 5.1. and 5.3. in this report),
- Work on an introductory chapter for Section 5 of the *Aquatic Code* and *Terrestrial Code* (see Item 4.1.6. in this report),
- Progress of *Terrestrial Code* Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. on trade and plans to review *Aquatic Code* Section 5. (see Items 5.1. and 5.4. in this report).

The Bureaux agreed that proposed revisions to Chapter 1.1. 'Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information' of the *Terrestrial Code* and *Aquatic Code* should be undertaken in parallel to ensure consistency between respective Chapters 1.1. given the importance of alignment. The Bureaux agreed to review each other's draft revised Chapters 1.1. at their February 2026 meetings with the intention to circulate the revised texts at that time so that Members can consider proposed amendments to both Chapters 1.1. to ensure a coordinated process.

The Code Commission encouraged Members to read the [Aquatic Animal Standards Commission's report](#) for the details of relevant items.

4. Work Programme

The Commission discussed ongoing priority topics of its work programme, issues raised during the General Session, and considered comments and new requests received.

Comments received

Comments on the work programme were received from the UK, the EU and the WRO.

The Commission acknowledged comments expressing support for the work programme and the Commission's priorities.

The Commission acknowledged comments on the revision of the Glossary definition for 'poultry' as well as related articles in Chapter 10.4. 'Infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza virus'. The Commission noted that the revision of the definition for 'poultry' will continue to be progressed as a high priority (see Item 4.1.1. of this report). In addition, the Commission agreed to add the revision of Chapter 10.4. into its work programme to align with the work on the revision of definition for 'poultry' and general work on the format of case definitions.

The Commission acknowledged a comment supporting the revision of Chapter 4.13. 'Disposal and dead animals'. The Commission noted that this work continues to be on its work programme and will be started after the work on Chapter 4.14. 'General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection' (see Item 4.1.5. of this report).

The Commission acknowledged comments on proposals to include selected highly processed commodities, such as protein meal and rendered fats, as safe commodities in relevant disease-specific chapters. The Commission also agreed that if meat, as defined in Glossary definition of the *Terrestrial Code*, is included in the list of safe commodities, then all meat-derived commodities, including highly processed commodities, should also be considered as safe commodities. The Commission noted that the list of safe commodities will be discussed and revised accordingly as part of the revision of each disease-specific chapter.

The Commission reminded Members that the work programme outlines the current and the planned work to be undertaken to develop new or revise existing standards of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission commended the increased interest shown by Members in providing comments on the work programme and strongly encouraged Members to continue to provide feedback on potential new topics, whether they agree with the topics being proposed, as well as their level of prioritisation.

4.1. Ongoing priority topics (other than texts circulated for comments)

The Commission discussed the progress of a number of ongoing priority topics and noted that no new or revised text for these items are provided for comment at this time.

4.1.1. Glossary definition for 'poultry'

Background

In May 2023, at the 90th General Session, some Members requested that the revision of the definition of 'poultry' be included in the Commission's work programme to ensure it provided Members with greater flexibility and to resolve issues for non-poultry birds or birds that do not play a significant epidemiological role in the spread of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) through international trade.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Commission considered the request as well as comments received to review the Glossary definition of 'poultry' and agreed to add the revision of the definition of 'poultry' to its work programme as priority four, noting that this work should be addressed as part of its future work to review Section 10 Aves of the *Terrestrial Code*.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Commission considered requests from some Members to increase the priority level for this work. The Commission agreed to increase the priority of this item to level two and requested the Secretariat to consult with experts and relevant partner international organisations, to better define the issues and potential amendments to the definition for 'poultry'.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission reviewed the inputs provided by the experts and organisations together with all comments received since 2022 when amendments were last adopted. The Commission agreed to increase the priority level to one and requested the Secretariat develop a proposal taking into consideration expert opinion and comments for its review at its next meeting that would be applicable to contexts of all Members and relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission reviewed the proposal presented by the Secretariat, considering the possibility of a simplified definition of poultry, while noting that for some listed diseases such as HPAI and Newcastle disease, all types of birds were included for the purpose of notification while some birds could be excluded from the definition of free status of a country or zone. The Commission discussed that a simplified definition of poultry should focus on a positive description of what types of birds are poultry, without including a list of types of birds that are not considered as poultry.

The Commission requested that the Secretariat work with one of its members to continue to develop a simplified poultry definition based on animal hosts that would be used to determine when the occurrence of disease would need to be notified to WOA. The Commission also requested the development of proposed revisions for Chapter 10.4. to determine which specific populations would be concerned by the free status for HPAI, relevant sanitary measures and surveillance provisions.

Discussion

The Commission reviewed a draft simplified Glossary definition for 'poultry', as well as a new definition for 'commercial poultry' that could be used specifically for Chapter 10.4. and possibly other avian disease chapters. The Commission also considered and discussed proposed revisions to Chapter 10.4. that would continue to require HPAI notification and disease management for all 'poultry', while allowing a country to maintain a HPAI free status for 'commercial poultry' for international trade of relevant commodities.

The Commission agreed that further work was required on these proposals and requested that the Secretariat continue to work with a representative from the Commission and provide an updated proposal at its next meeting in February 2026.

4.1.2. Wildlife health

Background

At its September 2022 meeting, the Commission reviewed progress made by the Working Group Wildlife (Working Group) on relevant topics under the WOA Wildlife Health Framework and consequently agreed to add to its work programme an item to review how the *Terrestrial Code* addresses wildlife health.

Since September 2023, the Working Group has submitted comments on relevant chapters circulated for comments.

Discussion

The Commission wished to acknowledge the valuable inputs of the Working Group on various topics of relevance to wildlife health and reiterated its willingness to continue its work to enhance how the *Terrestrial Code* can continue to address wildlife health.

4.1.3. Chapter 1.1. Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information

Background

In September 2024, the Commission considered issues regarding the interpretation of the provisions in Chapter 1.1. 'Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information', in particular the need to review the term 'unusual host' under point 1.f) of Article 1.1.3., following the work of the task force on animal hosts (see Item 7.5.1. in this report), and agreed to include a revision of Chapter 1.1. in its work programme.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission discussed with representatives of the WOA World Animal Health Information and Analysis Department (WAHIAD) several aspects of the current text which could be considered unclear or ambiguous, considering recent and historic issues associated with Members' notifications, particularly concerning the references to 'unusual' host species and 'new strains', as well as to the 'stability' of events. The Commission agreed on the need to review some wording of Chapter 1.1. to improve clarity. Draft proposed amendments were also shared with the Scientific Commission for input.

Discussion

At this meeting, the Code Commission reviewed Chapter 1.1. considering the input of the Scientific Commission and issues regarding notification raised by the WAHIAD. Amendments were also proposed to improve clarity and syntax.

The Code Commission agreed that proposed revisions should be discussed with the Aquatic Animals Commission so that work on the revision of Chapter 1.1. of the *Terrestrial Code* and *Aquatic Code* can be undertaken in parallel to ensure consistency between respective Chapters 1.1., except where differences are necessary. As such, the Code Commission will circulate revised Chapter 1.1. at its February 2026 meeting after reviewing revised draft Chapter 1.1. of the *Aquatic Code*, so that Members can consider proposed amendments to both Chapters 1.1. to ensure a coordinated commenting process (see Item 3.3. in this report).

4.1.4. Revision of Chapter 4.4. Zoning and compartmentalisation

Background

At its September 2021 meeting, the Commission discussed several issues raised during the 88th General Session prior to the adoption of the revised Chapter 4.4. The Commission agreed to consider, at its next meeting, a comment to amend Article 4.4.7. to clarify whether a time limit should be defined for a containment zone.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Commission reviewed Article 4.4.7. in light of comments that highlighted differences in Members' understanding of critical aspects of the implementation of zoning. The Commission was informed that the WOA Observatory was undertaking a Thematic study on the 'Use, challenges and impact of zoning' and agreed to consider the information that would be obtained from this study, to expand the scope of this work item to clarify critical concepts in Chapter 4.4. 'Zoning and compartmentalisation' and to develop a new Chapter 4.X. 'Implementation of zoning'.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Commission requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to develop a new Chapter 4.X. 'Implementation of zoning' for the *Terrestrial Code* and to also review relevant points in Chapter 4.4. 'Zoning and compartmentalisation' to ensure consistency and complementarity between the two chapters. The Commission requested the Secretariat to draft the Terms of Reference for an *ad hoc* Group to undertake this work for consideration by the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission at their respective September 2024 meetings.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission discussed the draft Terms of Reference for an *ad hoc* Group on zoning provided by the Secretariat and agreed that given the complexity of this work, before convening an *ad hoc* Group, a task force should be established composed of members of the Scientific Commission and the Code Commission to better define the *ad hoc* Group's Terms of Reference.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission discussed the revised Terms of Reference developed by the zoning task force that had met twice since September 2024.

Discussion

The Commission was informed that the *ad hoc* Group for Zoning had met in May 2025 and had undertaken its work aligned with the Terms of Reference. The Secretariat informed the

Commission that the *ad hoc* Group proposed to rename Chapter 4.4. from 'Zoning and compartmentalisation' to 'Defining Subpopulations of Animals' and to focus on the common elements of zoning and compartmentalisation, to better explain how to establish and maintain subpopulations of animals with a distinct animal health status or under different disease management practices such as protection, surveillance or vaccination for instance. The *ad hoc* Group developed an outline for a new Chapter 4.Y. 'Implementation of Zoning,' that will focus on best practices for establishing zones for various purposes.

The Commission considered the May 2025 [report of the *ad hoc* Group on zoning](#), the revised definitions for 'animal health status' and 'zone', the revised draft Chapter 4.4. 'Defining Subpopulations of Animals' and the outline of a draft Chapter 4.Y. 'Application of Zoning.'

The Commission reviewed the proposed revised definitions 'animal health status' and 'zone' and provided some feedback for the next *ad hoc* Group meeting to consider. The Commission noted that these definitions may evolve as the development of these chapters continues.

The Commission appreciated the new direction of revised draft Chapter 4.4. which was renamed 'Defining Subpopulations of Animals'. The new chapter explains the different ways that subpopulations of animals can be defined, including through the use of zoning and compartmentalisation. The Commission noted that the chapter reflects the many ways that Veterinary Authorities have approached disease control and animal health status, such as the ability to focus on disease control in one species over other susceptible species, or vaccinating animals in a high-risk area while other animals remain unvaccinated. The Commission agreed that the focus of Chapter 4.4. could be on establishing and maintaining populations and subpopulations. The Commission requested that the *ad hoc* Group continue to revise Chapter 4.4. to address other mechanisms of establishing populations and subpopulations of animals, while they work on both chapters. In addition, the *ad hoc* Group should also consider populations and subpopulations based on vaccination status, wild animals versus domestic or captive wild animals, and zones defined by the control measures implemented or lack thereof.

The Commission also considered the outline for a new draft Chapter 4.Y. 'Implementation of zoning'. It approved the concept as drafted and encouraged the *ad hoc* Group to continue to develop the details of this chapter, including for example differences between zoning used in previously free countries or zones as part of control of new outbreaks and zoning used as part of progressive disease control and eradication in countries or zones where the disease is present. The Commission also suggested that the chapter include text on zoning for trade purposes only, such as the use of equine disease-free zones used to move or gather horses internationally for competition. The Commission also requested that the *ad hoc* Group include information about the importance of animal hosts to show that different subpopulations of animals have different epidemiological importance, and therefore do not always need to be considered in the notification, animal health status, control of disease or trade recommendations. Risk-based factors should determine which animals are included when a subpopulation is established. Finally, the Commission requested that the *ad hoc* Group consider removing the current Article 4.4.8. on bilateral recognition of zones, which should be included in the next revision of Chapter 5.3., where it should cover recognition of populations or subpopulations, in addition to zones and compartments.

The Commission noted that the Secretariat will reconvene the *ad hoc* Group to continue this work and will report on its progress at its February 2026 meeting.

4.1.5. Revision of Chapter 4.14. General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection

Background

At its September 2021 meeting, the Commission reviewed Section 4 of the *Terrestrial Code* and agreed that high priority should also be given to the revision of Chapter 4.14. 'General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection', Chapter 4.13. 'Disposal of dead animals' as well as to the development of a new Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity'.

At its February 2022 meeting, the Commission agreed that priority should be given to the development of a new Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity' and noted that the broad nature of this topic would likely impact the revisions of Chapters 4.13. and 4.14.

The Commission requested that the *ad hoc* Group on Biosecurity that was to meet in March 2024 to draft a new chapter on biosecurity also review Chapter 4.14. 'General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection' and provide recommendations as to how to proceed.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission considered the [March 2024 report of the *ad hoc* Group on Biosecurity](#), in particular its recommendations that given the number and importance of arthropod vector-borne diseases and of their control in the management of outbreaks, both disinfection and disinsection should be addressed in the same chapter. The Commission agreed that the focus of the revised Chapter 4.14. should be on disease prevention and control, and how disinfection and disinsection are used to prevent the spread of disease, given that the prevention of spread of disease is the focus of Section 4 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to revise Chapter 4.14. and asked the Secretariat to prepare the draft Terms of Reference for its review at the Commission's next meeting of September 2025.

Discussion

The Commission commented on the draft Terms of Reference for an *ad hoc* Group on Disinfection and Disinsection. They considered that the focus of the work should be on the general recommendations on cleaning and disinfection, and disinsection, types of disinfection and disinsection methods to be used for various types of pathogenic agents or vectors in establishments and not on technical details such as a list of disinfectants effective for specific disease agents nor concentration of disinfectants. The *ad hoc* Group could also consider alternatives to disinfection, such as fallowing, composting and other natural ways of disinfection that have shown effectiveness and can be implemented under certain circumstances. The Commission requested that the *ad hoc* Group also consider whether a revision of the Glossary definition of 'disinfestation' is relevant.

The Commission asked the Secretariat to update the Terms of Reference based on this discussion and to convene an *ad hoc* Group to start this work, carefully considering the type of expertise that might be required.

4.1.6. Development of an introductory chapter of Section 5

Background

At its February 2024 meeting, the Commission discussed the possible development of an introductory chapter to Section 5. 'Trade measures, import/export procedures and veterinary certification', similar to the introductory chapters included in some other sections of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission agreed that an introductory chapter for Section 5 could provide background and clarity on the objective and content of the chapters in Section 5. The Commission requested the *ad hoc* Group on Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. provide advice on this proposal. At its April 2024 meeting, the *ad hoc* Group agreed with this proposal and drafted suggested topics to include in an introductory chapter.

Concurrently, at its September 2024 meeting, the Aquatic Animal Commission also agreed on the need for an introductory chapter to the corresponding Section 5 of the *Aquatic Code*.

During the Bureaux meeting of these two Commissions, in September 2024, it was agreed that this work should be developed in collaboration given the similarities between Sections 5 of the *Aquatic Code* and the *Terrestrial Code*.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to establish a task force consisting of two members from each of the two Commissions to draft the introductory chapter to Section 5. The Code Commission requested that the Secretariat report back on progress at its September 2025 meeting, and increased the priority of this work from three to two.

Discussion

The Commission reviewed a draft introductory chapter to Section 5 that was developed by the task force. They considered that the initial scope was too broad and clarified that the introductory chapter should emphasise the objective of Section 5 and provide an overview of the purpose of each chapter in the Section in achieving this objective. Other aspects of the *Terrestrial Code* as relevant to the international veterinary certification and import and export operations focus of Section 5, such as related to relative disease status, veterinary capacity or negotiation of conditions, may be better referenced in summary later in the chapter. It was also discussed that such broader content was useful guidance for Members and may also be considered for adding into the User's Guide.

During the Bureaux meeting of the two Commissions (see Item 3.3. of this report), the Bureau of the Aquatic Animals Commission reported that the Aquatic Animals Commission had reviewed the draft introductory chapter developed by the task force and had suggested a different approach for revising the draft introductory chapter, for example the Aquatic Animals Commission preferred to maintain some background information from other sections of the *Terrestrial* and *Aquatic Codes*. During the Bureaux meeting, the two Bureaux requested that the Secretariat reconvene the task force to develop a revised chapter that addresses the concerns of both Commissions.

4.1.7. Revision of Chapter 6.8. Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes

Background

Chapter 6.8. 'Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes' was last updated in 2018. In 2024, a mapping exercise identified that the chapter does not include considerations on surveillance needs for antimicrobial resistance (AMR) of companion animals and for integrated surveillance across relevant sectors (animals and animal-derived food products, humans, plants and the environment).

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission considered a proposal from the Working Group on Antimicrobial Resistance (Working Group) to amend Chapter 6.8. to include considerations for surveillance programmes for companion animals and integrated surveillance. The Commission agreed to include this work in its work programme as a priority two and requested that the Working Group provide a draft Terms of Reference for an *ad hoc* Group, noting that care was needed in the prioritisation of AMR activity, especially in many Members with limited resources.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission provided comments on the draft Terms of Reference proposed by the Working Group for the *ad hoc* Group to revise Chapter 6.8.

Discussion

The Commission was informed that the *ad hoc* Group's first meeting took place virtually on 8 September 2025 to explain the process for the revision of a chapter and the role of the Commission. The Commission was informed that the *ad hoc* Group will meet during 2026 to revise Chapter 6.8. The Commission suggested that one of its members be invited as observer to this *ad hoc* Group and requested that the Working Group review the revised draft chapter before it is received by the Commission.

The Commission requested that the Secretariat provide an update on this work at its future meeting.

4.1.8. Revision of chapters on transport of animals (Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.)

Background

At its February 2023 meeting, the Commission agreed to commence work to revise Chapter 7.2. 'Transport of animals by sea' and Chapter 7.3. 'Transport of animals by land' of the *Terrestrial Code*, and requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to undertake this work.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission considered the June 2024 report of the *ad hoc* Group and agreed with the recommendation to merge Chapters 7.2. and 7.3. and to also include Chapter 7.4. 'Transport of animals by air', in a single chapter. The Commission requested the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to start the development of the single chapter. In addition, the Commission requested that recommendations for the transport of animals by foot also be considered for inclusion, given its relevance in many parts of the world (e.g. transhumance).

Discussion

The Commission considered the March 2025 report of the *ad hoc* Group, including draft new Chapter 7.2. and requested that the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to continue to finalise the draft chapter taking into account its general comments, to streamline and rationalise the chapter, reduce redundancy and improve the structure and readability.

The Commission expressed its interest for the *ad hoc* Group to meet before February 2026 so that it can consider its report at its next meeting.

4.1.9. Revision of Chapter 7.6. 'Killing for disease control purposes'

Comments were received from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China (People's Rep. of), Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, the UK, the USA, AU-IBAR, the EU, ICFAW and the WOAHP Wildlife Working Group.

Background

At its February 2018 meeting, the Commission agreed to revise Chapter 7.6. 'Killing of animals for disease control purposes' and requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to undertake this work, as well as the revision of relevant Glossary definitions. The first *ad hoc* Group meeting was held in June 2023.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Commission considered the June 2023 report of the *ad hoc* Group, including the draft revised Chapter 7.6. The Commission provided feedback on the proposed text and requested that the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to continue working on the draft chapter.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Commission continued considering the June 2023 report *ad hoc* Group report, including the revised draft Chapter 7.6. together with some comments made by the Commission in preparation of this meeting. It agreed to circulate the first eight articles for comments and requested the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to finalise text for the remaining articles.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission reviewed the comments received for the first eighth articles of the revised draft Chapter 7.6. and proposed work continue on the remaining articles, taking into account guidance from the Commission.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission considered the [October 2024 report](#) of the *ad hoc* Group, including the remaining draft articles of Chapter 7.6. and made additional amendments, as relevant. The Commission circulated the revised draft Chapter 7.6. for comments.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments received on Chapter 7.6. 'Animal welfare at the time of killing for purposes other than slaughter' that was circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission considered in detail comments on Articles 7.6.1., 7.6.2., 7.6.3, 7.6.4 and 7.6.6., as well as general comments. The Commission also discussed the relevance of keeping in the draft certain articles pertaining to killing methods for which a large number of comments were received.

It requested the Secretariat that its proposals on these comments, as well as the other comments received but not considered in detail, be further worked on by relevant experts.

The Commission noted that the *ad hoc* Group was scheduled to be reconvened before the end of the year and agreed to consider the revised draft Chapter 7.6. amended by the *ad hoc* Group together with its responses to relevant Member comments at its February 2026 meeting.

4.1.10. Revision of Chapter 11.5. 'Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* (CBPP)'

Background

A Member made an intervention during the 2025 General Session prior to adoption of the revised Chapter 11.5. 'Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* (CBPP)' and noted that the direct testing of semen for CBPP is unreliable and that only one laboratory has a validated test. The President of the Code Commission noted the comment and requested the Member to submit its comment in writing for the Commission's consideration at its September 2025 meeting.

Discussion

The Commission considered the comment received in writing, including proposed amendments, and noted that the corresponding Chapter 3.4.8. 'Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides*) in the *Terrestrial Manual* does not contain detailed information about the use of tests on specific samples such as germinal products.

The Code Commission agreed to discuss the proposal with the Biological Standards Commission during the Bureaux meeting (see Item 3.2. of this report). The Bureau of the Biological Standards Commission noted the comment and agreed to look into the suitability of diagnostic tests using specific samples such as germplasm in the disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Manual*.

The Commission requested the Secretariat to consult subject-matter experts on the Member proposal and to provide an update at a future meeting.

4.1.11. Infection with bovine pestiviruses (bovine viral diarrhoea) (new Chapter 11.X.)

Background

At its September 2022 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to develop a new Chapter 11.X. 'Infection with bovine pestiviruses (bovine viral diarrhoea)'. Based on a draft developed by experts, the Biological Standards Commission and the Scientific Commission, the Code Commission proposed a new draft chapter consisting of a single article outlining general provisions, including the definition of the disease and its occurrence.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Commission considered comments and agreed to amend the disease name in Article 1.3.2. of Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAHP' from 'Bovine viral diarrhoea' to 'Infection with bovine pestiviruses (Bovine viral diarrhoea)' and circulated the amended chapter for comment.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission was informed that the revised Chapter 3.4.7. 'Bovine viral diarrhoea' of the *Terrestrial Manual* was adopted at the 91st General Session in May 2024. Consequently, the Commission agreed to recommence its review of the revised new Chapter 11.X. and proposed the revised new Chapter 11.X. for adoption at the 92nd General Session in 2025.

At the 92nd General Session in 2025, several Members did not support adoption citing concerns that the case definition should include an option for confirmation of diagnosis via serology, or seroconversion. The President of the Code Commission agreed to withdraw the proposed new chapter from adoption and to continue work on this new draft chapter. He invited Members to submit comments, in writing, for the Commission to consider at its September 2025 meeting.

Discussion

The Commission considered Member concerns raised during the WOA 92nd General Session as well as comments submitted in writing on the definition of the occurrence of infection with bovine viral diarrhoea.

The Code Commission agreed to discuss this item during the Bureaux meeting with the Biological Standards Commission (see Item 3.2. of this report). Both Bureaux agreed to work with subject-matter experts on the case definition for bovine viral diarrhoea when diagnostic standards are reviewed in Chapter 3.4.7. of the *Terrestrial Manual*. The Code Commission agreed to maintain this item in its work programme and requested the Secretariat to work with subject-matter experts in coordination with the Biological Standards Commission to review diagnostic tests in Chapter 3.4.7. of the *Terrestrial Manual*.

4.1.12. Revision of Chapter 14.8. Scrapie

Background

At its February 2023 meeting, in response to comments to prioritise the work to review Chapter 14.8. Scrapie, the Commission agreed to progress this work.

At its September 2023, the Commission acknowledged that a number of requests to revise Chapter 14.8. had been submitted by Members over recent years and requested that the Secretariat develop a plan to revise the chapter.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered the April 2024 report of the *ad hoc* Group, including a revised draft chapter. The Code Commission requested the Secretariat to consult with experts and with the Biological Standards Commission to determine whether standardised methods exist for assessing resistance to scrapie and, if so, whether they should be first included in the *Terrestrial Manual* before the development of a revised chapter of the *Terrestrial Code*.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Code Commission reviewed the responses from experts that considered that there are standardised methods to ascertain genetic resistance, though they disagreed that a description of these methods should be in the *Terrestrial Manual* chapter and that this position was supported by the Biological Standards Commission. The Code Commission requested to discuss this jointly with the Biological Standards Commission at its next Bureaux meeting in September 2025.

Discussion

The Code Commission discussed this item with the Biological Standards Commission during the Bureaux meeting (see Item 3.2. of this report). The Biological Standards Commission considered that scrapie resistance is influenced by multiple factors and agreed to consult subject-matter experts again to see if additional progress has been made that would facilitate setting a standard on genetic resistance in the *Terrestrial Manual*. Pending agreement on the availability of a global standard for such tests, the Code Commission noted that Members can continue to use, for disease control or for trade on bilateral basis, scrapie-resistant genotypes.

4.1.13. Removal of questionnaire chapters (Chapters 1.7. to 1.12.) from the Terrestrial Code

Background

In September 2019, the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission agreed on exploring the removal of the questionnaires for official recognition of animal health status and endorsement of official control programmes (Chapters 1.7. to 1.12.) from the *Terrestrial Code* and instead proposed to maintain them on the WOAHP website.

In February 2021, both Commissions agreed that the questionnaires would be removed after completion of the necessary harmonisation of all relevant disease-specific chapters. In September 2024, both Commissions agreed that the removal of the questionnaires would be proposed for adoption after the adoption of Chapter 11.5. 'Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* (CBPP)' and 12.1. 'Infection with African horse sickness virus' at the 92nd WOAHP General Session.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments received on its February 2025 meeting report as well as interventions at the 92nd General Session in May 2025, regarding the proposal to remove the questionnaires from the *Terrestrial Code*. Some Members expressed concern that these chapters provide clarity and transparency in the process of determining official animal health status. Some noted that hosting the questionnaires solely on the WOAHP website could limit opportunities for Members' input on future revisions and reduce oversight, raising concerns that changes might be made without formal consultation with Members. Several comments also stressed the importance of clearly demonstrating how these questionnaires would be presented and updated online before any final decision is made, and requested further information on the process for removal from the *Terrestrial Code*.

The Code Commission reiterated that questionnaires are not 'standards' per se, but rather procedural tools to support the assessment of provisions described in the relevant disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*. As such, they do not belong a priori in the *Terrestrial Code*. This position has been extensively discussed by both the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission and reported in relevant meeting reports.

The Code Commission reminded Members that details on the revision process once the questionnaires are removed from the *Terrestrial Code* and maintained on the WOAHP website, were outlined in the February 2025 meeting report of the Scientific Commission. In addition, the Code Commission noted the ongoing work on Chapter 1.6. (see Item 6.2. of this report), which could help addressing Members concerns in the view of removing the questionnaires from the *Terrestrial Code*.

However, in light of requests from several Members to retain the questionnaires within the *Terrestrial Code*, the Commission asked WOAHP Headquarters to continue developing mechanisms that would assure Members of the transparency in the procedures to update the questionnaires outside of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission will revisit this topic once these mechanisms are in place. The Commission also noted that this may be explored as part of the current work of the WOAHP Governance Review Committee for clarity on what might comprise international standards and what might comprise associated WOAHP technical procedures or other WOAHP guidance documentation.

4.2. Items under consideration for inclusion in the work programme

The Code Commission considered new items that had not been included in the Commission's work programme because of the need for more data or information. The Commission reviewed whether new information was available and agreed to include the following items in its work programme.

- Revision of animal health status related articles of official status disease chapters (Chapters 8.8. FMD, 14.7. PPR and 15.2. CSF), following recent adoption of Chapters 11.5. CBPP and 12.1. AHS

- Chapter 10.4. 'Infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza virus', in parallel with the work on the glossary definition of 'poultry'
- Chapter 11.9. 'Infection with lumpy skin disease virus', in parallel with the work on Chapter 14.9. 'Sheep pox and Goat pox'

4.3. New proposals or requests for inclusion in the work programme

The Commission noted comments on proposals or requests for the development or revision of standards in the *Terrestrial Code*. However, due to time constraints and a heavy agenda, the Commission did not discuss these and agreed to address these items at its next meeting. The Commission noted that the following items have been proposed or requested:

- inclusion of 'salted natural casings' and 'gelatine/collagen' as safe commodities in relevant disease-specific chapters;
- development of new Glossary definition for 'treatment';
- development of new Glossary definitions and revision of current definitions related to some specific highly processed commodities;
- clarification of the term 'rendered fats' in Spanish.

4.4. Prioritisation of items on the work programme

Taking into consideration the progress of work items since its last meeting, relevant topics addressed during this meeting and comments submitted, the Commission discussed the prioritisation of ongoing and future work programme items and agreed to amendments as presented below.

New items added to the work programme:

- revision of Glossary definition for 'approved';
- new Glossary definition for 'animal host';
- revision of Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA';
- revision of Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with foot and mouth disease virus';
- revision of Chapter 11.9. 'Infection with lumpy skin disease virus';
- revision of Chapter 15.2. 'Infection with classical swine fever virus'.

Items removed:

- all new and revised texts adopted at the 92nd General Session in May 2025.

The Commission reminded Members that the order of prioritisation used in the work programme reflected the level of priority agreed upon by the Commission taking into account an assessment of each item in terms of its importance, impact, resources available and Member comments. Members are encouraged to continue to comment on the items on the work programme as well as prioritisation of items at any time in the Commission's work cycle.

The Commission highlighted that the inclusion of an item in the work programme means there is an agreement by the Commission on the need to undertake work, but that the decision as to when to commence each work item depends on the overall consideration of priorities, the progress of ongoing work and the resources and data available. The order of prioritisation aims to provide a transparent guide to plan and organise the work of the Commission and the Secretariat. The Commission highlighted that the order of prioritisation used in its work programme is not always aligned with the actual progress of each work item, as this will depend on the complexity of each item and associated discussions, including involving expert consultations, exchanges with other relevant Specialist Commissions and WOA Member inputs and comments.

The Commission reminded Members that, although it reviews its work programme at each meeting and reconsiders the prioritisation of items according to changes in necessity and urgency, to ensure continuity it generally aims not to modify significantly the order of prioritisation.

The Commission thanked Members and partners who submitted comments on work items at an early stage and encouraged Members and partners to also review work items in the Commission's work programme that have not yet started or are in preparation, even those in priority 3 or 4. Members and partners are invited to submit comments for specific items, as well as available information, evidence, or data, including implementation approaches that could be taken into consideration once work commences.

The updated work programme is presented in [Annex 4](#), for comments.

5. Texts circulated for comments and to be proposed for adoption in May 2026

The Code Commission discussed the following new or revised texts including texts which were circulated for comments in its February 2025 report and that will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

5.1. Glossary

Comments were received from Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Korea (Rep. of), New Zealand, South Africa, the USA, Americas region, AU-IBAR and the EU.

'border inspection post', 'container', 'point of entry', 'point of exit', 'quarantine centre', 'transit country' and 'means of transport'

Background

At its September 2021 meeting, the Commission agreed to revise Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. and an *ad hoc* Group was convened to develop the revised draft Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. The *ad hoc* Group also proposed the development of a new Glossary definition for 'point of exit' and the revision of existing Glossary definitions for 'border post', 'quarantine station', 'container' and 'vehicle/vessel'. The Commission reviewed the new and revised definitions and circulated them for comments.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Commission considered comments and requested the *ad hoc* Group to review the proposed amendments at its April 2024 meeting.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission reviewed [the April 2024 report of the *ad hoc* Group](#) and considered the revised Glossary definitions for 'border inspection post', 'container', 'point of exit', 'point of entry', 'quarantine centre', and 'transit country' developed in connection with the ongoing revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission considered comments received and made relevant amendments. The revised Glossary definitions were circulated for comments in the Commission's February 2025 report.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments on Glossary definitions for 'border inspection post', 'container', 'point of entry', 'point of exit', 'quarantine centre', 'transit country' and 'means of transport'.

The Commission's responses to comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The revised Glossary definitions for 'border inspection post', 'container', 'point of entry', 'point of exit', 'quarantine centre', 'transit country' and 'means of transport' are presented as part of [Annex 5](#) for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

'biosecurity', 'biosecurity plan' and 'swill'

Background

At its September 2022 meeting, the Commission requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to develop a new chapter on biosecurity. As part of this work, the Commission agreed to review the Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity' and 'biosecurity plan' and to develop a new definition for 'swill'.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Commission considered the definitions for 'biosecurity', 'biosecurity plan', and 'swill' prepared by the *ad hoc* Group on Biosecurity and agreed to circulate them for comment.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Commission considered comments and requested that the *ad hoc* Group on Biosecurity review these at its March 2024 meeting.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission reviewed [the March 2024 report of the *ad hoc* Group](#) and considered the Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity', 'biosecurity plan', and 'swill', in conjunction with the new draft chapter on biosecurity. The revised definitions were circulated for comments.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission addressed comments received and made relevant amendments. The revised definitions were circulated for comments.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments received on Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity', 'biosecurity plan' and 'swill' that were circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to the comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The revised Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity', 'biosecurity plan' and 'swill' are presented as part of [Annex 5](#) for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

'Disinfection' and 'pathogenic agent'

Background

At its September 2023 meeting, the Commission agreed to include the revision of the Glossary definition for 'disinfection' in its work programme, in response to comments on the new draft Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity'.

In addition, the Commission agreed to add to its work programme the development of a definition for 'pathogenic agent' and requested the *ad hoc* Group on Biosecurity to undertake this task.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission considered the proposed Glossary definitions for 'disinfection' and 'pathogenic agent' drafted by [the *ad hoc* Group on Biosecurity](#) and agreed with the proposals. The draft definitions were circulated for comments.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission considered the comments received and made relevant amendments. The revised Glossary definitions were circulated for comments.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments received on Glossary definitions for 'disinfection' and 'pathogenic agent' that were circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to the comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The Glossary definitions for 'disinfection' and 'pathogenic agent' are presented as part of [Annex 5](#) for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

‘Disinsection’

Background

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission agreed to develop a new Glossary definition for ‘disinsection’ based on discussion of Chapter 4.14. ‘Disinfection and Disinsection’. The Commission developed a new glossary definition, in line with the revised draft definition for ‘disinfection’ which was circulated for comments.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments received on the Glossary definition for ‘disinsection’ that was circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission’s responses to the comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The Glossary definition for ‘disinsection’ is presented as part of [Annex 5](#) for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

‘Isolation’

Background

At its February 2024 meeting, the Commission agreed to add the development of a new Glossary definition for ‘isolation’ to its work programme, in response to a proposal from the *ad hoc* Group undertaking the revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. The Commission requested the *ad hoc* Group on the Revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. and the *ad hoc* Group on Biosecurity to work together to draft a new Glossary definition for ‘isolation’.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission considered the proposed new Glossary definition for ‘isolation’ and made minor amendments for clarity. The new draft definition for ‘isolation’ was circulated for comment.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments received on the Glossary definition for ‘isolation’ which was circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission’s responses to comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The Glossary definition for ‘isolation’ is presented as part of [Annex 5](#) for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

‘Seroconversion’

Background

At its September 2024 meeting, in response to comments received on the new draft Chapter 8.24. ‘Infection with Nipah virus’, the Code Commission agreed to develop a new definition for ‘seroconversion’, in line with the definition in the *Terrestrial Manual*. The Code Commission requested the Secretariat to prepare a draft definition, in consultation with the Biological Standards Commission, for consideration at its next meeting.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Code Commission, in collaboration with the Biological Standards Commission, reviewed a draft Glossary definition for ‘seroconversion’ proposed by the Secretariat and agreed to circulate it for comments.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered comments received on the Glossary definition for 'seroconversion', which was circulated in its February 2025 meeting report, and consulted with the Biological Standards Commission regarding some of the comments.

The Commission's responses to comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The Glossary definition for 'seroconversion' is presented as part of [Annex 5](#) for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

5.2. Articles 1.3.1., 1.3.3. and 1.3.7. of Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA'

Comments were received from Korea (Rep. of), Mexico, AU-IBAR and the EU.

Background

At its February 2025 meeting, the Code Commission considered the conclusion of the Scientific Commission, along with the opinions of experts on the assessment of Nairobi sheep disease against listing criteria in Chapter 1.2. 'Criteria for the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the WOA list'. The Code Commission agreed that the disease does not meet all the required listing criteria and therefore proposed removing Nairobi sheep disease from the WOA list, proposing the corresponding amendments to Article 1.3.7. of Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA'. The Commission circulated the revised Article 1.3.7. for comment.

Discussion

Article 1.3.7.

The Commission considered comments on Article 1.3.7. of Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations by WOA' that was circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The Commission reminded Members that Nairobi sheep disease (NSD) did not meet the criteria for listing as described in Chapter 1.2. 'Criteria for the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the WOA list'.

In response to a comment, the Code Commission referred to the opinion of the subject-experts and the [report of the Scientific Commission of September 2024](#) and noted that there has not been any recent nor definitive evidence of international spread of NSD via live animals, their products, vectors or fomites. It noted expert opinion that reports of NSD from East Africa, India and China that were detected in ticks were isolated events, each involving distinct variants of NSD virus (NSDV) circulating exclusively within their respective regions. There has been no evidence of geographical spread of these local variants, or their spread via movement of animals, animal products, vectors or fomites. Therefore, the Code Commission agreed with the Scientific Commission and did not consider Criterion 1 to be met.

While the Commission noted a comment that NSDV, including the variant Ganjam virus has been associated with mortalities in sheep and goats, the Commission considered that the evidence provided was of outbreaks that occurred decades ago and that there is no recent evidence of infection with NSDV having a significant impact on the health of domestic animals.

In addition, the Commission noted that over the past 10 years, no Member has notified the occurrence of infection with NSDV to World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS), and considered that the primary objective of listing a pathogenic agent as per Article 1.2.1. is not met.

The Commission reiterated that the criteria in Chapter 1.2 would have to be met to justify the continued listing of NSD. The Commission maintained its recommendation to delist NSD and clarified that a request for listing may be reconsidered when there is up to date scientific evidence of international spread of NSD and current data on impacts to animal health.

Articles 1.3.1. and 1.3.3.

The Commission also noted that amendments to the disease name and chapter title have been proposed for new disease-specific Chapters 8.X. 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus' and 10.X. 'Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens) (see Items 5.7. and 5.8. in this report, respectively). Given these proposed amendments, the Commission agreed to amend the name of these diseases in Articles 1.3.1. and 1.3.3. of Chapter 1.3. to align with the title of the disease-specific chapters.

The revised Articles 1.3.1., 1.3.3. and 1.3.7. of Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAHP' are presented as [Annex 6](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

5.3. Biosecurity (new Chapter 4.X.)

Comments were received from Australia, Canada, Chile, China (People's Rep. of), Chinese Taipei, Korea (Rep. of), Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, the UK, the USA, AU-IBAR and the EU.

Background

At its September 2022 meeting, the Code Commission requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to develop a chapter structure on biosecurity and to revise relevant Glossary definitions for the consideration of the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission.

At its February 2023 meeting, the Code Commission considered the *ad hoc* Group's report and feedback from the Scientific Commission, and agreed that the proposed structure of the new Chapter 4.X., and the overall content were appropriate and requested that the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to continue work to develop a new draft chapter and to revise Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity' and 'biosecurity plan', and to propose a new definition for 'swill'.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Code Commission considered the [ad hoc Group's report](#) and reviewed the new draft Chapter 4.X., the proposed revised Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity' and 'biosecurity plan', and a new definition for 'swill' (see Item 5.1. in this report), together with input from the Scientific Commission. The Code Commission circulated the new draft Chapter 4.X. and the revised and new Glossary definitions for comment.

At its February 2024, the Commission acknowledged the many comments received and requested that the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to consider comments received and amend the text, as relevant.

In September 2024, the Commission reviewed the March 2024 [report of the ad hoc Group](#) and considered the updated draft Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity' and made amendments, where relevant, and ensured consistency with conventions of the *Terrestrial Code*. The revised Chapter 4.X. was circulated for comment.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission addressed the comments received and made amendments, where relevant to Chapter 4.X. The revised draft Chapter 4.X. was circulated for comment.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments on the new draft Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity' that was circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The revised draft Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity' is presented as [Annex 7](#) for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

5.4. Measures and procedures applicable during ‘exportation’, ‘transit’ and ‘importation’ (Chapters 5.4. to 5.7.)

Comments were received from Canada, Chile, China (People’s Rep. of), Japan, Korea (Rep. of), Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, the UK, the USA, AU-IBAR and the EU.

Background

At its September 2017 meeting, the Commission agreed to include a review of Section 5. ‘Trade measures, import/export procedures and veterinary certification’, in its work programme to better support Members in managing the risks associated with the introduction of diseases through the importation of commodities.

At its September 2021 meeting, the Commission reviewed the current chapters of Section 5 and agreed that the revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. should be given priority, and at its February 2022 meeting, the Commission requested that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to undertake this work based on the Terms of Reference developed by the Commission.

At its February 2023 meeting, the Commission reviewed the November 2022 report of the [ad hoc Group on Chapters 5.4. to 5.7.](#) and agreed to replace the four current chapters (Chapters 5.4., 5.5., 5.6. and 5.7.) with three new chapters that will provide recommendations on measures and procedures that are applicable during ‘exportation’, ‘transit’ and ‘importation’, respectively. The Commission also agreed with the proposal to develop a fourth chapter to address key facilities (e.g., border control/inspection posts and quarantine facilities). The Commission requested that the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to draft the revised chapters.

At its September 2023 meeting, the Commission considered the June 2023 report of the [ad hoc Group on Revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7.](#) and the new draft Chapter 5.4. ‘Measures and procedures applicable in the exportation of commodities’, Chapter 5.6. ‘Measures and procedures applicable in the importation of commodities’, and associated Glossary definitions. The Commission circulated the draft new Chapters 5.4. and 5.6. and revised new Glossary definitions for comments and requested that the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to revise Chapter 5.5. ‘Measures and procedures applicable to the transit of commodities’ and develop a new draft Chapter 5.7. ‘Border inspection posts and quarantine centres’.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Commission considered the comments received on the revised chapters and the November 2023 report of the meeting of the [ad hoc Group on Revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7.](#) The Commission requested that the *ad hoc* Group be reconvened to consider the comments and revise the text, where relevant. The Commission also provided guidance on the development of Chapters 5.5 and 5.7. for the *ad hoc* Group to address.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission considered the report of the [April 2024 meeting of the ad hoc Group on Revision of Chapters 5.4. to 5.7.](#) The Commission made some additional amendments, where relevant, and circulated four revised chapters as well as associated Glossary definitions for comments.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission considered comments and made additional amendments to the four draft chapters, where relevant, and circulated for comments.

The revised draft Chapter 5.4. and 5.6. have been circulated three times, and the revised draft Chapter 5.5. and the new draft Chapter 5.7. have been circulated twice for comment.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments on the revised draft Chapter 5.4., Chapter 5.5., Chapter 5.6. and the new draft Chapter 5.7. that was circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Code Commission’s responses to comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The revised draft Chapter 5.4. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the exportation of commodities', Chapter 5.5. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the transit of commodities', Chapter 5.6. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the importation of commodities', and the new draft Chapter 5.7. 'Border inspection posts and quarantine centres' are presented as [Annex 8](#), [Annex 9](#), [Annex 10](#) and [Annex 11](#), respectively, for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

5.5. Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. 'Animal welfare during slaughter'

Comments were received from Canada, China (People's Rep. of), Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Korea (Rep. of), Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the UK, the USA, the EU and ICAEW.

Background

The revised Chapter 7.5. 'Animal welfare during slaughter' was adopted at the 91st General Session in May 2024. However, in response to some Member interventions prior to adoption, the President of the Code Commission proposed to place point 4. of Article 7.5.30. 'under study' and requested Members to submit comments in writing and that the Code Commission would review them at its September 2024 meeting.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission reviewed the supporting data submitted by a Member regarding point 4. of Article 7.5.30. and requested the *ad hoc* Group for Chapter 7.5. to provide an opinion for the Commission's consideration.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission considered the *ad hoc* Group's opinion that the information received did not provide sufficient scientific evidence to modify the current adopted text. The Commission noted that the information provided corresponded to electrical parameters used for multi-stage stunning procedures, which are oriented to meat quality requirements, rather than animal welfare considerations. The Commission agreed to maintain the text as presented and delete '[Under study]' in Article 7.5.30. The revised draft article was circulated for comments.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments received on the point 4. of Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. 'Animal Welfare During Slaughter', which was circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission agreed that given no new information on electrical parameters was provided, the proposed new text in this point related to electrical parameters was correct, thus it deleted the reference to '[Under study]'.

The Commission noted that some comments were received on other parts of the article, which had not been circulated for comments. The Commission nevertheless reviewed the comments received and agreed to address only some of these comments, which were related to the changes proposed. It made relevant amendments only where it improved the clarity of the text.

The Commission's responses to the comments considered and the rationale for the additional amendments are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The revised Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. 'Animal welfare during slaughter' is presented as [Annex 12](#) for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

5.6. Harmonisation of official status disease chapters Chapter 8.8. Infection with foot and mouth disease virus and Chapter 15.2. Infection with classical swine fever

Background

In May 2025, revised Chapter 11.5. 'Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)' and Chapter 12.1. 'Infection with African horse sickness virus' were adopted, which included amendments that went beyond harmonisation with other disease-specific chapters with official recognition of free status.

The Commission agreed to start work to amend in the same way relevant articles in the remaining chapters that pertain to official recognition status (other than bovine spongiform encephalopathy), i.e. Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with foot and mouth disease virus', Chapter 14.7. 'Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus' and Chapter 15.2. 'Infection with classical swine fever virus'.

Discussion

The Commission considered the proposals developed by the Secretariat regarding amendments to relevant articles of Chapters 8.8., 14.7. and 15.2. to harmonise relevant provisions.

The Commission explained that the purpose of revising these articles is to harmonise the relevant texts. It was noted that the scope of this revision did not include any amendments to the substance or the addition of new content.

The revised Articles 8.8.3., 8.8.4. and 8.8.8. of Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with foot and mouth disease virus' and Articles 15.2.3. and 15.2.5. of Chapter 15.2. 'Infection with classical swine fever virus' are presented as [Annex 13](#) and [Annex 14](#), respectively, for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026. On the other hand, the revised Chapter 14.7., which contains more proposed modifications, is presented in [Annex 23](#) for comments only (see Item 6.7. in this report).

5.7. Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (new Chapter 8.X.)

Comments were received from Australia, China (People's Rep. of), Korea (Rep. of), Mexico, New Zealand, Thailand, the USA, AU-IBAR and the EU.

Background

At its February 2022 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to add the development of a new chapter for Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever to its work programme given this is a high-priority zoonotic disease in Asia and Africa. The Code Commission agreed to initiate this work once a case definition was developed by the Scientific Commission.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission was informed that the Scientific Commission had approved a draft case definition for infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus which had been posted on the WOAHP website to facilitate Members notification, in the absence of a *Terrestrial Code* chapter.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission was informed that a revised Chapter 3.1.5. 'Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever' of the *Terrestrial Manual* had been adopted at the 91st General Session in May 2024 and therefore agreed to develop a new Chapter 8.X. 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus', consisting of a single article on general provisions, including definitions of the listed disease and of its occurrence. The Commission highlighted that the objective of this chapter was to support notification by Members due to the public health risks associated with this disease. The new draft Chapter 8.X. 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus' was circulated for comments.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments received in response to draft Chapter 8.X. 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus', which was circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The Commission agreed to amend the name of the listed disease in Article 1.3.1. of Chapter 1.3. to 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus' for harmonisation with the proposed disease name in Chapter 8.X.

The new draft Chapter 8.X. 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus' and the revised Article 1.3.1. of Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAHP' are presented as [Annex 15](#) and [Annex 6](#), respectively, for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

5.8. Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens) (new Chapter 10.X.)

Comments were received from Korea (Rep. of), the UK, the USA and the EU.

Background

At its February 2023 meeting, the Code Commission was informed that the Scientific Commission had approved a draft case definition for turkey rhinotracheitis that had been developed by subject-matter experts. The Code Commission considered the draft case definition and requested that the Scientific Commission clarify some points, notably on the animal hosts, which are susceptible animals that play a significant role in the epidemiology or control of the disease.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered feedback from the Scientific Commission as well as feedback from the Biological Standards Commission. Given this, the Code Commission agreed to draft a new Chapter 10.X. consisting of a single article on general provisions, including definitions of the listed disease and of its occurrence.

The Commission also agreed to use 'Infection with avian metapneumovirus (turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens)' as the title of the new draft chapter.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments on the new draft Chapter 10.X. that was circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The Commission agreed to amend the name of the listed disease in Article 1.3.3. of Chapter 1.3. to 'Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens)' for harmonisation with the proposed disease name in Chapter 10.X.

The revised new draft Chapter 10.X. 'Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens)' and the revised Article 1.3.3. of Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAHP' are presented as [Annex 16](#) and [Annex 6](#), respectively, for comments and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

6. Texts circulated for comments

The Commission discussed the following new or revised texts and circulated them for comments.

6.1. Glossary

'laboratory'

Background

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission while revising Chapter 1.6. of the *Terrestrial Code* (refer to Item 6.2. in this report), noted that the current Glossary definition for 'laboratory' is limited to facilities for diagnostic purposes, and that it is relevant to also consider approved facilities used for purposes other than diagnosis, such as research, vaccine development and manufacturing, biological products development and manufacturing. The Code Commission agreed to progress the revision of the definition of 'laboratory' in collaboration with the Biological Standards Commission.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Code Commission considered feedback from the Biological Standards Commission who acknowledged the need for a broader, more inclusive definition that encompasses facilities handling pathogenic agents and pathological materials beyond diagnostic purposes, while ensuring alignment with relevant standards and biosafety considerations.

Discussion

The Code Commission, in collaboration with the Biological Standards Commission (see Item 3.2. in this report), reviewed the revised definition of 'laboratory' and agreed that the revised definition addresses a wider range of purposes.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the Commission agreed that a 'laboratory' should be approved by the Veterinary Authority. In addition, the Commission agreed that Competent Authorities other than the Veterinary Authority may be considered the authority responsible for approving, accrediting, or registering the 'laboratory'. Therefore, the Commission agreed to revise the Glossary definition for 'approved' to reflect this. (see Item below).

The Commission agreed to present a clean version of the revised definition.

The revised Glossary definition for 'laboratory' is presented as part of [Annex 17](#) for comments.

'approved'

Discussion

As described in the previous item on 'laboratory', the Commission noted that given a responsible authority other than the Veterinary Authority may approve, accredit or register a laboratory, the Glossary definition for 'approved' should be amended to reflect this. The Commission agreed to add the revision of Glossary definition for 'approved' to its work programme with priority 2.

The Commission reviewed the current Glossary definition for 'approved' and proposed to include a reference to approval by other relevant Competent Authorities.

The revised Glossary definition for 'approved' is presented as part of [Annex 17](#) for comments.

6.2. Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOA (Chapter 1.6.)

Comments were received from Chile, Korea (Rep. of), New Zealand, AU-IBAR and the EU.

Background

At its September 2022 meeting, the Commission considered a request to amend Chapter 5.8. 'International transfer and laboratory containment of animal pathogenic agents', and to improve clarity as to whether Members can hold pathogenic agents in laboratories without affecting their country or zone animal health status. The Commission agreed that this specific request should be addressed in the context of official status recognition by amending Chapter 1.6. 'Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOA'.

At its February 2023 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to develop a new Article 1.6.4. to clarify that holding a pathogenic agent in a laboratory with an appropriate level of containment and biosecurity in accordance with the *Terrestrial Manual* such as a diagnostic reference or vaccine or antigen banks, will not impact the animal health status of a free country or zone. The Code Commission also agreed to address in the same article similar provisions currently included in other horizontal chapters and requested the opinion of the Scientific Commission on this proposal.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Commission noted that draft Article 1.6.4. is closely linked with the revised Chapters 5.4 to 5.7. and the new Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity', and requested the opinion of relevant *ad hoc* Groups on this proposal before progressing further.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission considered the opinions of relevant *ad hoc* Groups and further amended draft Article 1.6.4., including the use of the term 'quarantine centre' instead of 'quarantine station' given that there is an ongoing proposal to revise the Glossary term from 'quarantine station' to 'quarantine centre' (see Item 5.1. in this report).

Revised Chapter 1.6. has been circulated twice for comments.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments on draft Chapter 1.6. 'Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOAAH' circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to comments are presented in [Annex 3](#).

In the title, the Commission proposed to delete the reference to 'procedures for' as the provisions in the chapter are not limited to procedures.

In addition, the Commission proposed further amendments to the text to improve clarity in view of comments received concerning the maintenance of status.

In Article 1.6.1., the Commission proposed to include reference to Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis' to address issues of importation raised by Members and added text on the titles of the chapters referenced, to clarify the focus of these chapters.

The Commission proposed to delete paragraph 5 of Article 1.6.1. as it considered that a reference to the WOAAH framework for the official recognition of animal health status, the endorsement of official control programmes, and their maintenance, and associated Resolutions should not be included in the standard. On the other hand, in paragraph 6, the Commission added text to specify the process involved in recognition of official animal health status or endorsed official control program, including their assessment by experts and reference to their adoption in a Resolution by the World Assembly.

In Article 1.6.2., the Commission proposed to delete 'in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1.' as it considered this to be implicit.

The revised Chapter 1.6. 'Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOAAH' is presented as [Annex 18](#) for comments.

6.3. New draft Chapter 3.X. 'Emergency management'

Background

At the 89th General Session, in 2022, Resolution No. 28 on emergency management recommended that WOAAH international standards address emergency management. At its September 2023 meeting, the Commission agreed with the proposal from WOAAH Headquarters to develop a standard on emergency management for the *Terrestrial Code*.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Commission agreed with the draft Terms of Reference for an *ad hoc* Group to develop a standard on emergency management for the *Terrestrial Code*. The *ad hoc* Group on emergency management met in April 2024 to initiate its work.

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission reviewed the April 2024 report of the [ad hoc Group](#) on emergency management and requested that the *ad hoc* Group also consider relevant work of the *ad hoc* Groups working on the chapters on biosecurity and animal welfare at the time of killing, as well as with potential future work on disinfection and disposal of dead animals.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission considered [the December 2024 report of the ad hoc Group](#) and the draft chapter developed by the *ad hoc* Group based on the structure developed at its first meeting. The Commission provided some advice for the consideration of the *ad hoc* Group when it meets next, including the need for consistency of terminology used throughout the chapter, and to define some terms where it will promote a better understanding of the chapter.

The Commission agreed that this chapter was best placed in Section 3 of the *Terrestrial Code* given that it addresses best practices for Veterinary Services to be able to respond to veterinary emergencies.

Discussion

The Commission considered the [June 2025 report of the *ad hoc* Group on emergency management](#) and the revised draft chapter on emergency management. The Commission provided a number of amendments to the draft chapter to ensure it aligns with the level of detail provided in other chapters, conventions in the *Terrestrial Code* and consistency with other relevant horizontal chapters. The Commission also ensured sufficient coverage of the veterinary role and veterinary responsibilities within broader emergency management arrangements.

The new draft Chapter 3.X. 'Emergency management' is presented as [Annex 19](#) for comments.

6.4. Japanese encephalitis (Chapter 8.10.)

Comments were received from Australia, Canada, China (People's Rep. of), Chinese Taipei, Korea (Rep. of), New Zealand, South Africa, AU-IBAR and the EU.

Background

At its September 2022 meeting, the Commission agreed to include a revision of Chapter 8.10. 'Japanese encephalitis' in its work programme following requests from Members. The Commission also noted that the revision of Chapter 12.4. 'Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western)' and Chapter 12.11. 'Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis' had been included in its work programme in February 2020. Considering the similarities of these diseases, the Commission agreed to revise the three chapters to ensure a consistent approach. The Commission also agreed that Chapter 8.21. 'West Nile fever' should be taken into consideration in the same manner.

While acknowledging that a major revision of these chapters will be needed, before discussing revised texts of the chapters, the Code Commission requested that a listing scientific assessment be conducted in collaboration with the Scientific Commission. At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission noted that the Scientific Commission in its September 2023 report had finalised assessments for Japanese encephalitis (JE), Eastern (EEE) and Western equine encephalomyelitis (WEE), and Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE) against the listing criteria in Chapter 1.2. 'Criteria for the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the WOAHP list' and agreed that they all meet the listing criteria and so should continue to be listed in Chapter 1.3. 'Chapter: 1.3. Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAHP'.

Based on the outcomes of the assessments, the Commission requested that all chapters that address the five equine encephalitides i.e., EEE, WEE, JE, West Nile fever and VEE be reviewed by relevant experts, who should assess whether EEE and WEE should be covered in separate chapters and define the animal hosts to be targeted for each disease, and whether the names of diseases containing specific country or region names should be re-considered, taking into account the relevant WHO guidelines.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Code Commission considered November 2024 [ad hoc Group report](#) together with the opinion of the Scientific Commission, and the revised draft Chapter 8.10. 'Infection with Japanese encephalitis virus (Japanese encephalitis)'. The Commission amended the revised draft Chapter 8.10, where relevant and circulated it for comment.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments received on Chapter 8.10. 'Infection with Japanese encephalitis virus (Japanese encephalitis)' that was circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The Commission requested the Secretariat to seek expert advice on some comments regarding the role of 'sheep' as a potential amplifying species and to consider this advice at its next meeting. Nevertheless, it agreed to circulate the revised Chapter 8.10. for comments.

The revised Chapter 8.10. 'Infection with Japanese encephalitis virus (Japanese encephalitis)' is presented as [Annex 20](#) for comments.

6.5. Tularemia (Chapter 8.20.)

Comments were received from Australia, Chinese Taipei, Korea (Rep. of), Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, the USA, AU-IBAR and the EU.

Background

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered a proposal from the Scientific Commission to include a case definition developed by experts and endorsed by the Scientific Commission in Chapter 8.20. 'Tularemia'.

The Code Commission noted that the current Chapter 8.20. only includes general provisions, provisions for free country and for infected zone, and general recommendations for the importation of live hares from infected countries. The Code Commission also noted that as the current chapter was developed in 1982 and last updated in 2014, the articles did not follow the framework that is used to draft the disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Code Commission highlighted that the Scientific Commission had recommended that the animal hosts for the chapter be defined as 'animals in the order Lagomorpha and Rodentia', but the current chapter targets only hares, genus *Lepus*. Based on these considerations, the Code Commission agreed to include the revision of Chapter 8.20. in its work programme. The Code Commission requested the Secretariat to prepare a revised draft Chapter 8.20. 'Tularemia' to include the new case definition and to align the text with the framework for the Commission to consider at its next meeting.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Commission considered the revised Chapter 8.20. prepared by the Secretariat. The Commission considered that indicating the specific name of subtypes of the pathogenic agents was adequate and agreed not to include 'type A' and 'type B'. The revised Chapter 8.20. was circulated for comments.

Discussion

The Commission considered comments received on Chapter 8.20. 'Infection with *Francisella tularensis* (Tularemia)' that was circulated in its February 2025 meeting report.

The Commission's responses to comments considered are presented in [Annex 3](#).

The Commission reminded Members that the purpose of revising Chapter 8.20. was to include the new case definition and align the text with the framework. The Commission noted that the scope of this revision did not include a comprehensive revision. Consequently, it decided not to address some comments that required expert consultations and requested the Secretariat to seek expert advice on these comments that the Commission would consider at its next meeting.

The revised Chapter 8.20. 'Infection with *Francisella tularensis* (Tularemia)' is presented as [Annex 21](#) for comments.

6.6. Revision of Chapter 12.11. Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis

Background

In the process of revising the equine encephalitis chapters (see Item 6.4. in this report), the Commission agreed to convene an *ad hoc* Group to revise Chapter 12.11. 'Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis'. The Commission requested that the *ad hoc* Group consider relevant amendments made to the revised Chapters 12.4. on Eastern and Western equine encephalomyelitis and Chapter 8.10. 'Japanese encephalitis' to ensure harmonisation of relevant provisions.

Discussion

The Code Commission considered the [April 2025 *ad hoc* Group report on the Revision of Chapter 12.11. 'Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis'](#) and the revised draft Chapter 12.11. 'Infection with Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis)' together with the opinions of the Scientific Commission.

The Commission agreed with the *ad hoc* Group suggestion to propose a new revised Chapter 12.11. as a clean text due to the extensive revision needed. The Commission reviewed and amended the text for clarity and consistency.

The Code Commission considered the opinion of the Scientific Commission regarding the title of the chapter but did not agree with the proposal to simplify it given that the title is linked to the name of WOAHP listed disease in Chapter 1.3. The Code Commission agreed to use 'variants' rather than 'strains' to harmonise with terms used in the *Terrestrial Manual*. The Code Commission also noted that the name of the listed disease in Chapter 1.3. will be amended to harmonise with this chapter, but this will be proposed closer to the adoption of the revised Chapter 12.11.

The Commission agreed with the proposal of the *ad hoc* Group to limit the variants of Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus. For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the Commission explained that specifying a particular type, subtype or variant of a pathogenic agent infecting its animal host could avoid misunderstandings. The Commission agreed that 'equids' are considered as an animal host and so should be included in the definition of the disease and its occurrence, but not other species such as sheep, goats, dogs and cats.

The Commission agreed with the proposal of the *ad hoc* Group regarding the incubation period. The Commission agreed to include an infective period in addition to the incubation period as it is well defined.

The Commission considered the opinion of the *ad hoc* Group regarding safe commodities, but did not agree with the exclusion of some commodities from the list of safe commodities. The Commission highlighted that the criteria for inclusion in the list of safe commodities are defined in Chapter 2.2. 'Criteria applied by WOAHP for assessing the safety of commodities', and are based on the evidence that the pathogenic agent is not present in the traded commodity in an amount able to cause infection in a human or animal by a natural exposure route, either due to its natural absence in the tissues from which the commodity is derived or to its inactivation by the standard processing or treatment that the animal products have undergone while being produced. Based on these criteria, the Commission agreed to include meat products and processed hides and skins into the list of safe commodities. In addition, in accordance with its work programme, the Commission also agreed to include 'extruded dry pet food' as a safe commodity (refer to items on 'Commodities' in Annex 4 'Work programme').

Regarding commodities such as meat and germinal products that were assessed as not meeting the criteria of safe commodities, the Commission noted that risk mitigation recommendations for the importation of these commodities should be considered for inclusion in the chapter. The Commission requested the Secretariat to seek expert advice on what provisions would be needed for the safe importation of these commodities and to report back to the Commission at its next meeting.

Regarding the articles on animal health status, protection of equids from culicine mosquito bites and surveillance, the Commission agreed with the proposals of the *ad hoc* Group and made some additional amendments for clarity and to harmonise with the framework.

Although the Commission requested to seek expert advice on recommendation for importation of some commodities, it agreed to circulate the revised Chapter 12.11. for comments and to add these provisions at a later stage.

The revised Chapter 12.11. 'Infection with Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis)' is presented as [Annex 22](#) for comments.

6.7. Revision of Chapter 14.7. Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus

Background

At its September 2024 meeting, the Code Commission considered a new draft article for Chapter 14.7. 'Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus' for the importation of susceptible animals from an infected country or zone for direct slaughter proposed by the Scientific Commission. The Code Commission noted that in addition to this proposal, there was a need to review Article 14.7.19. and Article 14.7.25., which included references to articles of Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with foot-and-mouth disease virus', and to resolve inconsistencies following the recent adoption of a revised Chapter 8.8.

The Code Commission agreed to undertake a more comprehensive revision of Chapter 14.7. to address all these pending issues including a review of scientific evidence suggesting that suids may be a possible source of spread for peste des petits ruminants virus. The Code Commission requested the Secretariat to seek expert advice and the opinion of the Scientific Commission and to report back at its next meeting.

The *ad hoc* Group on Peste des petits ruminants which met in November 2024 considered the requested items.

Discussion

The Code Commission updated Chapter 14.7. 'Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus' for alignment with the framework as well as consistency with recently revised chapters for diseases for which WOAHP grants official status (see Item 5.6. in this report). The Code Commission also considered the proposed revisions recommended by the Scientific Commission and the November 2024 [report of the *ad hoc* Group on Peste des petits ruminants](#).

In Article 14.7.1. updates were made to clarify which animals are considered animal hosts, and which are merely susceptible. This was based on information about what animals can be infected with PPRV and develop clinical signs of disease, and also on scientific evidence of which animals play a significant epidemiological role in the transmission of disease.

In Article 14.7.2. the list of safe commodities was updated based on the recommendations of the experts and formatted for consistency.

A new Article 14.7.10bis. 'Recommendations for importation of domestic sheep and goats destined for slaughter from countries or zones infected with PPRV' was added. This article was drafted by experts for Members who wished to import animals for direct slaughter from affected countries with a less stringent sanitary measures while not jeopardising their free status.

Article 14.7.19. was updated based on expert recommendations to remove references to articles in Chapter 8.8. and update appropriate sanitary measures for trade in milk.

Article 14.7.23. was evaluated with the purpose of removing the reference to the intended use of the products from the title of the article. A determination was made by the experts that the sanitary measures in the article were sufficient to mitigate the risk, even if the products were not restricted to the intended use. Due to similarities between the revised Article 14.7.22. and 14.7.23., the two articles were combined in a new Article 14.7.22.bis which was formatted for consistency.

Article 14.7.25. was deleted and the products listed were added to the list of safe commodities in Article 14.7.2., in agreement with expert recommendations.

The Commission requested that the Secretariat ask for an expert opinion on whether the current sanitary measures for importation of fresh meat and meat products in Article 14.7.17 meet the criteria for safe commodity, as the risk mitigation requirements (no clinical signs and slaughter in an approved abattoir with ante- and post-mortem inspection with favourable results) are the same irrespective of the status of the country or zone of origin, and are not specifically addressing PPR.

The Commission asked that the Secretariat organise a comprehensive expert review of all the surveillance articles in this chapter (Articles 14.7.27.-14.7.32.). The objectives of the surveillance should be considered, and surveillance strategies created to meet those objectives.

The Commission also noted that the chapter currently does not address the use of vaccination for the control of PPR, although vaccination is currently an important tool being used to control the spread of disease worldwide and there is an effective vaccine available for this disease. The Secretariat was asked to also consult with experts to incorporate some information on best practices for the use of vaccination to control and eradicate PPRV, and possibly draft an article on the official control programmes.

Although further amendments will be made following consideration of expert opinion as described above, the revised draft Chapter 14.7. 'Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus' is presented as [Annex 23](#) for comments.

6.8. Revision of Chapter 14.9. Sheep pox and goat pox

Background

At its February 2023 meeting, the Commission, in response to a request, agreed to include the revision of Chapter 14.9. 'Sheep pox and goat pox', in its work programme. Further comments supporting this revision were reviewed by the Commission at its September 2023 meeting.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission agreed to prioritise this work since there had been reports of spread of the disease into new areas, apparent under-reporting of cases, and difficulties in diagnosis because of recombination between lumpy skin disease virus and sheep pox virus (SPPV) and goat pox virus (GTPV).

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission reviewed the Terms of Reference for an *ad hoc* Group to undertake the revision of Chapter 14.9. 'Sheep pox and goat pox'. In addition to the usual content of a disease-specific chapter, the Commission requested that the *ad hoc* Group address recommendations on disease prevention and control, including vaccination, as this would benefit Members in the control of the disease. Given similarities of the pathogenic agents, the Commission also agreed with a request from WOAHA Headquarters to request advice from the *ad hoc* Group on the potential need to revise Chapter 11.9. 'Infection with lumpy skin disease virus'.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Code Commission considered the [November 2024 report of the *ad hoc* Group on Sheep and goat pox](#), including revised draft Chapter 14.9. 'Sheep pox and goat pox', as well as the opinion of the Scientific Commission. The Code Commission noted that, in agreement with the opinion of the Scientific Commission, further clarifications were needed, including addressing discrepancies in risk mitigation measures between animals and animal products in the articles on sanitary measures at import, and ensuring they are based on scientific evidence and are proportionate to the risk. The Code Commission agreed not to circulate the revised draft chapter and requested that the Secretariat work with the *ad hoc* Group to address the concerns identified. The Code Commission also considered preliminary advice as sought on revision of Chapter 11.9 'Infection with lumpy skin disease virus'.

Discussion

The Code Commission reviewed the November 2024 report of the *ad hoc* Group on Sheep and goat pox and the opinion of the Scientific Commission. The Code Commission was also informed that the *ad hoc* Group's proposed amendments to Chapter 3.8.11. of the *Terrestrial Manual* would be reviewed by the Biological Standards Commission as part of the 2026/2027 cycle (see Item 3.2. in this report).

The Code Commission reviewed, the revised draft Chapter 14.9. 'Infection with sheeppox virus (sheeppox) and goatpox virus (goatpox)' and amended the text for clarity and consistency with the framework. The Code Commission also reviewed the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group and the Scientific Commission on Chapter 11.9. 'Infection with lumpy skin disease' and proposed corresponding changes to Chapter 11.9. so that both chapters were aligned, where relevant.

In Article 14.9.1., the Code Commission agreed with the *ad hoc* Group and the Scientific Commission that reference should be made to capripoxviruses as there are no antibody or antigen tests specific to SPPV or GTPV.

The Commission agreed with the *ad hoc* Group's recommendation to include protein meal and hooves and horns as safe commodities in Article 14.9.2, and to add extruded dry pet food, gelatine and collagen to the list of safe commodities given that respectively the pressure and heat treatment

and the inherent hydrolysis process would inactivate capripoxviruses. The Commission also added heat-treated meat products in a hermetically sealed container with an F0 value of 3 or above to the list of safe commodities, as well as skeletal muscle meat. The Commission noted that the *ad hoc* Group's recommendation on sanitary measures at import of skeletal muscle meat was only ensuring the animals were subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.3., which are considered to be standardised protocols not addressing specific risk mitigation. Based on this information, in addition to the lack of scientific evidence as a possible transmission pathway, the Commission included skeletal muscle meat in the article on safe commodities.

In relation to the provisions for the recovery of free status of the country or zone, the Code Commission agreed with the Scientific Commission that the waiting period should be calculated from the completion of cleansing and disinfection, rather than slaughter or killing of the last case, and proposed modifications to the text. In addition, considering the persistence of the capripoxviruses in the environment, the Code Commission proposed that free status may be recovered 8 months after this cleaning and disinfection, provided a stamping-out policy has been implemented along with a combination of clinical, virological and serological surveillance demonstrating the absence of infection.

Regarding the recommendations for the importation of domestic sheep and goats, the Code Commission considered there was no need for a safety margin of 7 days in addition to the incubation period of 21 days (which already incorporated a safety margin) for the minimum residency period. It considered this to be excessive and proposed a residency period of 21 days and applied this throughout the chapter where relevant. The Code Commission agreed with the Scientific Commission and subsequent clarification from the *ad hoc* Group that infected animals may be missed if relying on clinical signs alone, and therefore proposed to subject unvaccinated animals to a serological test at least 35 days after entering the quarantine centre. This would ensure that infected animals have sufficient time to demonstrate detectable antibodies, if they acquired the infection just prior to entering the quarantine centre. The Code Commission also agreed to specify that vaccinated animals should be vaccinated with live attenuated vaccines. The Code Commission noted that live attenuated vaccines are highly efficacious, and it was not necessary to include a post-vaccination serological test. Therefore, it removed this requirement for a post-vaccination serological testing across the chapter.

The Code Commission agreed with the Scientific Commission that the provisions for the importation of genetic material should be proportionate to the risk posed by live animals and proposed changes to align the requirements of donor animals with that of live animals. The Code Commission considered it excessive to require semen to be tested in addition to testing of the donor animals every 28 days, and removed the requirement for semen to be subjected to an agent detection test. Likewise for the importation of oocytes and embryos, the Code Commission considered that it was sufficient to subject donor animals to a serological test on the day of collection and at least 28 days after collection, and there was no need for an additional agent identification test on the animal on the day of collection.

Regarding the importation of milk and milk products from sheep and goats from infected countries or zones, the Commission recommended including an additional option of maintaining pH at less than 6 for more than an hour as this would significantly inactivate capripoxviruses, rendering a loss of infectivity¹.

The Code Commission agreed with the proposal of the Scientific Commission to include additional articles on the importation of wool and hair from sheep and goats from infected countries and zones and skins from both free and infected countries and zones.

Due to the extensive changes proposed, the Commission agreed to present the revised draft Chapter 14.9. as clean text for comments ([Annex 24](#)).

Chapter 11.9. 'Infection with lumpy skin disease'

The Code Commission agreed with the recommendation of the *ad hoc* Group and the Scientific Commission to include yaks (*Bos grunniens*) and mithuns (*Bos frontalis*) as animal host species for lumpy skin disease virus, considering their epidemiological role in transmission and their importance

¹ Weiss K.E. (1968). – Lumpy Skin Disease Virus. . In Cytomegaloviruses. Rinderpest Virus. Lumpy Skin Disease Virus (J.B. Hanshaw, W. Plowright & K.E. Weiss, eds), Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. pp 111–131 doi:10.1007/978-3-662-39771-8_3.

as livestock species in certain regions. The Code Commission proposed to define animal hosts as 'bovines', as water buffaloes are included in 'bovines'. Consequently, the Code Commission deleted 'water buffaloes' throughout the chapter.

The Commission proposed to add extruded dry pet food and protein meal to the list of safe commodities as is proposed for Chapter 14.9.

Considering the effectiveness of vaccination as a control measure, the Commission requested the Secretariat to consult subject-matter experts on

- the duration of the period where no vaccination has been carried out for obtaining free status (which is different than for sheeppox and goatpox)
- the period for surveillance for there to be no case in order for a country or zone to be considered free from lumpy skin disease if vaccination was used, along with
- the associated waiting periods for recovery as the current periods are based on calculations of the vector season and
- the number of days after which a vaccinated animal is considered immune.

The experts should also review the articles on surveillance and develop an article on prevention and control programmes for lumpy skin disease, as has been done for Chapter 14.9.

Additional changes were made throughout the text to align with the corresponding amendments in Chapter 14.9.

The Commission agreed to present the revised draft Chapters 14.9 as clean text (and a tracked changes version) given the extensive amendments made. In addition, although further amendments will be made following consideration of expert opinion as described above, the Commission agreed to present the revised draft chapter for comments at this time.

The revised draft Chapter 14.9. 'Infection with sheeppox virus (sheeppox) and goatpox virus (goatpox)' is presented as a clean version in [Annex 24](#), and a tracked version in [Annex 24bis](#) for comments.

The revised draft Chapter 11.9. 'Infection with lumpy skin disease' is presented as [Annex 25](#) for comments.

7. Updates on WOAHP initiatives relevant to the Code Commission

7.1. Work of the Governance Review Committee

The Commission was updated of the work of the WOAHP Governance Review Committee in developing recommendations to the Assembly on updates to WOAHP's legal framework, institutional, regional, technical and financial governance in accordance with Assembly [Resolution No. 12 \(2024\)](#) and [Resolution No. 5 \(2025\)](#). Relevant to the work of WOAHP Specialist Commissions, the work included a review of the appointment processes of experts to WOAHP's Specialist Commissions and other technical bodies, the development of a Technical Procedural Manual on WOAHP's technical decision-making processes and distinguishing binding and non-binding standards, with final recommendations expected to be presented at the WOAHP 93rd General Session. Specialist Commission members were encouraged to engage with their Delegate on the Governance Review Committee's work.

7.2. Animal Health Forum at the WOAHP General Session

The Commission was updated on the Animal Health Forum held during the 92nd WOAHP General Session, which focused on veterinary vaccines and vaccination, and addressed barriers to vaccine availability, access, demand and adoption. Discussions covered trade implications, regulatory challenges, public perception, and the role of vaccines in reducing AMR and supporting One Health. The Forum informed the adoption of [Resolution No. 29](#), which outlined 11 recommendations for WOAHP and its Members to enhance vaccine availability, quality, and strategic use. The technical report of the session may be found [here](#). The Commission was invited to review the recommendations and provide WOAHP Headquarters with feedback on the implementation of the Resolution.

7.3. 7th WOAHA Animal Welfare Global Forum

The Secretariat provided an update on the upcoming 7th WOAHA Animal Welfare Global Forum, 'Regional Animal Welfare Strategies and Platforms: A key tool for the global implementation of WOAHA animal welfare standards' to be held Paris, France from 13-14 November 2025. The objective of the Forum is to support the WOAHA regions to develop and implement effective Regional Animal Welfare Strategies and Platforms.

The Forum is an invitation-only event, and a report, including a summary of key discussions and conclusions, will be published on the WOAHA website. The Secretariat reported that approximately 40 participants will be invited, including selected Delegates and Animal Welfare Focal Points from each region, Regional Commission Presidents, representatives from Animal Welfare Collaborating Centres and relevant International Organisations with cooperative agreements with WOAHA. The Commission noted this update.

7.4. WOAHA Zoning Forum

In view of the challenges raised by WOAHA Members in the effective application and recognition of zoning for terrestrial animal diseases, WOAHA recognises the need to provide further practical support to its Members. The Secretariat informed the Commission that WOAHA is organising a Global Forum on Zoning, that will allow the sharing of experience by Members, explore practical solutions that have enabled the successful establishment and recognition of disease-free zones, and discuss lessons learnt and recommendations on best practices. This Forum will take place in December 2025 for invited participants. Members of the *ad hoc* Group on zoning will participate in the Forum in order to gain a better understanding of revisions that may need to be incorporated into their ongoing work on zoning (see Item 4.1.4. in this report).

7.5. Terrestrial Code content standardisation

7.5.1. Animal hosts to be targeted by WOAHA Standards for a listed disease

Background

At its September 2023 meeting, building on the development of the 'Framework for *Terrestrial Code* Standards' and ongoing collaboration with the Scientific Commission to update case definitions for WOAHA listed-diseases, the Code Commission agreed on the need to clearly define which susceptible animals should be included as animal hosts in a disease-specific chapter of the *Terrestrial Code* and the corresponding chapter of the *Terrestrial Manual*.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission, the Scientific Commission, and the Biological Standards Commission agreed to establish a standardised approach for guiding the inclusion of susceptible animals in the *Terrestrial Manual* and animal hosts in the *Terrestrial Code*, clarifying the purpose and implications of the approach. A dedicated task force was created, working remotely between February and April 2024 to prepare a report for the three Specialist Commissions.

At the September 2024 meeting, the three Specialist Commissions reviewed the report and endorsed the proposed approach to streamline the coverage of susceptible animals that would be considered animal hosts for listed diseases in the *Terrestrial Code*. They agreed on the importance of the listing criteria (Chapter 1.2.) in determining relevant animals for inclusion in the *Terrestrial Code* and supported including additional details on disease epidemiology and wider associated animal susceptibility in the *Terrestrial Manual*. The Code Commission stressed the need for a consistent application of this approach to ensure a shared understanding of its implications for notification, status, trade and surveillance.

At its February 2025 meeting, the Code Commission revisited the report of the task force considering recent *ad hoc* Groups' work, the texts currently being circulated and the discussions on the interpretation of Chapter 1.1. concerning animal hosts. The Commission discussed the relevance of the different animal species depending on their role in the epidemiology or impact of the disease. The Commission requested representatives of the Commission work with the Secretariat to incorporate these decisions in the 'Framework for *Terrestrial Code* standards'.

Discussion

The Commission discussed the categories of animals developed by the Secretariat and representatives of the Commission to standardise the reference to various subsets of susceptible animals and the consequences arising from their infection, across the disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, and to reflect this in the 'Framework for *Terrestrial Code* standards'.

The Commission noted the distinction between susceptible animals and animal hosts and agreed that animal hosts are a subset of susceptible animals whose infection with a pathogenic agent of a listed disease defines a case requiring notification because they play a significant role in the epidemiology or impact of the disease as described in Chapter 1.2. The Commission explained that within animal hosts, there can be a specific subset for which an animal health status may be declared or granted, such as those chapters that differentiate domestic and wild subpopulations. The Commission also noted that sanitary measures for international trade may also be developed for all or a subset of animal hosts. The Commission also discussed that some susceptible animals not considered animal hosts could still be referenced in a disease-specific chapter, not for notification or defining status, but to support surveillance strategies for instance.

The Commission considered that this categorisation is important as guidance for experts working on disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* as well as for the management of notification by Members. The Commission requested that the Secretariat share this categorisation with the other Specialist Commissions for their input. Once this guidance has been tested with experts and refined by application to upcoming revisions to disease-specific chapters, the Commission would propose relevant changes to the User's Guide, develop a Glossary definition for 'animal host' and include this categorisation into the framework.

7.6. Updated WOAHS International Standards available on-line

The Commission was informed that the [online versions](#) of the WOAHS *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*, *Aquatic Animal Health Code*, *Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals* and the *Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals* have been updated as of 5 September 2025. These updates reflect all new and revised texts adopted at the [92nd WOAHS General Session](#) in May 2025.

The Commission was informed that in addition to the dynamic, searchable online version of the WOAHS Standards Navigation Tool, first published in April 2025, users can also download PDFs of the entire *Terrestrial Code*, *Aquatic Code*, *Aquatic Manual* or *Terrestrial Manual*, or a specific chapter.

To access WOAHS Standards, go to: [Codes and Manuals - WOAHS - World Organisation for Animal Health](#)

7.7. WOAHS Observatory

The Commission was updated on the ongoing activities of the WOAHS Observatory. The Second Monitoring report will focus on the following sections: trade and sanitary measures, self-declarations and official status, movement control and precautions at borders, zoning and compartmentalisation, antimicrobial use and antimicrobial resistance and implementation of the One Health approach. A preview of the main results may be found on the [WOAHS website](#). The full report containing a description of the indicators, interpretation and recommendations for Members and WOAHS will be published in late 2025. The findings will be incorporated into the development of the 8th Strategic Plan.

The Commission was also updated on the [first phase](#) of the Thematic study on animal welfare during transport by land and sea which involved a survey to assess the extent to which standards are being implemented. The next phase aims to identify both barriers and success factors experienced by Members. A report summarising both phases of the study is planned for release in the first quarter of 2026.

The Commission was also informed that in March 2025, the Observatory launched a call for proposals to select the topics for its next Thematic study, and the Commission were invited to contribute. The prioritisation process is ongoing and will be guided by established decision-making criteria. The resulting list of priority topics will be submitted to the Observatory Steering Committee for final validation. The next Thematic study is scheduled to be conducted during 2026.

7.8. Substandard and Falsified Veterinary Products

The Commission was provided with an update on the work of WOA Headquarters on Substandard and Falsified Veterinary Products (SFVP) and how to better incorporate this topic into the *Terrestrial Code* (and *Terrestrial Manual*) so that Members are better able to prevent, detect and respond to SFVP.

The Commission noted the preliminary assessment of relevant *Terrestrial Code* chapters with existing or related SFVP content, and agreed to a careful enhancement of the incorporation of SFVP in Chapters 3.2. 'Quality of Veterinary Services', 3.4. 'Veterinary legislation' and Section 6 'Veterinary Public Health', the latter concerning surveillance for antimicrobial resistance. Any changes should be in keeping with the overall objective and broad remit of these chapters, particularly those in Section 3. The Commission agreed to consider the development of relevant new Glossary definitions after this work has been progressed.

The Commission was informed that an *ad hoc* Group would be convened to undertake work which will be presented to the Commission once completed.

7.9. WOA Global Conference on Biothreat Reduction

The Commission was informed that [WOAH's Global Conference on Biological Threat Reduction](#) (Geneva, 28–30 October 2025) will bring together 400 participants from a range of sectors including animal health, public health, and law enforcement to address the evolving landscape of biological threats. Coinciding with key anniversaries of the Biological Weapons Convention and Geneva Protocol, the Conference aims to reflect on historical and current biological threats and anticipate future risks, strengthen international cooperation and secure concrete commitments, foster multi-sectoral collaboration for global health security and promote innovative strategies linking animal health with other sectors. The Conference will feature plenaries, panels, and side events, with expected outcomes including stronger partnerships and improved biothreat awareness.

.../Annexes

Annex 1. Adopted Agenda

MEETING OF THE WOAHP TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

Paris, 9 to 18 September 2025

1. Welcome

1.1. Deputy Director General

1.2. Director General

2. Adoption of agenda

3. Cooperation with other Specialist Commissions

3.1. Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases

3.1.1. SOP for listing decision for diseases, infections and infestations

3.1.2. SOP for determining whether a disease should be considered as emerging

3.1.3. Case definition

3.1.4. Removal of questionnaire chapters (Chapters 1.7. to 1.12.)

3.2. Biological Standards Commission

3.2.1. Biological Standards Commission's recommendations to the *Terrestrial Code* (following *Manual* updates proposed for adoption)

3.2.2. Revision of Chapter 14.8. Scrapie

3.2.3. Request to consider the tests for importation of semen

3.2.4. Substandard and Falsified Veterinary Products (SFVP)

3.3. Aquatic Animals Commission

3.3.1. Chapter 1.1. Notification of disease and provision of epidemiological information

3.3.2. New chapter on emergency management

3.3.3. Revision of Chapter 4.4. Zoning and compartmentalisation and new chapter on implementation of zoning

3.3.4. Development of introductory chapter for Section 5

3.3.5. Revision of chapters on certification procedures

4. Code Commission's work programme not including texts proposed for comments or adoption

4.1. Ongoing work items (not in order of priority)

4.1.1. Glossary definition

4.1.2. Revision of Glossary definition for 'poultry'

4.1.3. Wildlife health

4.1.4. User's Guide

4.1.5. Animal hosts to be used for WOAHP listed diseases

- 4.1.6.** New chapter on emergency management
- 4.1.7.** Chapter 1.1. Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information
- 4.1.8.** Revision of Chapter 4.4. Zoning and compartmentalisation and new chapter on implementation of zoning
- 4.1.9.** Revision of Chapter 4.7. Collection and processing of bovine, small ruminant and porcine semen
- 4.1.10.** Revision of Chapter 4.14. General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection
- 4.1.11.** Development of introductory chapter of Section 5
- 4.1.12.** Revision of chapters on certification procedures (Chapters 5.1., 5.2. and 5.10. to 5.13.)
- 4.1.13.** Revision of Chapter 6.8. Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes
- 4.1.14.** Revision of chapters on animal welfare during transport (Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.)
- 4.1.15.** Revision of Chapter 8.8. Infection with foot and mouth disease virus
- 4.1.16.** New Chapter 11.X. Infection with bovine pestiviruses (Bovine viral diarrhoea)
- 4.1.17.** Revision of equine encephalitis chapters (Chapters 12.11. VEE and 8.21. WNF)
- 4.1.18.** Revision of Chapter 14.7. Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus
- 4.1.19.** Revision of Chapter 14.9. Sheep pox and goat pox
- 4.1.20.** Revision of Chapter 10.9. Infection with Newcastle disease virus

4.2. Items under consideration for inclusion in work programme

4.3. New proposals and requests for inclusion in work programme

- 4.3.1.** New requests from Members and International Organisations
 - 4.3.1.1.** Request on Article 10.4.1. of Chapter 10.4. Infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses
 - 4.3.1.2.** Request regarding the inclusion of salted natural casings and gelatine/collagen as safe commodities
 - 4.3.1.3.** Request on new Glossary definition for 'treatment'
 - 4.3.1.4.** Request on new Glossary definitions and revision of current definition related to commodities
- 4.3.2.** Other requests
 - 4.3.2.1.** Clarification of term of 'rendered fats' in Spanish (translation issue)
 - 4.3.2.2.** Revision of chapters on official status diseases (Chapters 8.8. FMD, 14.7. PPR and 15.2. CSF)

4.4. Prioritisation of items in work programme

5. Texts circulated for comments

5.1. In February 2025 meeting report

- 5.1.1.** Glossary
- 5.1.2.** Chapter 1.3. Diseases, infections and infestations by WOA

- 5.1.3. Chapter 1.6. Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOA
- 5.1.4. Chapter 4.X. Biosecurity and corresponding Glossary
- 5.1.5. Chapter 5.4. Measures and procedures applicable to the exportation of commodities
- 5.1.6. Chapter 5.5. Measures and procedures applicable to the transit of commodities
- 5.1.7. Chapter 5.6. Measures and procedures applicable to the importation of commodities
- 5.1.8. Chapter 5.7. Border inspection post and quarantine centre
- 5.1.9. Glossary corresponding Chapters 5.4. to 5.7.
- 5.1.10. Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. Animal welfare during slaughter
- 5.1.11. Chapter 7.6. Animal welfare at the time of killing
- 5.1.12. Chapter 8.10. Infection with Japanese encephalitis virus (Japanese encephalitis)
- 5.1.13. Chapter 8.20. Infection with *Francisella tularensis* (Tularemia)
- 5.1.14. New Chapter 8.X. Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
- 5.1.15. New Chapter 10.X. Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens)

6. Updates on WOA initiatives relevant to the Code Commission

- 6.1. WOA Global Animal welfare strategy (Forum)
- 6.2. WOA Zoning forum
- 6.3. *Terrestrial Code* data standardisation
 - 6.3.1. Framework for *Terrestrial Code* standards
 - 6.3.2. Animal hosts
- 6.4. Transparency of the WOA process for the elaboration of Standards
- 6.5. WOA Online Navigation Tool
- 6.6. WOA Observatory
- 6.7. Substandard and Falsified Veterinary Products
- 6.8. Update on movement control consultancy

7. Meeting review

8. Date of next meeting

Annex 2. List of Participants

MEETING OF THE WOAHP TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

Paris, 9 to 18 September 2025

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

Dr Etienne Bonbon
(President)
Seconded National Expert
European Commission
Brussels
BELGIUM

Dr Gaston Maria Funes
(Vice-President)
Counsellor for Agricultural
Affairs,
Embassy of Argentina to the
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Dr Kiyokazu Murai
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Ministry of Agriculture,
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Dr Caroline Dubé
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National Manager,
Animal Health Risk Assessment
and Intelligence Section,
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
CANADA

Dr Salah Hammami
(member)
Epidemiologist and virologist,
Full professor
National School of Veterinary
Medicine
Sidi Thabet
TUNISIA

Dr John Stratton
(member)
Director,
Animal Biosecurity Branch,
Biosecurity Animal Division,
Department of Agriculture,
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AUSTRALIA

WOAH HEADQUARTERS

Dr Gillian Mylrea
Head
Standards Department

Dr Charmaine Chng
Deputy Head
Standards Department

Dr Joyce Bowling-Heyward
Chargée de Mission
Standards Department

Dr Akinobu Kawamura
Chargée de mission
Standards Department

Dr Leopoldo Stuardo
Scientific Coordinator
Standards Department

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
1	Category (general): In general, Member supports the draft new Chapter and has inserted some comments throughout the chapter for the consideration of the Commission	Noted.
2	Category (general): The Member supports the newly revised Glossary definitions.	Noted.
3	Category (general): There is inconsistency in the terminology used to refer to the animals in question. The definitions related to Biosecurity (Biosecurity and Biosecurity plan) refer to “animals” and other definitions, such as border inspection post and container, refer to “commodities”. The definition of “animal” is “means a mammal, reptile, bird or bee.” And the definition of “commodity” is “means live animals, products of animal origin, animal genetic material, biological products and pathological material”. Therefore, the definitions for biosecurity and biosecurity plan, as proposed, would only apply to live mammals, reptiles, birds or bees, not animal products, semen, embryos etc. Is this intentional? Could consider aligning the terminology and use “commodity” in these definitions to encompass not only live animals?	The Code Commission agreed that it is intentional that the definition of biosecurity refers to animals which are affected by exposure to pathogenic agents, either from other animals, from vectors or from fomites. For non-animal commodities, such as fomites that could be traded, it is ‘contamination’ rather than ‘exposure’ which also allows them to transmit pathogenic agents.
4	Category (general): Les Membres félicite la Commission du Code pour l'élaboration du Glossaire qui est essentiel à la compréhension commune des termes utilisés par les Membres pour la mise en œuvre des normes sanitaires de l'OMSA.	Noted.
5	Category (general): The Member in general supports these revised definitions provided the comments below are addressed.	Noted.

GLOSSARY

BIOSECURITY

means a set of management, behavioural and physical measures designed to reduce the likelihood ~~risk~~ of entry of pathogenic agents into a given population and the exposure of animals to these pathogenic agents ~~introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents~~ animal diseases, infections or infestations ~~in order to avoid their establishment and spread within and from and within an animal~~ that population.

6	Category (addition):	Did not agree - a set of management measures is a

	Proposed amended text: means a set of management, <u>behavioural</u> and physical <u>procedures or</u> measures designed to reduce the <u>likelihood</u> ~~risk~~ of <u>entry of pathogenic agents into a given population and the exposure of animals to these pathogenic agents introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents <u>animal diseases, infections or infestations in order to avoid their establishment and spread within and from and within an animal that population.</u></u> Rationale: Improves readability and suggests actual procedures that are physical that can be put in place as well as measures which may not be physical – e.g. paper-based.	procedure, and a measure may also be a procedure, so no change needed.
7	Category (change): Proposed amended text: means a set of management, <u>behavioural procedural</u>, and physical measures designed to reduce the <u>likelihood</u> ~~risk~~ of <u>entry of pathogenic agents into a given population and the exposure of animals to these pathogenic agents introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents <u>animal diseases, infections or infestations in order to avoid their establishment and spread within and from and within an animal that population.</u></u> Rationale: Including behavioral factors may lead to suitability assessments (e.g. mental health) rather than performance- and outcome-based metrics established from procedural controls. This change also makes the definition more objectively achievable.	Did not agree – 'behavioural' is not the same as 'procedural', see above.
8	Category (deletion and addition): Proposed amended text: désigne un ensemble de mesures de gestion et d'agencements <u>comportementaux et</u> physiques destinés à réduire <u>la probabilité le risque</u> d'introduction, <u>d'établissement et de propagation d'agents pathogènes de maladies, d'infections ou d'infestations animales vers, au sein ou depuis ou au sein d' dans une population donnée et l'exposition des animaux à ces agents pathogènes afin d'éviter leur établissement maintien et leur propagation au sein de ou depuis cette population animale.</u> Rationale: Le terme « maintien » est plus approprié au contexte. Dans la version française, il convient de remplacer établissement par maintien ou persistance Les amendements proposés apportent plus de clarté et de concision à la définition.	Did not agree, as the work 'établissement' in French in this context is closer from the English and the intended meaning, which is that the pathogenic agents are well established, but without any meaning of time.

BIOSECURITY PLAN

means a plan ~~document or series of documents~~ that identifies potential sources and pathways and factors for entry of pathogenic agents into a given population, and the exposure of animals and factors for the transmission of these pathogenic agents the introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents disease in a zone

or compartment, and describes the corresponding biosecurity measures to be implemented and the mechanisms to evaluate its performance and to update it which are being or will be applied to mitigate the disease risks, if applicable, in accordance with the recommendations in the *Terrestrial Code*.

9	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: means a ~~plan document or series of documents that identifies~~ potential ~~sources and pathways and factors~~ for ~~entry of~~ <u>pathogenic agents into a given population</u>, and the ~~exposure of animals and factors for the transmission of these pathogenic agents the introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents disease in a zone or compartment~~, and describes the corresponding <u>biosecurity measures to be implemented and the mechanisms to evaluate its performance and to update the plan it</u> which are being or will be applied to mitigate the disease risks, if applicable, in accordance with the recommendations in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>. Rationale: Clarity	Agreed.
10	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: means a ~~plan document or series of documents that identifies~~ potential ~~sources and pathways and factors~~ for ~~entry of~~ <u>pathogenic agents into a given population</u>, and the ~~exposure of animals and factors for the transmission of these pathogenic agents the introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents disease in a zone or compartment~~. <u>and It also describes the corresponding biosecurity measures to be implemented and the mechanisms to evaluate its performance and to update it the plan</u> which are being or will be applied to mitigate the disease risks, if applicable, in accordance with the recommendations in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>. Rationale: Edited for clarity.	Agreed.

BORDER INSPECTION POST

means any airport, or any port, railway station or road check point ~~international point of entry for commodities open to international trade of commodities, and associated facilities, where import veterinary official inspections can be~~ is performed by Veterinary Services.

CONTAINER

means a non-self-propelled receptacle or other rigid structure for ~~holding animals to carry hold~~ commodities during transportation a journey by one or several means of transport.

DISINFECTION

means an action the application, after thorough cleansing, of procedures intended to inactivate or destroy pathogenic agents on potentially contaminated objects the infectious or parasitic agents of animal diseases, including zoonoses; this applies to premises, vehicles and different objects which may have been directly or indirectly contaminated.

11	Category (general): Recommend including the purpose/s of “disinfection” in the definition so it is clear what needs to be achieved by the process. For instance, disinfection may prevent transmission of certain microorganisms to a susceptible host or it might make articles safe for use or disposal.	The secondary purpose is not necessarily needed in the definition. However, noted for the future revision of Chapter 4.14. ‘Disinfection and disinsection’.
12	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: “means an action intended to inactivate or destroy pathogenic agents on potentially contaminated objects <u>and surfaces</u> .” Rationale: As a clarification because it is not entirely obvious that objects also include surfaces.	Agreed.

DISINSECTION

means an action intended to kill or eliminate arthropods from establishments, means of transport, slaughterhouses or any other premises or equipment used for animals.

13	Category (change): Proposed amended text: <u>DISINSECTION DISINFESTATION</u> Rationale: The Code definition of “disinsection” expands a common meaning of the term to include all arthropods. Generally, the definition of the word (and even the word itself) suggests its meaning is more limited to removal of insects only. Recommend replacing this term with “disinfestation,” which is a more commonly recognized and used term. Generally, “disinfestation” means removal of all pests--arthropods and small rodents--that could cause disease. It may be less confusing to narrow this definition for Code reference to the removal of only arthropods versus expanding the definition of disinsection to include removal of all arthropods.	Did not agree -The term ‘disinsection’ has been used in the Terrestrial Code and also by WHO. In addition, there is already a Glossary definition for ‘disinfestation’, which bears another meaning. However, noted for the future revision of the Chapter 4.14. ‘Disinfection and disinsection.’

ISOLATION

means the placement of an animal or a group of animals separated from other animals under appropriate biosecurity.

14	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: <u>means the ~~placement~~ physical separation of an animal or a group of animals ~~separated~~ from other animals under appropriate biosecurity.</u> Rationale: To provide clarity.	Agreed

PATHOGENIC AGENT

means a biological agent that causes, or contributes to, the development of a disease in *animals*.

15	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: <u>means a biological agent or toxin that causes, or contributes to, the development of a disease in <i>animals</i>.</u> Rationale: Recommend addition of “or toxin” because they may also be pathogenic agents.	Did not agree – For the purposes of the Code, the agent is the biological agent (which may produce toxins), and not the toxins produced by an agent.
16	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: <u>désigne un agent biologique qui est la cause du, ou contribue au développement d’une maladie chez un <i>animal</i>. »</u> Rationale: Editorial	Agreed.
17	Category (general): Given that the term ‘contribute’ can have quite a broad meaning, the Member invites the Code Commission to review how this definition is applicable in different chapters of the Code (e.g. such broad definition might have different consequences in the disease notification chapters compared to the specific disease chapters or the biosecurity chapter).	Did not agree – pathogenic agents, including some of listed diseases, can cause disease alone or in combination with other contributing factors.

POINT OF ENTRY

means any **point specific location** at which *commodities* enter the territory of a country.

18	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: <u>means any point specific location at which <i>commodities</i> enter the ~~territory of a~~ country.</u> Rationale: This could be read that all countries have territories in the sense of organised division within a country rather than an area of land under the jurisdiction of a ruler or state. Using only the word “country” would remove the potential for misunderstanding of this statement.	Did not agree as ‘territory of a country’ highlights a geographic area under the jurisdiction of a country, and is appropriate to not limit the scope of the definition.

POINT OF EXIT

means any **point specific location** from where *commodities* leave the territory of a country ~~the exporting country~~.

19	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: <u>means any point specific location from where <i>commodities</i> leave the ~~territory of a~~ country ~~the exporting country~~.</u>	Did not agree, comment addressed above.

	Rationale: This could be read that all countries have territories in the sense of organised division within a country rather than an area of land under the jurisdiction of a ruler or state. Using only the word “country” would remove the potential for misunderstanding of this statement.	

QUARANTINE STATION CENTRE

means an *establishment* under the control of the *Veterinary Authority* where *animals* are maintained in isolation for observation, and if appropriate testing and treatment, during a specified length of time under appropriate biosecurity to prevent with no direct or indirect ensure no contact with other animals and vectors when relevant, to ensure so that there is no transmission entry of specified pathogenic agents from entering outside into nor escape escaping out of the establishment while the animals are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and, if appropriate, testing or treatment.

20	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: means an <i>establishment</i> under the control of the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> where <i>animals</i> are maintained <u>in isolation for observation, and if appropriate testing and treatment, during a specified length of time under appropriate biosecurity to prevent with no direct or indirect ensure no contact with other animals and vectors when relevant, to ensure so that there is no transmission entry of specified pathogenic agents from entering outside into nor escape escaping out of the establishment while the animals are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and, if appropriate, testing or treatment. with appropriate biosecurity and in isolation from other animals, to ensure there is no transmission of specific pathogenic agents outside the establishment while the animals are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and, if appropriate, testing or treatment.</u> Rationale: 1. Re-word for clarity (as above edit, similar to original) 2. Recommend change to remove “from entering into... the establishment” when referring to pathogenic agents and quarantine centres. Not all pathogenic agents will be detectable at entry so cannot all be prevented from entering at all times. This can be due to subclinical disease, disease incubation periods, stress and transit exposure to pathogens that can reactivate latent infections or expose to new ones, and economic or regulatory limits to testing for pathogenic agents. 3. WOAHS Terrestrial Code does outline the purpose of Quarantine Centres programs to provide more context Ch.5.9.1, specifically “Quarantine programmes are designed to both facilitate the detection of communicable diseases and to make accurate assessments of the overall health status of individuals or groups entering a new population.”	Did not agree to reword as the current text is clear. Did not agree to remove ‘from entering into...’, as although some pathogenic agents may enter the establishment with the animals, physical barriers and management steps are taken to lower risk of the entry of specified pathogenic agents.

	Supporting evidence: WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code Section 5, Chapter 5.6.1 & 2 WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code Section 5, Chapter 5.9.1	
21	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: Designa ~~una explotación un sistema productivo, una instalación o un área~~ bajo control de la autoridad veterinaria en la que se mantienen animales en aislamiento (...) Rationale: Para la versión en español. El termino “explotación” en el contexto productivo en español tiene una connotación negativa y puede conllevar a confusiones a los lectores.	Agreed
22	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: means an <i>establishment</i> under the control of the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> where <i>animals</i> are maintained in isolation for observation, and if ~~applicable~~ ~~appropriate~~ testing and treatment, during a specified length of time under ~~appropriate~~ <i>biosecurity</i> to prevent ~~with no direct or indirect ensure no contact with other animals and vectors when relevant, to ensure so that there is no transmission~~ <i>entry of</i> specified pathogenic agents ~~from entering~~ <i>outside into</i> nor ~~escape~~ <i>escaping</i> out of the <i>establishment</i> while the <i>animals</i> are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and, if appropriate, testing or treatment. Rationale: Using “appropriate” twice in one sentence. Using a descriptive word twice in a sentence is usually avoided in English. Replacement with “applicable” improves readability and still conveys the message.	Agreed with the rationale, however, the text was amended differently, by replacing ‘appropriate’ with ‘adequate’.

SEROCONVERSION

means either the change from a seronegative to a seropositive condition of an *animal*, demonstrated by a serological test specific for the antigen, or a four-fold or more rise in antibody titre in paired sera sampled at an appropriate interval, demonstrated by an ordinal test specific for the antigen.

23	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: <u>means either the change from a seronegative to a seropositive condition of an <i>animal</i>, demonstrated by a serological test specific for the antigen, or demonstration of a four-fold or more rise in antibody titre between an acute and convalescent serum, in paired sera sampled at an appropriate interval, demonstrated by using an ordinal test specific for the antigen.</u>	Did not agree. The BSC discussed this, and agreed not to include 'acute and convalescent serum' in the definition, to allow for a simpler and more flexible definition. See below regarding the deletion of the type of serological test used.

	Rationale: Recommend slight edits so as to more closely match the definition of seroconversion in Glossary of WOAHS Manual of Diagnostic tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial animals- aim to avoid potential unnecessary confusion between 'paired sera' and 'acute and convalescent serum' Supporting evidence: WOAHS Manual of Diagnostic tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial animals, Glossary of Terms: Seroconversion definition (though note is also being considered for revision): • Seroconversion: i. Demonstration of a change from a seronegative to a seropositive condition using a serological assay specific for the antigen OR ii. Demonstration of a four-fold or more rise in antibody titre between an acute and convalescent serum using an ordinal test specific for the antigen.	
24	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: <u>means either the change from a seronegative to a seropositive condition of an <i>animal</i>, demonstrated by a serological test specific for the antigen, or a four-fold or more rise in antibody titre in paired sera sampled at an appropriate interval, demonstrated by concurrent testing in the same test run by an ordinal test specific for the antigen.</u> Rationale: Due to the inherent variation between test runs in testing systems systems, it is essential to analyze serum pairs (i.e. acute and convalescent) in the same test run in order to determine if there has been a four-fold increase in titre.	Did not agree - this is too prescriptive for a Glossary definition. It is up to Members to establish the best and more secure way of handling and testing the samples, as recommended in the Terrestrial Manual.
25	Category (Change): Proposed amended text: <u>means either the change from a seronegative to a seropositive ~~state condition~~ of an <i>animal</i>, ~~demonstrated by a serological test specific for the antigen~~, or a four-fold or more rise in antibody titre in paired sera ~~sampled that were taken~~ at an appropriate interval, ~~demonstrated by an ordinal test specific for the antigen.~~</u> Rationale: i) Simplification of the definition. The meaning of ordinal is not well known and not necessary in the text. ii) We suggest changing the word 'condition' to 'state', because an animal's serological status is a state and not a condition.	Agreed, editorial change made for clarity.
26	Category (addition and deletion): Proposed amended text: <u>means either the change from a seronegative to a seropositive condition of an <i>animal</i>, demonstrated by a</u>	Did not agree – this is too detailed for a Glossary definition and is covered in the Terrestrial Manual.

	serological test specific for the antigen, or a <u>four-fold or more significant rise in antibody titre in paired sera sampled at an appropriate interval, demonstrated by an ordinal test specific for the antigen. The magnitude of titre increase considered significant (e.g., a four-fold rise) may vary depending on the virus, the testing methodology, and the epidemiological context</u> Rationale: A rise in antibody titre must be defined in the context of the specific disease, test protocol, and surveillance or diagnostic objective, and cannot be applied as a universal rule. Supporting evidence: World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). (2021). <i>Equine Viral Arteritis</i>. In <i>OIE Terrestrial Manual</i>. Retrieved from https://www.oie.int/en/what-we-do/standards/codes-and-manuals/terrestrial-manual-online-access/	In addition, the BSC confirmed that a minimum of four-fold rise was necessary to demonstrate a seroconversion of animals.
27	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: <u>means either the change from a seronegative to a seropositive condition of an animal, demonstrated by a serological test specific for the antigen at two time points, or a four-fold or more rise in antibody titre in paired sera sampled at an appropriate interval, demonstrated by an ordinal test specific for the antigen.</u> Rationale: Recommend addition of the phrase “at two time points” to better clarify how the change from seronegative to seropositive, inherent to the process of seroconversion, needs to be made from testing samples collected at two distinct time points, one sample yielding a negative result, and the other sample yielding a positive result. Some Code chapters are now identifying a confirmed case of disease based solely on the process of seroconversion. This includes the recently adopted Chapter 8.Y, Nipah virus, and Chapters 8.2, Tularemia and 10.X Avian Metapneumovirus, currently under review. This edit is not only important to Articles 8.Y.1.3 (Nipah), 8.20.1.3 (Tularemia) and 10.X.1.3 (Avian metapneumovirus) as significant points for disease case definitions, but it also helps draw a clear distinction between a confirmed case of disease based on seroconversion in contrast to a confirmed case based on detection of antibodies specific to an antigen from a single animal sample when clinical signs or other epidemiological links are present (Articles 8.Y.1.4 (Nipah), 8.20.1.4 (Tularemia) and 10.X.1.4 (Avian metapneumovirus)).	Did not agree – no added clarity. The fact that the paired sera are sampled ‘at an appropriate interval’ implies they are sampled at two time points.
28	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Region, with the exception of a Member, appreciate WOA’s work to draft a glossary definition for term, “seroconversion.” However, we request the following edit to better describe this term’s meaning:	Did not agree – no added clarity. Refer to comment above.

	<u>means either the change from a seronegative to a seropositive condition of an <i>animal</i>, demonstrated by a serological test specific for the antigen at two time points, or a four-fold or more rise in antibody titre in paired sera sampled at an appropriate interval, demonstrated by an ordinal test specific for the antigen.</u> Rationale: Adding the phrase “at two time points” better clarifies how the change from seronegative to seropositive, inherent to the process of seroconversion, needs to be made from testing samples collected at two distinct time points, one sample yielding a negative result, and the other sample yielding a positive result. We acknowledge that some Code chapters are now identifying a confirmed case of disease based solely on the process of seroconversion. This includes the recently adopted Chapter 8.Y, Nipah virus, and Chapters 8.2, Tularemia and 10.X Avian Metapneumovirus, currently under review. This proposed edit is not only important to Articles 8.Y.1.3 (Nipah), 8.20.1.3 (Tularemia) and 10.X.1.3 (Avian metapneumovirus) as significant points for disease case definitions, but it also helps draw a clear distinction between a confirmed case of disease based on seroconversion in contrast to a confirmed case based on detection of antibodies specific to an antigen from a single animal sample when clinical signs or other epidemiological links are present (Articles 8.Y.1.4 (Nipah), 8.20.1.4 (Tularemia) and 10.X.1.4 (Avian metapneumovirus) .	

SWILL

means food scraps or food waste, that contain or have been in contact with *animal products*, and which may be used as *feed*.

29	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: <u>designa restos de comida o residuos alimenticios, que contienen o no <i>productos animales</i> o <i>que</i> han estado en contacto con <i>éstos productos animales</i>, y que podrían usarse como <i>pienso</i> (o <i>alimento para animales</i>)</u> Rationale: Tengan o no productos animales, siguen siendo desperdicios. Además, debe desincentivarse la alimentación de los animales con desperdicios, sean de origen animal o vegetal, hasta por un tema de bienestar animal. Está claro que hay mayor riesgo si tienen productos animales.	Did not agree as only waste that either contains, or has been in contact with, animal products could pose a risk, and as such be considered ‘swill’.

TRANSIT COUNTRY

means a country through which *commodities* destined for another country ~~an importing country~~ are transported or in which they make a stopover ~~is made at a border post~~.

VEHICLE/VESSEL MEANS OF TRANSPORT

means ~~any means of conveyance including any land vehicle, a train, truck, trailer,~~ aircraft or ~~ship/vessel~~ that is used for ~~carrying/transporting animals~~ commodities.

30	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: means ~~any means of conveyance including any land vehicle,~~ <u>train, a train, truck, trailer,</u> aircraft or ~~ship/vessel~~ that is used for ~~carrying/transporting animals~~ <u>commodities</u>. Or means ~~any means of conveyance including any land vehicle,~~ <u>(train, truck, trailer, motorbike, car, bicycle)</u> ~~a train, truck, trailer,~~ aircraft or ~~ship/vessel~~ that is used for ~~carrying/transporting animals~~ <u>commodities</u>. Rationale: It is not clear if the term “any land vehicle” includes trains. The removal of the word “train” may exclude this form of transport from this definition, because some definitions of “land vehicle” do not encompass rail.	Did not agree as to avoid misunderstanding, it was summarised as ‘any land vehicle’.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
1	Category (general): Given that infection with NSDV had not been reported to WAHIS in the last 10 years, Member agrees with the assessment of NSDV against the criteria of Chapter 1.2 by the SCAD as well as supports the Code Commission's decision to remove Nairobi sheep disease from the WOAHS list	Noted
2	Category (general): La maladie du mouton de Nairobi est supprimée de la liste car elle ne satisfait pas aux critères d'inclusion du chapitre 1.2 intitulé « Critères d'inclusion de maladies, d'infections et d'infestations » dans la liste de l'OMSA. Par conséquent, le membre soutient la proposition qui est pertinente	Noted
3	Category (general): The Member in general supports this revised chapter.	Noted

CHAPTER 1.3.

DISEASES, INFECTIONS AND INFESTATIONS LISTED BY WOAHS

[...]

Article 1.3.7.

The following are included within the category of diseases and *infections* of caprinae:

- Caprine arthritis/encephalitis
- Contagious agalactia
- Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia
- Infection with *Chlamydia abortus* (Enzootic abortion of ewes, ovine chlamydiosis)
- Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus
- Infection with *Theileria lestoquardi*, *Theileria luwenshuni* and *Theileria uilenbergi*
- Maedi-visna
- ~~Nairobi sheep disease~~

1.3.7._1	Category (change): Proposed amended text:	Did not agree. The Code Commission reminded Members that criteria (Criteria 1 to 4)

	- ~~Enfermedad de Nairobi~~ Enfermedad de Nairobi Rationale: No eliminar la enfermedad de Nairobi del capítulo 1.3 En la categoría de las enfermedades e <i>infecciones</i> de <i>caprinae</i> están incluidas las siguientes: – Agalaxia contagiosa – Artritis/encefalitis caprina – Enfermedad de Nairobi consideren que se debe incluir porque: La enfermedad ovina de Nairobi (EON) es una enfermedad viral transmitida por garrapatas que afecta al ganado ovino y caprino. Se caracteriza por fiebre y gastroenteritis hemorrágica, aborto y elevada mortalidad. Es posiblemente el virus más patógeno de los pequeños rumiantes. La mayoría de las demás especies no parecen ser sensibles; sin embargo, se han descrito algunos casos clínicos en duikers azules (<i>Cephalophus monticola</i>). La rata de campo africana (<i>Arvicanthus abyssinicus nubilans</i>) es un reservorio potencial. Los informes sobre la EON endémica se concentran principalmente en África oriental y central, desde Etiopía hasta la República Democrática del Congo; sin embargo, la evidencia serológica sugiere que este o un virus similar también pueden darse en otras partes de África (p. ej., Botsuana y Mozambique). Una variante conocida como virus Ganjam, que alguna vez se pensó que era un virus separado, circula en partes de Asia, como India, Sri Lanka y China. Se han descrito en el campo diferencias relacionadas con la raza en cuanto a la sensibilidad, aunque no están necesariamente confirmadas por estudios en ovejas infectadas experimentalmente. En África, la tasa de mortalidad en el campo llega a ser de hasta un 70-90 % para las razas autóctonas de ovejas; sin embargo, es del 30 % para las razas exóticas y cruzadas. Por el contrario, el virus Ganjam causa una mayor mortalidad en las razas exóticas que en las autóctonas de la India. Los signos clínicos en las cabras son similares a los de las ovejas, pero suelen ser menos graves, aunque se ha descrito una mortalidad de hasta el 80 %. La presencia de inmunidad calostrual no solo protege a los corderos y cabritos de la exposición en las primeras etapas de la vida, sino que también facilita el desarrollo de una inmunidad activa, lo que permite la supervivencia en áreas infestadas por garrapatas.¹ Supporting evidence:	described in Chapter 1.2. should be met for the inclusion of a disease. Refer to Item 5.2. of the report.

	White WR. Nairobi sheep disease. In: <i>Foreign animal diseases. 7th ed.</i> Richmond, VA: United States Animal Health Association; 2008. p. 335-41.	

- Ovine epididymitis (*Brucella ovis*)
- Salmonellosis (*S. abortusovis*)
- Scrapie
- Sheep pox and goat pox.

[...]

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
1.6._1	Category (general): Miembro respalda los cambios propuestos al capítulo, los que resultan necesarios. Además, Miembro respalda la incorporación de las disposiciones específicas, incluidas como artículo 1.6.4.	Noted
1.6._2	Category (general): The Member in general supports this revised chapter provided the comments below are addressed. The Member wishes to underline, again, that it cannot support removing the questionnaires for official recognition of animal health status (i.e. Chapters 1.7., 1.8., 1.9., 1.10., 1.11. or 1.12.) from the Code, as indicated in the Member comments on the September 2024 Code Commission report (Section 3.1. and 7.2). Indeed, turning those chapters into guidelines published on the WOAHP website would deprive Member Countries any control on their content and could result in changes at any time without prior consent of Delegates. Therefore, those questionnaires should remain as chapters in the Code. In addition, Member Countries would benefit from assessing whether the provisions for recovery of free status in case where imported cases lead to no further onward spread. While we acknowledge that this could be a complex issue involving several aspects (e.g. timely outcome of the epidemiological investigation, effective surveillance in place, sound implementation of effective control measures), some provisions considering these factors would make the recovery of a free status swifter. While this could apply to diseases with an official status with long recovery periods (e.g. CBPP), it would also be true for some other diseases which are based on self-declarations (e.g. rabies). Further comments are inserted in the text below.	Regarding the questionnaire chapters, the Commission did not consider that the Code should include the procedure to this level of detail. Agreed with Scientific Commission that even if imported, if a case was detected within a country and outside a quarantine centre or border inspection post, the current provisions for recovery of a status should apply. The Member should demonstrate that there were no secondary cases. If the Member considered that it has taken measures before the time limit to ascertain that no further spread has occurred, it could apply to WOAHP to have its status reinstated.

CHAPTER 1.6.

PROCEDURES FOR OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF ANIMAL HEALTH STATUS, ENDORSEMENT OF AN OFFICIAL CONTROL PROGRAMME, AND PUBLICATION OF A SELF-DECLARATION OF ANIMAL HEALTH STATUS, BY WOAHP

Article 1.6.1.

Application for official recognition of animal health status and endorsement of an official control programme by WOAHP

A Member Country may request:

- 1) official recognition of *animal health status* by WOAHP of:
 - a) freedom of a country or *zone* from African horse sickness (AHS);
 - b) risk status of a country or *zone* with regard to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE);
 - c) freedom of a country or *zone* from classical swine fever (CSF);
 - d) freedom of a country or *zone* from contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP);
 - e) freedom of a country or *zone* from foot and mouth disease (FMD), where *vaccination* is either practised or not practised;
 - f) freedom of a country or *zone* from peste des petits ruminants (PPR);
- 2) endorsement by WOAHP of:
 - a) an *official control programme* for CBPP;
 - b) an *official control programme* for FMD;
 - c) an *official control programme* for PPR;
 - d) an *official control programme* for dog-mediated rabies.

WOAHP does not grant official recognition of *animal health status* or endorsement of an *official control programme* for diseases other than those listed under points 1 and 2 above.

The Member Country should present documentation setting out the compliance of their *Veterinary Services* with the provisions of Chapters 1.1., 1.4., 3.2., 3.3. and 4.4. of the *Terrestrial Code*, when relevant, and with the provisions of the relevant disease-specific chapters in the *Terrestrial Code* and the *Terrestrial Manual*.

When requesting official recognition of *animal health status* or endorsement by WOAHP of an *official control programme*, the Member Country should follow the Standard Operating Procedures (available on the WOAHP website) and submit to WOAHP a dossier providing the information requested in the following chapters (as appropriate): 1.7. (for AHS), 1.8. (for BSE), 1.9. (for CSF), 1.10. (for CBPP), 1.11. (for FMD) or 1.12. (for PPR).

The WOAH framework for the official recognition of *animal health status*, the endorsement of *official control programmes*, and their maintenance is described in relevant Resolutions adopted by the World Assembly of WOAH Delegates.

The country or the *zone* will be included in the relevant lists of official *animal health status* or endorsed *official control programmes* only after the evidence submitted has been adopted by the World Assembly of WOAH Delegates.

When a Member Country requests official recognition of *animal health status* for a *zone*, the geographical boundaries of the proposed *zone* should be clearly defined. When applying for recognition of a free *zone* that is adjacent to another *zone* of the same status, it should be stated whether the new *zone* is being merged or kept separate. If the proposed *zone* remains separate, details should be provided of the control of the movement of relevant *commodities* between the *zones* in accordance with Chapter 4.4.

The overall objective of the WOAH endorsed *official control programmes* is for Member Countries to progressively improve their animal health situation and eventually attain official recognition of *animal health status* or in the case of dog-mediated rabies to make a self-declaration as a free country or *zone*. The *official control programme* should be applicable to the entire country even if certain measures are directed towards defined *zones*.

Article 1.6.2.

Maintenance of official recognition of animal health status and endorsement of an official control programme by WOAH

Retention on the lists of countries and *zones* having an official *animal health status* or of countries having an endorsed *official control programme* requires that the information in relevant chapters be re-submitted annually and that changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events be notified to WOAH in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1.

1.6.2._1	Category (deletion and addition): Proposed amended text: Retention on the lists of countries and <i>zones</i> having an official <i>animal health status</i> or of countries having an endorsed <i>official control programme</i> requires that the information in relevant chapters be re-submitted annually and that changes in the epidemiological situation or other <u>relevant significant</u> events be notified to WOAH in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1 Rationale: For a situation to be relevant, it must have epidemiological significant in animal health	Partially agreed, the Code Commission proposed amendments to the sentence and considered this comment to be addressed.
1.6.2._2	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: “Retention on the lists of countries and <i>zones</i> having an official animal health status or of countries having an endorsed official control programme requires that ~~the information in relevant chapters be re-submitted annually and that~~ changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events be notified to WOAH in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1.” Rationale: The Member needs to reiterate this important point: The modification proposed above	Partially agreed, the Code Commission proposed amendments to the sentence and considered this comment to be addressed.

	aligns with the Member's previous requests to simplify the reconfirmation process for official statuses. This annual resubmission can place a considerable administrative burden on Member Countries, especially given that the end result of disease management measures lead transparency in the animal health situation, which is already covered under the notification requirements of Chapter 1.1. By fulfilling these requirements, Member Countries provide the necessary assurances to promptly inform all parties of any changes in animal health status. As a result, adding further documentation requirements beyond the requirements of Chapter 1.1. may not be strictly necessary. Reference is also made to the Member comments on the AHS and CBPP chapters. The feedback from the Code commission refers to the fact that “<i>annual reconfirmation requires more than notification of events or changes in situation, rather this is also required in other corresponding chapter texts in the Terrestrial Code, notably in Article 1.4.6.</i>”. Indeed the Member invites the WOAHS specialist Commissions to review and streamline the whole process in an organic manner; this will require follow-up changes in the respective disease-specific chapters.	

Non-compliance with the requirements for the maintenance of *animal health status* results in the suspension of that status. Within 24 months of suspension, except otherwise stated in the disease-specific chapter, a Member Country may apply for the recovery of a previously recognised status, following the provisions of the relevant disease-specific chapter. When the status has not been recovered within the specified period of its suspension, it is withdrawn and the Member Country should reapply following the procedure for the application for official recognition of *animal health status*.

WOAH may withdraw the endorsement of an *official control programme* if there is evidence of:

- non-compliance with the timelines or performance indicators of the programme; or
- significant problems with the quality of the *Veterinary Services* as described in Section 3 of the *Terrestrial Code*; or
- an increase in the *incidence* or distribution of the disease that cannot be addressed by the programme.

Article 1.6.3.

Publication by WOAHS of a self-declaration of animal health status by a Member Country

A Member Country may make a self-declaration of freedom of a country, *zone* or *compartment* from a WOAHS *listed disease* or another animal disease, *infection* or *infestation*. The Member Country may inform WOAHS of the claimed status and request publication by WOAHS of the self-declaration to inform WOAHS Member Countries.

A Member Country requesting the publication of a self-declaration should follow the Standard Operating Procedure (available on the WOAHS website) for submission of a self-declaration of *animal health status* and provide documented information on its compliance with the relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including:

- evidence that the *infection* or *infestation* is a *notifiable disease* in the entire country;

- history of absence or eradication of the *infection* or *infestation* in the country, *zone* or *compartment*;
- *surveillance* including an *early warning system* for all relevant species in the country, *zone* or *compartment*;
- measures implemented to maintain freedom in the country, *zone* or *compartment*.

The self-declaration may be published only after all the information provided has been received and administrative and technical screening has been performed by WOA. Publication does not imply endorsement of the claim of freedom by WOA and does not reflect the official opinion of WOA. Responsibility for the accuracy of the information contained in a self-declaration lies entirely with the WOA Delegate of the Member Country concerned.

Except when otherwise provided for in the *listed disease*-specific chapter, an *outbreak* in a Member Country, a *zone* or a *compartment* having a self-declared free status results in the loss of the self-declared free status. A Member Country wishing to reclaim a lost free status should submit a new self-declaration following the procedure described in this article.

WOA does not publish self-declarations for *listed diseases* in point 1 of Article 1.6.1.

Article 1.6.4.

Specific provisions

The *animal health status* of a country or zone is not affected by:

– the presence of the pathogenic agent in an animal product at a border inspection post;

1.6.4._1	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: <u>the presence of the pathogenic agent in an imported animal product at a border inspection post;</u> Rationale: According to the definition of border inspection post, only an imported animal product is applicable. However, it is necessary to include the “imported” for animal products just as it is specified in “imported animals in a quarantine centre” for clarity.	Agreed.

- the presence of the disease, *infection*, or *infestation* in imported animals in a *quarantine centre*;
- the importation or the presence of the pathogenic agent, or of *commodities* or organisms carrying the *pathogenic agent*, in a *laboratory* or other *approved* facilities with appropriate laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity in accordance with the *Terrestrial Manual*.

1.6.4._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: <u>the importation or the presence of the pathogenic agent, or of <i>commodities</i> or organisms carrying the <i>pathogenic agent</i>, in an <i>approved</i> laboratory or other <i>approved</i> facilities with appropriate laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity in accordance with Chapter 5.8 and the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i>.</u>	Did not agree as the amended definition of laboratory (see Item 6.1. of the report) includes reference to ‘approved’. Agreed, included reference to Article 5.8.5.

	Rationale: The requirement for use of a laboratory approved by the Veterinary Authority should be retained to ensure the facility is meeting required standards for its tests. The definition of 'Laboratory' uses of the word 'such' and hence does not specifically make it a requirement for a laboratory to be approved by a Veterinary Authority, only that they can be. The word 'approved' makes it a requirement. We agree that the Terrestrial Manual should be specifically referred to in this clause. However, Chapter 5.8 is also a directly relevant standard to this clause. By the current sentence only referring to the Terrestrial Manual it may create confusion, with some interpreting that the relevant requirements of Chapter 5.8 are not required to also be met.	For the moment the Code Commission retained reference to other approved facilities, but considered that this would be addressed with the new definition of laboratory.

This should be supported by evidence of compliance with all relevant standards of the *Terrestrial Code* and *Terrestrial Manual*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
4.X._1	Category (general): Miembro felicita a OMSA y a la Comisión de Código, por preparar un capítulo tan importante como es Bioseguridad. Miembro respalda la propuesta borrador que se está discutiendo.	Noted.
4.X._2	Category (general): In general, Member supports the draft new Chapter and has inserted some comments throughout the chapter for the consideration of the Commission	Noted
4.X._3	Category (general): It is recommended to formulate "the Biosecurity Procedures in Swine Production" and incorporate it into Section 6 "Veterinary Public Health" of the WOA Terrestrial Animal Health Code. The swine industry is a core pillar of global animal protein supply, contributing to over 30% of human dietary animal protein sources. The economic losses caused by swine diseases account for a significant proportion of global livestock industry losses. Due to the lack of biosecurity measures, the industry has suffered catastrophic impacts. Therefore, the recommendations to formulate the "Biosecurity Procedures in Swine Production" and incorporate it into Section 6 "Veterinary Public Health" of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code are based on the following reasons: First, safeguarding Public Health. Pathogens such as Swine Influenza Virus and Hepatitis E can threaten human health through cross-species transmission. Standardized biosecurity protocols can reduce the risk of zoonotic infections. Additionally, biosecurity measures significantly reduce the use of therapeutic antibiotics, thereby blocking the spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) genes through the environment and food chain. Second, enhancing Production Efficiency and Economic Benefits. The current Terrestrial Animal Health Code lacks systematic biosecurity specifications for swine production. Extensive production data from Member demonstrates that the establishment and effective implementation of biosecurity systems in large-scale swine farms significantly improve disease prevention and control capabilities, enhance production efficiency, reduce costs, and strengthen the resilience and stability of the swine industry supply chain. Third, promoting International Trade and Global Collaboration. Currently, the global ASF epidemic continues to spread, not only causing severe impacts on the global pig industry but also posing a serious threat to international trade security. Introducing unified biosecurity standards will help mitigate trade barriers caused by divergent national regulations and reduce the cross-border spread of diseases such as ASF. Moreover, standardized guidelines will provide cost-	TAHSC considers that the proposed work would best be considered initially as a guidance document outside the Code and therefore encouraged the Member to contact the Headquarters on this matter.

	effective solutions for developing countries, narrowing the gap in disease prevention resources among member states and fostering coordinated development of the global livestock industry. Fourth, to strengthen the foundational framework and provide reference models for constructing biosecurity standards for transboundary animal diseases. Formulating "the Biosecurity Procedures in Swine Production" will provide standardized tools for transnational epidemic prevention and control. The establishment, optimization, and maturation of this regulation will provide both a working foundation and valuable reference for formulating future biosecurity standards concerning other critical transboundary animal diseases, promote sustainable trade in the livestock industry, especially helping resource-limited countries enhance industrial resilience and strengthen the global "One Health" strategy to protect humans from threats including zoonotic diseases and bacterial drug resistance. Member has accumulated extensive and successful experience in preventing major swine diseases such as ASF and ensuring biosecurity in swine production. It is recommended that Member apply to lead the drafting of this chapter, contributing Member's wisdom and solutions to global swine disease prevention and biosecurity enhancement.	
4.X._4	Category (general): Can we confirm our understanding that the Veterinary Authority is expected to have oversight of any Competent Authority carrying out activities under the Terrestrial Code by definition as the Veterinary Authority has primary responsibility in the whole territory for coordinating the implementation of the standards of the Terrestrial Code. This would infer that throughout this chapter and Chapters 5.4 – 5.7, when it states 'Veterinary Authority or relevant Competent Authority' this is intended to provide flexibility on the authority who carries out the activity but does not change the expectation that the Veterinary Authority has oversight of all activities for implementation of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code.	Did not agree – The definition of Veterinary Authority states that it 'coordinates' the implementation of WOAHS standards. This is not necessarily 'oversight'.
4.X._5	Category (general): We would like to express our sincere appreciation to the Commission for their dedicated work on this Chapter. The effort to clarify and structure the content is commendable. We would also like to emphasize the importance of retaining the terms Bio-exclusion, Biocontainment, and Bio-management. These terms are not redundant; rather, they provide essential distinctions that deepen the reader's understanding of the broader concept of "biosecurity." Their inclusion helps to clearly define the various components and strategies involved,	Did not agree. These concepts (bio-exclusion, biocontainment and biomanagement) are covered under external and internal biosecurity, which is captured in the current chapter, therefore the meaning is already there. There is already a reference to PPPs, covered in section 3, as well as references to

	thereby enhancing the practical application and interpretation of biosecurity measures. We also encourage a more explicit recognition of the role of <i>Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)</i> and other stakeholders. Their involvement is critical to the successful implementation and long-term effectiveness of biosecurity measures. Strengthening the guidance on stakeholder engagement would support more inclusive and resilient biosecurity systems.	stakeholder engagement more generally.
4.X._6	Category (general): The Member in general supports this revised chapter provided the comments below are considered.	Noted.

SECTION 4.

DISEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL

CHAPTER 4.X.

BIOSECURITY

Article 4.X.1.

4.X.1._1	Category (general): The Member agrees with the scope of biosecurity in connection with international trade and socio-economic sustainability, as well as the clear specification of the roles of each actor, such as Veterinary Authority, Veterinary Services, Breeder, etc.	Noted.

Introduction

Biosecurity is the cornerstone of animal health programmes and as such should be implemented to prevent and control diseases in *populations*. In addition to reducing the risk of disease, the benefits of *biosecurity* include a reduced ~~need for use of~~ *veterinary medicinal products*; reduced *killing of animals* for disease control purposes; reduced economic losses; protection of livelihoods; ~~assurance of sustainability of improved~~ animal production; improved food security and food safety; promotion of animal, human and environmental health; ~~and assurance of~~ safe trade and business continuity.

4.X.1._2	Category (change): Proposed amended texts: In addition to reducing the risk of disease, the benefits of <i>biosecurity</i> include a reduced <u>need to use</u> ~~need for use of~~ <i>veterinary medicinal products</i>; reduced <i>killing of animals</i> for disease control purposes; reduced economic losses; protection of livelihoods; ~~assurance of sustainability~~	Agreed but amended differently for clarity.

	~~of improved~~ animal production; improved food security and food safety; promotion of animal, human and environmental health; ~~and assurance of safe trade and business continuity.~~ Rationale: The benefits of biosecurity are increased animal health outcomes which in turn reduces the need to use veterinary medicinal products. The proposed wording more accurately represents the relationship between biosecurity and use of veterinary medicinal products.	
4.X.1._3	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: <i>Biosecurity</i> is the cornerstone of <u>animal</u> health programmes and as such should be implemented to prevent and control diseases in <i>populations</i>. In addition to reducing the risk of disease, the benefits of <i>biosecurity</i> include a reduced ~~need for use of~~ <u>dependency on veterinary medicinal products</u>; reduced <u>killing culling of animals</u> for disease control purposes; reduced economic losses; protection of livelihoods; ~~assurance of sustainability of improved optimized~~ animal production; <u>improved enhanced</u> food security and food safety <u>standard</u>; promotion of animal, human and environmental health; ~~and assurance of safe trade and business continuity.~~ Rationale: -	Did not agree as it did not add clarity.
4.X.1._4	Category (addition and change): Proposed amended texts: <i>Biosecurity</i> is the cornerstone of <u>animal</u> health programmes and as such should be implemented to prevent and control diseases in <i>populations</i>. In addition to reducing the risk of disease, the benefits of <i>biosecurity</i> include a reduced ~~need for use of~~ <u>including antimicrobial agents</u>; reduced ~~killing of animals~~ for disease control purposes; reduced economic losses; protection of livelihoods; ~~assurance of sustainability of improved~~ animal production; improved food security and food safety; promotion of animal, human and environmental health; ~~and assurance of safe trade and business continuity.~~ Rationale: Recommend reversion to the previous text "need for." The current language ("use of") could imply or create a situation to control the use of drugs as opposed to eliminating the need for them with good biosecurity (i.e. removing the drivers which lead to medicinal product use but still maintaining the ability to use them at the discretion of the local or national authorities). Recommend addition of "including antimicrobial agents" to emphasize the important benefit that biosecurity decreases the need for antimicrobials in animal populations.	See above 4.X.1._2

4.X.1._5	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: “[...]reduced killing of animals for disease control purposes; reduced economic losses; protection of livelihoods; <u>sustainable and</u> improved animal production; improved food security and food safety; promotion of animal, human and environmental health; , and assurance of safe trade and business continuity [...]” Rationale: While it is acknowledged that the term “improved” is more encompassing, losing the sustainability concept weakens the whole paragraph.	Did not agree as it did not add clarity and sustainability is already covered.

Article 4.X.2.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles and recommendations to allow for a consistent approach that could be applied to implement *biosecurity* for a *population* or *subpopulation* irrespective of the settings or scale, such as at farm or non-production establishment, herd/flock, compartment, zone, or country, ~~zone, compartment, herd/flock, farm or non-production establishment~~ level.

4.X.2._1	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: This chapter provides general <u>principlesprovisions</u> and recommendations to allow for a consistent approach that could be applied to implement <i>biosecurity</i> for a <i>population</i> or <i>subpopulation</i> irrespective of the settings or scale, such as at <u>farm or non-production establishment, herd/flock, compartment, zone, or country, ~~zone, compartment, herd/flock, farm or non-production establishment~~</u> level. Rationale: Edited to align text with updated term “provisions” used in Article 4.X.3	Did not agree but changed Article 3 title to be consistent.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to the *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant actors, as described in Article 4.X.4., on the principles, implementation and evaluation of *biosecurity* to support disease prevention and control programmes. The chapter applies to *animals*, their gatherings and husbandry systems, to all components of animal keeping and transport, and to the interface between domesticated *animals*, wildlife, humans and ~~wildlife and the environment~~.

4.X.2._2	Category (addition and editorial): Proposed amended texts: The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> and other relevant actors, as described in Article 4.X.4., on the principles, implementation and evaluation of <i>biosecurity</i> to support disease prevention and control programmes. The chapter applies to <i>animals</i>, their gatherings and husbandry systems, to all components of animal	Agreed but amended differently for clarity.

	keeping, <u>and transportation, processing, disposal of carcasses</u> and to the interface between domesticated <u>animals, wildlife, humans and wildlife and the environment</u> (or precise suggested deletion): Rationale: Biosecurity should cover transportation, processing and disposal of carcasses of animals	

More specifically, this chapter aims to:

- describe the general guiding principles of *biosecurity*;
- identify the roles and responsibilities of the different actors in *biosecurity*;
- describe the potential sources and pathways for entry of pathogenic agents into a *population* and the exposure of *animals* and factors for the transmission of pathogenic agents;

4.X.2._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: describe the potential sources and pathways for entry of pathogenic agents into a population and the exposure <u>route</u> of animals and factors for the transmission of pathogenic agents; Rationale: The exposure of animals could mean the exposure status of animals. The exposure route is more specific.	Agreed but amended differently for clarity.

- describe the components of *biosecurity*;
- provide guidance on the design, application, monitoring, evaluation and training with regards to *biosecurity* and *biosecurity plans*.

The chapter does not apply to laboratories, ~~whose a~~ Approaches to laboratory biosecurity are addressed in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 4.X.3.

General guiding principlesprovisions

The desired objectives of *biosecurity* should be defined. To achieve ~~the these~~ objectives ~~of *biosecurity*~~, the following should be considered:

4.X.3._1	Category (deletion): Proposed amended texts: “The desired objectives of biosecurity should be defined <u>and should consider the following:–To achieve these objectives, the following should be considered</u> ” Rationale:	Did not agree, no added clarity.

	To clarify with the new wording that the defined biosecurity objectives consider the factors in points 1 to 11.	

- 1) The *population* for which *biosecurity* is to be implemented, including its context ~~and~~ size and its *animal health status*.

4.X.3._2	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: The population for which biosecurity is to be implemented, including its context and, size and ~~its~~ animal health status. Rationale: Redundant word	Did not agree – no added clarity.
4.X.3._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The <i>population</i> for which <i>biosecurity</i> is to be implemented, including <u>its context</u> ~~and~~ size, <u>type of animal operation</u> and ~~its~~ animal health status. Rationale: Recommend addition of “type of animal operation” as production type should be considered in any biosecurity planning.	Partially Agreed - Edited for clarity to explain ‘context’.
4.X.3._4	Category (general): The word “context” in point 1) does not appear obvious. Does it refer to the production system, health management approach or something else? Possibly this could be clarified in further revisions.	Agreed - Edited for clarity to explain ‘context’.

- 2) The identification of the ~~hazards~~ pathogenic agents of concern and from where and how they may be introduced, and how they may be introduced, established and spread within in and spread from the *population*.

4.X.3._5	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The identification of the ~~hazards~~ <u>pathogenic agents of concern</u> and from where and how <u>they may be introduced</u> , <u>and how they may be introduced</u> , established and spread <u>within in</u> and spread from the <i>population</i> . Rationale: Edited for clarity.	Agreed.

- 3) The factors and frequency of events that influence the introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents.

4.X.3._6	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts:	Did not agree – no added clarity and covered later in the chapter.

	The factors and frequency of events that influence the introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents. <u>Consideration of should be broad, and include environmental factors such as geographical isolation, vector movements, weather patterns, and other factors that may affect the incidence of disease.</u> Rationale: In a chapter covering general biosecurity where content is broadsweeping and covers many different settings, it could be helpful and appropriate to list out some factors for consideration as good reference.	

- 4) Scientific evidence to assess the risk.
- 5) ~~and P~~proportionality of to the measures to manage the risk.
- 6) Sustainability, adaptability, and monitoring.
- 7) Human behaviour to maximise compliance.
- 7) ~~Evaluation of compliance built into the day-to-day operations.~~
- 8) Socio-economic impacts of *biosecurity*.
- 9) Impacts on other *populations* and the environment.
- 10) Development of a *biosecurity plan* that promotes consistent implementation of *biosecurity*.
- 11) Engagement with, training and awareness of, and communication with, all actors involved in *biosecurity*.

These ~~principles-general provisions of biosecurity~~ apply to any type of activity (intensive, extensive, commercial or non-production); only the measures comprising the *biosecurity* should be adapted to the situation.

4.X.3._7	Category (editorial and deletion): Proposed amended text: These ~~principles-general provisions of biosecurity~~ apply to any type of activity (intensive, extensive, commercial or non-production); <u>only</u> the measures comprising the <i>biosecurity</i> should be adapted to the situation. Rationale: Clarity, "only" is not required and does not make sense in the sentence.	Agree to delete 'only', and changed provisions to principles (as well as in the title of the article) for accuracy.

Article 4.X.4

Roles and responsibilities

The roles and responsibilities of different actors in *biosecurity* should be clearly defined and communicated ~~with consideration made and may vary depending on~~ to the context (e.g. establishment, compartment, zone, or country ~~country, zone, compartment, establishment-level~~), the scale and type of operations and existing public-private partnerships. Implementation of *biosecurity* requires engagement and collaboration amongst all actors involved.

4.X.4._1	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The roles and responsibilities of different actors in <i>biosecurity</i> should be clearly defined and communicated ~~with consideration made~~ <u>and may vary depending on</u> the context (e.g. <u>establishment, compartment, zone, or country</u> ~~country, zone, compartment, establishment~~ level), <u>the scale, population and/or subpopulation</u>, and type of operations <u>and existing public-private partnerships</u>. Implementation of <i>biosecurity</i> requires engagement and collaboration amongst all actors involved. Rationale: Populations and their subpopulations can vary in their habitat/housing requirements, handleability, their degree of interactions with wildlife and the environment, disease susceptibility and specific welfare needs. These considerations would all have implications for biosecurity roles and responsibilities. Whilst it could be argued that populations/subpopulations may be included broadly under “types of operation”, including it as a separate entity provides greater clarity for both terms. One population/subpopulation may be managed through different types of operations based on a specific context (e.g. within a country or zone), or throughout its lifetime (e.g. extensive on farm management, to feedlot, to abattoir). Furthermore, one type of operation could involve more than one population or subpopulation (e.g. mixed species farming enterprise, or dairy cattle herd with calves, heifers and cows). The addition of “population and/or subpopulation” means that the “type of operations” can be interpreted with a more defined scope to mean a specific farming, commercial industry or processing operation.	Agreed but amended differently.
4.X.4._2	Category (deletion): Proposed amended texts: “The roles and responsibilities of different actors in biosecurity should be clearly defined and communicated and may vary depending on the context (e.g. establishment, compartment, zone, or country level), the scale and type of operations <u>and existing public-private partnerships</u>. Implementation of biosecurity requires engagement and collaboration amongst all actors involved” Rationale: While private public partnership are important, they might not be systematic. Therefore pinpoint them out appears unnecessary in this paragraph.	Partially agreed with the rationale and amended the text for clarity.

- 12) **Veterinary Authority** or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should be responsible for the development and oversight of ~~policy on and~~ legislative frameworks and general policies for *biosecurity*. These ~~policies~~ should include the relative contribution and roles of *veterinarians* and *veterinary paraprofessionals* in both the private and public sectors, promote and provide guidance for the implementation of *biosecurity*. When required ~~For~~ for international trade ~~purposes~~, the *Veterinary Authority* should have an active role in ~~enforcement~~, oversight, and verification of *biosecurity* and *biosecurity plans*.

4.X.4._3	Category (general): Numbering needs to be corrected for Veterinary Authority	Agreed.

- 1) **Veterinary Services** should execute and implement policies and legislation on *biosecurity* under the supervision of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities*.
- 2) **Veterinarians and veterinary paraprofessionals and other relevant advisors** should give advice on *biosecurity* and the *biosecurity plans*. This advice should be aligned with the policies and legislation, where available.
- 3) **Breeders, owners, managers, keepers, transporters, feed producers and other relevant actors** are responsible for developing, implementing and monitoring *biosecurity* and the *biosecurity plan* and should seek advice from *veterinarians*, *veterinary paraprofessionals* or other relevant advisors.

4.X.4._4	Category (change): Proposed amended texts: <u>Breeders, Population</u> owners, managers, keepers, transporters, feed producers and other relevant actors are responsible for developing, implementing and monitoring <i>biosecurity</i> and the <i>biosecurity plan</i> and should seek advice from <i>veterinarians</i> , <i>veterinary paraprofessionals</i> or other relevant advisors. Rationale: Breeders are a specific type of producers who can also be owners. The text of this chapter always refers to the "population", since this term applies to all types of production. Therefore, it would be logical to refer to the population owners, managers, keepers, etc.	Did not agree but amended the text for clarity.

- 4) **Training entities** should provide training in *biosecurity* for relevant actors. Coordination between the *Veterinary Authority*, other relevant *Competent Authorities*, the *veterinary statutory body* and veterinary educational institutions may be required to ensure *biosecurity* training delivered to *veterinarians*, *veterinary paraprofessionals* and other relevant advisors meets relevant standards, especially the recommendations of Article 4.X.9.
- 5) **Farmer associations, veterinary and para-veterinary associations, and other relevant associations** should advocate and promote *biosecurity* among their members, and may become directly involved in leading and overseeing the *biosecurity* planning and implementation by their members.

4.X.4._5	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: Farmer associations, veterinary and para-veterinary associations, and other relevant	Agreed but amended differently.

	associations should advocate and promote <i>biosecurity</i> among their members, <u>and may become directly involved in leading and overseeing the biosecurity planning and implementation by their members. They should as well develop biosecurity training programs to ensure that all farm personnel and allied industry personnel receive proper training.</u> Rationale: In some countries, grower associations directly contribute to the development and delivery of biosecurity training programs. This contribution should be acknowledged. The responsibility of developing biosecurity training programs cannot be limited to veterinary services training veterinarians and para-veterinarians. Article 4.X.4, point 4 seems to limit training to advisors (“training delivered to veterinarians, veterinary paraprofessionals and other relevant advisors”); although this is obviously important, it is also important to ensure that all farm personnel get proper training.	
4.X.4._6	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: correct the numbering of point 1) to 6) Rationale: -	Agreed.
4.X.4._7	Category: Change Proposed amended text: point 6) <u>56) Farmer associations, veterinary and para-veterinary veterinary paraprofessional associations, and other relevant associations</u> should advocate and promote biosecurity among their members ... Rationale: For consistency with the glossary definition “veterinary paraprofessional”	Agreed
4.X.4._8	Category (deletion): Proposed amended texts: “Farmer associations, veterinary and para-veterinary associations, and other relevant associations should advocate and promote biosecurity among their members, and may become <u>directly</u> involved in leading and overseeing the biosecurity planning and implementation by their members” Rationale: unnecessary word and over emphasising the role of these associations with their direct responsibility, which in principle lays with the operator. Associations can only be involved but not with a direct impact to each any every case.	Agreed.

Article 4.X.5.

4.X.5._1	Category (general): It is recommended to add "wildlife" in Article 4.X.5. Wildlife serve as reservoir hosts and transmission sources for multiple pathogens, and their contact with farmed animals significantly increases the risk of disease introduction. Consequently, wildlife inhabiting or active around farm premises should be identified as potential biosecurity risk points, and "wildlife" should be specifically highlighted in Article 4.X.5., either by listing separately or under "live animals".	Did not agree as the point 1) includes wildlife.
4.X.5._2	Category (general): The Member supports the revised articles on the description of pathogen transmission, as they improve effectiveness by providing a systematic classification that reflects the complexity of transmission pathways.	Noted.

Potential sources of pathogenic agents

Pathogenic agents can be spread through from different sources, which should be identified and considered when implementing *biosecurity* and developing a *biosecurity plan*. The main Potential sources of pathogenic agents to be considered include:

- 1) live animals,
- 2) germinal products,
- 3) secretions and excretions,
- 4) animal products,
- 5) dead *animals* and parts thereof and afterbirth materials,
- 6) arthropods such as mosquitoes, midges, flies, lice, ~~or~~ ticks or beetles,
- 7) fomites such as peoples' clothing, boots, *vehicles*, crates, bedding, or farm equipment,
- 8) *feed* and *feed ingredients* ~~including~~ such as forage, grazing pastures and swill,
- 9) water, soil and air,

4.X.5._3	Category (change): Proposed amended text: water, soil and <u>air-aerosols</u> Rationale: After COVID-19, the awareness of aerosols, rather than air, in different diameters in size are important in pathogen transmission. Supporting evidence: Song Y, Yixin M, Rachael M, Qiyue T, John S, Na L, et al. Aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2?	Did not agree due to no added clarity.

	Evidence, prevention and control. Environ Int. 2020;144:106039.	

10) *biological products*,

11) humans.

Article 4.X.6.

Transmission pathways

Transmission of pathogenic agents can occur either through *animal-to-animal* contact without an intermediate (direct transmission), or through an intermediate such as fomites, water, *feed*, *animal products*, *germinal products*, *biological products*, humans and the relevant animal environment (indirect transmission). Transmission pathways of pathogenic agents should be assessed based on scientific evidence and considered when implementing *biosecurity* or developing a *biosecurity plan*. Transmission pathways are not mutually exclusive and include:

4.X.6._1	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: Transmission of pathogenic agents can occur either through <i>animal-to-animal</i> contact without an intermediate (direct transmission), or through an intermediate such as <u>air fomites</u> , water, <i>feed</i> , <i>animal products</i> , <i>germinal products</i> , <i>biological products</i> , humans <u>and other fomites</u> and <u>the relevant</u> animal environment (indirect transmission). Rationale: Transmission by air is a very common means of transmission and most of the others on the list are fomites.	Did not agree - Humans and germinal products are not fomites. Agreed to add 'air'.
4.X.6._2	Category (change): Proposed amended text: or through an intermediate such as fomites, <u>aerosols</u> , water, feed, animal products, germinal Rationale: After COVID-19, the awareness of aerosols, rather than air, in different diameters in size are important in pathogen transmission. Supporting evidence: Song Y, Yixin M, Rachael M, Qiyue T, John S, Na L, et al. Aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2? Evidence, prevention and control. Environ Int. 2020;144:106039.	See 4.X.6._1
4.X.6._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: Transmission of pathogenic agents can occur either through <i>animal-to-animal</i> contact without an intermediate (direct transmission), or through an intermediate such as fomites, water, <u>vectors</u> , <i>feed</i> , <i>animal products</i> , <i>germinal products</i> , <i>biological products</i> , humans and <u>the relevant</u> animal	Agreed - added in different location.

	environment (indirect transmission). Transmission pathways of pathogenic agents should be <u>assessed based on scientific evidence and</u> considered when implementing <i>biosecurity</i> or developing a <i>biosecurity plan</i>. Transmission pathways are not mutually exclusive and include: Rationale: Recommend addition of “vectors” to complete list, especially with recent increases in their prevalence. Vectors are mentioned below in the chapter, but should be highlighted here as well.	
4.X.6._4	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: “Transmission of pathogenic agents can occur either through animal-to-animal contact without an intermediate (direct transmission), or through an intermediate such as fomites, water, feed, animal products, germinal products, biological products, humans and the relevant animal environment <u>relevant for the concerned population</u> (indirect transmission). Transmission pathways of pathogenic agents should be assessed based on scientific evidence <u>when possible</u> and considered when implementing <i>biosecurity</i> or developing a <i>biosecurity plan</i>. Transmission pathways are not mutually exclusive and include:” Rationale: Clarify that the word “relevant” relates to the concerned animal population. Give the needed flexibility when dealing with small scale establishments non always able to perform a formal risk assessment.	Did not agree on the first comment due to no added clarity. Regarding the second comment, the Code Commission will discuss adding text to the User’s Guide explaining, as already mentioned in past reports of the Code Commission, that when the Code states that a Member should follow a recommendation, it is assumed that it only applies ‘when possible’ or ‘when available.’ Constantly repeating this statement in the Code itself is redundant.

- 1) Vertical transmission from parents to offspring *in ovo*, *in utero* or during birth.
- 2) Horizontal transmission from one *animal* to another that is not vertical.
- 3) Iatrogenic transmission.

4.X.6._5	Category (general): We note that the term “iatrogenic” is used in the chapter but is currently not defined in the WOAHS glossary. To support clarity and consistency in interpretation, we propose that “iatrogenic” be added to the glossary. This term is important in the context of biosecurity, as it refers to adverse effects or conditions caused inadvertently by medical or veterinary treatment or procedures. Including a definition would help ensure a shared understanding among stakeholders and enhance the precision of the chapter.	Did not agree - Dictionary definition is adequate.

- 4) Sexual transmission through reproductive secretions such as semen and vaginal fluids or transmitted directly between surfaces in contact during mating.
- 5) Vector-borne transmission via *vectors* including blood-feeding arthropods such as mosquitoes, flies, ticks, fleas and lice. *Vectors* may be mechanical with no biological association between the *vector* and pathogenic agent or biological where the pathogenic agent undergoes a multiplication or a developmental change within the *vector*, necessary for survival, transmission or host *infection*.
- 6) Droplets or airborne transmission of ~~pathogenic agents~~ through particles suspended in the air. Pathogenic agents may travel in particles of multiple sizes (droplets and droplet nuclei) that remain suspended in the air or deposited on surfaces. Airborne transmission may include short or long distances (which may be referred to as aerosol or wind-borne transmission, respectively).
- 7) Transmission through fomites, *germinal products*, *animal products* and *biological products*.

4.X.6._6	Category (change): Proposed amended text: <u>8) Transmission through contaminated water and feed via the digestive tract.</u> Rationale: All intermediates listed in the first paragraph of this Article have been explicitly specified in the following specific transmission pathways, with the exception of "water and feed". Consuming water or feed contaminated by pathogens is one of the important ways of spreading animal diseases. Many pathogens, such as Salmonella, Foot-and-mouth disease virus, Avian influenza virus, etc., can enter the digestive tract of animals through contaminated drinking water or feed, causing mass infections. Especially under intensive farming conditions, the shared drinking water system and feed feeding equipment are extremely likely to cause the rapid spread of pathogens among livestock herds. Therefore, it is necessary to point out that "Transmission through contaminated water and feed via the digestive tract" is also one of the important ways of pathogen transmission.	Agreed but amended differently.

The relative importance of the different transmission pathways will vary depending on the epidemiological characteristics of pathogenic agents of concern.

Article 4.X.7.

4.X.7._1	Category (general): The Member agrees that the structuring of external and internal components of biosecurity based on transmission pathways, combined with the implementation and evaluation procedures, contributes to the increased effectiveness of biosecurity plan.	Noted.

Components of biosecurity

Biosecurity can be applied to any type of *population*. The components of *biosecurity* focus on reducing the likelihood of transmission of pathogenic agents through interactions with elements outside the *population* (external *biosecurity*) and on reducing risk ~~the likelihood~~ of transmission of pathogenic agents within the *population* (internal *biosecurity*). The components of *biosecurity* aim at avoiding or breaking the transmission pathways described in Article 4.X.6. All relevant components of *biosecurity* should be applied to address all potential sources of pathogenic agents of concern, transmission pathways as well as unexpected events, and may vary according to the *population*.

4.X.7._2	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: “Biosecurity can be applied to any type of population. The components of biosecurity focus on reducing the likelihood of transmission of pathogenic agents through interactions with elements outside the population (external biosecurity) and on reducing the likelihood of transmission of pathogenic agents within the population (internal biosecurity). The components of biosecurity aim at <u>avoiding the transmission pathways described in Article 4.X.6, or breaking them or breaking the transmission pathways described in Article 4.X.6.</u> All relevant components of biosecurity should be applied to address all potential sources of pathogenic agents of concern, transmission pathways as well as unexpected events, and may vary according to the population.” Rationale: Linguistic issue as “avoiding” and “breaking” together seem on a first sight contradictory.	Did not agree due to no added clarity.

1. Components of external biosecurity may include the following:

- a) Introduction of *animals*, *animal products* and *germinal products* into a population should be limited to the extent necessary ~~minimised~~ and if undertaken, the *animal health status* of the source *population* should be assessed.
- b) ~~Whenever~~ Before *animals* are newly introduced into the *population*, they should go through a monitored isolation period of sufficient length, during which measures such as test or treatment may be implemented to ~~reduce~~ mitigate the ~~risk~~ likelihood of transmission of pathogenic agents.

4.X.7._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: ~~Whenever~~ <u>Before</u> <i>animals</i> are <u>newly</u> introduced <u>or re-introduced</u>, into the <i>population</i>, they should go through a monitored isolation period of sufficient length, during which measures <u>such as test or treatment</u> may be implemented to ~~reduce~~ <u>mitigate</u> the ~~risk~~ <u>likelihood</u> of transmission of pathogenic agents. Rationale: The addition of the term “newly introduced” alone does not incorporate the risk that re-introduced or returning animals (e.g returning from a show, event or other reason) may pose to the resident population. The suggested amendment is broader in scope and covers this scenario.	Agreed but amended differently.

4.X.7._4	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: ~~b. Whenever~~ Before <i>animals</i> are <u>newly</u> introduced into the <i>population</i> , they should go through a monitored isolation period of sufficient length, during which measures <u>such as test or treatment</u> may be implemented to ~~reduce~~ <u>mitigate</u> <u>minimise</u> the <u>risk likelihood</u> of transmission of pathogenic agents. Rationale: -	Did not agree due to no added clarity.
4.X.7._5	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: ~~Whenever~~ Before <i>animals</i> <u>of an unknown or different animal health status</u> are <u>newly</u> introduced into the <i>population</i> , they should go through a monitored isolation period of sufficient length, during which measures <u>such as test or treatment</u> may be implemented to ~~reduce~~ <u>mitigate</u> the <u>risk likelihood</u> of transmission of pathogenic agents. Rationale: Isolation may be unnecessary if both newly introduced and resident animals share a comparable health status concerning the targeted pathogenic agents.	Agreed.
4.X.7._6	Category (deletion): Proposed amended texts: “Before animals are newly introduced into the population, they should go through a monitored isolation period of sufficient length, during which measures <u>such as test or treatment</u> may be implemented to reduce the likelihood of transmission of pathogenic agents.” Rationale: Only tests and treatment appears minimalistic. Isolation, biosecurity, movement controls, control could also be valid measures. Better keep the text general.	Did not agree as they are examples to facilitate understanding.

- c) Contact between *populations* of unknown or different *animal health status* should be avoided through segregation using managerial measures, physical or natural barriers.

4.X.7._7	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: Contact between <i>populations</i> of unknown or different <i>animal health status</i> should be avoided through segregation using managerial measures, physical or natural barriers. <u>For example, structural elements, such as barns and fences, can help separate and protect animals from the spread of pests and disease.</u> Rationale: Edit provided to highlight the value of structural biosecurity elements (barns, fences, etc)	Did not agree as the “physical barrier” in this point can clearly cover the proposal.

	which can effectively separate and protect animal populations	

- d) Human access to the *population* should be controlled. When humans come in contact with *animals*, they should take measures to ~~reduce~~mitigate the ~~risk~~likelihood of bi-directional transmission of pathogenic agents, ~~which includes as a minimum wearing dedicated clothing and footwear, and hand hygiene. When humans come in contact with different populations subsequently, the order of the visits should be organised to minimise the likelihood of bi-directional transmission.~~

4.X.7._8	Category (change): Proposed amended texts: <u>When humans come in contact with different populations subsequently, the order of the visits should be organised to minimise the likelihood of bi-directional transmission must consider the health status of the different populations to minimize the risk of transmission between the populations.</u> Rationale: The amendment seems to be mainly concerned about transmission between animals and humans potentially going both ways based on the use of “bi-directional transmission”. However, if other visits are planned, the order must consider the health status of the different populations. The biosecurity measures necessary between visiting two different populations must first be concerned with limiting the risk of transmission between these populations. The measures designed to protect humans remain the same.	Agreed but amended differently.
4.X.7._9	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Human access to the <i>population</i> should be controlled. When humans come in contact with <i>animals</i>, they should take measures to ~~reduce~~<u>mitigate</u> the ~~risk~~<u>likelihood</u> of bi-directional transmission of pathogenic agents, ~~which includes as a minimum wearing dedicated clothing and footwear, and hand hygiene. When humans come in contact with different populations subsequently, wherever possible the order and timing of the visits should be organised to minimise the likelihood of bi-directional transmission.~~ Rationale: i) The time between contact is also relevant. ii) Provides necessary flexibility, e.g. a veterinary animal health emergency means it may not be always possible to organise or maintain a desired order of visits.	First proposal – addressed above Second proposal – agreed.
4.X.7._10	Category (addition and change):	Did not agree due to no added clarity.

	Proposed amended texts: Human access to the <i>population</i> should be controlled. When humans come in contact with <i>animals</i>, they should take measures to ~~reduce~~mitigate the ~~risk~~likelihood of <u>bi-directional iatrogenic and zoonotic</u> transmission of pathogenic agents, <u>including the use of personal protective equipment</u> which includes as a minimum wearing ~~dedicated clothing and footwear, and hand hygiene~~. When humans come in contact with different <u>populations</u> subsequently, <u>the order of the visits should be organised to minimise the likelihood of bi-directional transmission.</u> Rationale: Recommend edits to: 1. clarify how humans spread and/or become infected by pathogens and 2. align with current terminology (i.e. zoonosis/zoonotic commonly means transmission of pathogens between humans and animals, such that the bi-directional nature of transmission is inherent in the term). Use of PPE is a standard/critical component of biosecurity both internally and external- to internal. Recommend specifically mentioning PPE as a measure to mitigate transmission of pathogenic agents. Supporting evidence: https://www.cdc.gov/one-health/about/about-zoonotic-diseases.html https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10546628/ https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/immunology-and-microbiology/zoonosis	

- e) Equipment and clothing used to handle or care for *animals* should not be shared between different *populations*. If shared, equipment and clothing should undergo cleaning and *disinfection* at least before each use~~and after use~~.

4.X.7._11	Category (change): Proposed amended texts: Equipment <u>and clothing</u> used to handle or care for <i>animals</i> should not be shared between different <i>populations</i>. If shared, equipment and clothing should undergo cleaning and <i>disinfection</i> <u>at least</u> before ~~each use~~ <u>and after each use</u>. Rationale: Recommend retaining the previous text -"cleaning and disinfection before and after each use". The optimal method to minimize pathogen spread via equipment or clothing is to clean and disinfect before and after use.	Did not agree as the current text recommends the minimum action for biosecurity, which Members can choose to exceed depending on the local situation.

- f) Transport vehicles in contact with *animals* or their products should undergo cleaning and *disinfection at least before each use and after use*.

4.X.7._12	Category (deletion): Proposed amended texts: Transport vehicles in contact with <i>animals</i> or their products should undergo cleaning and <i>disinfection at least before each use and after use</i>. Rationale: "At least before each use" would indicate that one would expect these vehicles to be cleaned at any other time. Is it necessary to imply this? If the recommendation is to clean and disinfect before each use, is it relevant that it may occur at other times when before each use is the most opportune time to prevent exposure to subsequent animals?	See 4.X.7._11
4.X.7._13	Category (change): Proposed amended text: f) Transport vehicles in contact with <i>animals</i> or their products should undergo cleaning and <i>disinfection at least before each use and after use and after use (if transporting the same kind of animals or animal products continuously, they should undergo cleaning and disinfection at least before use), and drying if necessary</i>. Rationale: First, according to the current standard regulations, vehicle cleaning and disinfection are not required after vehicle use. However, if the vehicle carries pathogens during transportation, these pathogens may multiply during vehicle parking and spread through air, contact with personnel or equipment, etc., thus increasing the risk of disease transmission. It is recommended to restore the regulation of "cleaning and disinfection before and after use". If it is necessary to reduce the implementation cost, the clause content can be refined while retaining the key requirements, that is, adding "if continuously transporting the same type of animals or animal products, at least undergo cleaning and disinfection before use". Second, drying can destroy the pathogen structure through high temperature and significantly reduce the risk of disease transmission. It is recommended that after cleaning and disinfection of vehicles transporting animals and animal products, drying is carried out to further enhance the biosecurity effect. Given the differences in the economic development levels of each member, drying is not mandatory here, and it is required to "drying if necessary".	See 4.X.7._11

- g) *Animal products, faeces, manure or other waste materials* should be handled in a way to ~~mitigate~~ minimise the spread of pathogenic agents. Special care should be taken to avoid contact with or attraction of other animals and arthropods.

4.X.7._14	Category (deletion): Proposed amended texts: ~~“Special care should be taken to avoid contact with or attraction of other animals and arthropods.”~~ Rationale: Duplication with point c) above.	Did not agree – There are different considerations than point c., which deals with the populations under biosecurity. Here the context is not necessarily between populations.

- h) Dead *animals* and parts thereof should be handled, stored and disposed of in a way to ~~mitigate~~ minimise the spread of pathogenic agents and to avoid contact with or attraction of other *animals* and arthropods.
- i) *Feed* should be produced in accordance with Chapter 6.4. and should be, stored and transported in dedicated equipment to minimise the contact with potential sources of pathogenic agents. Feeding of untreated swill should be avoided.

4.X.7._15	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: <i>Feed</i> should be produced <u>in accordance with Chapter 6.4. and should be</u> , stored and transported in dedicated equipment to minimise the contact with potential sources of pathogenic agents. Feeding of untreated swill should be avoided <u>if there is a risk of disease transmission</u> . Rationale: The current text is too closed, and the use of untreated swill should be risk based. The definition of swill includes feed for all species, this would include dogs, cats, and poultry for which feeding of untreated food scraps or food waste may not pose a disease transmission risk e.g. uncooked beef bones for dogs.	Did not agree – if treated as per the recommendation in the Code (i.e. at least 90 °C for at least 60 minutes), swill does not pose any risk, but difficult to assess specifically if untreated swill actually poses a risk or not, hence a general recommendation to avoid the feeding of untreated swill (as defined in the proposed Glossary definition).

- j) Water should originate from low-risk sources or be treated to remove or inactivate pathogenic agents. The safety of the water ~~and feed~~ should be checked regularly.
- k) Contacts between the *population* and pets, birds, rodents, insects, and other *wildlife* or pests should be avoided by selecting an appropriate site and through using engineering, mechanical or chemical control.

4.X.7._16	Category (change): Proposed amended text: ~~Unintended~~ <u>C</u> ontacts between the <i>population</i> and ~~other animals~~ <u>pets, birds, including</u> pets, birds, rodents, ~~arthropods, insects, and other wildlife or pests~~ should be avoided <u>by selecting an appropriate site and through</u> using <u>engineering, mechanical/physical barriers</u> or chemical control. Rationale: i) Some contact between animals can be intended e.g. mixed animal zoo enclosures and working dogs on farm. ii) Arthropods includes insects as well as other important vectors e.g. mites and ticks.	Partially Agreed. Did not agree to add 'unintended' because it is not relevant. Did not agree to delete 'mechanical' and replace with 'physical barriers', as it did not add clarity.

	iii) Remaining changes to simplify text and increase readability.	

~~l)~~ ~~k)~~ To minimise airborne transmission of pathogenic agents, sufficient distance or physical barriers between *populations* and ~~possible~~ potential sources of pathogenic agents should be considered. In some circumstances, air treatments might be considered.

~~m)~~ ~~h)~~ When cleaning and *disinfection* or other measures are not feasible or effectiveness is undetermined, an additional period of no contact between potential sources of pathogenic agents (e.g. humans, buildings, *vehicles*, equipment, materials, pastures) and the *population* may be applied. The effectiveness of this measure will depend on the specific circumstances and should be verified.

4.X.7._17	Category (change): Proposed amended text: <u>n) Physical separation must be established between farm premises and external areas.</u> Rationale: Physical separation inside and outside the farm is a fundamental barrier to blocking the cross-regional transmission of pathogens, which can effectively prevent wildlife, stray animals, unsterilized vehicles and personnel from entering the farm at the source. We believe that clause c) of Article 4.X.7. "Components of external biosecurity" is to avoid contact between groups with different animal health conditions inside the farm through management measures, physical or natural barriers. It is recommended that the newly added clause n) work in coordination with clause c) to further strengthen biosecurity. If the Committee believes that clause c) already implies the isolation of animals, vehicles or items outside the farm, we hope that the Committee will modify clause c) to make its expression more direct and clear to avoid ambiguity.	Did not agree as it is already covered in points c) and k).

2. Components of internal biosecurity may include the following:

4.X.7._18	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: <u>a) A surveillance plan should be in place to monitor the health of animals and to detect sick animals. It should outline the basic farm infrastructure, indicate the degree of animal observation and the farmer's ability to segregate, isolate and treat sick animals.</u> Rationale: Livestock husbandry varies enormously in terms of species farmed, intensity of production, farmed area, property infrastructure and hence time for detection of sick animals and the ability to observe, remove and isolate or otherwise control disease spread. If sick animals are to be isolated and treated (original paragraph a), they must first be observed	Did not agree – A surveillance plan itself is not a component of internal biosecurity. Amended the text for clarity.

	and the ability to observe and so on is dependent on farm infrastructure and intensity of husbandry. It is important to capture.	

- a) Sick *animals* should be isolated to prevent other *animals* from being exposed. Treatments should be administered ~~safely~~ to avoid iatrogenic transmission.

4.X.7._19	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: Sick <i>animals</i> should be isolated <u>or cull</u> to prevent other <i>animals</i> from being exposed. Treatments should be administered ~~safely~~ to avoid iatrogenic transmission. Rationale: -	Did not agree as either healing or culling normally comes after isolation, but here the point is about physical separation of sick animals. See proposed Glossary definition of 'isolation'.
4.X.7._20	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: Sick <i>animals</i> should be isolated to prevent other <i>animals</i> from being exposed. ~~Treatments should be administered safely to avoid iatrogenic transmission.~~ <u>Iatrogenic transmission should be avoided during administration of treatments.</u> Rationale: Existing language with deletion of "safely" can be interpreted as "treatments must be given/are required in order to avoid iatrogenic transmission". We respectfully suggest that the intent of the text is more clearly reflected by the suggested rewording.	Agree but amended differently
4.X.7._21	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Sick animals should be isolated to prevent other animals from being exposed. Treatments should be administered <u>with caution</u> ~~safely~~ to avoid iatrogenic transmission. Rationale: Clarification	See 4.X.7._20

- b) All-in all-out management should be applied, as appropriate, to all *animals* kept in the same space including cleaning and *disinfection* of the space between groups of *animals*.
- c) Stocking densities that result in impaired health through increased transmission rates and higher virulence of pathogenic agents, or increased susceptibility to *infections*, should be avoided.

4.X.7._22	Category (deletion): Proposed amended texts: Stocking densities that result in impaired health through increased transmission rates ~~and higher~~	Agreed and amended for clarity.

	<u>virulence</u> of pathogenic agents, or increased susceptibility to <u>infections</u>, should be avoided. Rationale: The virulence of pathogens is not related to stocking densities - this is an incorrect addition. Virulence is a separate consideration from biosecurity mitigations.	

- d) Within the *population*, *units* with different characteristics impacting disease risk should be kept separately.
- e) When the management of the *population* involves contact with different *units*, the workflow should be organised from the lowest to the highest risk of *infection*, considering transmission of pathogenic agents and susceptibility of the *units*. When moving between the *units*, measures to mitigate transmission of pathogenic agents should be applied.

4.X.7._23	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: When the management of the <i>population</i> involves contact with different <i>units</i>, the workflow should be organised from the lowest to the highest risk of <i>infection</i>, considering transmission of pathogenic agents and susceptibility of the <i>units</i>. When moving between the <i>units</i>, measures to mitigate transmission of pathogenic agents should be applied, <u>including appropriate use of personal protective equipment</u>. Rationale: Use of PPE is a standard/critical component of biosecurity both internally and external-to internal. Recommend specifically mentioning PPE as a measure to mitigate transmission of pathogenic agents.	Did not agree - Example is too specific and prescriptive.

- f) Cleaning and *disinfection* of the equipment and surfaces should be applied between consecutive groups of *animals*.

4.X.7._24	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: <u>g) Other infection prevention measures should be implemented, such as vaccination, husbandry and maintenance of a relationship with a veterinarian or paraveterinarian to decrease the disease transmission risks.</u> Rationale: Other day to day activities support good biosecurity and decrease disease transmission risk.	Did not agree - The proposed point is not a component of an internal biosecurity plan. This chapter is meant to focus on biosecurity measures and does not preclude other animal health and management measures from being implemented. Nevertheless, added a sentence in Article 2 for clarity.

Article 4.X.8.

Biosecurity plan

A *biosecurity plan* promotes consistent implementation of *biosecurity*. While remaining scientifically justifiable, and it should balance the objectives and intended benefits with the practicality, cost, regulatory requirements and should include necessary provisions for its maintenance and continuous improvement. The aim of a *biosecurity plan* is to organise, structure and document *biosecurity* including its evaluation.

4.X.8._1	Category (general): It is recommended considering if this paragraph should be modulated to clarify how strong this statement is: "While remaining scientifically justifiable". Does this mean that every biosecurity plan needs a scientific justification? What about measures coming from experience?	Agreed and amended differently.

The *biosecurity plan* should include the following sections:

a) Purpose and scope

This section should provide an overview of the plan, its purpose and scope. In addition, it should outline the goals and objectives of the plan, as well as the *population* characteristics, including animal husbandry systems, and epidemiological context.

b) Roles and responsibilities

Design, implementation, and monitoring is a shared responsibility. Therefore, it is essential to describe the roles and responsibilities of all actors for ensuring adherence and compliance with *biosecurity*.

4.X.8._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: Design, implementation, and monitoring is a shared responsibility. Therefore, it is essential to describe the roles and responsibilities of all actors for ensuring adherence and compliance with <i>biosecurity</i> . <u>This section should also include the authorities responsible for resource allocation (funding, personnel resources for training, etc.).</u> Rationale: Recommend including responsible parties for securing funding in a biosecurity plan, as they are often left out and lead to implementation issues.	Agreed - Made amendments to the introductory paragraph of Article 4 to address this concern.

c) Identification of pathogenic agents, sources and transmission pathways

In addition to the identification of the potential pathogenic agents of concern, this section should include their potential sources and transmission pathways.

d) Description of biosecurity

This section should describe the relevant components of *biosecurity* in accordance with Article 4.X.7.

It should also include relevant response procedures for emergencies.

e) Surveillance of pathogenic agents

The *biosecurity plan* should include the procedures for surveillance for early detection ~~to detect the presence of pathogenic agents of concern,~~ in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

4.X.8._3	Category: Change Proposed amended text: point e) Surveillance of pathogenic agents The biosecurity plan should include the procedures for surveillance ~~for~~ <u>focusing on</u> early detection to detect the presence of pathogenic agents of concern, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Rationale: To improve the readability and clarity of the recommendations	Did not agree due to no added clarity.

f) Communication and reporting

This section should outline the procedures for communicating information about the *biosecurity plan* to all relevant actors. It should also include procedures for reporting incidents and sharing information with relevant authorities.

g) Training and education

This section should outline the training and education needs and identify programmes to ensure all relevant actors are aware of the *biosecurity plan* and clearly understand their roles and responsibilities to implement and maintain the *biosecurity* and the consequences of non-compliance.

h) Supporting documents

This section should outline the standard operating procedures ~~(SOPs)~~, checklists, and record-keeping templates which describe routine management processes and ensure that responsibilities and duties are consistently fulfilled and documented. It should also include relevant training materials for all actors involved in the implementation of the *biosecurity plan*.

i) Evaluation and continuous improvement

This section should describe the procedures for monitoring and evaluation of the *biosecurity plan* and its implementation in accordance with Article 4.X.10. Biosecurity Incidents and breaches in *biosecurity*, as well as corrective actions taken, should be documented. The *biosecurity plan* should be reviewed and updated regularly to ensure its relevance and effectiveness.

Article 4.X.9.

4.X.9._1	Category (general): The Member agrees that clearly identifying the responsible entities for training and awareness activities has helped institutionalize accountability for their implementation.	Noted.

Training and awareness

1. Training

Regular training on *biosecurity* should be undertaken according to the needs identified and should include all relevant actors. Training should be provided by those with sufficient qualifications and experience. The training should be in line with legislative and policy frameworks. Such training may include:

- Principles of *biosecurity*,
- Sources of pathogenic agents, transmission pathways and relevant factors to susceptibility,
- Components and implementation of *biosecurity*, including emergency planning and response,

4.X.9._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Components and implementation of <i>biosecurity</i> , including <u>preventive measures, surveillance</u> , emergency planning and response, Rationale: It is important to highlight the preventative aspect of biosecurity and surveillance for early detection, and not just reactive aspects of biosecurity.	Did not agree as there is no need to highlight any specific points here, it is all included in components and implementation of biosecurity. Nevertheless, amended the text differently.

- Monitoring and evaluation of *biosecurity*,
- Purpose, development and implementation of a *biosecurity plan*,
- Competency-based training requirements should be identified and documented for each actor. The training achieved should be recorded and monitored to ensure the required level of competencies are obtained or maintained.

2. Awareness

All relevant actors described in Article 4.X.4. and the general public, when applicable, should be made aware of the importance of *biosecurity* (and the *biosecurity plan* if appropriate) at strategic places (e.g. *border inspection posts*, farm entrances, *markets*) and times (e.g. *disease outbreaks*, changes in the epidemiological situation). Raising awareness may be the responsibility of the *Veterinary Authority*, other relevant *Competent Authorities*, or Veterinary Services, ~~or Producers~~, and other relevant actors may also be responsible depending on the context and extent of the *risk*.

4.X.9._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: All relevant actors described in Article 4.X.4. and the general public, when applicable, should be made aware of the importance of <i>biosecurity</i> <u>measures and implementation</u> (and the <i>biosecurity plan</i> if appropriate) at strategic places (e.g. <i>border inspection posts</i> , farm entrances, <i>markets</i>) and times (e.g. <i>disease outbreaks</i> , changes in the epidemiological situation). Raising awareness may be the responsibility of the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> , other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> , <u>or Veterinary Services</u> , ~~or Producers~~ , <u>and</u> other relevant actors <u>may also be responsible</u> depending on the context and extent of the <i>risk</i> . Rationale: -	Did not agree due to no added clarity.

Article 4.X.10.

4.X.10._1	Category (general): The Member agrees that the system has been structured to evaluate the implementation and effectiveness of biosecurity plan, with the results being used to modify the plan and risk mitigation.	Noted.

Evaluation and continuous improvement

The implementation of *biosecurity*, the compliance with the *biosecurity plan* and the effectiveness of implemented measures should be subjected to evaluation for continuous improvement.

- 1) The evaluation of implementation should be based on predefined scope and criteria, taking into consideration the expected scale of the operation and the characteristics of the *population* concerned. This will determine at which level of responsibility the evaluation should be conducted, and at which frequency. The frequency should be adapted to changing circumstances such as new *animal health status*, newly identified pathogenic agents or changes in epidemiological situation, previous evaluations, changes in production or changes in plan. The evaluation should determine the level of implementation of *biosecurity*, through collected evidence that may include documentation of procedures, other routine records, monitoring technologies, onsite audits as well as interviews with personnel. Based on these findings, the evaluation may allow the establishment of a risk-based *biosecurity* score as a whole or for each measure.
- 2) Compliance with the *biosecurity plan* should be evaluated routinely or following a change in the epidemiological situation. Documented evidence of compliance should be collected routinely and be provided for any evaluation. The evaluation of compliance with the *biosecurity plan* should be executed preferably by an independent party, in accordance with the policies and legislation, where available.

4.X.10._2	Category (general): Additionally, the two phrases “production type” and “or other significant change” should also apply to point 2 of the same article.	Agreed.

- 3) The effectiveness of the *biosecurity plan* should be evaluated routinely or following a change in production type, epidemiological situation, or other significant change, to ensure the *biosecurity plan* is complete, fit for purpose and up to date. The evaluation should be based on animal health or performance data. The outcomes of the evaluations should be communicated to all relevant actors and should inform if the plan needs to be modified, and which risk mitigation or corrective actions are needed so that the *biosecurity plan* can be updated accordingly.

4.X.10._3	Category (general): In point 3, it is not clear what is meant by “other significant change”. We would like to suggest either explaining or defining the phrase. Additionally, the two phrases “production type” and “or other significant change” should also apply to point 2 of the same article.	See 4.X.10._2

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.4._1	Category (general): In general, Member supports the draft new Chapter and has inserted some comments throughout the chapter for the consideration of the Commission	Noted
5.4._2	Category (general): According to Article 5.4.1, this chapter provides exporting countries with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of their Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities and of operators. In the current draft, “Veterinary Authority in the exporting country” and “Veterinary Authority” are used throughout this Chapter. For consistency, “the Veterinary Authority” should be used except as otherwise specified.	Agreed with the rationale. The Code Commission agreed to add text to clarify the applicable usage of ‘Veterinary Authority’ and ‘Competent Authorities’ in the first article of each of the Chapters 5.4. to 5.6., respectively. Term ‘of the exporting country’ was removed from 5.4 as use then applied to exporting country unless otherwise specified. Same amendment was applied to Chapters 5.5. applied to transit country and 5.6. applied to importing country, respectively.
5.4._3	Category (general): The Member agrees with the new revisions which include the clear definitions of terms related to exportation, the detailed explanation regarding the responsibilities of Operators, and the Official Controls of Veterinary Authority for exportation.	Noted
5.4._4	Category (general): <i>International veterinary certificate should be changed to veterinary health certificate.</i> The justifications are the name more simplifies understanding for stakeholders including the operators.	Did not agree as ‘international veterinary certificate’ is defined in Glossary of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> and it is appropriate to use defined term.
5.4._5	Category (general): The Member thanks the Commission for its work on this chapter. We note that the definition and phrasing of “operator” vary across Chapters 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 (e.g., “business operators any natural or legal entity or person...”). To ensure clarity and consistency, we recommend standardising the definition of “operator” across all chapters. We suggest defining the term once in Chapter 5.1 or in a glossary and referring to it consistently thereafter.	Did not agree as the text is clear as currently written
5.4._6	Category (general): The Member generally supports this draft revised chapter provided the comments below are taken into consideration.	Noted

CHAPTER 5.4.

MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE IN TO THE EXPORTATION OF COMMODITIES

Article 5.4.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable ~~in to~~ the exportation of *commodities* to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through *international trade of commodities*, without creating unjustified trade restrictions, covering from facilities of origin (such as *establishment, slaughterhouse/abattoir, semen collection centre*) to the *point of exit*.

For the purposes of this chapter, 'operator' means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for export of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter.

This chapter provides *exporting countries* with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of the *Veterinary Authority* or other *relevant Competent Authorities*, and of *operators*, business operators ~~any natural or legal entity or person responsible for export of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter (hereafter 'operator')~~, in addition to responsibilities that are described in Article 5.1.3. This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and ~~performance~~ implementation of official controls for exportation.

This chapter applies to all *commodities*; some recommendations are specifically addressed to certain ~~of these commodities~~.

5.4.1._1	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: <u>While ~~t~~</u> This chapter applies to all <i>commodities</i> ; <u>some</u> recommendations are specifically addressed to certain ~~of these commodities~~ . Rationale: Readability.	Agreed

Article 5.4.2.

General considerations

The *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country* should ~~ensure that make operators aware of the importing country requirements, if they are available to the Veterinary Authority in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. In addition, the Veterinary Authority should make operators aware of the process required to meet the conditions of the international veterinary certificate including importing country requirements, including all information required for the agreed international veterinary certificate, in accordance with Article 5.1.1. and Chapter 5.3., are available to exporters.~~

5.4.2._1	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> of the <i>exporting country</i> should ~~ensure that make~~ <u>ensure</u> operators <u>are</u> aware of the <i>importing country</i> requirements, <u>if they are available to the Veterinary Authority in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. In addition, the Veterinary Authority should make operators aware of the process required to meet the conditions of the international veterinary certificate</u>	Agreed

	~~including importing country requirements, including all information required for the agreed international veterinary certificate, in accordance with Article 5.1.1. and Chapter 5.3., are available to exporters.~~ Rationale: improve language.	
5.4.2._2	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: “The Veterinary Authority of the exporting country should make operators aware of ~~the importing country requirements~~ <u>the requirements of the importing country</u>, [...]” Rationale: Editorial.	Did not agree as the current text is clear and this is applied throughout the chapter.

The ~~Veterinary Authority of the exporting country~~ should be responsible for the implementation performance of official controls in coordination with other relevant *Competent Authorities* in accordance with *veterinary legislation* to ensure that exported *commodities* ~~can be traded safely and meet the requirements of the importing country requirements.~~ Its legal mandate and responsibilities of the Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities, as described in Article 3.4.5. and 3.4.13., should include the export official controls activities at any step in the export process and the opportunity to request from the operator-exporter any necessary information. Where appropriate, the *Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities* may delegate certain tasks ~~in accordance with point 2 of Article 3.4.5.~~ Adequate human, technical, physical and financial resources should be available in the *exporting country* for the Veterinary Services to allow these effectively implement official controls ~~to be undertaken effectively and to properly apply the certification obligations and procedures laid down in Chapters 5.1. and 5.2., in accordance with the quality principles described in Article Chapter 3.2.2.~~

5.4.2._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: <u>“Where the veterinary authority has been made aware of the current importing country requirements, through official agreement or notification, the Veterinary Authority should be responsible for [...]”</u> Rationale: Clarification of the text.	Did not agree as the current text is clear.

The *Veterinary Authority* should cooperate closely with the customs authority and other authorities of the *exporting country* dealing with exports to ensure that official controls are implemented ~~performed effectively, and to protect maintain the status compliance~~ of the *commodities* with importing country requirements without creating unjustified barriers to trade. This cooperation should also cover actions to prevent and combat fraud or illegal pathways.

5.4.2._4	Category (addition and deletion): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should cooperate closely with <u>all relevant authorities, including</u> ~~the customs authority and other authorities~~ of the <i>exporting country</i> dealing with exports to ensure that official controls are <u>implemented</u> ~~performed effectively, and to protect maintain the status compliance~~ of the <i>commodities</i> <u>with importing country requirements without creating unjustified barriers to trade.</u> This cooperation should also cover actions to prevent and combat fraud <u>or illegal pathways.</u>	Agreed to add ‘all relevant authorities, including’ Did not agree to delete ‘effectively’ as it is needed to ensure the implementation of the official control in cooperation with other relevant authorities.

	Rationale: In many countries, the mandate of Customs officials is to focus on import controls rather than export. Therefore, other relevant authorities including customs authorities should be the primary focus for cooperation with the Veterinary Authority to ensure export controls are implemented. Remove the word “effectively” as competence of implementation should be assumed as the default in the application of any program or controls.	
5.4.2._5	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should cooperate closely with the customs authority and other authorities of the exporting country dealing with exports to ensure that official controls are implemented performed effectively, and to protect to maintain the status compliance of the commodities with importing country requirements without creating unjustified barriers to trade. Rationale: Edited for clarity.	Agreed

The *Veterinary Authority* should have procedures, as applicable, for certification of the *animal health status* of the herd/flock, compartment, zone, or country, zone, compartment, or herd/flock as well as of the disease situation in *establishments* and other premises and communicate with the operator-exporter regarding any additional documentary evidence that may be required to support such certification.

5.4.2._6	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should cooperate closely with the customs authority and other <u>relevant law enforcement</u> authorities of the exporting country dealing with exports to ensure that official controls are implemented performed effectively, and to protect maintain the status compliance of the commodities with importing country requirements without creating unjustified barriers to trade. Rationale: For consistency with Article 5.6.8.	Agreed, text was amended differently for clarity
5.4.2._7	Category (change): Proposed amended texts: La <i>autoridad veterinaria</i> deberá contar, según corresponda, con procedimientos para la certificación del estatus zoosanitario <u>del rebaño animal o animales, compartimiento, zona o país, zona, compartimiento o rebaño</u>, al igual que para la situación sanitaria de las explotaciones y de otras instalaciones y comunicar al <u>operador exportador</u> toda prueba documental adicional que pueda requerirse para apoyar dicha certificación. Rationale: Sobre la palabra rebaño, en dado caso, se sugiere incluirse animal o animales, ya que no puede generalizarse el término para todas las especies, y de	Did not agree as ‘animal health status’ applies to ‘unit’ at least. However, the Code Commission added a new paragraph below to address this comment.

	manera más específica, puede ser a partir de un individuo.	
5.4.2._8	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should have procedures, <u>as applicable</u>, for certification of the <i>animal health status</i> of ~~the an individual animal~~, <u>herd/flock, compartment, zone, or</u> country, ~~zone, compartment, or herd/flock~~ as well as of the disease situation in <i>establishments</i> and other premises and communicate with the <u>operator</u> ~~exporter~~ regarding any additional documentary evidence that may be required to support such certification. Rationale: Animals can be traded as individuals as well as herds/flocks etc e.g. horses, dogs, cats, and zoo animals.	Comment addressed above.
5.4.2._9	Category (general): Recommend an explanation of the phrase “as applicable” be provided or specific examples when these requirements are not applicable to help Member Countries better understand the expectations for certifying the animal health status of their country, zone or compartment.	The Code Commission explained that there are importations of commodities that may not require international veterinary certification for status (i.e. where certification is not applicable such as for safe commodities).

The *Veterinary Authority* in the ~~exporting country~~ should ensure that the applicable certified *animal health status* of the herd/flock, compartment, zone, or country, ~~zone, compartment, or herds/flock~~ or *animals*, is based on appropriate *surveillance* and reporting in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

5.4.2._10	Category (change): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> in the ~~exporting country~~ should ensure that the <u>applicable</u> certified <i>animal health status</i> of the <u>animal, herd/flock, compartment, zone, or</u> country, ~~zone, compartment, or herds/flock~~ or <i>animals</i>, is based on appropriate <i>surveillance</i> and reporting in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Rationale: Debe dejarse “animal”, ya que hay algunos que se exportan como individuos, en especial los de genética, zoológicos, mascotas.	Comment addressed above
5.4.2._11	Category (change): Proposed amended texts: La <i>autoridad veterinaria</i> ~~en el país exportador~~ deberá garantizar que el <i>estatus zoonosanitario</i> certificado aplicable ~~al~~ <u>del rebaño animal o animales, compartimiento, zona o país</u> ~~zona, compartimiento o rebaño~~ se basa en la <i>vigilancia</i> y en la notificación apropiadas de acuerdo con el Capítulo 1.4. Rationale: Justificación anterior.	Comment addressed above

5.4.2._12	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The ~~Veterinary Authority in the exporting country~~ should ensure that the <u>applicable</u> certified animal health status of ~~the an individual animal, herd/flock, compartment, zone, or country, zone, compartment, or herds/flock or animals~~, is based on appropriate surveillance and reporting in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Rationale: Animals can be traded as individuals as well as herds/flocks etc e.g. horses, dogs, cats, and zoo animals.	Comment addressed above

The ~~Veterinary Authority in the exporting country~~ should have procedures for registration and approval of *establishments* of origin, where applicable, and other facilities used for production and handling of consignments, to comply with the ~~agreed international veterinary certificate~~. Operators should not hinder access by the ~~Veterinary Authority~~ to the *commodities*, the premises where they are located and the ~~means by which they are transported of transport~~. During official controls, operators should assist and cooperate with the ~~Veterinary Authority Services~~ and make available all relevant information concerning the consignment.

5.4.2._13	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The ~~Veterinary Authority~~ <u>or other relevant Competent Authorities</u>, ~~in the exporting country~~ should have procedures for registration and approval of <i>establishments</i> of origin, where applicable, and other facilities used for production and handling of consignments, to comply with the ~~agreed international veterinary certificate~~. Rationale: Countries may have systems of oversight with shared jurisdiction between the Veterinary Authority and other Competent authorities. The usage of Competent Authority allows for differing systems of governmental organization that may exist for different Members.	Agreed
5.4.2._14	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The ~~Veterinary Authority in the exporting country~~ should have procedures for registration and approval of <i>establishments</i> of origin, where applicable, and other facilities used for production and handling of consignments, <u>as needed</u> to comply with the ~~agreed international veterinary certificate~~. Rationale: Recommend addition of "as needed" since not all international veterinary certificates have the same identification/traceability requirements.	Did not agree as the current text is clear that it is when applicable.

The ~~Veterinary Authority of the exporting country~~ should ensure that appropriate identification of *commodities* is in place to support traceability for the consignment to comply with the ~~agreed international veterinary certificate~~. *Animal identification* should be in accordance with Chapter 4.2. and Chapter 4.3.

Upon request from the *Veterinary Authority* of the *importing country* or from the *Veterinary Authority* of the *transit country*, the *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country* should provide additional information on the process to ensure compliance with the conditions included in the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~, and undertake investigation and reporting, and give reasonable access for audit in case of repeated non-compliant consignments ~~jeopardising the safety of trade~~. The *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country* should ~~take-ensure that the appropriate and necessary preventive measures to ensure that the status of the commodities remain compliant is not jeopardised~~ before and during transport to the point of exit. The *exporting country* should suspend the export of a *commodity* when there is reason to believe that it may present a risk for animal **health** and public health or ~~that if~~ it does not comply with the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~.

5.4.2._15	Category (editorial and addition): Proposed amended texts: Upon request from the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> of the <i>importing country</i> or from the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> of ~~the~~ <i>transit country</i>, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> of the <i>exporting country</i> should provide additional information on the process to ensure compliance with the conditions included in the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~, <u>and undertake investigation and reporting, and</u> give reasonable access for audit in case of repeated non-compliant consignments ~~jeopardising the safety of trade~~. The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> of the <i>exporting country</i> should ~~take-ensure that the appropriate and necessary preventive measures to ensure that the status of the commodities remain compliant is not jeopardised~~ before and during transport <u>from the facility of origin to the point of exit</u>. The <i>exporting country</i> should suspend the export of a <i>commodity</i> when there is reason to believe that it may present a risk for animal health and public health or ~~that if~~ it does not comply with the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~. Rationale: [for editorial] The suggested change is to recognise that there may not always be a transit country or there maybe more than one. [for addition] Clarity	Agreed with the first proposal. Did not agree as it is clear with the current text
5.4.2._16	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: The <i>exporting country</i> should suspend the export of a <i>commodity</i> when there is reason to believe that it may present a risk for animal health <u>and/or</u> public health or ~~that if~~ it does not comply with the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~. Rationale: Edited for clarity. Using “and” suggests that both conditions need to be present. Risk to animal health alone may be sufficient reason to suspend export.	Agreed

The *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country* should promptly communicate to the *Veterinary Authority* of the *importing country*, any change or situation, such as a change of the animal health status, that may affect its capacity to fulfil-certify the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~.

5.4.2._17	Category (addition):	Agreed

	Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> of the <i>exporting country</i> should promptly communicate to the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> of the <i>importing country</i> <u>and any transit country</u>, any change of ~~the~~ <u>situation, such as a change of the animal health status</u>, that may affect its capacity to ~~fulfil~~ <u>certify</u> the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ <u>international veterinary certificate</u>. Rationale: A change in health status may also impact a transit country's willingness to act as a transit country or the procedures the transit country would implement to preserve their animal health.	

The *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country* should also inform without delay the *Veterinary Authority* of the importing country, and, where necessary, the *transit country*, in the event that a particular issue such as the occurrence of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements which may affects the compliance status of a *commodity* which has already left the *exporting country*. This information should be part of the relevant emergency response plan developed in accordance with Chapter 4.19.

5.4.2._18	Category (change): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> of the <i>exporting country</i> should also inform without delay the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> of <u>the importing country</u>, and, <u>where necessary</u>, the <i>transit country</i>, <u>when required by the transit country</u> in the event that a particular issue <u>such as the occurrence of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements which may affects the compliance status</u> of a <i>commodity</i> which has already left the <i>exporting country</i>. Rationale: Edited to clarify who would determine when reporting qualifies as "necessary."	Did not agree as the current text is sufficiently clear

In case of animals, operators should ensure that animal welfare is maintained throughout the export process in accordance with Section 7 as relevant.

5.4.2._19	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: <u>In case of live animals, operators should ensure that animal welfare is maintained throughout the export process in accordance with Section 7 as relevant.</u> Rationale: Edited for clarity.	Did not agree as it is aligned with the current Glossary definition for 'animal'

The *Veterinary Authority* of the ~~exporting country~~ should carry out collaborative activities with other relevant Competent Authorities, customs, other authorities and operators, and with *Veterinary Authorities* in other countries, to control the risk posed by the illegal cross-border movement of *commodities*, i.e. the international movement of *commodities* done in a way to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls.

5.4.2._20	Category (addition and deletion): Proposed amended texts:	Agreed to add 'informal' Did not agree with deletion as it could support the what the

	The ~~Veterinary Authority of the exporting country~~ should carry out collaborative activities with other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u>, customs, other authorities and operators, and with <i>Veterinary Authorities</i> in other countries, to control the risk posed by <u>the informal or</u> illegal cross-border movement of <i>commodities</i>, ~~i.e. international the international movement of commodities done in a way to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls.~~ Rationale: To be coherent with the other annexes, including in articles 5.5.5 and 5.6.8, which reads “informal or illegal cross-border movement [...]”. This is also in line with the information presented in the <i>Report of the meeting of WOAHS terrestrial animal health standards commission</i> (February 2025), Section 6.5, which states that “the Commission agreed to use both ‘illegal’ and ‘informal’.” (p.41). The part that is proposed to be deleted refers specifically to illegal cross-border movement of commodities as defined in Section 6.5 of the <i>Report of the meeting of WOAHS terrestrial animal health standards commission</i> (February 2025). The Commission highlighted that some other cross-border movements may occur without following all regulatory procedures that may not be known (i.e. unintentionally) or consistently implemented, such as when commodities are moved locally between communities across land borders in cross-border pastoralist areas.	illegal cross-border movement is. The Code Commission amended text for clarity.
5.4.2._21	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: The ~~Veterinary Authority of the exporting country~~ should carry out collaborative activities with other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u>, customs, <u>and</u> other <u>relevant law enforcement</u> authorities and operators, and with <i>Veterinary Authorities</i> in other countries, to control the risk posed by the illegal cross-border movement of <i>commodities</i>, i.e. the international movement of <i>commodities</i> done in a way to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls. Rationale: For consistency with Article 5.6.8.	Agreed

Article 5.4.3.

General principles applicable to procedures for official controls for exportation

1. Preparation for exportation

~~Operators~~Exporters should ~~announce~~ inform the Veterinary Authority of their intention to the export to the Veterinary Authority sufficiently in advance ~~as to meet the conditions of the agreed international veterinary certificate~~ and the administrative requirements of the *exporting, transit and importing countries*.

5.4.3._1	Category (editorial):	Agreed

	Proposed amended texts: <del>Operators</del>~~Exporters~~ should ~~announce~~—~~inform~~ the ~~Veterinary Authority~~ of their intention to the export to the ~~Veterinary Authority~~ sufficiently in advance as to <u>allow for meet</u> these conditions of the ~~agreed~~—<i>international veterinary certificate</i> and the administrative requirements of the <i>exporting, transit and importing countries</i> <u>to be met</u>. Rationale: Clarity, informing the Veterinary Authority of an intention to export is not in itself ensuring that the conditions are met.	

~~Operators~~~~Exporters~~ should provide to the *Veterinary Authority* ~~the~~as required details of the consignment. The *Veterinary Authority* should outline to the ~~operator~~~~exporter~~ the procedures, standards and timeframe for preparation of the consignment, and the documentary evidence required to demonstrate compliance with these requirements. Where relevant, the *Veterinary Authority* should identify eligible bodies or officers for ~~the implementation~~~~performance~~ and certification of procedures specified in the ~~agreed~~—*international veterinary certificate*.

5.4.3._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: Add “<u>Operators should provide information about containers treated with fumigant gas to the Veterinary Authority of transit and destination</u>” at the end of paragraph two in Article 5.4.3.1 Rationale: Ship containers are recurrently treated with gas to combat pests. It can be noxious to personnel performing official control and impossible to detect without opening the container and can fluctuate in different parts of the container. It would therefore be beneficial to have the information in advance for safety reasons.	Agreed, text was amended differently.

The ~~operator~~~~exporter~~ and the *Veterinary Authority* should coordinate the implementation, and its documentation, of the conditions of the ~~agreed~~—*international veterinary certificate*. Implementation of these conditions and its documentation should be in accordance with the procedures and standards communicated by the *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country* and will form the basis upon which the *Official Veterinarian* will issue the *international veterinary certificate* for the consignment.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that the facilities and operational procedures required for isolation of *animals or processing of products* comply with the conditions of the ~~agreed~~—*international veterinary certificate*, ~~which may including include~~ registration, approval, and inspection, in accordance with ~~Chapters 4.6., 4.7. and 5.7. or other~~ relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*.

Testing of *commodities* required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~—*international veterinary certificate* should be in accordance with Article 3.2.10. and with the *Terrestrial Manual*. The *Veterinary Authority* should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~~~exporter~~ the procedures for sample collection, identification and submission, the list of ~~approved~~—*laboratories* and the *approved* diagnostic tests.

The *Veterinary Authority* should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~~~exporter~~ the procedures for *vaccination* and treatment if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~—*international veterinary certificate*. The ~~operator~~~~exporter~~ should arrange for *vaccination* or treatment of *animals* in line with these conditions, noting timeframes relevant to the scheduled date of exportation. *Vaccination* and treatment of *animals* should use *veterinary medicinal products* registered or allowed in the *exporting country*, in line with the conditions of the agreed international veterinary certificate.

5.4.3._3	Category (addition and deletion): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~ ~~exporter~~ the procedures for <i>vaccination</i> and treatment if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~. The ~~operator~~ ~~exporter~~ should arrange for <i>vaccination</i> or treatment of <i>animals</i> <u>in line with these conditions</u>, noting timeframes relevant to the scheduled date of exportation. <i>Vaccination</i> and treatment of <i>animals</i> should use <i>veterinary medicinal products</i> registered <u>or approved or allowed</u> in the <i>exporting country</i>, <u>in line with the conditions of the agreed-international veterinary certificate</u>. Rationale: 'or allowed' is suggested to be removed as it supports the use of products that are not officially registered and would not have sufficient regulatory oversight for safety and/or efficacy. It could also result in increased use of fraudulent products. Member suggests 'or approved' to allow flexibility for competent authority systems but still would indicate a requirement for Competent Authority oversight.	Agreed, text was amended differently for clarity
5.4.3._4	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~ ~~exporter~~ the procedures for <i>vaccination</i> and treatment if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~. The ~~operator~~ ~~exporter~~ should arrange for <i>vaccination</i> or treatment of <i>animals</i> <u>in line with these conditions</u>, noting timeframes relevant to the scheduled date of exportation. <i>Vaccination</i> and treatment of <i>animals</i> should use <i>veterinary medicinal products</i> registered <u>or allowed authorised for use by the Veterinary Authority</u> in the <i>exporting country</i>, <u>in line with the conditions of the agreed-international veterinary certificate</u>. Rationale: We acknowledge the validity of the Commission's comment on the possibility of off-label use. However, the text 'or allowed' is broad and nonspecific. Some veterinary medicinal products may be allowed in a country, but there may be restrictions that even impact off label use. Given that the Veterinary Authority has the primary authority for coordinating the implementation of Code standards, the presence and use of veterinary medicines, including vaccinations, within a country should have some have some level of Veterinary Authority agreement even if that is simply that off-licence use in animals or in some species is allowed for a product. We suggest changing the text to 'allowed' to use to 'authorised for use by the Veterinary Authority'. This would provide for off-licence use while still providing the importing country some assurance that the	Comment addressed above

	exporting country's Veterinary Authority is aware of veterinary medicines able to be used in the traded species in their country.	
5.4.3._5	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should define and communicate to the <u>operator</u>~~exporter~~ the procedures for <i>vaccination</i> and treatment if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ <i>international veterinary certificate</i>. The <u>operator</u>~~exporter~~ should <u>arrange for ensure vaccination</u> or treatment of <i>animals</i> <u>are in line with these conditions</u>, noting timeframes relevant to the scheduled date of exportation. Rationale: Edited to clarify that this language encompasses both required and prohibited vaccinations/treatments.	Did not agree as it is not the responsibility of operators to ensure these measures, but rather to practically arrange for them.

The *Veterinary Authority* should define and communicate to the operator~~exporter~~ the standards and procedures for *disinfection* of and *disinsection* disinsection elimination of arthropod vectors from of vehicles/vessels~~the means of transport~~ and *containers* in accordance with Chapter 4.14., if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ *international veterinary certificate*.

5.4.3._6	Category (addition and deletion): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should define and communicate to the <u>operator</u>~~exporter~~ the standards and procedures for <i>disinfection</i> of and <i>disinsection</i> <u>deinfestation</u>~~disinsection~~ <u>elimination of arthropod vectors from of vehicles/vessels</u>~~the means of transport~~ and <i>containers</i> in accordance with Chapter 4.14., if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ <i>international veterinary certificate</i>. Rationale: deinfestation may be the more appropriate term here as it includes both insects and other small animals.	Did not agree The <i>ad hoc</i> Group initially proposed to use 'elimination of arthropod vectors' since the term 'disinsection' is not clearly defined in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>. However, as the new Glossary definition for 'disinsection' was proposed, the Code Commission agreed to use 'disinsection' in draft Chapters 5.4. to 5.6., respectively, for consistency.
5.4.3._7	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should define and communicate to the <u>operator</u>~~exporter~~ the standards and procedures for <i>disinfection</i> of and <i>disinsection</i> <u>disinsection desinfestation</u> <u>elimination of arthropod vectors from of vehicles/vessels</u>~~the means of transport~~ and <i>containers</i> in accordance with Chapter 4.14., if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ <i>international veterinary certificate</i>. Rationale: We recommend considering replacing the term "disinsection" with "desinfestation" where appropriate. While "disinsection" refers specifically to the elimination of arthropod vectors, "desinfestation" encompasses a broader range of external pests, including rodents. This change would better reflect the	Comment addressed above

	scope of sanitary measures needed to address all relevant vectors and pests associated with the transport and importation of commodities.	

In the case of animals, The operator/exporter should also be able to provide to the Veterinary Authority a journey travel transport plan from the point of exit in the exporting country to the point of unloading in the importing country. In the case of animals, it should be in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. or 7.4. Section 7. and in compliance with the importing country requirements as relevant.

2. Procedures of exportation

a) Verification and certification

The ~~operator/exporter~~ should cooperate with the Veterinary Authority to demonstrate that the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~ have been met and that the consignment is eligible for certification and export. The ~~operator/exporter~~ should provide all documentary evidence of compliance with the importing country requirements conditions of the agreed and the international veterinary certificate as required by the Veterinary Authority, including an import permit where appropriate. There should be clear traceability and linkage, at every stage of preparation of ~~animals and animal product/commodities~~, to the final consignment presented for export, as relevant to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~.

5.4.3._8	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The ~~operator/exporter~~ should provide all documentary evidence of compliance with the <u>importing country requirements conditions of the agreed and the international veterinary certificate</u> as required by the Veterinary Authority, including <u>an</u> import permit <u>where appropriate</u>. Rationale: Recommend an explicit statement of conditions be provided clarifying when an import permit is required and when it is not. For example, if only some countries require import permits, edit this to "include an import permit when required by the country."	Did not agree as the current text is clear that an 'import permit' is one of the examples which may be required by the Veterinary Authority.

The Official Veterinarian should review the preparation of the export consignment to confirm that commodities animals and animal products have been clearly identified at every stage of their preparation, that the consignment complies with the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~ and is in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. of the Terrestrial Code. The Official Veterinarian should also review all transport arrangements the journey travel plan for the consignments of animals to ensure it they support maintenance compliance with the importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations in Section 7. of the commodity's status and animal welfare.

5.4.3._9	Category (deletion): Proposed amended texts: The Official Veterinarian should also review <u>all transport arrangements the journey travel plan for the consignments of animals to ensure it they support maintenance compliance with the importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations in Section 7. of the commodity's status and animal welfare.</u>	Did not agree as the reference to animal welfare is useful. The Code Commission amended the text to reference national regulations and provide flexibility.

	Rationale: Recommend removal for consistency with roles, as elsewhere in this chapter the operator is identified as responsible entity for animal welfare considerations. Furthermore, a country's Veterinary Services may not have the regulatory mechanism to attest to animal welfare requirements for exports. For instance, the focus of Member Official Veterinarians is to ensure that live animal export consignments meet Member and the exporting country's animal health regulations to avoid transboundary diseases from moving between countries.	

Once satisfied that preparations and journey travel plan transport arrangements are appropriate and that the consignment is eligible for certification and export, the *Official Veterinarian* should issue the *international veterinary certificate*.

b) Domestic transportation of commodities

The *Veterinary Authority* should collaborate with other relevant authorities and stakeholders to ensure that management of the consignment ~~pre-export~~ before and during transport to the point of exit is consistent with ~~agreed~~ established processes and standards.

The ~~operator~~ exporter should ensure that the assembly, *loading* and crating of *animals* or other *commodities* is appropriate to maintain compliance with the importing country requirements ~~preserving the status~~ and *animal welfare* of the consignment from the *place of shipment*, including adequate *disinfection of* and *disinsection* disinsection elimination of arthropod vectors ~~from~~ ~~the vehicle/vessel~~ means of transport and *container*.

5.4.3._10	Category (deletion): Proposed amended texts: The ~~operator~~ <u>exporter</u> should ensure that the assembly, <i>loading</i> and crating of ~~animals or other commodities~~ is appropriate to <u>maintain compliance with the importing country requirements</u> ~~preserving the status~~ and <i>animal welfare</i> of the consignment from the <i>place of shipment</i>, including adequate <i>disinfection of</i> and <i>disinsection</i> <u>disinsection elimination of arthropod vectors</u> ~~from~~ ~~the vehicle/vessel~~ <u>means of transport</u> and <i>container</i>. Rationale: The definition of commodities includes live animals and to ensure internal consistency within the Code. For example, Article 5.4.3, section 2.a, paragraph 1 and 2 which refers to <i>commodities</i> in lieu of <i>animal and animal products</i>.	Agreed
5.4.3._11	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: The ~~operator~~ <u>exporter</u> should ensure that the assembly, <i>loading</i> and crating of <i>animals</i> or other <i>commodities</i> is appropriate to <u>maintain compliance with the importing country requirements</u> ~~preserving the status~~ and <i>animal welfare</i> of the consignment from the <i>place of shipment</i>, including adequate <i>disinfection of</i> and <i>disinsection</i> <u>disinsection</u>	Agreed

	~~elimination of arthropod vectors~~ ~~off from~~ of the ~~vehicle/vessel~~<u>means of transport</u> and ~~container~~. Rationale: Readability.	
5.4.3._12	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: The ~~operator~~<u>exporter</u> should ensure that the assembly, <i>loading</i> and crating of <i>animals</i> or other <i>commodities</i> is appropriate to <u>maintain compliance with the importing country requirements</u>~~preserving the status and animal welfare of the consignment from the place of shipment, including adequate disinfection of and disinsection~~ <u>disinsection</u> ~~elimination of arthropod vectors~~ ~~from~~<u>of</u> the ~~vehicle/vessel~~<u>means of transport</u> and ~~container~~. Rationale: Edited for clarity to say “disinsection of the means of transport and container.” A commenter previously made this suggested edit in 5.4.3._2 of annex 3. However, the TAHSC response addressed a different part of that comment and did not address this particular edit.	Comment addressed above

The *Veterinary Authority* in the *exporting country* may require health and welfare inspection of consignments of *animals* at the *point of exit*, which includes the possibility to deny permission to export if concerns are identified.

Article 5.4.4.

Specific recommendations depending on commodities

1. Animals

~~In the case of animals, the Veterinary Authority should ensure that animal welfare is maintained throughout the whole process of exportation, in accordance with Chapters 7.1., 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4. as relevant.~~

The ~~operator~~exporter should ensure that ~~vehicles/vessels~~means of transport used for transportation of *animals* throughout the ~~whole export process of exportation~~ undergo adequate *disinfection*, and that measures are implemented to prevent and control vermin such as rodents or arthropods. These measures should be applied before every *loading of animals*. ~~Vehicles/vessels~~Means of transport should contain only *animals* meeting the same sanitary requirements of the same health status except where effectively adequately separated to prevent disease transmission.

5.4.4._1	Category (change): Proposed amended texts: The ~~operator~~<u>exporter</u> should ensure that ~~vehicles/vessels~~<u>means of transport</u> used for transportation of <i>animals</i> throughout the ~~whole export process of exportation~~ undergo adequate <i>disinfection</i>, and that measures are implemented to prevent and control vermin such as rodents or arthropods. These measures should be applied before every <i>loading of animals</i>. ~~Vehicles/vessels~~<u>Means of transport</u> should contain only <i>animals</i><u>meeting the same zoo</u><u>sanitary requirements of the same health status</u> except where	Did not agree as it is sufficient with the current text.

	<del>effectively</del>~~adequately~~ separated to prevent disease transmission. Rationale: The "sanitary requirements" may cause ambiguity. It can be understood that animals have the same health condition or meet relevant quarantine standards, or it can also be understood as the hygiene of the animal's body surface cleanliness. To avoid ambiguity, the "sanitary requirements" is changed to "zoosanitary requirements", emphasizing that it is necessary to meet relevant zoosanitary standards.	
5.4.4._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The <del>operator</del>~~exporter~~ should ensure that ~~vehicles/vessels~~<u>means of transport</u> used for transportation of <i>animals</i> throughout the ~~whole export process of exportation~~ undergo adequate <i>disinfection</i>, and that measures are implemented to prevent and control vermin such as rodents or arthropods. These measures should be applied before every loading of <i>animals</i>. ~~Vehicles/vessels~~<u>Means of transport</u> should contain only <i>animals</i> <u>meeting the same sanitary requirements of the same health status</u> except where ~~effectively~~ ~~adequately~~ separated to prevent disease transmission and such separation is approved by the <u>importing country</u>. Rationale: According to the Report of the meeting of ad hoc Group in April 2024, "(...) the ad hoc Group, in line with the opinion of the Code Commission, agreed with a comment that more than one consignment of animals could be shipped at the same time on a vehicle/vessel, provided that the animals are adequately separated and importing country requirements allow for this to occur." Member shares the same view and proposes the addition as above.	Did not agree as this paragraph provides the general recommendation to ensure the adequate separation of animals. Approval of this measure by the importing country is not always required.
5.4.4._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The <del>operator</del>~~exporter~~ should ensure that ~~vehicles/vessels~~<u>means of transport</u> used for transportation of <i>animals</i> throughout the ~~whole export process of exportation~~ undergo adequate <i>disinfection and disinsection</i>, and that measures are implemented to prevent and control vermin such as rodents or arthropods. Rationale: Recommend aligning language with phrase "disinfection and disinsection" used elsewhere in this chapter.	Did not agree as it is covered by 'measures are implemented to...'
5.4.4._4	Category (general): The text should make it clear that 'loading' here refers to the first loading of a consignment of animals and not subsequent loadings.	Did not agree as it is clear with the current text that this is recommended at 'every loading'.

	This is because there may be multiple loadings and unloadings during a single consignment's journey.	

Containers should be either new or cleaned and disinfected before every *loading* of *animals*, in accordance with Chapter 4.14., ~~or be for single use~~

5.4.4._5	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: <i>Containers</i> should be either new or cleaned, ~~and~~ disinfected, <u>and disinsected</u> before every <i>loading</i> of <i>animals</i> , in accordance with Chapter 4.14., ~~or be for single use~~ Rationale: Recommend the addition of "disinsected" to container preventive measures.	Did not agree as current text 'cleaned and disinfected' is sufficient for the preparation of containers.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that, before leaving the *exporting country*, consignments of *animals* ~~should be~~are subjected to a visual examination, at an appropriate place and time according to the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the *exporting country*. It should be ensured that, from the time of this visual examination inspection until the time of leaving the *exporting country*, the *animals* in the consignment are not in contact with other *animals* of a different health status.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~in the exporting country~~ may require welfare inspection of consignments of *animals* at the *point of exit*. Such inspections should be supported by *veterinary legislation*, which should also ascribe authority to deny permission to export if *animal welfare* concerns are identified.

5.4.4._6	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> ~~in the exporting country~~ may require welfare inspection of consignments of <i>animals</i> at the <i>point of exit</i> . Such inspections should be supported by <i>veterinary legislation</i> , which should also ascribe authority to deny permission to export if <i>animal welfare</i> concerns are identified, <u>in accordance with Section 7.</u> Rationale: Proposal to add the specific Section related to animal welfare to be coherent with the rest of the text and annexes which refers to Section 7 in occurrence where animal welfare is referred to, and since Section 1 of Article 5.4.4 refers to Animal.	Agree, text was amended differently.

2. Germinal products

Consignments of *germinal products* should be packed, dispatched, and transported in a way that preserves the viability and integrity of the products.

Consignments of *hatching eggs* should be dispatched from parental *flocks* that meet the conditions of the ~~agreed international veterinary certificate~~. *Containers* should be either new or cleaned and disinfected before every use, in accordance with Chapter 4.14.

Cryogenic tanks for semen, oocytes ~~or~~ embryos should be dispatched from *semen collection centres* or *collection centres* that meet the conditions of the ~~agreed international veterinary certificate~~. They should be

single-use cryogenic tanks or be cleaned and disinfected before use in accordance with Chapter 4.14. and use new liquid nitrogen.

Consignments of semen, oocytes or, embryos, should be identified in accordance with the relevant recommendations of Chapters 4.6. to 4.11.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that, before leaving the *exporting country*, consignments of *germinal products* ~~be~~are subjected to a visual examination and documentary check and cryogenic tanks for semen, oocytes or, embryos ~~be~~are sealed and marked, according to the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed-international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country.

3. Animal products

Containers used for transporting *animal products* should be suitable for the type of product, protect the *animal products* from damage or contamination, and fulfil the conditions of the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed-international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that adequate measures are taken to clean and, where necessary after cleaning, to disinfect before use, *containers* and *means of transportation* in accordance with Chapter 4.14., particularly when conveying or transporting unpacked materials.

5.4.4._7	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should ensure that adequate measures are taken to clean and, where necessary after cleaning, to disinfect <u>and disinsect</u> before use, <i>containers</i> and <i>means of transportation</i> in accordance with Chapter 4.14., particularly when conveying or transporting unpacked materials. Rationale: Recommend addition of “and disinsect” container preventive measures.	Did not agree Refer to above (5.4.4._5)

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that, before leaving the *exporting country*, consignments of *animal products* ~~should be~~are subjected to a visual examination and documentary check, according to the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed-international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country.

Article 5.4.5.

Emergency p[lan]ning for unexpected events

~~The *Veterinary Authority* should develop a plan to address the occurrence within the *exporting country* after the *commodities* have been exported, of a *listed disease* or a disease referred to in the *importing country* requirements, which may have impacted the status of the exported *commodities*. The *Veterinary Authority* should be guided by *importing country* requirements in implementing the plan.~~

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that the ~~operator~~exporter develops and documents a plan to address ~~emergencies-unexpected events~~ which may impact the ~~compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations in Section 7.~~ being exported, failure of transport arrangements, The plan should address concerns such as deviation from the *journey plan*, incidents compromising the characteristics of the commodities, failure to reach the transit or importing country, or rejection of the consignment by them ~~transit or importing country~~. The emergency-plan may be generic or specific to each consignment, ~~and should focus on preserving the status of the consignment and animal welfare in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~

5.4.5._1	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should ensure that the <del>operator</del>~~exporter~~ develops and documents a plan to address <del>emergencies</del>~~unexpected events~~ which may impact the <del>compliance</del>~~status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations in Section 7.~~ ~~being exported, failure of transport arrangements.~~ The plan should address concerns such as deviation from the <i>journey plan</i>, incidents compromising the characteristics of the commodities, ~~failure to reach the transit or importing country~~, or rejection of the consignment by them ~~transit or importing country~~. The ~~emergency~~ plan may be generic or specific to each consignment, ~~and should focus on preserving the status of the consignment and animal welfare in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~ <u>The plan should have practical arrangements in place to ensure that it can be implemented, and specifically any animal welfare concerns are addressed.</u> Rationale: Suggest adding the last sentence to ensure that animal welfare concerns are addressed and that any plans in place are easily implemented (not just written).	Did not agree as it is already covered in the first sentence of this paragraph.
5.4.5._2	Category (change): Proposed amended texts: <del>The Veterinary Authority should ensure, that the operator</del>~~exporter~~ <u>Operators should</u> develops and documents a plan to address <del>emergencies</del>~~unexpected events~~ which may impact the <del>compliance</del>~~status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations in Section 7.~~<u>The Veterinary Authority should ensure that compliance of the commodities is maintained even in unexpected events.</u> Rationale: The Veterinary Authority cannot ensure operators' development and documentation of a plan to address unexpected events because that is not a requirement for export. The Veterinary Authority should ensure the compliance of a commodity is maintained (e.g. a commodity is sealed even in an unexpected event).	Did not agree as it is necessary to ensure that the plan addresses unexpected events. Did not agree to add the additional sentence as it is difficult for the Veterinary Authority to ensure the compliance of the commodities during the transport such as after the shipment.
5.4.5._3	Category (editorial): Proposed amended texts: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should ensure that the <del>operator</del>~~exporter~~ develops and documents a plan to address <del>emergencies</del>~~unexpected events~~ which may impact the <del>compliance</del>~~status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations in Section 7~~ <u>of the Terrestrial Code.</u> ~~being exported, failure of transport arrangements.~~ The plan should address concerns such as deviation from	Did not agree as the current text is clear.

	the <u>journey plan</u>, <u>incidents compromising the characteristics of the commodities</u>, failure to reach the <u>transit or importing country</u>, or rejection of the consignment by them <u>transit or importing country</u>. The ~~emergency~~ plan may be generic or specific to each consignment, and should focus on preserving the status of the consignment and <u>animal welfare</u> in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4. Rationale: Clarity for the reader.	
5.4.5._4	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: The <u>Veterinary Authority</u> should ensure that the ~~operator~~<u>exporter</u> develops <u>and documents</u> a plan to address ~~emergencies~~<u>unexpected events</u> which may impact the <u>compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations in Section 7.</u> ~~being exported~~, failure of transport arrangements, <u>The plan should address concerns such as deviation from the journey plan, incidents compromising the characteristics of the commodities captured on the international veterinary certificate</u>, failure to reach the <u>transit or importing country</u>, or rejection of the consignment by them ~~transit or importing country~~. The ~~emergency~~ plan may be generic or specific to each consignment <u>and should focus on preserving the animal health status of the consignment</u>, and should focus on preserving the status of the consignment and <u>animal welfare</u> in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4. Rationale: Edited to reflect that not all characteristic changes are relevant for trade; the proposed edits clarify which characteristic changes should be accounted for in the operator's plan. In 5.4.5._2 of Annex 3 a commenter suggested this amendment and the TAHSC responded with agreement to amend the text differently. At present, the text did not appear to be updated.	Agreed, text was amended differently
5.4.5._5	Category (general): Given the ongoing work of AW chapters 7.2 and 7.3 on transport of animals by sea and land, they should be checked against this draft chapter to ensure consistency and avoid contradictions.	Noted

The ~~emergency~~ plan should identify responsibility for development and communication of alternative transport arrangements when necessary. The relevant Competent Authority in the exporting, transit and importing countries should be consulted as appropriate by the operator regarding revised transport arrangements to assess the implications for the compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations. The Veterinary Authority in the exporting country should be consulted on alternative transport arrangements for consignments of animals to ensure that animal welfare is preserved.

~~The emergency plan should include procedures for managing exported consignments that fail to reach the designated transit or importing countries or are rejected by them.~~

NOT FOR COMMENT

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.5._1	Category (general): The Member supports the revised Chapter.	Noted
5.5._2	Category (general): <i>International veterinary certificate should be changed to veterinary health certificate.</i> The justifications are the name more simplifies understanding for stakeholders including the operators.	Comment addressed above (Refer to 5.4._4)
5.5._3	Category (general): The Member supports this draft revised chapter.	Noted

CHAPTER 5.5.

MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO THE TRANSIT OF COMMODITIES

Article 5.5.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents, without creating unjustified restrictions, when *commodities* destined for another country are either making a stopover in, or transported through a *transit country*, covering from the *point of entry* to the *point of exit*.

5.5.1._1	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents, without creating unjustified trade restrictions, when <i>commodities</i> destined for another country are either making a stopover in, or transported through a <i>transit country</i> , covering from the <i>point of entry</i> to the <i>point of exit</i> . Rationale: The same requirements should be applied for <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> in the transiting country than in the importing country. Propose the above addition to be consistent with Article 5.4.1._1 of Annex 19 and 5.6.1._1 of Annex 21.	Agreed
5.5.1._2	Category (addition and editorial): Proposed amended text: This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through international trade of commodities , without creating unjustified trade restrictions, when <i>commodities</i> destined for another	Agreed

	country are either making a stopover in, or transported through a <i>transit country</i> , covering from the <i>point of entry</i> to the <i>point of exit</i> . Rationale: The scope statement should include the context of international trade. The suggested additions are consistent with the wording of this section in Chapters 5.4, and 5.6.	

For the purposes of this chapter, ‘operator’ means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for transit of *commodities* subject to the provisions of this chapter.

This chapter provides *transit countries* with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of their *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant *Competent Authorities* and of *operators* ~~any natural or legal entity or person responsible for transit of *commodities* subject to the provisions of this chapter (hereafter ‘operator’)~~. An international movement of *commodities* may be considered a ‘transit’ if *commodities* are transported from an *exporting country* through a *transit country* to an *importing country*. The transit period should not exceed the time necessary for transport and logistics, and *commodities* and all relevant conditions as stated in the certificate issued by the *exporting country* should remain unchanged; otherwise the operation should be interpreted as an importation and exportation.

5.5.1._3	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: An international movement of <i>commodities</i> may be considered a ‘transit’ if <i>commodities</i> are transported from an <i>exporting country</i> through a <i>transit country</i> to an <i>importing country</i> . <u>The</u> transit period should not exceed the time necessary for transport and logistics, and <i>commodities</i> and all relevant conditions as stated in the certificate issued by the <i>exporting country</i> should remain unchanged; otherwise the operation should be interpreted as an importation and exportation. Rationale: space.	Agreed

This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and implementation of official controls for transit.

Article 5.5.2.

General considerations

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* of the *transit country* should ensure that *transit country* requirements and procedures, including a list of the *border inspection posts* designated for the transit of *commodities*, are made available to operators and to the *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country*.

A *transit country* may require adequate advance notice or approval regarding the date of entry into and exit from its territory of *commodities*, stating the type of *commodity*, species, quantity, *means of transport* and the *point of entry* or *border inspection post*, route, holding locations and *point of exit* to be used.

Operators should be aware of the *transit country* requirements and procedures before shipment, which may include announcing to the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* of the *transit country* the arrival of consignments at the *point of entry*. Operators should ensure that *commodities* are presented for official controls, including the original official certificates or documents, or digital equivalents, in accordance with *transit country* requirements, and that requirements and procedures defined by the *Competent Authorities* of the *transit country* are met.

Operators should ensure that the *commodities* are separated from any other commodities in the *transit country*, not meeting the same sanitary requirements, that all relevant conditions as stated in the certification issued by the *exporting country* remain unchanged, and that the Veterinary Authorities of the transit country and the importing country are informed of any unforeseen unloading of commodities in the transit country ~~is informed to the Veterinary Authorities of the transit country and the importing country.~~

5.5.2._1	Category (deletion and editorial): Proposed amended text: Los operadores deberán garantizar que las <i>mercancías</i> están separadas de <u>cualquier</u> otras ~~mercancías~~ en el <u>país de tránsito que no cumpla los mismos requisitos sanitarios</u> , que todas las condiciones relevantes consignadas en el certificado expedido por el <i>país exportador</i> siguen siendo las mismas y que se informa a las <i>autoridades veterinarias del país de tránsito</i> y del <i>país importador</i> de cualquier <i>descarga</i> imprevista de las <i>mercancías</i> . Rationale: Se sugiere quitar mercancías	Did not agree as it creates less clarity in the text.

In the case of *animals*, operators should ensure that *animal welfare* is maintained throughout the transit process, in accordance with Section 7 as relevant.

5.5.2._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: In the case of <u>live animals</u> , operators should ensure that <i>animal welfare</i> is maintained throughout the transit process, in accordance with Section 7 as relevant. <u>In the case of animal products, original seals and packaging should not be opened.</u> Rationale: Recommended additions are meant to better clarify animals and expectations for proper receipt of animal products.	Did not agree, addressed above (refer to 5.4.2._19) Did not agree as it is covered by paragraph 4 ('all relevant conditions as stated in the certification').

Article 5.5.3.

General principles applicable to procedures for official controls for transit

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should implement official inspection, with appropriate frequency, based on risk ~~and with appropriate frequency~~ to ensure compliance with the *transit country* requirements. By way of derogation, the *Veterinary Authority* may exempt from inspection *safe commodities* or *commodities* posing a negligible risk and for which inspection is not considered necessary.

5.5.3._1	Category (general): [for the first sentence] Recommend this phrase be more specifically defined or examples provided to better clarify for Member Countries what an appropriate frequency might be.	Did not agree as the text should not be prescriptive.
5.5.3._2	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: ~~By way of derogation, t~~ The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> may exempt from inspection <i>safe commodities</i> or <i>commodities</i>	Agreed

	posing a negligible risk and for which inspection is not considered necessary. Rationale: Recommend deletion of the phrase “By way of derogation, as it is unnecessary and has the potential to be confusing.	

A *transit country* may not accept the transit of *commodities* not complying with its requirements.

5.5.3._3	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: A <i>transit country</i> may <del>refuse</del>~~not accept~~ the transit of <i>commodities</i> not complying with its requirements. Rationale: Edited for clarity.	Agreed.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that conditions included in the *international veterinary certificate* at origin are maintained during official controls, stopover, storage and transport, that *biosecurity* is applied to prevent transmission of pathogenic agents throughout the transit process and that unnecessary delays are avoided. They should also ensure *animal welfare* is maintained during *transit* in accordance with Section 7. Original documentation intended for the *importing country* should remain with the consignment.

5.5.3._4	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> <u>of the exporting and the transit country</u> should ensure that conditions included in the <i>international veterinary certificate</i> at origin are maintained during official controls, stopover, storage and transport, that <i>biosecurity</i> is applied to prevent transmission of pathogenic agents throughout the transit process and that unnecessary delays are avoided. <u>They should also ensure <i>animal welfare</i> is maintained during <i>transit</i> in accordance with Section 7.</u> Original documentation intended for the <i>importing country</i> should remain with the consignment. Rationale: For clarity purposes	Did not agree as this applies to the transit country. The Code Commission removed ‘at origin’ for clarity.
5.5.3._5	Category (general): Further consideration of defining or clarifying what constitutes a “stopover” in the context of transit, as it may be interpreted differently across jurisdictions.	Did not agree as the current text is sufficient.

Article 5.5.4.

Planning for the unexpected events

5.5.4._1	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: Planning for ~~the~~ unexpected events	Agreed

	Rationale: Edited for clarity and consistency with the title of the same section of chapter 5.4	

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that the operator develops and documents a plan to address unexpected events which may compromise the compliance of the transited *commodities* with the requirements of the *transit country* or the *importing country*. The plan may be generic, or specific to each consignment, and should focus on preventing the introduction to the *transit or the importing country* of a *listed disease* or a disease referred to in the *transit or the importing country* requirements, and on ensuring *animal welfare* recommendations in Section 7. The plan should identify responsibilities and include procedures for commodities not complying with the *transit or the importing country* requirements.

5.5.4._2	Category (change): Proposed amended text: ~~The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> should ensure that the~~ <i>Operator</i> <u>should</u> ~~develops and documents~~ a plan to address unexpected events which may compromise the compliance of the transited <i>commodities</i> , with the requirements of the <i>transit country</i> or the <i>importing country</i> . <u>The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> should ensure that compliance of the commodities is maintained even in unexpected events.</u> Rationale: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> cannot ensure operators' development and documentation of a plan to address unexpected events because that is not a requirement for transit. The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> should ensure the compliance of a commodity is maintained (e.g. a commodity is sealed even in an unexpected event).	Did not agree, comment addressed above (refer to 5.4.5._2)
5.5.4._3	Category (change): Proposed amended text: ~~The plan may be generic, or specific to each consignment, and should focus on <u>preserving the animal health status of the consignment preventing the introduction to the transit or the importing country of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the transit or the importing country requirements</u>, and on ensuring <i>animal welfare</i> recommendations in Section 7. The plan should identify responsibilities and include procedures for commodities not complying with the <i>transit or the importing country</i> requirements.~~ Rationale: Edited for consistency with the same section of chapter 5.4	Agreed to add the text. Did not agree to delete the text as this is a necessary concept for the transit country.

Article 5.5.5.

General recommendations on measures to address identified informal or illegal movement of commodities at border inspection posts

To control the *risks* posed by informal or illegal cross-border movement at *border inspection posts*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should coordinate and cooperate with the customs or relevant law enforcement authority as described in Article 5.6.8.

NOT FOR COMMENT

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.6._1	Category (general): In general, Member supports the draft new Chapter and has inserted some comments throughout the chapter for the consideration of the Commission	Noted
5.6._2	Category (general): Miembro respalda los cambios propuestos al capítulo, los que resultan necesarios. Además, Miembro agradece que la Comisión del Código haya tomado en cuenta la propuesta de modificación remitida como comentario al anexo 19 del informe de la reunión de la Comisión del Código Terrestre, de septiembre del año pasado.	Noted
5.6._3	Category (general): The Member agrees with the new revisions which include the clear definitions of terms related to importation, the import procedure, and the clear definitions and explanations regarding disposal of international catering waste.	Noted
5.6._4	Category (general): <i>International veterinary certificate should be changed to veterinary health certificate.</i> The justifications are the name more simplifies understanding for stakeholders including the operators.	Comment addressed above (5.4._4)
5.6._5	Category (general): The Member generally supports this draft revised chapter provided the comment below is taken into consideration.	Noted

CHAPTER 5.6.

MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE INTO THE IMPORTATION OF COMMODITIES

Article 5.6.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable to in the importation of *commodities* to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through *international trade of commodities*, without creating unjustified trade restrictions, covering from ~~the time of arrival at the~~ point of entry ~~border of~~ in the *importing country* until clearance of *commodities*.

For the purposes of this chapter, 'operator' means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for transit of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter.

5.6.1._1	Category (change):	Agreed

	Proposed amended text: For the purposes of this chapter, ‘operator’ means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for <u>import transit</u> of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter. Rationale: This chapter relates to importation of commodities.	
5.6.1._2	Category (change): Proposed amended text: For the purposes of this chapter, ‘operator’ means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for <u>transit importation</u> of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter. Rationale: Definition appears to be a duplication of that for Chapter 5.5. rather than providing a substitute definition for an importer for this chapter.	Comment addressed above
5.6.1._3	Category (change): Proposed amended text: “For the purposes of this chapter, ‘operator’ means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for <u>transit import or movement</u> of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter.” Rationale: We would like to seek WOA’s clarification on the rationale of using the term “transit” and suggested amendments (highlighted in green) below, to better reflect the purpose of the chapter:	Comment addressed above
5.6.1._4	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: The 2nd paragraph For the purposes of this chapter, ‘operator’ means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for <u>transit import</u> of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter. Rationale: This chapter focuses on the importation of commodities.	Comment addressed above
5.6.1._5	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: For the purposes of this chapter, ‘operator’ means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for <u>transit import</u> of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter. Rationale: This chapter addresses importation, not transit. Language updated to mirror deleted language in the next paragraph.	Comment addressed above
5.6.1._6	Category (change): Proposed amended text:	Comment addressed above

	“For the purposes of this chapter, ‘operator’ means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for <u>transit importation</u> of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter.” Rationale: Align with the scope of the chapter.	

This chapter provides *importing countries* with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of their *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant *Competent Authorities*, and of *operators*, any natural or legal entity or person responsible for import of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter business operators (hereafter ‘operator’), in addition to responsibilities that are described in Article 5.1.2. This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and implementation performance of official controls for importation. This chapter not only covers legal importation, but also provides general recommendations for illegal or informal entry of commodities.

The animal health status of the importing country or zone is not affected by the presence of disease or infection in imported animals in a quarantine centre or at a border inspection post.

5.6.1._7	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: The animal health status of the importing country or zone is not affected by the presence of disease or infection in imported animals in a quarantine centre or at a border inspection post <u>provided that the importing country demonstrates that effective stamping out and cleaning and disinfection procedures have been carried out and that no dissemination from the quarantine centre or border inspection post has occurred.</u> Rationale: Animals which are in quarantine or at a border inspection post have not yet entered the country of import and are under official control. If infected animals have been identified in quarantine or at a border inspection post then the import inspection process is functioning as intended and the importing country should not be penalized, provided that they can demonstrate that appropriate actions were taken following identification of the disease.	Did not agree as this concept will be covered by Chapter 1.6.4. (Refer to item 6.2. of the report)
5.6.1._8	Category: Change Proposed amended text: propose to retain text in the last paragraph that read “The animal health status of the importing country or zone is not affected by the presence of disease or infection in imported animals in a quarantine centre or at a border inspection post.” Rationale: This paragraph provides important information that will help in the implementation of the chapter.	Comment addressed above

Article 5.6.2.

General considerations

The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country should ensure that the importing country requirements, which may be included in international veterinary certificates, and as well as up-to-date information relevant to the import procedures, including a list of the border inspection posts designated for the import and transit of those commodities, are made available to operators and to the exporting countries.

5.6.2._1	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: The <u>Veterinary Authority</u> or other relevant <u>Competent Authorities</u> of the <u>importing country</u> should ensure that the <u>importing country requirements</u>, which may be included in <u>international veterinary certificates</u>, and as well as up-to-date information relevant to the import procedures, including a list of the <u>border inspection posts</u> designated for the import and transit of those <u>commodities</u>, are made available to operators and to the <u>exporting countries</u>. <u>Operators should assume the responsibility of collaborating with the exporter to ensure documentation complies with the importing country's regulations and maintain records of imports for traceability purposes.</u> Rationale: The role of the operators in conveying relevant requirements of import to the exporter should clearly be outlined and emphasized on record keeping for traceability purposes	Agreed with the rationale, added text differently.

The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country should be responsible for the performance implementation of official controls in accordance with veterinary legislation to ensure that imported commodities can be safely imported. They should also ensure animal welfare is maintained in accordance with Section 7. Its legal mandate and responsibilities of the Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities, as described in Articles 3.4.5. and 3.4.13., should include the import official controls activities at any step and the possibility to request from the operator/importer any necessary information. Where appropriate, the Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities may delegate certain tasks in accordance with point 2 of Article 3.4.5. Adequate human, technical, physical and financial resources should be available in the importing country for the Veterinary Services to effectively implement perform official controls inspection in accordance with the quality principles described in Article-Chapter 3.2-2.

An importing country may require adequate advance notice or approval regarding the date of entry of commodities into its territory of commodities, stating the type of commodity, species, quantity, means of transport and the border inspection post to be used.

The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities when relevant, should perform Official inspections should be implemented, with appropriate frequency, in accordance with Article 3.2.12. regularly, based on a risk basis and with appropriate frequency to ensure compliance with the importing country requirements. By way of derogation, the Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities may exempt from the inspection, safe commodities or commodities posing a negligible risk and for which inspection is not considered necessary.

Biosecurity should be applied to prevent transmission of pathogenic agents from commodities throughout the import process.

An importing country may prohibit the introduction entry into its territory of a consignment of commodities not complying with the importing country requirements.

Operators/importers should be aware of the importing country requirements and import procedure before the importation and inform/announce, in advance, to the Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities the arrival of consignments at the border inspection post, in accordance with importing country requirements. Operators/importers should ensure that commodities are presented for official controls inspection at the border

inspection post, together with the original ~~official~~ international veterinary certificates or documents, or digital equivalents, which are required to accompany the consignments.

In case of *animals*, ~~operators~~ importers should ensure that *animal welfare* is maintained throughout the ~~whole import process of importation~~, in accordance with ~~Chapters 7.1., 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~ Section 7 as relevant.

5.6.2._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: In case of <i>animals</i>, ~~operators~~ <u>importers</u> should ensure that <i>animal welfare</i> is maintained throughout the ~~whole import process of importation~~, in accordance with ~~Chapters 7.1., 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~ <u>Section 7</u> as relevant. <u>There should be practical arrangements in place to ensure that animal welfare contingency plans can be implemented during the process.</u> Rationale: Suggest adding an additional sentence to ensure that animal welfare concerns are addressed and that any plans in place are easily implemented (not just written).	Did not agree as the current text is sufficient.

The ~~Veterinary Authority of the importing country~~ should carry out collaborative activities with other relevant Competent Authorities, customs, other authorities and operators, and with *Veterinary Authorities* in other countries, to control the risk posed by the illegal cross-border movement of *commodities*, i.e. international movement of *commodities* done in a way to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls.

5.6.2._3	Category (addition and deletion): Proposed amended text: The ~~Veterinary Authority of the exporting country~~ should carry out collaborative activities with other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u>, customs, other authorities and operators, and with <i>Veterinary Authorities</i> in other countries, to control the risk posed by <u>the informal or</u> illegal cross-border movement of ~~commodities, i.e. international movement of commodities done in a way to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls.~~ Rationale: To be coherent with the other annexes, including for articles 5.6.1 and 5.6.9, which cites “informal” in conjuncture with “illegal”. This is also in line with the information and recommendations presented in the <i>Report of the meeting of WOAHS terrestrial animal health standards commission</i> (February 2025), Section 6.5, which states that “the Commission agreed to use both ‘illegal’ and ‘informal’.” (p.41). The text that is proposed to be deleted refers specifically to illegal cross-border movement of commodities as defined in Section 6.5 of the <i>Report of the meeting of WOAHS terrestrial animal health standards commission</i> (February 2025). The Commission highlighted that some other cross-border movements may occur without following all regulatory procedures that may not be known (i.e.	Comment addressed above (refer to 5.4.2._20)

	unintentionally) or consistently implemented, such as when commodities are moved locally between communities across land borders in cross-border pastoralist areas.	
5.6.2._4	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: La autoridad veterinaria ~~del país importador~~ deberá llevar a cabo actividades de colaboración con otras autoridades competentes relevantes, con las aduanas, ~~otras autoridades~~ y operadores, y con las autoridades veterinarias en otros países, para controlar el riesgo que suponen los movimientos transfronterizos ilegales de mercancías, es decir, los movimientos internacionales de mercancías que se realizan para evitar explícita e intencionalmente los controles oficiales. Rationale: Se sugiere quitar ya que es repetitivo	Did not agree as other authorities, such as law enforcement authorities, are not Competent Authorities and should be included. (refer to 5.4.2._21)

Article 5.6.3.

General principles applicable to procedures for ~~import~~ official controls for importation

Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities should ~~take control of~~ the imported commodities to ~~decide-determine~~ whether or ~~not~~ the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements.

~~Import-Official~~ controls should be ~~performed-implemented~~ at an appropriate place which might include a *border inspection post*, a point of entry, *quarantine centre*, the place of destination, or premises of the operator responsible for the consignment. The consignment should remain under the control of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities until formal clearance.

In case of emergency, ships and aircrafts may be granted access to a port or airport ~~which that~~ are not their intended destination. In those cases, they should be subjected to the animal health and animal welfare measures which the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities may consider necessary based on the potential risk.

1. Official inspection

Where official inspections of commodities are ~~performed-implemented~~, they should always include a documentary check and, depending on the risk to human health, and animal health and or animal welfare, should also include identity checks and physical inspection checks. When the *Veterinary Authority* or other Competent Authorities ~~Services~~ needs to have full access to the consignment for the purpose of identity checks or physical inspection, consignments should be partially or fully unloaded from the means of transport.

5.6.3._1	Category (change): Proposed amended text: When ~~implementing~~ performing a documentary check, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> <u>or other Competent Authorities</u> ~~Services~~ should inspect the required documents, in original or their digital equivalents as agreed between the <i>importing</i> and <i>exporting country</i>, to ensure that: Rationale: Recommend keeping previous language. This would allow border agents, acting on behalf of Veterinary Services, to inspect required	Did not agree as this paragraph is about the implementation of standards of the Terrestrial Code. Based on the Glossary definition for 'Veterinary Services', the Veterinary Services is appropriate.

	documentation, and provide additional resources to the Veterinary Authority for better facilitating trade.	

a) Documentary check

A documentary check should be ~~implemented~~ performed on all consignments presented for official ~~controls inspection~~ to ensure that they meet the *importing country* requirements.

~~A~~ Documentary check should include examination of the *international veterinary certificate*, and possibly of laboratory reports or other documents, including those of a commercial nature, which are required to accompany the consignment.

When ~~implementing~~ performing a documentary check, the ~~Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities/Services~~ should inspect the required documents, in original or their digital equivalents as agreed between the *importing* and *exporting country*, to ensure that:

- i) the *international veterinary certificate* has been issued by the *Official Veterinarian* of the *exporting country*; complies with relevant principles set out in Article 5.2.3. and corresponds as relevant to the model ~~established~~ established by the importing country or agreed between the exporting and by the importing country for that *commodity* and intended use, ~~based on Chapters 5.10. to 5.13.;~~ and
- ii) the information contained in the checked documents complies with the *importing country* requirements.

b) Identity check

An identity check should be ~~implemented~~ performed upon arrival of the consignment at the point of inspection, as a visual inspection to verify that the content and the labelling of a consignment, including the identification of *commodities*, seals and means of transport, correspond to the information declared in the *international veterinary certificate* and accompanying documents.

The frequency of identity checks, the quantity of *commodities* to be inspected as well as the criteria for ~~sampling selection for checking~~ should be determined by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country based on *risk assessment*.

c) Physical inspection

To verify compliance with importing country requirements and physical integrity, ~~P~~ physical inspection should include, as appropriate:

- i) clinical examination of ~~an animals~~ for evidence of ~~transmissible~~ diseases and *animal welfare* issues
- ~~ii) and~~ physical checks of *animal products* and *germinal products*.

5.6.3._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: ~~ii) and~~ physical checks of <i>animal products</i>, <u>by-products</u> and <u>germinal products</u>. Rationale: by-products should be added to the list for physical examination to ensure compliance with importing country requirements. Only glossary definitions should be in italics, therefore products and germinal products should not be in italics. This change should be reflected throughout the chapter.	Did not agree as the Glossary definition for 'animal product' is sufficient.

~~iii) and, as appropriate, checks on packaging and labelling.~~

~~iv) checks on the means of transport, labelling and temperature records,~~

~~v) the sampling for analysis, testing or diagnosis, and~~

vi) any other checks required by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities to verify compliance with the *importing country* requirements.

The frequency of physical inspection, the quantity of *commodities* to be inspected as well as the criteria for sampling selection for physical inspection should be determined by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country based on risk assessment, and considering the following:-

i) For animals

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities of the importing country should determine the number of animals to be clinically examined should be determined~~ in accordance with the overall number of *animals* in the consignment and the declared purpose of the animals, which it may be increased if the physical checks carried out have not been satisfactory.

~~In some cases, such as For animals that are not required to be identified individually and animals considered to be dangerous, clinical examination should could~~ consist of observation of the state of health and behaviour of the entire group or of a representative number of *animals*.

If the clinical examination reveals an anomaly, a more thorough clinical examination may be carried out, including sampling and testing, where appropriate.

ii) ~~Germinal~~ For germinal products

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities should carry out Physical checks of the consignment should be carried out~~ to verify the compliance of labelling and the transport conditions with *importing country* requirements, including, when relevant, temperature records when relevant and the integrity of the seals, packaging material and cryogenic tanks.

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities of the importing country should determine the number of items to be checked, which may be increased if the checks carried out have not been satisfactory.~~

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities may carry out physical checks to verify that the labelling complies with importing country requirements.~~

Physical inspection may include laboratory testing of the *germinal products*.

5.6.3._3	Category (change and addition): Proposed amended text: Las inspecciones físicas pueden incluir <u>una evaluación sensorial y</u> la realización de pruebas en los productos <u>de origen animal o uso en animales</u> . Rationale: Se sugiere cambiar por productos de origen o uso en animales que son parte de la regulación sanitaria en el comercio.	Did not agree as 'physical inspection' already covers this.

If the physical checks reveal an anomaly, a more thorough inspection may be carried out.

iii) For Animal products

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities should carry out physical checks of the consignment should be carried out to verify the compliance of labelling and the transport conditions with importing country requirements, including temperature records when relevant and the integrity of the packaging material and seals.~~

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities may carry out physical checks to verify that the labelling complies with importing country requirements.~~

Physical inspection may include sensory examination and laboratory testing of the *animal products*.

If the physical checks reveal an anomaly, a more thorough inspection may be carried out.

2. Sampling and testing

Sampling and testing of imported *commodities* ~~with a view to checking compliance with the health-importing country requirements laid down in the international veterinary certificate,~~ may be ~~implement~~performed following a risk-based sampling plan or upon suspicion of non-compliance resulting from the documentary, identity or physical checks of *commodities*, ~~without creating unjustified barriers to trade~~. Testing should be ~~implement~~performed in an ~~approved~~ laboratory.

5.6.3._4	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: Sampling and testing of imported <i>commodities</i> ~~with a view to checking compliance with the health-importing country requirements laid down in the international veterinary certificate,~~ may be ~~implement~~performed following a risk-based sampling plan or upon suspicion of non-compliance resulting from the documentary, identity or physical checks of <i>commodities</i>, ~~without creating unjustified barriers to trade~~. Testing should be ~~implement~~performed in an ~~approved~~ laboratory. Rationale: The principle of avoiding unjustified barriers to trade is already addressed in the first paragraph of Article 5.6.1. and it should apply in general.	Agreed
5.6.3._5	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Los muestreos y los análisis de las <i>mercancías</i> importadas que se llevan a cabo para verificar el cumplimiento con los requisitos ~~del país importador sanitarios establecidos en el certificado veterinario internacional~~ pueden ~~realizarse~~ <u>implementarse</u> siguiendo un plan de muestreo basado en el riesgo o en una sospecha de no conformidad resultado de la verificación de los documentos, de la identidad o de los controles físicos de las <i>mercancías</i>, <u>sin crear barreras sanitarias injustificadas para el comercio</u>. Las pruebas se deberán efectuar en un <i>laboratorio aprobado</i>. <u>oficial y las muestras deberán ser tomadas por la autoridad veterinaria.</u> Rationale: Se sugiere incluir laboratorio oficial y las muestras deberán ser tomadas por la autoridad	Did not agree as the current text is sufficient because the testing should be implemented in a 'laboratory' which is defined in the Glossary as 'approved' for international trade, and the procedures for sampling can include personnel from Veterinary Services that is not part of Veterinary Authority.

	veterinaria por cuestiones de dar formalidad en caso de sospecha de riesgo.	
5.6.3._6	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Sampling and testing of imported <i>commodities</i> ~~with a view to checking compliance with the health-importing country requirements laid down in the international veterinary certificate~~, may be ~~implemented~~ performed following a risk-based sampling plan or upon suspicion of non-compliance resulting from the documentary, identity or physical checks of <i>commodities</i>, ~~without creating unjustified barriers to trade~~. Testing should be ~~implemented~~ <u>perform</u> in an <u>approved</u> ~~n-approved~~ laboratory. Rationale: The requirement for use of a laboratory approved by the Veterinary Authority should be retained to ensure the facility is meeting required standards for its tests. The definition of 'Laboratory' uses of the word 'such' and hence does not specifically make it a requirement for a laboratory to be approved by a Veterinary Authority, only that they can be. The word 'approved' makes it a requirement.	Did not agree as the Glossary definition for 'laboratory' covers its approval.
5.6.3._7	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Testing should be ~~implemented~~ performed in <u>an approved</u> laboratory. Rationale: Recommend keeping the "approved" laboratory language as previously stated. Approved laboratories are officially approved, accredited or registered by the Veterinary Authority. Trade decisions should be made based on test results run by laboratories that meet this minimum level of oversight.	Comment addressed above

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities may develop a risk-based sampling plan for imported consignments, that should specify the percentage of consignments to be sampled, taking into account the animal health status of the importing and exporting country, the species concerned, the nature and declared purpose of the *commodities*, the number of incoming consignments and the results of previous sampling.

Where no immediate danger to animal health or public health is suspected from *commodities* sampled in accordance with a sampling plan, a consignment may be released before the results of laboratory tests are available. A traceability system should be in place to recall commodities if needed.

5.6.3._8	Category (change): Proposed amended text: Where no immediate danger to animal health or public health is suspected from <i>commodities</i> sampled in accordance with a sampling plan, a consignment may be released before the results of laboratory tests are available. <u>A mechanism allowing recall commodities such as a traceability system should be in place to</u>	Did not agree, however the Code Commission used the word 'mechanism' for recall, noting it was a separate process linked to traceability

	<u>~~recall commodities~~ if needed.</u> Rationale: Even if a traceability system is not in place, commodities could be recalled.	
5.6.3._9	Category (addition, deletion and change): Proposed amended text: Cuando no se sospeche de un peligro inmediato para la sanidad animal o la salud pública derivado de las <i>mercancías</i> objeto de muestreo de conformidad con el plan <u>~~establecido de muestreo~~, ~~la remesa el embarque~~</u> puede liberarse antes de que los resultados de laboratorio estén disponibles. <u>Se deberá instaurar un sistema de trazabilidad encaminado a retirar las <i>mercancías</i> si resulta necesario.</u> Rationale: Se sugiere quitar de muestreo y poner: establecido para una mejor redacción Sustituir la palabra remesas por mercancías o embarque según corresponda en todo el texto Se propone cambiar remesas por mercancías o embarque, a fin de dar más claridad a la redacción. Lo anterior, debido a que le termino remesas se utiliza más para referir al envío de dinero de aquellas personas que radican en otra nación a su país de origen. Por embarque se entiende la acción de cargar las mercaderías sobre los medios de transporte en que han de salir del recinto aduanero con destino al exterior o a otras Aduanas del país. (Código Aduanero. Artículo 46) https://www.condusef.gob.mx/?p=remesas#:~:text=%C2%BFQu%C3%A9%20son%20las%20REMESAS%3F,familias%20que%20viven%20en%20M%C3%A9xico https://www.aduanas.gub.uy/innovaportal/v/2610/8/inova.front/embarque-definicion.html	Agreed to replace with 'establecido' Did not agree to replace with 'embarque' because 'remesa' is the term used in the Terrestrial Code and keep this for consistency. In the Code, 'embarque' refers to 'shipment'.
5.6.3._10	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: <u>~~Where no immediate danger to animal health or public health is suspected from commodities sampled in accordance with a sampling plan, a consignment may be released before the results of laboratory tests are available. A traceability system should be in place to recall commodities if needed.~~</u> Rationale: It is poor biosecurity to release from containment or Veterinary Authority control risk material before test results have been obtained. The most effective and cost-effective form of biosecurity is prevention and keeping unwanted pathogenic agents out of a country, consequently risk materials should not be released until they have fully completed their	Did not agree, considering this is a common practice when samples are part of routine compliance checking and are not based on any suspicion, and it is appropriate to include it, with relevant recommendations for recall.

	preventive measures, including, when applicable, receipt of acceptable test results for release.	

3. Sanitary measures at import

To meet the *importing country* requirements, in addition to the *sanitary measures* implemented in the *exporting countries*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of importing country may require *sanitary measures* to be implemented at importation before release of the *commodities from official controls*. Measures may include *disinfection of* and ~~disinsection—elimination of arthropod vectors from~~ *vehicles/vessels means of transport* and *containers* used in the transportation and *unloading of commodities*, in accordance with Chapter 4.14.

5.6.3._11	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: Measures may include <i>disinfection of</i> and ~~disinsection—elimination of arthropod vectors from~~ <i>vehicles/vessels means of transport</i> and <i>containers</i> used in the transportation and <i>unloading of commodities</i> , in accordance with Chapter 4.14. Rationale: -	Agreed
5.6.3._12	Category: Change Proposed amended text: The last sentence of the 3 rd paragraph Measures may include <i>disinfection of</i> and <i>disinsection elimination of arthropod vectors from</i> <i>vehicles/vessels means of transport</i> and <i>containers</i> used in the transportation and <i>unloading of commodities</i> , in accordance with Chapter 4.14. Rationale: For consistency with the glossary definition “disinsection”	Agreed

In the case of *animals*, measures may include *vaccination*, treatment or isolation. In the case of other *commodities*, measures may include a holding period or the application of physical or chemical treatment.

5.6.3._13	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: In the case of <i>animals</i> , measures may include <i>vaccination</i> , <i>further testing</i> , treatment or isolation. In the case of other <i>commodities</i> , measures may include a holding period or the application of physical or chemical treatment. Rationale: Further testing maybe required in some instances.	Agreed, but ‘further’ is not necessary to add.

4. Release of consignments

Based on the ~~implement~~ *performed import-official controls*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of importing countries should decide whether the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements.

5.6.3._14	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: Based on the ~~implement~~ performed import-official controls <u>implemented</u> , the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant Competent Authorities of importing countries</u> should decide whether the consignment complies with the <i>importing country</i> requirements. Rationale: editorial	Agreed

When the decision is made that the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements and has been cleared for release, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities should notify the operator ~~importer~~ and the information should be made available to the customs authorities.

Article 5.6.4.

Further action for non-compliant commodities

Commodities identified as non-compliant based on the ~~implement~~performed import-official controls should not be released by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities and should be isolated-detained under appropriate conditions including isolation for animals, pending further decision ~~by the Competent Authority~~.

5.6.4._1	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: <i>Commodities</i> identified as non-compliant based on the ~~implement~~ performed import-official controls <u>implemented</u> should not be released by the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u> and should be <u>isolated-detained</u> under appropriate conditions <u>including isolation for animals</u> , pending further decision ~~by the Competent Authority~~ . Rationale: editorial	Agreed

Depending on the type of *commodity* and the *risk* the *commodity* represents to human health and animal health, and the environment, or ~~for~~ due to animal welfare reasons, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities, should identify the options for the disposition of the *commodities* and notify the operator ~~importer~~. Disposition of *commodities* may include:

5.6.4._2	Category (change and editorial): Proposed amended text: Dependiendo del tipo de <i>mercancía</i> y del <i>riesgo</i> que representa para la <u>salud humana y la sanidad animal</u> <u>sanidad animal y salud humana</u> , para el medioambiente o ~~debido a~~ <u>por</u> razones de <i>bienestar animal</i> , la <i>autoridad veterinaria</i> u otras <i>autoridades competentes</i> <u>relevantes</u> deberán identificar las opciones de lo que se hará con las <i>mercancías</i> y la notificación al ~~importador~~ <u>operador</u> . El destino de las <i>mercancías</i> puede incluir: Rationale: Se sugiere Invertir, primero animal y luego humana, ya que es correspondencia directa de la OMSA.	Agreed

5.6.4._3	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: Depending on the type of <i>commodity</i> and the <i>risk</i> the <i>commodity</i> represents to human <u>health</u> and animal health, and <u>the</u> environment, or <u>for due to animal welfare</u> reasons, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u> , should identify the options for the disposition of the <i>commodities</i> and notify the <u>operator</u> ~~importer~~ . Disposition of <i>commodities</i> may include: Rationale: Edited for clarity.	Comment addressed above

- a) re-dispatching re-shipping the *commodity* back to the *exporting country* or another country, with the agreement, where appropriate, of the receiving *Competent Authority*;
- b) subjecting the *commodity* to treatment or to other risk mitigation measures necessary to allow importation;
- c) *killing* and disposal of *animals*, or destruction of other *commodities*.

Any action applied to consignments of *animals* should comply with ~~Chapters 7.1. and 7.6.~~ the relevant provisions of Section 7.

5.6.4._4	Category (editorial and addition): Proposed amended text: Any action applied to consignments of <i>animals</i> should comply with ~~Chapters 7.1. and 7.6.~~ <u>the relevant provisions of Section 7 of the Terrestrial Code.</u> Rationale: Clarity for the reader.	Did not agree as the current text is clear and follows the convention of the Code.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of the *importing country* should notify any decision and reasons to refuse entry of a *commodity* to the customs authorities and are encouraged to communicate it to the *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country*. Where appropriate, the Veterinary Authority of the exporting country should be given the opportunity to explain the situation in an attempt to have the consignment released.

5.6.4._5	Category (change): Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u> of the <i>importing country</i> should notify any decision <u>and reasons</u> to refuse entry of a <i>commodity</i> to the customs authorities and are encouraged to communicate it to the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> of the <i>exporting country</i> . <u>Where appropriate, the Veterinary Authority of the exporting country should be given the opportunity to explain the situation in an attempt to have the consignment released.</u> Rationale: First, from the perspective of the SPS Agreement, it may violate the principle of scientific basis stipulated in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. The current WTO/SPS Agreement clearly stipulates that health measures must be based on sufficient scientific basis. The quarantine decisions of the	Did not agree as 'Where appropriate...' indicates that this is an opportunity that could be provided by the importing country but is not compulsory.

	importing country should be based on its own risk assessment rather than the unilateral interpretation of the exporting country. Second, from the perspective of public health and safety risks, the risk of animal disease transmission is highly uncertain and spreads rapidly. The explanatory process between exporting and importing countries may delay the critical prevention and control opportunities. For instance, if the explanatory materials provided by the exporting country require time-consuming verification and the importing country has detected signs of the spread of the epidemic, it may trigger regional or even global public health crises. At the same time, the newly added provisions conflict with the Terrestrial Animal Health Code. The code itself has existing provisions on the "timeliness of emergency epidemic response", emphasizing the core position of rapid response in controlling the cross-border spread of animal diseases. The newly added provisions may limit the ability of the importing country to take emergency measures. Third, from the perspective of procedural efficiency and feasibility, the interpretation procedures for cross-border epidemics require coordination among multiple departments and in multiple languages, which may lead to a lengthy process. For instance, if the exporting country requests multiple supplementary materials or holds hearings, it will significantly increase the administrative costs of the importing country and prolong the detention time of the goods.	

Following decisions taken in relation to non-compliant *commodities*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities should supervise the effective disposition of the *commodities* and apply measures to prevent the introduction into the country of *commodities* which have been refused import, and the reuse of the *international veterinary certificate* that accompanied the consignment.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authority* of the *importing country* should inform the *exporting country* of any case of a *listed disease* or disease referred to in the *importing country requirements* in a consignment of *animals*.

5.6.4._6	Category (change): Proposed amended text: <u>The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authority</i> of the <i>importing country</i> should inform the <i>exporting country</i> of any case of a <i>listed disease</i> or disease referred to in the <i>importing country requirements</i> in a consignment of <i>animals</i> when necessary.</u> Rationale: First, the content reported by the importing country to the exporting country in the newly added clause is ambiguous, and the clause does not specify the specific scope of "any case" (such as whether it includes suspected cases, low pathogenic strains, etc.), which may lead to inconsistent notification	Did not agree as this is an appropriate requirement.

	standards among members. And if the importing country provides an expanded explanation of the " any case ", it may lead to excessive reporting and interfere with the normal production of the exporting country. Second , the new clause will significantly increase the administrative costs of the importing country, which is contrary to the provisions of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement on reducing and simplifying import and export procedures requirements.	
5.6.4._7	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: <u>The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authority</i> of the <i>importing country</i> should inform the <i>exporting country</i> of ~~any-relevant~~ case of a <i>listed disease</i> or disease referred to in the <i>importing country</i> requirements in a consignment of <i>animals</i>.</u> Rationale: There are cases where animals are regarded as a safe commodity (e.g. an infection of equids with eastern equine encephalitis virus or western equine encephalitis virus). In addition, there are cases where conditions for notification is defined between importing and exporting countries.	Did not agree as this is not meant to cover all listed diseases, but only the diseases referred to in the importing country requirements.
5.6.4._8	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: <u>The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> ~~or other relevant <i>Competent Authority</i>~~ of the <i>importing country</i> should inform the <i>exporting country</i> of any case of a <i>listed disease</i> or disease referred to in the <i>importing country</i> requirements in a consignment of <i>animals</i>.</u> Rationale: A Veterinary Authority is a country's official government agency responsible for communicating on its animal health status. Communications of findings of a potential listed disease or other significant animal disease should be made between Veterinary Authorities in the first instance. This is important to prevent miscommunication of disease status and unnecessary trade disruption. Supporting evidence: Terrestrial Animal Health Code Chapter 1.1	Did not agree as Chapter 1.1. is about notification to WOAH. This paragraph is related to the trade relationship between countries.

Article 5.6.5.

Emergency Planning for unexpected events

~~The *Veterinary Authority* or other *Competent Authorities* of the *importing country* should develop a plan to address the occurrence, within the *exporting country* after the *commodities* have been exported or within the *transit country* after the *commodities* have transited, of a *listed disease* or a disease referred to in the *importing country* requirements which may have impacted the status of the exported *commodities*.~~

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities may also develop a plan to address the occurrence of a listed disease, or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements, within the importing country before the animals have been released.~~

The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities should ensure that the operator~~importer~~ develops a plan to address unexpected events~~emergencies~~ which may impact the compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements~~being imported, and non-compliant commodities~~ described in Article 5.6.4. The ~~emergency~~ plan may be generic, or specific to each consignment, and should focus on preventing the introduction to the *importing country* of a *listed disease* or a disease referred to in the *importing country* requirements, and on animal welfare recommendations in accordance with Section 7~~Sections 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~ The ~~emergency~~ plan should identify responsibility and include procedures for actions taken for non-compliant *commodities* described in Article 5.6.4.

5.6.5._1	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: The Veterinary Authority or other <u>relevant</u> Competent Authorities should ensure that the <u>operator</u>~~importer~~ develops <u>and documents</u> a plan to address <u>unexpected events</u>~~emergencies~~ which may impact the <u>compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements</u>~~being imported, and non-compliant commodities~~ described in Article 5.6.4. The ~~emergency~~ plan may be generic, or specific to each consignment, and should focus on preventing the introduction to the <i>importing country</i> of a <i>listed disease</i> or a disease referred to in the <i>importing country</i> requirements, and <u>on animal welfare recommendations</u> in accordance with <u>Section 7</u>~~Sections 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~ The ~~emergency~~ plan should identify responsibility and include procedures for actions taken for non-compliant <i>commodities</i> described in Article 5.6.4. Rationale: The addition of 'and documents' is consistent with Articles 5.4.5 and 5.5.4.	Agreed

Article 5.6.6.

General recommendations applicable to ~~vehicles/vessels~~means of transport and containers that transported infected animals

~~Vehicles/vessels~~Means of transport and *containers* that transported *animals* found to be infected with a pathogenic agent of a *listed disease* or a disease referred to in the *importing country* requirements should be considered as contaminated, and the Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities should apply the following measures as appropriate to the risk:

5.6.6._1	Category (change and addition): Proposed amended text: Los ~~vehículos/buques~~ <u>medios de transporte</u> y <u>contenedores</u> que transportan animales que se han encontrado infectados por un agente patógeno de una <i>enfermedad de la lista</i> o de otra enfermedad contemplada en los requisitos del <i>país importador</i> deberán considerarse contaminados, y la <i>autoridad veterinaria</i> u otras <i>autoridades competentes</i> <u>relevantes</u> deberán aplicar las siguientes medidas en	Did not agree as Article 5.6.1. is sufficient.

	función del riesgo, considerar para aspectos de Una Salud. Rationale: Se sugiere considerar para aspectos de Una Salud.	
5.6.6._2	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: General recommendations applicable to ~~vehicles/vessels~~ means of transport and containers that transported ~~infected~~ animals ~~Vehicles/vessels~~ Means of transport and containers that transported ~~animals found to be infected with a pathogenic agent of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements~~ should be considered as contaminated, and the Veterinary Authority or other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u> should apply the following measures <u>as appropriate to the risk</u>: Rationale: By way of good biosecurity, <i>means of transport</i> and containers should always have the measures applied after use. This is also consistent with the proposed biosecurity chapter recommendation that these items should be cleaned between uses.	Did not agree as this article is specific for situations where infected animals were transported.

- a) treatment ~~or safe disposal~~ of the litter, forage and any other potentially contaminated material, by its removal from the ~~vehicles/vessels~~ means of transport and containers for immediate transportation to an establishment assigned in advance, where the animal health measures required by the *importing country* should be strictly applied;
- b) *disinfection* of all parts of the ~~vehicles/vessels~~ means of transport and containers which were used in the transport, feeding, watering, moving and *unloading* of the *animals*, as well as all baggage of travelling attendants, in accordance with Chapter 4.14.;
- c) ~~disinsection~~ elimination of arthropod vectors from ~~of vehicles/vessels~~ means of transport and containers in case of vector disease.

5.6.6._3	Category (change): Proposed amended text: C) ~~disinsection~~ <u>elimination of arthropod disinsection vectors from</u> ~~of vehicles/vessels~~ means of transport and containers in case of vector disease. Rationale: In the proposed revised chapter, the term of "disinsection" has been added, specifically "means an action intended to kill or eliminate arthropods from establishments, means of transport, slaughterhouses or any other premises or equipment used for animals.", and "disinsection" is still retained in the proposed revised section 5.4. Therefore, from the perspectives of consistency in context expression and language conciseness, it is recommended to unify it as "disinsection".	Agreed
5.6.6._4	Category: Change	Comment addressed above

	Proposed amended text: point c) c) ~~disinsection elimination of arthropod vectors from~~ <u>of</u> vehicles/vessels means of transport and containers in case of vector disease. Rationale: For consistency with the glossary definition "disinsection"	

Article 5.6.7.

General principles applicable to disposal of international catering waste

5.6.7._1	Category (change): Proposed amended text: General principles applicable to disposal of international <u>catering waste swill</u> Rationale: The term "swill" has been added to the proposed revised chapter. Therefore, from the perspective of consistency in context expression and language conciseness, it is more appropriate to use "swill" here.	Did not agree as international catering waste is a specific risk to be addressed and the associated reference made to 'swill' in the text is appropriate.

International catering waste that may contain or may have been in contact with animal products is considered a high-risk category of product and should therefore be subject to strict controls to minimise the risk of introduction of pathogenic agents.

5.6.7._2	Category (change): Proposed amended text: International <u>catering waste swill</u> <u>that may contain or may have been in contact with animal products</u> is <u>considered</u> a high-risk <u>category of</u> product and should therefore be subject to strict controls to minimise the risk of introduction of pathogenic agents. Rationale: The term "swill" has been added to the proposed revised chapter. Therefore, from the perspective of consistency in context expression and language conciseness, it is more appropriate to use "swill" here.	Agreed with the rationale, amended the text differently for clarity
5.6.7._3	Category (change and editorial): Proposed amended text: Los residuos del catering internacional <u>que pueden contener o haber estado un—en contacto con productos animales se consideran</u> <u>con una categoría de</u> productos de alto riesgo y, por consiguiente, deberán someterse a controles estrictos para minimizar el riesgo de introducción de agentes patógenos. Rationale: Error de redacción	Agreed

5.6.7._4	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: International catering waste <u>that may contain or may have been in contact with animals, animal products, or animal pathogens</u> is <u>considered</u> a high-risk category of product and should therefore be subject to strict controls to minimise the risk of introduction of pathogenic agents. Rationale: International catering waste may be contaminated via contact with animals or animal pathogens, not just animal products.	Did not agree as it is highly unlikely that this waste would be in contact with live animals. The significant risk posed by these wastes lies in the fact that they contain animal products, or that they have been in direct or indirect contact with some animal products.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities should ensure that all high risk international catering waste entering the country from the international means of transport is handled, collected and disposed of in a way to minimise the risk of introduction of pathogenic agents.

5.6.7._5	Category (change): Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u> should ensure that <u>all high risk</u> international <u>catering waste swill</u> entering the country from the international means of transport is handled, collected and disposed of in a way to minimise the risk of introduction of pathogenic agents. Rationale: The term "swill" has been added to the proposed revised chapter. Therefore, from the perspective of consistency in context expression and language conciseness, it is more appropriate to use "swill" here.	Did not agree, comment addressed above.
5.6.7._6	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: La <i>autoridad veterinaria</i> u otras <i>autoridades competentes relevantes</i> deberán garantizar que <u>todos</u> los residuos del catering internacional <u>de alto riesgo</u> que ingresen al país por un <i>medio de transporte</i> internacional se manipulen, colecten y eliminen de manera que se minimice el riesgo de introducción de agentes patógenos <u>y se consideren aspectos ambientales</u>. Rationale: Se sugiere incluir y <i>se consideren aspectos ambientales</i>.	Did not agree as this is out of the scope of the chapter.
5.6.7._7	Category (change): Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant Competent Authorities</u> should ensure that <u>all all high risk</u> international catering waste entering the country from the international means of transport is handled, collected and disposed of in a way to minimise the risk of introduction of pathogenic agents.	Agreed

	Rationale: This text is implying it is acceptable to have no biosecurity in place for non-negligible risk material (medium risk or other risk material). The change from all to high risk does not make for sound biosecurity.	

Article 5.6.8.

General recommendations on measures to address identified illegal movement of commodities at border inspection posts

5.6.8._1	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: General recommendations on measures to address identified <u>informal and</u> illegal movement of commodities at border inspection posts Rationale: TAHSC Feb 2025 Report, page 41, reads that the Commission agreed to use both 'illegal' and 'informal'.	Agreed, but replaced 'and' with 'or'

To control the *risks* posed by illegal cross-border movement at *border inspection posts*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant law enforcement Competent Authorities should coordinate and cooperate closely with the customs authority to ensure that the official controls inspection of for commodities entering the country areis implementperformed in accordance with the rules of this chapter and national legislation, including when fraud is suspected.

5.6.8._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: To control the <i>risks</i> posed by <u>informal and</u> illegal cross-border movement at <i>border inspection posts</i> , the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant law enforcement Competent Authorities</u> should coordinate and cooperate closely with the customs authority to ensure that the official <u>controls inspection of for commodities</u> entering the country <u>areis implementperformed</u> in accordance with the rules of this chapter and national legislation, <u>including when fraud is suspected</u> . Rationale: TAHSC Feb 2025 Report, page 41, reads that the Commission agreed to use both 'illegal' and 'informal'.	Agreed
5.6.8._3	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: To control the <i>risks</i> posed by illegal cross-border movement at <i>border inspection posts</i> , the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant law enforcement Competent Authorities</u> should coordinate and cooperate closely with the customs authority <u>and other relevant law enforcement authority</u> to ensure that the official <u>controls inspection of for commodities</u> entering the country <u>areis implementperformed</u> in accordance with the rules of this chapter and national	Agreed, text was amended differently.

	legislation, including when fraud is suspected. Rationale: For consistency with wording within this article.	

For that purpose, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities should ensure the timely exchange with the customs and other relevant law enforcement authority, including via electronic means, of information and decisions made relevant to the organisation and conduct of their respective activities for *commodities* entering the country. The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities should collaborate with the customs and other relevant law enforcement authority to ensure immediate notification to the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities ~~if of circumstances where a declaration is submitted to the customs authority for a consignment of those categories of commodities that should be~~ subject to official ~~inspection control~~ but with no evidence of an official ~~inspection control~~ having been conducted.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities, in collaboration with the customs and other relevant law enforcement authorities, should have practical arrangements in place to ensure the implementation of the measures described in Article 5.6.4. in case of detection of illegal cross-border movement of *commodities* at a *border inspection post*.

Article 5.6.9.

General recommendations on measures to address identified informal or illegal movement of commodities outside border inspection posts

5.6.9._1	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: General recommendations on measures to address identified <u>informal or</u> illegal movement of commodities outside border inspection posts Rationale: The word 'informal' should be removed as all movements should be either legal or illegal. We recognise the Commissions reason for suggesting retaining the term, however, we would consider the practice of local movements by communities across land borders, to be included within the movements legally provided for by the Veterinary Authority of the country. While movements that are being done in a way that expressly avoids official controls or regulations are clearly illegal movements. If the standards provide legitimacy to the avoidance of border mitigation measures, they will be supporting risk pathways for transboundary disease spread. There is no need to create a third category of trade, especially one that is not regulated by the Veterinary Authority and will create grey areas in international trade expectations.	Did not agree, as there are not only 'legal' or 'illegal' movements of commodities across borders. 'Legal' would mean expressly regulated by the country legislation, which is nearly never the case for these movements. The Code Commission explained that informal cross border movement of commodities means the unregulated, seemingly innocuous movement of commodities across borders that may present a significant sanitary risk (e.g. grazing animals moving across unregulated land borders) The Commission noted that this is reflecting what is happening in various parts of the world and did not recommend to develop a distinct category of movements.
5.6.9._2	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text:	Did not agree, comment addressed above

	General recommendations <u>Managing the Risk of ~~on~~ measures to address identified informal or illegal cross-border movement of commodities outside official border inspection posts</u> Rationale: Illegal cross-border movement of animals and animal products outside designated border inspection posts poses a significant risk to animal health, public health, and trade integrity. Such movements often bypass official sanitary controls. Strengthening interagency coordination ensures a unified enforcement approach, while the development of tailored mitigation mechanisms provides operational tools for risk prevention and rapid response. These actions are essential for improving surveillance coverage, minimizing disease incursions, and protecting the credibility of sanitary certification systems.	

To control the *risks* posed by the illegal cross-border movement of *commodities* outside of *border inspection posts*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should:

5.6.9._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: To control the <i>risks</i> posed by the <u>informal or</u> illegal cross-border movement of <i>commodities</i> outside of <i>border inspection posts</i>, the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other <u>relevant</u> <i>Competent Authorities</i> should: Rationale: To be coherent with Article 5.6.9 title, and TAHSC Feb 2025 Report on page 41 that reads that the Commission agreed to use both 'illegal' and 'informal'.	Agreed
5.6.9._4	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: To <u>effectively</u> control the <i>risks</i> posed by the illegal cross-border movement of <i>commodities</i> outside <u>designated of</u> <i>border inspection posts</i>, the <i>Veterinary Authority, in collaboration with</i> ~~or~~ other <u>relevant</u> <i>Competent Authorities,</i> should: Rationale: Illegal cross-border movement of animals and animal products outside designated border inspection posts poses a significant risk to animal health, public health, and trade integrity. Such movements often bypass official sanitary controls. Strengthening interagency coordination ensures a unified enforcement approach, while the development of tailored mitigation mechanisms provides operational tools for risk prevention and rapid response. These actions are essential for improving surveillance coverage, minimizing disease incursions, and protecting the credibility of sanitary certification systems.	Agreed to add 'effectively' Did not agree to add 'designated' as it is sufficient with the revised Glossary definition for 'border inspection post'. Agreed to add 'in collaboration with'

- 1) coordinate with border authorities (police, customs, transport, immigration) to provide technical support for identification of illegal cross border movement of *commodities*;

5.6.9._5	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: coordinate with border authorities (police, customs, transport, immigration) to provide technical support for identification of <u>informal or</u> illegal cross border movement of <i>commodities</i> ; Rationale: To be coherent with Article 5.6.9 title, and TAHSC Feb 2025 Report on page 41 that reads that the Commission agreed to use both 'illegal' and 'informal'.	Agreed
5.6.9._6	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: <u>Strengthen Interagency Coordination: Collaborate closely</u> ~~coordinate with other~~ border ~~control agencies~~ <u>authorities such as the</u> (police, <u>immigration, and</u> customs ~~services, transport, immigration~~) to provide technical support for <u>identifying identification and intercepting of</u> illegal ~~cross border~~ movement of <i>commodities</i> <u>across borders</u> ; Rationale: Illegal cross-border movement of animals and animal products outside designated border inspection posts poses a significant risk to animal health, public health, and trade integrity. Such movements often bypass official sanitary controls. Strengthening interagency coordination ensures a unified enforcement approach, while the development of tailored mitigation mechanisms provides operational tools for risk prevention and rapid response. These actions are essential for improving surveillance coverage, minimizing disease incursions, and protecting the credibility of sanitary certification systems.	Did not agree as the current text is clear.

- 2) develop and implement practical mechanisms to address informal or illegal cross border movement of *commodities* and ~~implementation thereof~~ in close collaboration with border authorities.

5.6.9._7	Category (change and addition): Proposed amended text: desarrollar ~~e implementar~~ mecanismos prácticos para <u>detectar</u> ~~gestionar~~ movimientos transfronterizos ilegales de <i>mercancías</i> y su implementación en estrecha colaboración con las autoridades fronterizas. Rationale: Se sugiere sustituir gestionar porque parece que se favorece la acción, poner: detectar.	Did not agree as it is not only about detection but also action to mitigate the risks posed by these practices.
5.6.9._8	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text:	Did not agree, comment addressed above.

	develop ~~and implement~~ practical mechanisms to address ~~informal or~~ illegal cross border movement of <i>commodities</i> and ~~implementation thereof~~ in close collaboration with border authorities. Rationale: The word ‘informal’ should be removed as all movements should be either legal or illegal. We recognise the Commissions reason for suggesting retaining the term, however, we would consider the practice of local movements by communities across land borders, to be included within the movements legally provided for by the Veterinary Authority of the country. While movements that are being done in a way that expressly avoids official controls or regulations are clearly illegal movements. If the standards provide legitimacy to the avoidance of border mitigation measures, they will be supporting risk pathways for transboundary disease spread. There is no need to create a third category of trade, especially one that is not regulated by the Veterinary Authority and will create grey areas in international trade expectations.	
5.6.9._9	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: <u>Develop and Implement Mitigation Mechanisms: Design and enforce develop and implement practical mechanisms aimed at detecting, preventing, and responding to address informal or illegal cross-border trade in movement of commodities, and implementation thereof in close collaboration with border authorities. These mechanisms should be developed in close coordination with relevant border authorities to ensure effectiveness and consistency.</u> Rationale: Illegal cross-border movement of animals and animal products outside designated border inspection posts poses a significant risk to animal health, public health, and trade integrity. Such movements often bypass official sanitary controls. Strengthening interagency coordination ensures a unified enforcement approach, while the development of tailored mitigation mechanisms provides operational tools for risk prevention and rapid response. These actions are essential for improving surveillance coverage, minimizing disease incursions, and protecting the credibility of sanitary certification systems.	Did not agree, comment addressed above

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
5.7._1	Category (general): The Member supports the revised Chapter.	Noted
5.7._2	Category (general): The Member supports this draft revised chapter provided the comment below is taken into consideration.	Noted

CHAPTER 5.7.

BORDER INSPECTION POSTS AND QUARANTINE CENTRES

Article 5.7.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides recommendations on *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* to support effective implementation of measures and procedures applicable to the exportation, transit and importation of *commodities*, in order to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents without creating unjustified trade restrictions.

5.7.1._1	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: This chapter provides recommendations on <i>border inspection posts</i> and <i>quarantine centres</i> to support effective implementation of measures and procedures applicable to the exportation, transit and importation of <i>commodities</i> , in order to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents <u>through international trade of commodities</u> without creating unjustified trade restrictions. Rationale: The suggested change provides consistent wording with related chapters 5.4. and 5.6.	Agreed

Quarantine centres may be used for isolation of *animals* either pre-exportation in accordance with disease-specific chapters in the *Terrestrial Code* or post-arrival. The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that the application of *biosecurity* at *quarantine centres* is appropriate to the type of isolation being undertaken, and effectively mitigates risks in accordance with disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* (pre-export isolation) or via *risk analysis* (post-arrival quarantine).

5.7.1._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: <u>Border inspection posts should maintain applicable biosecurity and containment of commodities while completing required inspections and procedures to prevent the potential transboundary spread of pathogenic agents. Commodities intended for import or in transit should be maintained under biosecurity and in containment until they are confirmed to meet requirements to be released into the country or, when</u>	Agreed with the rationale, but amended the text differently.

	applicable, while they are transferred to a quarantine centre. Rationale: A similar introductory paragraph to the one for quarantine centres should be present in the introduction of this chapter for border inspection post. This should outline that these facilities should be maintaining biosecurity and containment during completing border procedures and inspections. In addition, to prevent the movement of pathogenic agents from border inspection posts, the text should require commodities are maintained in containment until they are confirmed to meet requirements to be released or, where applicable, they are transferred to quarantine centres. Alternatively, these requirements could be in the definition of border inspection post.	

Article 5.7.2.

General considerations

Appropriate legislation should be in place, in accordance with Chapter 3.4., to define the facilities, the resourcing and operation of *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres*, and for their approval.

Material and financial resources should be available at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* as necessary to undertake the relevant functions of the facility while managing official controls, *biosecurity*, health and safety risks and *animal welfare* associated with the type and volume of *commodities* presented for inspection.

Appropriate administration systems should be available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* as necessary for the functions of the facility, including record keeping and information and communication technology, to support decision-making and communication.

Biosecurity consistent with Chapter 4.X. is critical to fulfil the functions of *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres*.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that:

- Operations at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* are supported by sufficient authorised personnel who are operating under the principles of Chapter 3.2., appropriately qualified with access to regular training, consistent with the intended use and the type and quantity of *commodities* presented.
- Operational details for *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* are made available to operators described in Chapters 5.4., 5.5. or 5.6., including the intended use and the categories of *commodities* for which they are designated, exact locations, contact details, hours of operation, booking requirements and costs.
- Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* describing the procedures undertaken there. Auditable records documenting the performance of these procedures should be kept, including the maintenance of *biosecurity*. Records should include the results of official controls, regular *surveillance* and *monitoring* in the facilities and the surrounding areas.

5.7.2._1	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are available to personnel at <i>border inspection posts</i> and <i>quarantine centres</i> describing the procedures undertaken there.	Agreed

	Rationale: Addition of “s” to match the plurality of “procedures”.	

- *Border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* have access to *laboratories* and other *approved* service providers with SOPs as necessary to support the implementation of official controls and the measures described in Chapters 5.4., 5.5. and 5.6. consistent with Article 3.2.6.

Article 5.7.3.

Cooperation with other agencies

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should engage with other governmental authorities with responsibilities at international borders in the design and operation of *border inspection posts*, to ensure that official inspection and clearance of transit or import consignments is streamlined where possible. Co-use of facilities and equipment at international borders with other authorities could be considered as long as it does not hinder normal operations described in this chapter. Key principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement should be considered to facilitate importation and transit of *commodities*.

5.7.3._1	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> should engage with other governmental authorities with responsibilities at international borders in the design and operation of <i>border inspection posts</i>, to ensure that official inspection and clearance of transit or import consignments is streamlined where possible. Co-use of facilities and equipment at international borders with other authorities could be considered as long as it does not hinder normal operations described in this chapter <u>or <i>biosecurity supporting safe trade in animal commodities</i></u>. Key principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement should be considered to facilitate importation and transit of <i>commodities</i>. Rationale: The prevention of transboundary spread of animal diseases should also be maintained during facility and equipment sharing arrangements.	Did not agree, however, the text was amended for clarity.

Article 5.7.4.

Requirements for a border inspection post

Design and operation of a *border inspection post* should be based on *risk analysis* and *biosecurity* including the following:

- 1) Separation between public areas and restricted areas for inspection of consignments.
- 2) Perimeter security of restricted areas to prevent entry of unauthorised people and *means of transport*, and unwanted animals, with access control for entry and exit of authorised personnel and *means of transport*.
- 3) Facilities and equipment suitable for the type and volume of *commodities* presented, necessary for implementation of the official control procedures described in Article 5.6.3, including secure unloading and loading, inspection, sampling and storage or detention of *commodities*, including adequate lighting and temperature control with surfaces appropriate for cleaning and *disinfection*.

- 4) Facilities and equipment for cleaning and *disinfection* and elimination of arthropod *vectors of means of transport* and *containers* that have been used in transportation of *commodities*, consistent with Article 5.6.6.

5.7.4._1	Category (change): Proposed amended text: 4) Facilities and equipment for cleaning and <i>disinfection</i> and <u>elimination of arthropod disinsection</u> <i>vectors of means of transport</i> and <i>containers</i> that have been used in transportation of <i>commodities</i> , consistent with Article 5.6.6. Rationale: In the proposed revised chapter, the term of "disinsection" has been added, specifically "means an action intended to kill or eliminate arthropods from establishments, means of transport, slaughterhouses or any other premises or equipment used for animals.", and "disinsection" is still retained in the proposed revised section 5.4. Therefore, from the perspectives of consistency in context expression and language conciseness, it is recommended to unify it as "disinsection".	Agreed
5.7.4._2	Category: Change Proposed amended text: point 4) 4) Facilities and equipment for cleaning and disinfection and <u>disinsection</u> ~~elimination of arthropod~~ <i>vectors</i> of means of transport and containers that have been used in transportation of commodities, consistent with Article 5.6.6. Rationale: For consistency with the glossary definition "disinsection"	Agreed

- 5) Waste management for restricted areas with storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste and, including discarded feed, rejected consignments, ~~dead animals~~ and ~~used bedding~~, with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste.

- 6) Operational procedures for cleaning and disinfection, waste management, and control of rodents and potential vectors.

5.7.4._3	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: <u>Operational—proceduresSOPs for cleaning and disinfection, waste management, and control of rodents and potential vectors.</u> Rationale: "SOPs" acronym was introduced above in 5.7.2 and for consistency, should be used throughout.	Agreed

Article 5.7.5.

Additional requirements for a border inspection post for animals

In addition to the principles described in Article 5.7.4., a *border inspection post* for consignments of *animals* should be designed and operate in accordance with *animal welfare* principles in Section 7 and should specifically include the following:

- 1) Separate access to restricted animal inspection areas via road infrastructure, to minimise delays.
- 2) Facilities necessary for the management of consignments of *animals* according to Article 5.6.3, including containment, feeding, watering, restraint and inspection, consistent with the type and number of *animals* presented.

5.7.5._1	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Facilities and equipment necessary for the management of consignments of <i>animals</i> according to Article 5.6.3, including containment, feeding, watering, restraint and inspection, consistent with the type and number of <i>animals</i> presented. Rationale: Addition of “and equipment” for consistency with other bullets in 5.7.4 ex: bullet 3.	Agreed

- 3) Facilities for temporarily holding *animals*, with adequate space, light, ventilation and separation as appropriate between consignments and species.

5.7.5._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Facilities for temporarily holding <i>animals</i> , with adequate housing and/or restraint systems , space, light, ventilation and separation as appropriate between consignments and species and separation of treated from non-treated animals . Rationale: Addition of language to 1. prevent escape or injury to personnel and animals and 2. support separating treated animals, such as when acaricide treatment is applied, for better consignment management.	Agreed

- 4) Separate facilities to isolate sick animals.

5.7.5._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: 4) <u>Separate facilities to isolate sick animals if needed.</u> Rationale: When a sick animal is found, it will be transported immediately to quarantine centres without staying in a border inspection post. In that case, there is no need for separate facilities to isolate sick animals.	Did not agree as there should always be facilities in case of need to isolate sick animals.

- 5) Animal waste management for dead animals, discarded feed, solid and liquid waste and used bedding.

5.7.5._4	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text:	Agreed with rationale, however the Code

	<u>~~Animal waste management for dead animals, discarded feed, solid and liquid waste and used bedding.~~</u> Rationale: Propose deletion of Point 5, as the content appears duplicative of Point 5 in 5.7.4. Dead animals should be rejected consignments. Discarded feed and used bedding are solid waste.	Commission noted that 'dead animal' should be retained. Considering the comment below, the text was amended for clarity.
5.7.5._5	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: <u>6) SOP for the management of sick animals and animal waste management.</u> Rationale: Addition of Point 6 for consistency with other bullet for SOPs listed in 5.7.4	Addressed above

Article 5.7.6.

Facilities involved in official inspection other than border inspection post

5.7.6._1	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Instalaciones que participan en la inspección oficial <u>de animales</u> que no sean puestos de inspección fronterizos Rationale: Agregar, de animales, ya que sólo se describen acciones que competen a las acciones de este tipo de inspecciones, por lo que debe de especificarse así.	Did not agree as this is not only for animals.

When the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authority* defines that official inspection could be implemented at an appropriate place other than a *border inspection post*, the facilities involved should be *approved* following the principles outlined in Articles 5.7.4. and 5.7.5., and the consignment should remain under the control of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* until formal clearance.

5.7.6._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: When the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authority</i> defines that official inspection could be implemented at an appropriate place other than a <i>border inspection post</i>, the facilities involved should be <i>approved</i> following the principles outlined in Articles 5.7.4. and 5.7.5., and the consignment should remain <u>under biosecurity and</u> the control of the <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> until formal clearance. Rationale: The animal commodity should remain under biosecurity during any transport to or while in alternative facilities.	Agreed

Article 5.7.7.

Requirements for a quarantine centre

Design and operation of a *quarantine centre* should be based on consideration of the following:

- 1) The disease situation of the country, *zone* or area surrounding the *quarantine centre*.
- 2) Location of facilities at a distance from other *establishments*, sufficient to avoid transmission of diseases of concern.

5.7.7._1	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Location of facilities at a distance from other relevant establishments, must be sufficient to avoid transmission of diseases of concern, cognizant of prevailing risk factors. Rationale: There are currently no internationally standardized minimum distance requirements between quarantine facilities and other establishments in the WOAHA Terrestrial Code or related manuals. Imposing a fixed distance without considering local epidemiological, ecological, and infrastructural realities may result in impractical or overly restrictive guidance, especially in densely populated or resource-constrained regions. By recommending that the required separation be determined based on prevailing local risk factors such as disease epidemiology, species housed, biosecurity practices, and environmental features—the text promotes a risk-based and context-specific approach. This allows Veterinary Authorities to make scientifically informed decisions that are both technically defensible and operationally feasible, while maintaining the primary objective of preventing disease transmission.	Did not agree to add 'relevant' as it is clear with the Glossary definition of establishment. Agreed to second point, text was amended differently

- 3) Site topography, to minimise disease risks associated with the flow of contaminated water.
- 4) Perimeter security to prevent entry of unauthorised people and *means of transport*, and unwanted animals.
- 5) Controls, including sanitary requirements, for entry and exit of authorised personnel, and the facilities necessary to apply these controls including changing rooms and showers. Controls for exit of authorised personnel may not be necessary for the isolation of *animals* before exportation or clearance.
- 6) Controls, including sanitary requirements, for entry and exit of *means of transport* and equipment, including veterinary instruments and supplies, and the facilities necessary to apply these controls. Controls for exit of *means of transport* and equipment may not be necessary for the isolation of *animals* before exportation or clearance.

5.7.7._3	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: ~~Controls for exit of <i>means of transport</i> and equipment may not be necessary for the isolation of <i>animals</i> before exportation or clearance.~~ Rationale: Quarantine and border facilities should be considered locations of high biosecurity risk. Good biosecurity principles should be maintained on means of transport and equipment that has been used on animals	Agreed

	in quarantine and border facilities associated with exported, transiting, or imported animals to prevent the risk of cross-contamination and subsequent disease occurrence.	

- 7) Controls for entry of supplies, including the sources, sanitary status and entry process for *feed* and bedding, and facilities necessary to handle and store these supplies.
- 8) Facilities and equipment for cleaning and *disinfection*, and removal of arthropod *vectors* including control of waste and effluent, for *means of transport* and *containers* that have been used in transportation of import consignments of *animals*.
- 9) ~~Waste management~~—In the case of isolation of *animals* after arrival, waste management should be in accordance with a *biosecurity plan* including storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste, including discarded *feed*, rejected consignments, dead *animals* and used bedding, with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste.
- 10) Facilities for containment and management of consignments of *animals*, including as appropriate to the animal species separation between consignments, *unloading/loading*, housing, yards, restraint, isolation, *vector* control, and for undertaking interventions required by *risk analysis* and/or relevant disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including sample collection, testing, *vaccination*, treatment and veterinary inspection.

5.7.7._4	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Facilities <u>and equipment</u> for containment and management of consignments of <i>animals</i> , including as appropriate to the animal species separation between consignments, <i>unloading/loading</i> , housing, yards, <u>safe</u> restraint <u>and handling</u> , isolation, <i>vector</i> control, and for undertaking interventions required by <i>risk analysis</i> and/or relevant disease-specific chapters of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> , including sample collection, testing, <i>vaccination</i> , treatment and veterinary inspection. Rationale: Addition of “and equipment” for consistency with other bullets in 5.7.4 (ex: bullet 3) and “safe” restraint “and handling” to emphasize the importance of safety for personnel and animals by preventing injury and/or accidental escape, particularly of large animals.	Agreed to add ‘and equipment’ Did not agree to add ‘safe’ as the current text is sufficient. Agreed to add ‘and handling’.
5.7.7._5	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: “Facilities for containment and management of consignments of animals, including as appropriate to the animal species separation between consignments, unloading/loading, housing, <u>feeding, watering</u> , yards, restraint, isolation, vector control, and for undertaking interventions required by risk analysis and/or relevant disease-specific chapters of the Terrestrial Code, including sample collection, testing, vaccination, treatment and veterinary inspection” Rationale: The current wording implies that the feeding and watering of animals is not part of the management of animal consignments. For BIPs feeding and watering is mentioned as an additional requirement for animals	Agreed

	[please refer to Article 5.7.5. 2)]. The requirement for BIPs should also apply to quarantine centres.	

- 11) Equipment for cleaning and *disinfection* and removal of arthropod *vectors* in the facility between consignments of *animals*.

5.7.7._6	Category (change): Proposed amended text: 11) Equipment for cleaning and <i>disinfection</i> and ~~removal of arthropod~~ disinsection ~~vectors~~ in the facility between consignments of <i>animals</i> . Rationale: In the proposed revised chapter, the term of "disinsection" has been added, specifically "means an action intended to kill or eliminate arthropods from establishments, means of transport, slaughterhouses or any other premises or equipment used for animals.", and "disinsection" is still retained in the proposed revised section 5.4. Therefore, from the perspectives of consistency in context expression and language conciseness, it is recommended to unify it as "disinsection".	Agreed

- 12) Operational procedures for cleaning and disinfection, waste management, and control of rodents and potential vectors.

5.7.7._7	Category (editorial and addition): Proposed amended text: ~~Operational procedures~~ SOPs for cleaning and disinfection, waste management, management of sick animals , and control of rodents and potential vectors. Rationale: "SOPs" acronym was introduced above in 5.7.2 and for consistency, should be used throughout; Addition of "management of sick animals" to cover the added requirement from Point 13.	Agreed

- 13) Separate facilities to isolate sick animals.

A *quarantine centre* for isolation of *animals* before exportation should be used to address the specific requirements in disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*. Unless specified in those chapters or importing country requirements, isolation of *animals* before exportation may be performed in other approved facilities.

Article 5.7.8.

Planning for unexpected events

The management of consignments at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* that have failed clearance and have thus been refused transit or import is covered in Chapters 5.4. to 5.6.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that plans are available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* that support responses to foreseeable but uncommon events. The plans should address communication, *biosecurity*, health and safety, and *animal welfare* in each instance, and may cover:

5.7.8._1	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: The <i>Veterinary Authority</i> or other relevant <i>Competent Authorities</i> should ensure that <u>plans SOPs</u> are available to personnel at <i>border inspection posts</i> and <i>quarantine centres</i> that support responses to foreseeable but uncommon events. The <u>plans SOPs</u> should address communication, <i>biosecurity</i>, health and safety, and <i>animal welfare</i> in each instance, and may cover: Rationale: “SOPs” acronym was introduced above in 5.7.2 and for consistency, should be used throughout.	Did not agree as this is the planning for unexpected events. There are no specific SOPs for unexpected events.

- Unexpected arrival of *commodities*.
- Evidence of a *listed disease* or a disease included in the *transit* or *importing country* requirements in a consignment of imported or transiting *animals* at a *border inspection post* or *quarantine centre*.
- Veterinary emergency in *animals* at a *border inspection post* or undergoing post-arrival isolation in a *quarantine centre*.
- Escape of *animals* or unwanted entry of animals.
- Evidence of *animal products* presenting a risk to animal or public health.
- Natural disasters and interruption of critical services threatening the operation of the *border inspection post* or *quarantine centre*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
7.5.30_1	Category (general): The Member thanks the Code Commission and in general supports this revised Chapter. The Member would like to propose some comments.	Noted.
7.5.30_2	Comment Category: General In general, Member supports the draft new Chapter and has inserted some comments throughout the chapter for the consideration of the Commission	Noted.
7.5.30_3	• Category: General Comment The Member agrees with the proposed revision not to accept the use of the 1000 Hz frequency for water-bath stunning, as proposed by certain countries, given the current lack of sufficient scientific evidence as presented by the Code Commission.	Noted.
7.5.30_4	Category: General Member thanks WOAHA for its work in amending this chapter's article 30. We can in general support the changes made. Yet, we do still have one additional comment as indicated below. Supporting evidence: not relevant	Noted.
7.5.30_5	Member generally supports the modifications to the article. Please find our comments below.	Noted.

CHAPTER 7.5. ANIMAL WELFARE DURING SLAUGHTER

[...]

Article 7.5.30.

Electrical water-bath stunning for poultry

1. Animal welfare concerns

In electrical water-bath stunning poultry are inverted and shackled by the legs from a shackle line. The bird's head has direct contact with the water-bath, and an electric current is passed from the water through the bird to the leg shackle. Hazards that may prevent effective electrical stunning are: lack of contact between head and water, differences in individual bird resistance, improper system grounding, pre-stun shocks due to wings contacting water before the head, and the use of inappropriate electrical parameters (low voltage/current or high frequency).

7.5.30_1	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: <i>Hazards</i> that may prevent effective electrical <i>stunning</i> are: lack of contact between head	Did not agree, as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

	and water, differences in individual bird resistance, improper system grounding, <u>excessive line speed</u>, pre-stun shocks due to wings contacting water before the head, and the use of inappropriate electrical parameters (low voltage/current or high frequency). Rationale: While “inappropriate line speed” is listed below as a hazard that increases the likelihood of animals experiencing pre-stun shocks, excessive line speeds <i>also</i> increase the risk that birds will fail to be effectively stunned. The reason for this is that waterbath stunning systems are engineered based on certain presumptions for how fast the slaughter line will run. When slaughter lines move faster than this, birds necessarily spend a shorter amount of time with their heads submerged in the waterbath. With the systems utilized in the U.S., any increase in line speed would necessitate that the length of the waterbath be increased in order to keep the percentage of appropriately stunned birds the same. Bilgili (1999) reports that, in the 1990s, slaughter plants in the U.S. lengthen their stunning cabinets from 6 to up to 14 feet in order to increase dwell time in the water bath and decrease the total resistance in the stunner. Further increases in line speeds will reduce dwell time in the water bath and thus increase risk of ineffective stunning. This point is reiterated by EFSA (2019): “Slaughterhouse design and construction should take into account the expected throughput rates, and the water-bath stunner should be of sufficient length to achieve effective stunning. Increasing the line speed with no other process changes would lead to shorter exposures to electrical water-bath stunning, with severe welfare consequences. In this situation, reducing throughput rate is probably the only preventive measure that can be implemented.” Supporting Evidence: Bilgili S. F. (1999). Recent advances in electrical stunning. <i>Poultry science</i>, 78(2), 282–286. https://doi.org/10.1093/ps/78.2.282	

Hazards that increase the likelihood of animals experiencing pre-stun shocks are: poor handling at shackling, inappropriate line speed, physical contact between birds, incorrect angle of entry ramp, entry ramp wetted by charged water, incorrect water-bath height, and shallow immersion.

Factors affecting individual bird resistance include the resistance between the shackle and the leg (leg/shackle interface), shackling on top of a severed foot, shackling by one leg, poor shackle position, incorrect shackle size, dry shackles, scale on the shackle surface, and keratinised skin on the legs (e.g. older birds).

Where ~~insufficient~~ ~~inappropriate~~ electrical stunning parameters are used, conscious animals are at risk of being electro-immobilised or paralysed causing pain and suffering.

7.5.30._2	Category: Change Proposed amended text: Where ~~insufficient~~ ~~inappropriate~~ <u>ineffective</u> electrical <u>stunning</u> parameters are used, conscious animals are at risk of being electro-immobilised or paralysed causing <u>pain</u> and suffering. Rationale: Member suggests 'ineffective' in which is the opposite of effective, is more suitable in the sentences because it incorporates the idea of being technically correct and powerful enough to deliver the desired welfare outcome. Supporting evidence: not relevant.	Did not agree, as the term 'insufficient' implies a quantitative meaning, which does not apply to frequency, and the term 'ineffective' cannot be applied to parameters. The parameters should a priori be appropriate for stunning to be effective (something that can be verifiable only a posteriori).

7.5.30._3	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Where inappropriate electrical stunning parameters are used, conscious animals are at risk of being electro-immobilised or paralysed causing pain and suffering. <u>Because it is difficult or impossible to distinguish unconscious birds from birds who have been electro-immobilized, it is essential to use only electrical parameters that have been proven to reliably result in unconsciousness.</u> Rationale: It is widely recognized that electroimmobilization (paralyzing animals with electricity without first inducing unconsciousness) is highly aversive and unacceptable on animal welfare grounds (AVMA 2024, p 48-49, 56, 75, 119, 124; EFSA 2019, p 24). With electroimmobilization, birds continuing to experience pain, fear, and other negative affective states during the slaughter process (e.g., neck cutting and exsanguination), even as they are rendered incapable of demonstrating signs of consciousness. It is essential that the WOAHL slaughter code clearly communicate that it not possible to determine, via observation,	Did not agree, as this additional text did not add to the clarity of the recommendation as adopted in May 2025.

	whether an animal is electroimmobilized or has been rendered unconscious (EFSA 2019) Supporting evidence: American Veterinary Medical Association. (2024). AVMA Guidelines for the Humane Slaughter of Animals: 2024 Edition. https://www.avma.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/Humane-Slaughter-Guidelines-2024.pdf EFSA AHAW Panel (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Animal Welfare), Nielsen SS, Alvarez J, Bicout DJ, Calistri P, Depner K, Drewe JA, Garin-Bastuji B, Gonzales Rojas JL, Gortázar Schmidt C, Miranda Chueca MÁ, Roberts HC, Sihvonen LH, Spooler H, Stahl K, Velarde Calvo A, Viltrop A, Winckler C, Candiani D, Fabris C, Van der Stede Y and Michel V, 2019. Scientific opinion on Slaughter of animals: poultry. <i>EFSA Journal</i> 2019;17(11):5849, 91 pp. https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5849	
7.5.30._4	The Member suggests amending the paragraph above as follows: ‘Where inappropriate electrical stunning parameters are used, conscious animals are at risk of being electro-immobilised or paralysed causing pain and suffering. <u>Due to the difficulty of distinguishing unconscious from electro-immobilised birds, it is therefore of particular importance that electrical parameters, which have been proven to be effective, are rigorously followed.</u>’ <u>Justification:</u> The Member would like to stress the importance of not electro-immobilising animals. EFSA notes (EFSA, Slaughter poultry 2019): • Due to the complexity of multiple bird waterbath stunning (EFSA, 2004), it is very difficult to distinguish birds that are electrically immobilised but still conscious – a result of using inappropriate electrical stunning parameters – from those that are correctly rendered unconscious through use of appropriate parameters (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2012b). • (...) using inappropriate electrical stunning parameters will induce electrical immobilisation rather than unconsciousness. https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5849	Did not agree. See the explanation above.

7.5.30._5	Categoría: Editorial y Adición Texto modificado propuesto: En artículo 7.5.30 - Ítem 1 – Precauciones de bienestar animal: Cuando se utilizan parámetros inapropiados de aturdimiento eléctrico (frecuencia y amplitud de corriente, tipo de corriente, duración del aturdimiento o tiempo de inmersión), los animales conscientes corren el riesgo de electro-inmovilizarse o paralizarse causándoles dolor y sufrimiento, por lo que un inadecuado mantenimiento del tanque de agua representa un peligro que aumenta la probabilidad de un aturdimiento no uniforme e inefectivo. Los equipos eléctricos mal mantenidos o utilizados incorrectamente pueden generar un sufrimiento extremo para el animal y así como comprometer la seguridad de los operarios. Previo al sacrificio, el manejo y la manipulación de las aves deben evitar el dolor y el miedo, así como daños evitables al ave y a la canal. Justificación: Ajuste de error de digitación. Igualmente, Se sugiere adicionar el texto ya que se percibe la ausencia de recomendaciones que enfatizen la importancia del mantenimiento (calibración) de los equipos utilizados en el sacrificio de los animales, tanto por el bienestar de estos como la seguridad de los operarios. Evidencia documentada, si corresponde: HSA. Electrical Waterbath Stunning of Poultry. 2016. https://www.hsa.org.uk/downloads/hsagn7waterbathpoultryapril2016pdfoptimiser.pdf	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently taking in consideration only the first part of the proposed amendments, which add indeed clarity to the term 'parameters'.

2. Animal-based and other measures

Multiple indicators should be used to determine whether a stun is effective and the animal is unconscious. Animal-based measures of an effective stun are: tonic-clonic seizures; apnoea; and absence of corneal or palpebral reflex.

7.5.30._6	Category: Deletion Proposed amended text: Animal-based measures of an effective stun are: tonic-clonic seizure; apnoea; and absence of corneal or palpebral reflex. Rationale: Member suggests to remove the animal based measure clonic seizures. To our knowledge, clonic seizures are not an animal-based measure of an effective stun in poultry stunned by electrical waterbath, therefore Member's legislation does not refer to clonic seizures as a measure for an effective stun. EFSA scientific opinion on monitoring procedures at	Did not agree as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

	slaughterhouses for poultry (https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2013.3521) and the EFSA Opinion on slaughter of animals (poultry) (https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5849) only mention tonic seizures as a measure for an effective stun.	

Animal-based measures of ineffective stun or recovery of consciousness are: vocalisation; spontaneous blinking; righting reflex; presence of corneal or palpebral reflex; rhythmic breathing; spontaneous swallowing; and head shaking.

7.5.30._7	Proposed amended text: Animal-based measures of ineffective stun or recovery of consciousness are: ~~vocalisation; spontaneous blinking; righting reflex; presence of corneal or palpebral reflex; rhythmic breathing; spontaneous swallowing; and head shaking.~~ breathing (identified by movements of the beak or abdominal muscles), wing flapping and making efforts to stand upright. RATIONALE: Language in Point 2 is more applicable to livestock and should be edited to reflect poultry signs of regaining consciousness to align with this section concerning electrical water-bath stunning for poultry. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9951727/	Did not agree, as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

7.5.30._8	Category: Insertion Proposed amended text: Animal-based measures of ineffective stun or recovery of consciousness are: vocalisation; spontaneous blinking; righting reflex; presence of corneal or palpebral reflex; rhythmic breathing; spontaneous swallowing; <u>wing flapping</u>; and head shaking. Rationale: Member suggests to include wing flapping as an animal based measure of an ineffective stun or recovery of consciousness as it is associated with unconsciousness according to the EFSA scientific opinion on monitoring procedures at slaughterhouses for poultry (https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2013.3521) and the EFSA Opinion on slaughter of animals (poultry) (https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5849).	Did not agree as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

7.5.30._9	Categoría adición: Texto modificado propuesto (o supresión sugerida): Las medidas basadas en el animal para un <i>aturdimiento</i> ineficaz o recuperación de la consciencia	Did not agree, as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

	son: vocalización, parpadeo espontáneo, reflejo de enderezamiento, presencia del reflejo corneal o palpebral, respiración rítmica, deglución espontánea sacudidas de cabeza y movimiento de alas Justificación: Se sugiere incluir movimiento de alas, como indicativo de un mal aturdimiento Evidencia documentada/ Supporting Evidence: Reglamento UE/EU Regulation 1099/2009 UE.	

7.5.30._10	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Animal-based measures of ineffective stun or recovery of consciousness are: vocalisation; spontaneous blinking; righting reflex; presence of corneal or palpebral reflex; rhythmic breathing; spontaneous swallowing; wing flapping during bleeding, and head shaking. Rationale: While wing flapping may occur in unconscious birds during or immediately after electrical stunning, wing flapping during bleeding has been found to be among the most relevant indicators of consciousness for turkeys after waterbath stunning (Contreras-Jodar et al 2023). Supporting Evidence: Contreras-Jodar, A., Varvaró-Porter, A., Velarde, A., & Michel, V. (2023). Relevant Indicators of Consciousness after Waterbath Stunning in Turkeys and Stunning Efficiency in Commercial Conditions. <i>Animals : an open access journal from MDPI</i>, 13(4), 668. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani13040668	Did not agree, as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

7.5.30._11	Categoría: Adición Texto modificado propuesto: En artículo 7.5.30 - Ítem 2 – Medidas basadas en el animal: Las medidas basadas en el animal para determinar que hubo un aturdimiento eficaz son: presencia de convulsiones tónico-clónicas (temblores corporales y contracciones leves y rápidas de las alas), apnea (ausencia de respiración), ausencia del reflejo corneal,	Did not agree, as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

	ausencia del reflejo palpebral. <u>Siempre se deben evaluar varios reflejos y comportamientos para llegar a una conclusión fiable, y nunca confiarse en uno solo.</u> Las medidas basadas en el animal para <u>determinar que hubo</u> un aturdimiento ineficaz o recuperación de la consciencia son: <u>presencia de</u> vocalizaciones—ón, parpadeo espontáneo, reflejo de enderezamiento, <u>presencia del</u> reflejo corneal o palpebral, <u>reflejo de la membrana nictitante</u>, respiración rítmica, deglución espontánea y sacudidas de cabeza. <u>Incluso la ausencia de convulsiones puede indicar un aturdimiento ineficaz.</u> Justificación: Se sugieren estos ajustes para tener un texto más claro. Evidencia documentada/ Supporting Evidence: HSA. Electrical Waterbath Stunning of Poultry. 2016. Pg. 59 (table 7a). https://www.hsa.org.uk/downloads/hsagn7waterbathpoultryapril2016pdfoptimiser.pdf	

3. Recommendations

The height of the water-bath stunner should be adjusted so that the birds' heads are completely immersed in the water. Avoid distractions such as people walking under the birds because this can cause birds to pull up.

7.5.30._12	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: The height of the water-bath stunner should be adjusted so that the birds' heads are completely immersed in the water, <u>reaching up to the base of the wings.</u> Rationale: To ensure the birds' head is completely immersed. Supporting evidence: Malaysian Protocol for the Halal Meat and Poultry Production.	Did not agree, as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.
7.5.30._13	Comment Category: change Proposed amended text: The height of the water-bath stunner should be adjusted <u>as needed</u> so that <u>all the</u> birds' heads are completely immersed in the water. Avoid distractions such as people walking under the birds because this can cause birds to pull up.	Did not agree, as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

	Rationale: The water bath should also be adjusted throughout the day as needed to ensure that the heads of even the smallest birds are submerged under water.	

Personnel should watch for short or stunted birds as these birds will not be able to make contact with the water and will not be stunned. These birds should be stunned in the slaughter line (e.g. penetrative captive bolt) or removed and euthanised.

7.5.30._14	Proposed amended text: Personnel should watch for short or stunted birds as these birds will not be able to make contact with the water and will not be stunned. These birds should be ~~stunned in the slaughter line (e.g. penetrative captive bolt)~~ or removed and euthanised. RATIONALE: Recommend deleting stunning in the slaughter line language, as the referenced birds (i.e. short or stunted) would not realistically continue in the slaughter line.	Did not agree, as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

7.5.30._15	Category (addition, deletion, change, editorial, general): Editorial. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): Personnel should watch for short or stunted birds as these birds will not be able to make contact with the water and will not be stunned. These birds should be stunned in the slaughter line (e.g. <u>non</u> -penetrative captive bolt) or removed and euthanised. Rationale: We have identified a typo here as only non-penetrative captive bolt is used to stun poultry, generally with the cash special captive bolt gun. Supporting evidence: not relevant.	Did not agree, as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

7.5.30._16	Categoría: Adición Texto modificado propuesto: En artículo 7.5.30 – Ítem 3 – Recomendaciones: El personal deberá estar atento a las aves pequeñas o con retrasos de crecimiento, ya que puede que no entren en contacto con el agua y no se aturdan. Estas aves deberán <u>inmediatamente</u> aturdirse en la línea de sacrificio <u>con un método de aturdimiento alternativo</u> (por ejemplo, perno cautivo penetrante) <u>y sangrarse; si</u>	Did not agree, as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

	<u>esto no es posible, las aves deberán retirarse y ser sacrificadas de emergencia o someterlas a eutanasia.</u> Justificación: Ajustes para mejorar la comprensión del texto. No estamos seguros del uso de la palabra “eutanasia” en este contexto, esto sería más un sacrificio de emergencia. Evidencia documentada/ Supporting evidence: HSA. Electrical Waterbath Stunning of Poultry. 2016. https://www.hsa.org.uk/downloads/hsagn7waterbathpoultryapril2016pdfoptimiser.pdf	

The rail of the shackle line should run smoothly. Sudden movement such as jolts, drops or sharp curves in the line may cause birds to flap and avoid the stunner.

7.5.30._17	Proposed amended text: The rail of the shackle line should run smoothly, use breast rubs and be dimly lit. Sudden movement such as jolts, drops or sharp curves in the line may cause birds to flap and avoid the stunner. RATIONALE: : Both appropriate lighting (i.e., dim lighting, blue lighting) to keep birds calm during and after shackling (pre-stun) and use of appropriate and well-maintained breast rubs from the shackling area to the entrance to the stunner keep birds calm and reduce wing movement, vocalization and stress prior to stunning. https://www.avma.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/Humane-Slaughter-Guidelines-2024.pdf	Did not agree, as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

To minimise any disturbance to birds during shackling, where shackles are wet to improve conductivity, they should be wetted only prior to birds' legs being placed in them.

7.5.30._18	Categoría cambio: Texto modificado propuesto (o supresión sugerida): Con el fin de minimizar cualquier perturbación en las aves durante la suspensión, cuando los ganchos se humedecen para mejorar la conductividad, <u>deberá hacerse</u>, sólo justo antes de colgar a las aves por las patas. Justificación: Mejora: ... deberá hacerse, sólo justo...	Did not agree. Translation was deemed correct.

Pre-stun shocks should be avoided and can be reduced by having a smooth shackle line and entry to the water-bath and by adjusting the water level of the bath to minimise overflow.

In the case of ineffective [stunning](#) or recovery, animals should be re-stunned using a backup system or be killed immediately. Ineffective [stunning](#) or return to consciousness should be systematically recorded and the cause of the failure identified and rectified.

[Stunning](#) equipment should be used, cleaned, maintained and stored following the manufacturer's recommendations.

Constant current stunners should be preferred to constant voltage stunners because the former ensure that the minimum current is provided to the animals independently from their impedance.

Regular calibration of the equipment according to the manufacturer's procedure is recommended. Effectiveness of the [stunning](#) should be monitored regularly.

7.5.30._19	Category : change Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): Regular calibration of the equipment according to the manufacturer's procedure is recommended. Effectiveness of the stunning should be monitored regularly constantly. Rationale: Member suggests that the effectiveness of stunning should be a constant check for personnel to ensure that stunning issues are corrected immediately.	Did not agree, as outside the scope of the current revision of the article, which is the electrical parameters.

[Slaughterhouses/abattoirs](#) should have standard operating procedures that define key operating parameters or follow the manufacturer's recommendations for [stunning](#), such as:

7.5.30._20	Categoría: Editorial Texto modificado propuesto: En artículo 7.5.30 – Ítem 3 – Recomendaciones: Las plantas de sacrificio ~~Los mataderos~~ deberán disponer de procedimientos operativos estándar que definan los parámetros operativos esenciales o deberán seguir las recomendaciones del fabricante para el aturdimiento (...) Justificación: Se ha solicitado en varias ocasiones a la OMSA el cambio de “matadero” por “planta de sacrificio” por una cuestión semántica y de impacto en la sociedad. Evidencia documentada/ Supporting evidence: N/A	Did not agree. It is a defined term in the Glossary.

- water level;

7.5.30._21	Proposed amended text: • salinity (salt concentration) • water temperature RATIONALE: Recommend adding salinity and water temperature as important operating parameters. https://www.avma.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/Humane-Slaughter-Guidelines-2024.pdf	Agreed, as it adds to the accurateness of the modified paragraph below relative to electrical currents.

- number of birds in the water-bath;
- contact between water and head, as well as between the legs and the leg shackle;
- electrical parameters (current intensity [A], waveform type [AC and DC], voltage [V] and frequency [Hz]);
- visual or auditory warning system to alert the operator to proper or improper function, such as a device that monitors and displays voltage and applied current.

Ensure an optimum combination of **intensity**, voltage and frequency **(for DC)** during electrical water-bath *stunning* practices, to maximise the effectiveness of *stunning*. **Lower frequencies ensure an effective stunning. Higher frequencies provide the lowest probability of a successful stun even at the highest intensity.**

7.5.30._22	Proposed amended text: Ensure an optimum combination of minimum current intensity , voltage and frequency (for DC) during electrical water-bath <i>stunning</i> practices, to maximise the effectiveness of <i>stunning</i> . Lower frequencies ensure an effective stunning. Higher frequencies provide the lowest probability of a successful stun even at the highest current intensity. RATIONALE: Recommend the addition of “minimum current” to better describe “intensity” and clarify parameters are <i>minimum</i> values which may need to be increased, depending on the resistance of the animal. Misinterpretation of recommended values can lead to under stunning.	Agreed with rationale, however the text was amended differently.

7.5.30._23	Category: Change Proposed amended text: ~~Ensure an optimum~~ <u>The</u> combination of intensity, voltage and frequency ~~(for DC AC) during electrical water-bath stunning practices, to maximise the~~ <u>should ensure</u> effectiveness of stunning. Lower frequencies ensure an effective stunning. Higher frequencies provide the lowest probability of a successful stun even at the highest intensity. Rationale: Only alternating currents (AC) have a frequency. Furthermore, effective stunning should be achieved but	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

	can only be ‘maximised’ to the extent acceptable with regards to meat quality. Lastly, starting the sentence with ‘Ensure’ is inconsistent with the wording of the other points of this paragraph. The reference to ‘electrical water bath stunning’ is redundant because the entire Article is about this method. Supporting evidence: Concerning AC: EFSA 2004, https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2004.45, p. 50/79	

7.5.30._24	Category: Deletion and addition Proposed amended text: Ensure an optimum combination of <u>current intensity</u>, voltage and frequency <u>(for DC)</u> during electrical water-bath <i>stunning</i> practices, to maximise the effectiveness of <i>stunning</i>. <u>Compared to sine wave AC, DC currents are less effective at consistently producing an effective stun and frequently result in conscious birds experiencing cardiac arrest; therefore, they should not be used. Lower frequencies ensure increase the probability of an effective stunning.</u> Rationale: The parenthetical “(DC)” does not make sense here. The combination of intensity (amperes), voltage (volts) and frequency (hertz) is important for the effectiveness of AC currents. Since DC currents are far less effective at rendering birds insensible compared to sine wave AC, they may result in a significant percentage of birds being electroimmobilized rather than rendered unconscious, and frequently result in cardiac arrest in conscious birds, it is essential that use of DC currents be strongly discouraged (Raj et al, 2006a; Raj et al, 2006b, McKeegan & Martin 2020; Shields & Raj 2010; Raj et al 2006a). Because of the difficulty in distinguishing an electroimmobilized bird from one effectively stunned with waterbath stunning (McKeegan & Martin 2020), it is essential that the WOA code provide clear and direct language regarding recommended stunning parameters. The word “current” is more often used in the scientific literature than “intensity” alone. Being consistent with the science would aid understanding, therefore either “current” or “current intensity” is recommended, rather than the term “intensity” (see HSA Summary of electrical terminology.” Finally, “increase the probability of” is preferred to “ensure” because it is unlikely that effective stunning will ever be 100% ensured.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

	Supporting Evidence: Humane Slaughter Association. (2016). Guidance Note 7: Electrical Waterbath Stunning of Poultry. https://www.hsa.org.uk/downloads/hsagn7waterbathpoultryapril2016pdfoptimiser.pdf Humane Slaughter Association. (n.d.). Summary of electrical terminology. https://www.hsa.org.uk/operating-an-electrical-waterbath/summary-of-electrical-terminology McKeegan, D. & Martin, J. (2020). Improving welfare in poultry slaughter. In C. Nicol (Ed), <i>Understanding the behaviour and improving the welfare of chickens</i>. Burleigh Dodds Science Publishing, Cambridge, UK. Raj, A.B.M (2006) Recent developments in stunning and slaughter of poultry. <i>World's Poultry Science Journal</i>, 62, 467-484. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043933906001097 Raj, M., O'Callaghan, M. and Hughes, S. (2006a). The effects of amount and frequency of pulsed direct current used in water bath stunning and of slaughter methods on spontaneous electroencephalograms in broilers. <i>Animal Welfare</i> 15, 19-24. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233505080_The_effects_of_amount_and_frequency_of_pulsed_direct_current_used_in_water_bath_stunning_and_of_slaughter_methods_on_spontaneous_electroencephalograms_in_broilers Raj, M., O'Callaghan, M. and Hughes, S. (2006b). The effects of pulse width of a direct current used in water bath stunning and of slaughter methods on spontaneous electroencephalograms in broilers. <i>Animal Welfare</i> 15, 25-30. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233602539_The_effects_of_pulse_width_of_a_direct_current_used_in_water_bath_stunning_and_of_slaughter_methods_on_spontaneous_electroencephalograms_in_broilers Raj, A.B.M, O'Callaghan M., and Knowles T.G. (2006c). The effects of amount and frequency of alternating current used in waterbath stunning and of slaughter methods on electroencephalograms in broilers. <i>Animal Welfare</i>, 15, 7-18. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233504118_The_effects_of_amount_and_frequency_of_alternating_current_used_in_water_bath_stunning_and_of_slaughter_methods_on_electroencephalograms_in_broilers	

	Shields, S. J., & Raj, A. B. (2010). A critical review of electrical water-bath stun systems for poultry slaughter and recent developments in alternative technologies. <i>Journal of applied animal welfare science</i> : JAAWS, 13(4), 281–299. https://doi.org/10.1080/10888705.2010.507119	

7.5.30._25	Category: change Proposed amended text : Ensure an optimum combination of intensity, voltage and frequency (for AC and pulsed DC) during electrical water-bath stunning practices, to maximise the effectiveness of stunning. Lower frequencies ensure an effective stunning. Higher frequencies provide the lowest probability of a successful stun even at the highest intensity. Rationale: Frequency is emphasized as a parameter that only alternating current and pulsed direct current possess. Supporting evidence: not relevant	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

7.5.30._26	Comment: addition Proposed amended text: Ensure an optimum combination of time, intensity, voltage and frequency (for DC) during electrical water-bath <u>stunning</u> practices, to maximise the effectiveness of <u>stunning</u>. Lower frequencies ensure an effective stunning. Higher frequencies provide the lowest probability of a successful stun even at the highest intensity. Rationale: Time, as noted below in point 4 is also an important factor to maximise the effectiveness of stunning.	Agreed with the rationale, however the text was amended differently.

7.5.30._27	The Member suggests amending the 1st sentence as follows: ~~'Ensure an optimum~~ The combination of intensity, voltage and frequency (for ~~DC~~) during ~~electrical water-bath stunning practices, to maximise the~~ <u>should ensure effectiveness of</u> stunning.'	Agreed as it adds clarity.

	<u>Justification:</u> Only alternating currents (AC) have a frequency. We also note that, for direct currents, the pulse width (or mark-space ratio) is a key parameter as regards the stunning outcome and that this is not reflected in the current text [EFSA 2004, https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2004.45, p. 50/79 & EFSA 2019, https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5849, p. 22]. Furthermore, effective stunning should be achieved but can only be 'maximised' to the extent acceptable with regards to meat quality. Lastly, starting the sentence with 'Ensure' is inconsistent with the wording of the other points of this paragraph. The reference to 'electrical water bath stunning' is redundant because the entire Article is about this method.	

Hazards to animal welfare such as inversion of conscious birds, pre-stun shocks, and variability in electrical current delivered to each bird are inherent risks of electrical water-bath stunning. Thus, alternative stunning systems which avoid these associated hazards should be preferred.

4. Species-specific recommendations

Effective electrical parameters should be based on scientific evidence for different species of birds.

Effective electrical parameters should be based on scientific data with field evidence on the welfare outcomes for different types and conditions of animals in accordance with point 5 of Article 7.1.4.

7.5.30._28	Categoría: Editorial Texto modificado propuesto: En artículo 7.5.30 – Ítem 4 – Recomendaciones específicas según la especie: Los parámetros eléctricos eficaces para los diferentes tipos de aves <u>y animales</u> se deberán determinar a partir de la evidencia científica. ~~Los parámetros eléctricos eficaces para los diferentes tipos de animales se deberán determinar a partir de los datos científicos de bienestar~~ de conformidad con el apartado 5 del Artículo 7.1.4. Justificación: Se sugiere unir los dos párrafos en uno. Evidencia documentada/ Supporting evidence:: N/A	Did not agree. The proposed text does not add clarity in relation to the modified text.

For water-bath stunning depending on the frequency, minimum recommended parameters intensities are recommended for the following species are:

7.5.30._29	Proposed amended text: For water-bath <u>stunning</u> depending on the frequency, <u>minimum recommended parameters</u> <u>minimum current intensities</u> are recommended for the following species <u>are</u>:	Agreed, comment addressed below.

	RATIONALE: Recommend the addition of “minimum current” to better describe “intensity” and clarify parameters are <i>minimum</i> values which may need to be increased, depending on the resistance of the animal. Misinterpretation of recommended values can lead to under stunning.	

7.5.30._30	Category (addition, deletion, change, editorial, general): Change. Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): For water-bath <i>stunning</i> depending on the frequency, minimum recommended parameters intensities <u>minimum currents</u> are recommended for the following species <u>are</u>: Rationale: Minimum current is the parameter name commonly used within the industry. The term ‘intensity’ refers to the Ohms law, where intensity ($I = V/R$) is the electric current through the conductor.	Agreed, comment addressed below.

7.5.30._31	The Member suggests amending the above sentence as follows: ‘For water-bath <i>stunning</i> depending on the frequency, ~~minimum~~ the <u>minimum recommended intensities</u> for the following per frequency and species are:’ <u>Justification:</u> EFSA, in its scientific opinion on Slaughter of animals: poultry (https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5849), observes that the better combination for optimised waterbath stunning is to use sine wave AC no higher than 600 Hz for a duration of 4 s minimum with an average current such as described in its table 2. EFSA also notices that inappropriate electrical stunning parameters will induce electrical immobilisation rather than unconsciousness, preventing them from showing signs of pain and fear.	Agreed with rationale, however the text was amended differently.

- For frequency below 200 Hz:
 - 100 mA for chicken,
 - 250 mA for turkeys,

- 130 mA for ducks and geese,
- 45 mA for quails.
- For frequency from 200 to 400 Hz:
 - 150 mA for chicken,
 - 400 mA for turkeys.
- For frequency from 400-600 Hz:
 - 200 mA for chicken,
 - 400 mA for turkeys.

Birds should receive the current for at least 4 seconds.

For ducks, geese and quails ~~should not be stunned at~~ frequencies higher than 200 Hz will not achieve effective stunning and therefore are not recommended. [under study].

For chicken and turkeys ~~should not be stunned at~~ frequencies higher than 600 Hz will not achieve effective stunning and therefore are not recommended. [under study].

7.5.30._32	Category: General We strongly support the inclusion of these specific parameters. Rationale: These parameters are necessary to ensure that birds are properly stunned. It is difficult to assess an effective electrical stun as birds that are still conscious may be immobilised and incapable of showing certain responses. Supporting evidence: <i>“Due to the complexity of multiple bird waterbath stunning (EFSA, 2004), it is very difficult to distinguish birds that are electrically immobilised but still conscious – a result of using inappropriate electrical stunning parameters – from those that are correctly rendered unconscious through use of appropriate parameters (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2012b).”</i> <i>« Electrical immobilisation of poultry would occur during waterbath stunning when the electrical parameters used for stunning do not induce immediate loss of consciousness indicating a generalised epileptiform activity in the brain (as demonstrated in laboratory studies using EEGs). When conscious birds are electrically immobilised, they will be prevented from showing signs of pain, fear, distress and welfare consequences even though they remain conscious.”</i> EFSA scientific opinion Slaughter of animals: poultry, p. 23 and 24. https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/5849	Noted.
7.5.30._33	Category: Change Proposed amended text:	Did not agree. There are data indicating that some parameters will not be

	For water-bath <i>stunning</i> depending on the frequency, <u>minimum recommended parameters intensities are recommended</u> for the following species <u>are</u>: • For frequency below 200 Hz: ○ 100 mA for chicken, ○ 250 mA for turkeys, ○ 130 mA for ducks and geese, ○ 45 mA for quails. • For frequency from 200 to 400 Hz: ○ 150 mA for chicken, ○ 400 mA for turkeys. • For frequency from 400-600 Hz: ○ 200 mA for chicken, ○ 400 mA for turkeys. Birds should receive the current for at least 4 seconds. <u>Validated parameters outside of these recommendations may be used where the outcome of an effectively stunned bird is demonstrated to be met.</u> <u>For ducks, geese and quails should not be stunned at frequencies higher than 200 Hz will not achieve effective stunning and therefore are not recommended. [under study].</u> <u>For chicken and turkeys should not be stunned at frequencies higher than 600 Hz will not achieve effective stunning and therefore are not recommended. [under study].</u> Rationale: There are many types of electrical frequency and waveform that can be used for stunning, and it is not possible to specify minimum currents for every frequency and waveform. Instead, there should be routine examination of the adequacy of the stunning and neck-cutting procedures. The key factor is that the chosen system should not allow birds to regain consciousness. In addition, the current proposed wording is also unnecessarily limiting, as frequencies above 600Hz are not included when scientific literature shows that higher frequency stunning results in effective stuns when appropriate voltage is used to ensure sufficient amperage to stun. The suggested additional text allows for other parameters to be used provided that the stun is shown to be effective, providing more flexibility, as is required by some countries. Supporting evidence:	effective, and this should be indicated in the article.

	EFSA, (2004) Welfare Aspects of Animal Stunning and Killing Methods: pg 129, 132, 133 “Based on the existing scientific knowledge, it can be suggested that the minimum RMS current necessary to stun chickens would be 100, 150 and 200 mA per bird in a water bath supplied with up to 200, above 200 and up to 400, and above 400 and up to 1500 Hz AC, respectively. When currents of lower than this are applied, the depth and duration of unconsciousness induced by the stun may not be adequate to prevent resumption of consciousness before neck cutting or during bleeding.” Pg 130 “a minimum RMS current of 400 mA, which was found to be satisfactory for head-only electrical stunning of turkeys, could also be recommended for water bath stunning of turkeys with high frequencies of AC or pulsed DC.” – high frequencies were up to 1500Hz. Sabow, A. B., Nakyinsige, K., Adeyemi, K. D., Sazili, A. Q., Johnson, C. B., Webster, J., & Farouk, M. M. (2017). High frequency pre-slaughter electrical stunning in ruminants and poultry for halal meat production: A review. <i>Livestock Science</i>, 202, 124-134.	

7.5.30._34	Category: Change Proposed amended text: Birds should receive the current for at least <u>1-4</u> seconds. Rationale: A period of 4 seconds is not necessary for the effective electrical stunning of poultry. Raj et al (2006) as cited by EFSA (2019) showed that a duration of 1 second is effective for poultry and 3 seconds for poultry is recommended by EFSA 2004. The important outcome is for sufficient current to span the brain as soon as possible after contact with the water bath, to ensure the birds will be effectively stunned. Increasing the duration of application of current may only have a marginal effect on the efficacy of stunning. Supporting evidence: EFSA 2019 Slaughter of Animals: Poultry . Part 3.2.1.1 waterbath, pg 22. EFSA 2004; Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW) on a request from the Commission related to welfare aspects of the main systems of stunning and killing the main commercial species of animals	Did not agree to change at this stage,, but referred to the Secretariat to seek expert opinion again on the appropriate minimum length (not a range) of application of the current.

7.5.30._35	Category: Change Proposed amended text: For water-bath <u>stunning with AC current</u>, depending on the frequency, <u>minimum recommended parameters intensities</u> are recommended for the following species are: • For frequency below 200 Hz: ○ 100 mA for chicken, ○ 250 mA for turkeys, ○ 130 mA for ducks and geese, ○ 45 mA for quails. • For frequency from 200 to 400 Hz: ○ ~~150~~ <u>200</u> mA for chicken, ○ 400 mA for turkeys. • For frequency from 400-600 Hz: ○ ~~200~~ <u>250</u> mA for chicken, ○ 400 mA for turkeys. Rationale: The amperages should be increased for chickens. Under field conditions, Girasole et al. (2016) showed that, using AC waveform, the minimum current necessary to achieve effective stunning in 90% of birds was 200 mA for 400 Hz and 250 mA for 600 Hz. Because 90% is too low (the goal is 100% effective stunning), the milliamperes should be higher. Supporting evidence: Girasole, M., Marrone, R., Anastasio, A., Chianese, A., Mercogliano, R. and Cortesi, M. L. (2016) Effect of electrical water bath stunning on physical reflexes of broilers: evaluation of stunning efficacy under field conditions. Poultry Science 95(5), 1205–1210. https://doi.org/10.3382/PS/PEW017. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0032579119318383 Raj, M., O’Callaghan, M. and Hughes, S. (2006). The effects of amount and frequency of pulsed direct current used in water bath stunning and of slaughter	Did not agree. The experts of the <i>ad hoc</i> group did not consider the new intensities proposed in the comment to be the minimum appropriate; on the contrary, data show that the figures currently proposed for adoption are appropriate.

	methods on spontaneous electroencephalograms in broilers. Animal Welfare 15, 19-24. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233505080_The_effects_of_amount_and_frequency_of_pulsed_direct_current_used_in_water_bath_stunning_and_of_slaughter_methods_on_spontaneous_electroencephalograms_in_broilers	

7.5.30._36	Categoría: Adición Texto modificado propuesto: En artículo 7.5.30 – Ítem 4 – Recomendaciones específicas según la especie: Para una frecuencia inferior a 200 Hz – 100 mA para gallinas pollos – 250 mA para pavos – 130 mA para patos y gansos – 45 mA para codornices Para una frecuencia de 200 a 400 Hz – 150 mA para gallinas pollos – 400 mA para pavos – Esta frecuencia no se recomienda para patos, gansos ni codornices Para una frecuencia de 400^a a 600 Hz – 200 mA para gallinas pollos – 400 mA para pavos – Esta frecuencia no es permitida para patos, gansos ni codornices Frecuencias superiores a 600 Hz no conseguirán un aturdimiento eficaz, por lo tanto, no se recomiendan. Las aves deberán recibir la corriente durante al menos 4 segundos. ~~Para los patos, gansos y las codornices con frecuencias superiores a 200 Hz no se conseguirá un aturdimiento eficaz y, por lo tanto, no se recomiendan. Para las gallinas y pavos con frecuencias superiores a 600 Hz no se conseguirá un aturdimiento eficaz y, por lo tanto, no se recomiendan.~~ Justificación: Se sugiere subir el texto final de este anexo, integrandolo a cada tipo de frecuencia para dar más claridad al texto. Evidencia documentada/ Supporting evidence:: HSA. Electrical Waterbath Stunning of Poultry. 2016. Pg. 49 (table 4).	Did not agree to the comment on the text proposed, as it was adding more confusion than clarity. However, agree to check the Spanish version of the Code for consistency.

	https://www.hsa.org.uk/downloads/hsagn7waterbathpoultryapril2016pdfoptimiser.pdf EFSA. 2019. https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/5849	

7.5.30._37	Category: Addition Proposed amended text: Proposed addition under Section 4: Species-specific recommendations: Higher stunning frequencies may be associated with a faster recovery of consciousness in poultry. Therefore, bleeding should be performed promptly after stunning to prevent potential animal welfare concerns. Rationale: Higher stunning frequencies may be associated with a faster recovery of consciousness in poultry. Therefore, it is essential that bleeding is carried out without delay following stunning, to ensure that the animal remains unconscious throughout the bleeding process. Failure to do so may result in birds regaining consciousness during bleeding, raising significant animal welfare concerns. Supporting evidence: According to 'Higher frequencies provide the lowest probability of a successful stun' as above.	Did not agree. Bleeding should always be done promptly after stunning so there is no need to add it here. Also, high frequencies are not recommended.

7.5.30._38	Category (addition, deletion, change, editorial, general): Addition Proposed amended text (or precise suggested deletion): Section 7.5.30 (4. Species-specific recommendations - last two sentences) ~~For dDucks, geese and quails should not be stunned at frequencies higher than 200 Hz will not achieve effective stunning and therefore are not recommended for use. [under study].~~ ~~For cChicken and turkeys should not be stunned at frequencies higher than 600 Hz will not achieve effective stunning and therefore are not recommended for use. [under study].~~ Rationale:	Did not agree., as it did not add clarity.

	Member suggests that the added words “for use” would help emphasize that the frequencies mentioned should not be used as they can result in animal welfare issues.	

[...]

NOT FOR COMMENT

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.10._1	Category (general): In general, Member supports the draft new Chapter and has inserted some comments throughout the chapter for the consideration of the Commission	Noted
8.10._2	Category (general): Recently, relevant literature shows that JEV can infect sheep, and sheep are susceptible to JEV infection and develop viremia, with levels and duration comparable to those observed in pigs. Mosquitoes fed viremic sheep blood showed an infection rate of 40.6 to 57.1%. —statistically similar to pig-derived data. These findings suggest sheep are novel potential amplifying host, establishing a "mosquito-sheep-mosquito" transmission cycle in sheep-rearing regions. If sheep are not designated as JEV quarantine objects, infected animals transported via international trade could present a critical risk: under current WOAHP policies, importing countries/regions cannot legally prohibit trade or implement disposal measures for sheep. This scenario would threaten susceptible populations—including pigs, equids, and humans—in importing regions, potentially triggering public health crises. Therefore, it is recommended to explicitly list sheep as quarantine and control targets for Japanese encephalitis within the code. Supporting evidence: Zhang H, Li D, Jiyang Z, Jingyue B, Zhiliang W, Yafeng Q, et al. Sheep serve as amplifying hosts of Japanese encephalitis virus, increasing the risk of human infection. Sci Adv. 2025;11:eads7441.	Did not agree as this needs further expert consultation. The Code Commission agreed to share this comment with subject-matter experts for input and to address it at its future meeting. Refer to item 6.4. of the report.
8.10._3	Category (general): The Member agrees with the newly revised Chapter, which includes a precise definition of Japanese encephalitis, identification of animal hosts (suids, equids, and wild birds), as well as the definition of infection with Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) and the infective period, which is defined as seven days. Moreover, we support the clear designation of equids as dead-end hosts that do not pose a risk of transmission, and therefore, equids and their products are not considered a transmission risk. Furthermore, the Member supports the inclusion of trade recommendations for suids in both JEV-free and JEV-infected countries, zones, and	Noted

	compartments, as well as surveillance and protective measures, including prevention of culicine mosquito bites in suid populations.	
8.10._4	Category (general): The Member supports this revised chapter and thanks the Code Commission for moving forward with it.	Noted

CHAPTER 8.10.

INFECTION WITH JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS VIRUS (JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS)

Article 8.10.1.

8.10.1._1	Category (general): The introductory paragraph should reflect the epidemiologically significant species, which the conditions of the chapter apply to, as well as other dead-end hosts which the conditions of the chapter do not. We request this is reflected more clearly such as in the PPRV and Aujeszky's disease virus, in which susceptible species are considered epidemiologically significant vs dead-end, and there is consistency on how the chapter applies to domestic vs wild susceptible species.	Noted. The current paragraph is sufficient for the purposes of this chapter. For more information, the Terrestrial Manual should be consulted.
8.10.1._2	Category (general): Proposed amended text: Member appreciates the recognition of the role of equids as dead-end hosts and supports the clarification that their infection does not affect a country's JE status. Propose including a clarification that Member is currently free of Japanese Encephalitis (JE), and that surveillance is important to detect any incursions, given the potential risk due to migratory birds and climate change. "WOAH is encouraged to promote awareness of these provisions to prevent the imposition of unjustified sanitary barriers, particularly affecting trade in pork and related products." Rationale: This will emphasize Member's current freedom from JE while underscoring the need for vigilance due to changing ecological patterns.	Did not agree as the proposed text is not in line with the scope of the disease-specific chapter of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> .

General provisions

Japanese encephalitis is a *vector-borne* disease of significant importance to public health transmitted by bites of culicine mosquitoes. Suids are considered amplifying hosts and wild birds are considered to be reservoir and amplifying hosts. Equids are dead-end hosts and therefore, equids and their products do not present a risk of transmission. However, equids may be useful sentinels for the early detection of Japanese encephalitis to mitigate animal health and public health risks posed by the pathogenic agent.

8.10.1._3	Category (change): Proposed amended text: Japanese encephalitis is a vector-borne disease of significant importance to public health transmitted by bites of culicine mosquitoes. ~~Suids are considered amplifying hosts and wild birds are considered to be reservoir and amplifying hosts. Although not the primary route of transmission, direct oronasal transmission between suids can also occur, potentially playing a role in the virus's maintenance and spread. Direct evidence (virus, viral antigen or viral RNA) of JEV infection has been identified in a variety of mammals and birds, including suids, human, equids, bats, passerine birds, livestock such as bovid and caprina, and carnivores such as meerkats and dogs. Therefore, although suids are conventionally considered amplifying hosts and wild birds are considered to be reservoir and amplifying hosts, the role of other animals as the alternative transmission cycle should be considered.~~ Rationale: Increasing numbers of studies have shown the evidences of JEV identified from different animals, such as sheep, cows or dogs. Alternative route of viral transmission, such as oronasal secretion among pigs, has been suggested playing important role in viral spread within herds. Sheep as an alternative amplifying host of JEV has also been suggested. Supporting evidence: Zhang H, Li D, Jiyang Z, Jingyue B, Zhiliang W, Yafeng Q, et al. Sheep serve as amplifying hosts of Japanese encephalitis virus, increasing the risk of human infection. Sci Adv. 2025;11:eads7441. Levesque ZA, Walsh MG, Webb CE, Zadoks RN, Brookes VJ. A scoping review of evidence of naturally occurring Japanese encephalitis virus infection in vertebrate animals other than humans, ardeid birds, and pigs. PLOS Negl Trop Dis. 2024;18(10):e0012510.	Did not agree as this information should be explained in the Terrestrial Manual. Regarding 'sheep', refer to 6.4. of the report.

	Ricklin M, García-Nicolás O, Brechbühl D, Python S, Zumkehr B, Nougairède A, et al. Vector-free transmission and persistence of Japanese encephalitis virus in pigs. Nat Commun. 2016;7:10832.	
8.10.1._4	Category (addition and change): Proposed amended text: Japanese encephalitis is a <i>vector</i>-borne disease of significant importance to public health transmitted by bites of culicine mosquitoes. <u>Humans and a wide range of animals are susceptible species for JE virus, however, only suids and wild birds are epidemiologically significant.</u> Suids are considered amplifying hosts, and wild birds are considered to be reservoir and amplifying hosts. Equids, <u>cattle, dogs, and goats</u> are dead-end hosts and therefore, <u>they equids</u> and their products do not present a risk of transmission. However, equids may be useful sentinels for the early detection of Japanese encephalitis to mitigate animal health and public health risks posed by the pathogenic agent. Rationale: [for addition of new sentence] The WOA Ad hoc group on the revision of chapters on Equine Encephalitis of the Terrestrial Code noted in their report that “a wide range of animals, including birds, reptiles, and amphibians are susceptible species for JE virus and there is evidence that birds from the family Ardeidae (herons and egrets) act as reservoirs. Antibodies have also been found in other families of birds. Birds such as ducks, passerines, gulls, and pigeons, can develop significant viraemia, while others such as crows, American white pelicans, and double-crested cormorants circulate little or no virus in the blood (Spickler, 2017)9. A wide range of mammals, including horses, can act as dead-end hosts. Nevertheless, swine is the only domestic animal species that is involved in JEV amplification. In the case of equids, the low viraemic levels prevent the transmission of the disease in natural conditions (Spickler, 2023)11.” [for addition of animals] Antibodies have been detected in cattle, goats, and dogs, but they are rarely or never affected by clinical disease and are also dead-end hosts (Bhattacharya & Basu, 2014; Mansfield et al., 2017; Hameed et al., 2021). Cattle, dogs, and goats are listed in Article 8.10.9 as incidental hosts. We suggest that to make it clear they are considered dead-end hosts rather	Agreed to add a sentence, however, did not agree to add the list of dead-end host species that are not used as sentinel. Equids can be used as sentinels for the awareness of the public health.

	than accidental hosts, which can also present a risk of disease transmission, they are listed in the introductory paragraph as dead-end hosts alongside Equids. Alternatively, the text in Article 8.10.9 should refer to them as dead-end hosts rather than incidental hosts. Supporting evidence: https://www.woah.org/en/document/ad-hoc-group-on-the-revision-of-chapters-on-equine-encephalitides-of-the-terrestrial-code/ Bhattacharya, S, & Basu, P (2014) Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) infection in different vertebrates and its epidemiological significance: a review. <i>International Journal of Fauna and Biological Studies</i>, 1(6): 32-37. Mansfield, K L, Hernández-Triana, L M, Banyard, A C, Fooks, A R, & Johnson, N (2017) Japanese encephalitis virus infection, diagnosis and control in domestic animals. <i>Veterinary Microbiology</i>, 201: 85-92. doi:10.1016/j.vetmic.2017.01.014 Muddassar Hameed 1,* , Abdul Wahaab 1, Mohsin Nawaz 1, Sawar Khan 1, Jawad Nazir 2, Ke Liu 1, Jianchao Wei 1,* , Zhiyong Ma 1,* Potential Role of Birds in Japanese Encephalitis Virus Zoonotic Transmission and Genotype Shift Viruses. 2021 Feb 24;13(3):357. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7996159/.	
8.10.1._5	Category (addition, deletion): Proposed amended text: Japanese encephalitis is a <i>vector</i>-borne disease of significant importance to public health transmitted by bites of culicine mosquitoes. Suids are considered amplifying hosts and wild birds are considered to be reservoir and amplifying hosts. Equids are <u>regarded as</u> dead-end hosts and therefore, equids and their products ~~do not~~ <u>are unlikely to</u> present a risk of transmission. <u>However, equids may be useful sentinels for the early detection of Japanese encephalitis to mitigate animal health and public health risks posed by the pathogenic agent. Japanese encephalitis has been documented in other various species, including dogs, cattle, goats, and domestic birds which are generally considered dead-end hosts or incidental hosts. Additionally, bats have been identified as potential hosts.</u>	Did not agree as this information should be included in the Terrestrial Manual.

	<u>although their role in the natural transmission cycle of JEV remains unclear. Non-reservoir and non-amplifying hosts, including equids may be useful sentinels for the early detection of Japanese encephalitis to mitigate animal health and public health risks posed by the pathogenic agent.</u> Rationale: Member, on reviewing the available literature, is not satisfied with the level of proof with regards to the inability of horses and equids to play a role in the transmission of JE. Thus, in keeping with the premise that “the absence of evidence does not constitute evidence of absence”. Member suggests a more cautious phrase with regard to the potential risks posed by viraemic horses during an epidemiologically active JE event. The addition serves to include other potential hosts and dead-end hosts as also portrayed in the Code Commission discussion on page 43 of the ‘Report of the Meeting of the WOAHP Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission / February 2025’. It is further recommended that the role of equids as sentinels be extended to include additional dead-end host species. Supporting evidence: Mulvey, Peter, et al. "The Ecology and Evolution of Japanese Encephalitis Virus." <i>Pathogens</i>, vol. 10, no. 12, 2021, article 1534. https://doi.org/10.3390/pathogens10121534	

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, Japanese encephalitis is defined as an *infection* of suids, equids, and wild birds (hereafter ‘animal hosts’) with Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV).

8.10.1._6	Category (change): Proposed amended text: For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, Japanese encephalitis is defined as an infection of <u>suids, equids, and wild birds (hereafter ‘animal hosts’)</u> <u>animal hosts</u> with Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV). Rationale: Increasing numbers of studies have shown the evidences of JEV identified from different animals, not limited to suids, squids and wild birds. Supporting evidence: Levesque ZA, Walsh MG, Webb CE, Zadoks RN, Brookes VJ. A scoping review of evidence of	Did not agree as species of animal hosts should be defined for the occurrence of the disease. Suids and wild birds play a significant role in the epidemiology of the disease. Equids can be used as sentinels for the awareness of the public health awareness and for early detection.

	naturally occurring Japanese encephalitis virus infection in vertebrate animals other than humans, ardeid birds, and pigs. PLOS Negl Trop Dis. 2024;18(10):e0012510.	
8.10.1._7	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: For the purposes of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>, Japanese encephalitis is defined as an <i>infection</i> of suids, ~~equids~~, and wild birds (hereafter 'animal hosts') with Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV). Rationale: Consistent with other Terrestrial Code chapters, species of no epidemiological significance and of no impact to a country's disease status are not included in the definition 'For the purposes of the Code'. Supporting evidence: For example, the Aujeszky's disease virus and peste des petits ruminants virus Terrestrial Code chapters.	Did not agree, comment addressed above.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with JEV:

- 1) JEV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or
- 2) nucleic acid or antigen specific to JEV has been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with Japanese encephalitis, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected *case*, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association with or exposure to JEV; or
- 3) seroconversion specific to JEV, which is not the consequence of *vaccination*, has been detected in an animal host; or
- 4) antibodies specific to JEV, which are not the consequence of *vaccination*, have been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with Japanese encephalitis or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected *case*, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association with or exposure to JEV.

8.10.1._8	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: ~~4) antibodies specific to JEV, which are not the consequence of vaccination, have been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with Japanese encephalitis or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association with or exposure to JEV.~~ Rationale: Due to the nature of cross-reactive antibodies induced by different orthoflavivirus infection, single serum antibody test has high chances of false positivity.	Did not agree as this is described in the Terrestrial Manual. The Code Commission noted that this is one of the options.

	Supporting evidence: Levesque ZA, Walsh MG, Webb CE, Zadoks RN, Brookes VJ. A scoping review of evidence of naturally occurring Japanese encephalitis virus infection in vertebrate animals other than humans, ardeid birds, and pigs. PLOS Negl Trop Dis. 2024;18(10):e0012510.	

A notification of infection of equids or wild birds with JEV does not affect the Japanese encephalitis status of a country or zone.

8.10.1._9	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: A notification of infection of ~~equids or~~ wild birds with JEV does not affect the Japanese encephalitis status of a country or zone. Rationale: Equids are incidental hosts and typically infections are detected once the virus is well established in the local mosquito population and thus can act as sentinels. This is similar to RVF, where indigenous human infections affect the status of the country or zone.	Did not agree as equids in this chapter is dead-end host. Moreover, it is different from RVF case, where infections in humans are normally detected earlier than animal populations, and human cases are linked with the cases of animals
8.10.1._10	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: ~~A notification of infection of equids or wild birds with JEV does not affect the Japanese encephalitis status of a country or zone.~~ Rationale: This clause is: i. not necessary for equids. Cases of listed diseases in species not included within the disease specific definition 'For the purposes of the Code' do not impact the disease status of a country and are not required to be notified. The exclusion of equids from the definition within the disease specific chapter as suggested in our accompanying comment would mean that infections in equids do not need to be notified and the inclusion of equids in this sentence is unnecessary. ii. not promoting transparency for the prevention of the transboundary movement of a vector-borne disease. For the prevention of vector-borne transboundary diseases, a status of country	For the first point, did not agree, comment addressed above. For the second point, the Code Commission explained that this paragraph is needed for important clarification and that other chapters (e.g. HPAI) include similar text.

	freedom should include all susceptible species except for dead-end hosts. Countries need to be aware that infection or disease is present in another country's reservoir hosts and vectors to enable informed decision making on their import mitigation measures. Supporting evidence: The relevance of wild waterbirds on the epidemiology and disease status of a country is demonstrated by: i) The natural international and domestic movement of reservoir wild birds cannot be prevented. This has implications for the presence and distribution of infected vectors, as was illustrated by the change in disease distribution of Japanese encephalitis in Australia in 2022. Climatic conditions resulted in the movement of reservoir birds into close and regular contact with vectors in traditionally free zones. https://wildlifehealthaustralia.com.au/Portals/0/Incidents/Role_of_waterbirds_Aus_2022-JEV-outbreak_RapidSynthesis_BirdLifeAustralia.pdf ii) The recommendation within the proposed chapter to put measures on the import of wild birds. This is epidemiologically sensible but also illustrates that the presence of infection in wild birds is epidemiologically relevant to a country's disease status, and that trading countries need to be made aware of the presence of infection and/or a change of status in these species.	
8.10.1._11	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: A notification of infection of equids or wild birds with JEV does not <u>necessarily</u> affect the Japanese encephalitis status of a country or zone. Rationale: N/A	Did not agree as the current text is clear.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *infective period* in suids shall be seven days.

8.10.1._12	Category (change): Proposed amended text: For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, the infective period of suids ~~shall be seven days.~~ <u>can be up to five days in the blood, seven days in the oral-nasal tract, up to 28 days in the tonsils.</u> Rationale: The duration of the infectious virus detected in suids depending on the tissues and organs. Supporting evidence: Lee S, Hwang J, Lyons A, Byers V, Hettenbach S, Burton R, Higgs S, Vanlandingham D. North American domestic pigs are susceptible to experimental infection with Japanese encephalitis virus. <i>Sci Rep.</i> 2018;8(1):7957.	Did not agree as this is based on the longest documented viraemia. Refer to the report of <i>ad hoc</i> Group (Nov 2024) In addition, the Code Commission explained that for the purposes of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>, these periods should be longer than maximum documented length.

Standards for diagnosis and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology of this disease, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 8.10.2.

Safe commodities

When authorising the importation or transit of the following *commodities*, *Veterinary Authorities* should not require any Japanese encephalitis-related conditions regardless of the *animal health status* of the country or *zone* of origin:

- 1) equids and other equid *commodities*;

8.10.2._1	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: 1) equids <u>in the absence of epidemiologically active outbreaks</u>; 2) other equid <i>commodities</i>; Rationale: See above Supporting evidence: Mulvey, Peter, et al. "The Ecology and Evolution of Japanese Encephalitis Virus." <i>Pathogens</i>, vol. 10, no. 12, 2021, article 1534. https://doi.org/10.3390/pathogens10121534	Did not agree as equids is dead-end host

- 2) *meat* and *meat products* from suids;
- 3) *protein meal* and rendered fat from suids;
- 4) gelatine and collagen from suids; and

- 5) hides, skins and hair from suids.

Article 8.10.3.

8.10.3._1	Category (general): Consider making provision for countries where suids are not kept or are minimal (e.g. no intensive pig industry), to still claim freedom from JE without the need for extensive surveillance, if environmental/ecological risk is low. Many African countries have minimal or no pig populations and low ecological risk, making JE unlikely. Recognizing this could reduce unnecessary surveillance burdens.	Noted, but it is the reason that the option regarding 'historically freedom' is defined.

Country or zone free from infection with JEV in suids

8.10.3._2	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: Country or zone free from infection with JEV in suids Rationale: What is being proposed for country freedom is not fit for purpose and more appropriate for compartment freedom, particularly when Japanese encephalitis is a vector-borne disease and when species other than suids, i.e. wild bird species, can act as reservoir <i>and amplifying</i> hosts. For the prevention of transboundary diseases, country freedom should include all susceptible species except for dead-end hosts. Supporting evidence: The relevance of wild waterbirds on the epidemiology and country level disease-free status is demonstrated by: i) That the domestic movement of reservoir wild birds cannot be prevented and has implications to the presence of infected vectors, as was illustrated by the change in disease distribution of JE in Australia in 2022. Climatic conditions resulted in the movements of reservoir birds into close and regular contact with vectors in traditionally free zones. ii) The recommendation within the proposed chapter for measures on the import of wild birds. This is epidemiologically sensible,	Did not agree, comment addressed above (refer to responses in Article 8.10.1.)

	but also serves to illustrate that the presence of infection in wild birds is epidemiologically relevant. iii) Article 8.10.3. point 2, while appropriate for a country with no infection present at all, illustrates why excluding wild birds from the Terrestrial Code definition of a free country for a vector-borne disease is inappropriate. It means that if a country has infection in wild birds but not suids, the Terrestrial Code would be providing for a country with infection present in wild birds to be implementing sanitary measures on imported wild birds when for that animal population they have the same health status – this is inconsistent with the principles of the SPS Agreement. iv) Surveillance in Article 8.10.3. point 4) should be based on surveillance across all susceptible species to maximise early detection within a truly free country and to understand the risk to suids and humans. v) Article 8.10.6 point 3 also illustrates why having a free country for a vector-borne disease when infection can be present in some species isn't sound. The clause is correctly requiring protection from vectors when transiting through an infected zone or country, but for importing countries that have infection, but just not in suids, and, hence, would be able to claim country or zone freedom as per the current draft, this is a discriminatory sanitary measure as the importing country's vectors are also infected.	

A country or *zone* may be considered free from *infection* with JEV when:

- 1) the *infection* has been notifiable in the entire country for at least the past two years;
- 2) appropriate *biosecurity* and *sanitary measures* to prevent the introduction of *infection* have been in place; in particular, the importation or movements of suids or wild birds and their *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter or other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';

8.10.3._3	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: 2) appropriate biosecurity and sanitary measures to prevent the introduction of infection have been in place; in particular, the importation or movements of suids ~~or wild birds~~ and their	Agreed with the rationale, replaced with 'captive wild birds' for clarity.

	commodities into the country or zone have been carried out in accordance with this chapter or other relevant chapters of the Terrestrial Code, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis'; Rationale: Movements of wild birds into a country would be very difficult to control. This also seems to be contradictory to the importance of wild birds considering infection of wild birds in a country or zone does not affect disease status, as stated above.	
8.10.3._4	Category (change): Proposed amended text: Change all "suids" to "livestock, including suids" in Chapter 8.10 such as: (2) appropriate biosecurity and sanitary measures to prevent the introduction of infection have been in place; in particular, the importation or movements of <u>livestock, including</u> suids or wild birds..... Rationale: Increasing numbers of studies have shown the evidences of JEV identified from different animals, not limited to suids, squids and wild birds. Therefore, it is suggested to change all "suids" to "livestock, including suids" in Chapter 8.10 Supporting evidence: Levesque ZA, Walsh MG, Webb CE, Zadoks RN, Brookes VJ. A scoping review of evidence of naturally occurring Japanese encephalitis virus infection in vertebrate animals other than humans, ardeid birds, and pigs. PLOS Negl Trop Dis. 2024;18(10):e0012510.	Did not agree as the current text is sufficient.
8.10.3._5	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: appropriate <i>biosecurity</i> and <i>sanitary measures</i> to prevent the introduction of <i>infection</i> have been in place; in particular, the importation or movements of suids or wild birds and their <i>commodities</i> into the country or <i>zone</i> have been carried out in accordance with this chapter <u>or and</u> other relevant chapters of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>, ~~including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';~~ Rationale: The proposed 'or' rather than 'and', as is normally used in disease specific chapters, removes the requirement for Member Countries to align with the relevant trade related measures in the	Did not agree to replace with 'and' as to provide the flexibility. Did not agree to delete phrase as this is for consistency and clarity.

	horizontal chapters when the disease specific chapter recommended measures are applied. The 'or' means the clause reads that these wider principles only apply where a country has utilised Chapter 2.1 to develop measures, or potentially depending on how the clause is read, do not need to apply at all. Further, the use of 'or' rather than 'and' also undermines the WOAHP recommended measures for importation that Member Countries have agreed. Utilisation of non-WOAH agreed measures will not be as transparent to forward traded nations. Non-harmonised measures also burdens importing countries to invest in resources and the cost of assessment to consider the robustness of alternative measures, potentially impacting the quality of measures utilised – as not all countries will have the resources for quality risk analysis and not all risk assessments are equivalent. The text 'including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis', is unnecessary as it is already covered by the previous part of the sentence. Should, reference to a Terrestrial Code chapter be retained, we request the clause should refer to Chapter 5.3. and not Chapter 2.1., as Chapter 5.3 outlines considerations for the determination of equivalence, including reference to risk analysis. Whereas Chapter 2.1 is not explicit that measures should be equivalent or higher than those of the Code, meaning that depending how the proposed clause is read, there is the potential that countries could read the proposed change to allow them to use Import Risk Analysis to create measures that are lower than the international standard agreed by Member Countries in the disease specific chapters. This would undermine the purpose of the WOAHP standards. Supporting evidence: President of Scientific Commission presentation at the WOAHP Annual General Session. 28 May 2025. Diagram slide 33.	

- 3) *vaccination* against JEV of suids was not conducted in the entire country or *zone* for the past 12 months;
- 4) and either:
 - a) the country or *zone* is historically free as described in point 2) b) of Article 1.4.6.; or

- b) for at least the past two years, *surveillance* in accordance with Article 8.10.9. has been in place in the entire country or *zone* and there has been no *case* in suids in the country or *zone*.

8.10.3._6	Category (change): Proposed amended text: Change all “suids” to “livestock, including suids” in Chapter 8.10 such as: (4) b) there has been no case in <u>livestock, such as</u> suids, in the country or zone Rationale: Increasing numbers of studies have shown the evidences of JEV identified from different animals, not limited to suids, squids and wild birds. Therefore, it is suggested to change all “suids” to “livestock, including suids” in Chapter 8.10 Supporting evidence: Levesque ZA, Walsh MG, Webb CE, Zadoks RN, Brookes VJ. A scoping review of evidence of naturally occurring Japanese encephalitis virus infection in vertebrate animals other than humans, ardeid birds, and pigs. PLOS Negl Trop Dis. 2024;18(10):e0012510.	Did not agree, comment addressed above
8.10.3._7	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: for at least the past two years, <i>surveillance</i> in accordance with Article 8.10.9. has been in place in the entire country or <i>zone</i> and there has been no case ~~in suids~~ in the country or <i>zone</i>. Rationale: What is being proposed for country freedom is not fit for purpose and more appropriate for compartment freedom, particularly when Japanese encephalitis is a vector-borne disease and when species other than suids, i.e. wild bird species, can act as reservoir <i>and amplifying</i> hosts. For the prevention of transboundary diseases, country freedom should include all susceptible species except for dead-end hosts. Supporting evidence: The relevance of wild waterbirds on the epidemiology and country level disease-free status is demonstrated by: i) That the domestic movement of reservoir wild birds cannot be prevented and has implications to the	Did not agree as for the purposes of this chapter, the animal health status is considered only for suids.

	presence of infected vectors, as was illustrated by the change in disease distribution of JE in Australia in 2022. Climatic conditions resulted in the movements of reservoir birds into close and regular contact with vectors in traditionally free zones. ii) The recommendation within the proposed chapter for measures on the import of wild birds. This is epidemiologically sensible, but also serves to illustrate that the presence of infection in wild birds is epidemiologically relevant. iii) Article 8.10.3. point 2, while appropriate for a country with no infection present at all, illustrates why excluding wild birds from the Terrestrial Code definition of a free country for a vector-borne disease is inappropriate. It means that if a country has infection in wild birds but not suids, the Terrestrial Code would be providing for a country with infection present in wild birds to be implementing sanitary measures on imported wild birds when for that animal population they have the same health status – this is inconsistent with the principles of the SPS Agreement. iv) Surveillance in Article 8.10.3. point 4) should be based on surveillance across all susceptible species to maximise early detection within a truly free country and to understand the risk to suids and humans. v) Article 8.10.6 point 3 also illustrates why having a free country for a vector-borne disease when infection can be present in some species isn't sound. The clause is correctly requiring protection from vectors when transiting through an infected zone or country, but for importing countries that have infection, but just not in suids, and, hence, would be able to claim country or zone freedom as per the current draft, this is a discriminatory sanitary measure as the importing country's vectors are also infected.	

Article 8.10.4.

Compartment free from infection with JEV in suids

8.10.4._1	Category (change): Proposed amended text: <u>A compartment may be considered free from infection with JEV when:</u> <u>1) the infection has been notifiable in the entire country for at least the past two years;</u> <u>2) appropriate biosecurity and sanitary measures to prevent the introduction of infection have been in place; in particular, the importation or movements of suids or wild birds and their commodities into the compartment have been carried out in accordance with this chapter and other relevant chapters of the Terrestrial Code</u> <u>3) vaccination against JEV of suids was not conducted in the compartment for the past 12 months;</u> <u>4) and for at least the past two years, surveillance in accordance with Article 8.10.9. has been in place in the compartment and there has been no case.</u> 5) Suids in the <i>compartment</i> should be protected from the bites of culicine mosquitoes in accordance with Article 8.10.8. Rationale: Increased clarity of the requirements. Supporting evidence: See previous comment under Article 8.10.3.	Did not agree as the cross reference to the relevant article is sufficient.

The establishment of a *compartment* free from *infection* with JEV should follow the relevant provisions laid down in Article 8.10.3. 1) and 2) and in Chapters 4.4. and 4.5.

8.10.4._2	Category (change): Proposed amended text: The establishment of a <i>compartment</i> free from <i>infection</i> with JEV should <u>also</u> follow the relevant provisions laid down <u>in Article 8.10.3. 1) and 2) and</u> in Chapters 4.4. and 4.5. Rationale: Surveillance in accordance with Article 8.10.9 should also be required.	Did not agree, comment addressed above.

	Supporting evidence: See previous comment under Article 8.10.3.	

Suids in the free *compartment* should be protected from the bites of culicine mosquitoes in accordance with Article 8.10.8.

Article 8.10.5.

Recovery of free status

To regain free status when an *infection* of JEV occurs in a previously free country or *zone*, Article 8.10.3. applies.

Article 8.10.6.

8.10.6._1	Category (addition): Add clarification that requirements for mosquito-proof transport and quarantine may be difficult to implement in many African contexts; suggest a risk-based approach. To make implementation feasible in resource-limited settings while maintaining acceptable biosecurity.	Noted

Recommendations for importation of suids from countries, zones or compartments free from Japanese encephalitis

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of Japanese encephalitis on the day of shipment;
- 2) were kept in a country, *zone* or *compartment* free from Japanese encephalitis since birth or for at least the past 14 days prior to shipment;
- 3) either,
 - a. did not transit through an infected *zone* during transportation to the *place of shipment*; or
 - b. were protected from culicine mosquito bites at all times when transiting through an infected *zone* in accordance with Article 8.10.8.

8.10.6._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: were protected from culicine mosquito bites at all times when transiting through an infected <i>zone</i> or <i>country</i> in accordance with Article 8.10.8. Rationale: Suids should also be protected from vectors during transit through infected countries, and not just infected zones.	Did not agree as this is the recommendation which should be subjected within the exporting country. To clarify the definition of infected country or zone, the Code Commission decided to develop new Article 8.10.4bis.

Article 8.10.7.

8.10.7._1	Category (addition): Add clarification that requirements for mosquito-proof transport and quarantine may be difficult to implement in many African contexts; suggest a risk-based approach. To make implementation feasible in resource-limited settings while maintaining acceptable biosecurity.	Noted

Recommendations for importation of suids from countries or zones infected with JEV

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of Japanese encephalitis on the day of shipment; and
- 2) either,
 - a. were vaccinated against JEV, and *vaccination* was completed according to the manufacture recommendation at least 21 days and no longer than one year prior to shipment; or

8.10.7._2	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: a. were vaccinated against JEV, and <i>vaccination</i> was completed according to the manufacturer's recommendation at least 21 days and no longer than one year prior to shipment; or Rationale: Grammatical adjustment	Agreed

- b. were isolated in a *vector-protected quarantine station*, which is located in an area of demonstrated low *vector* activity, for at least 14 days prior to shipment, and were protected from culicine mosquito bites at all times during transportation from the *quarantine station* to the *place of shipment* in accordance with Article 8.10.8.

Article 8.10.8.

8.10.8._1	Category (general): While the detailed quarantine and transport protection measures are scientifically sound, they may be difficult to implement in many African settings due to limited infrastructure. Member therefore proposes that risk-based and context-appropriate alternatives (e.g., timing transport to low vector activity periods, use of insect	Noted Already covered by the current text.

	repellents, and targeted vector mapping) be explicitly recognised as acceptable mitigation options.	

Protecting suids from culicine mosquito bites

1) Vector-protected quarantine station

The means of protection of the *quarantine station* should at least comprise the following:

- a. appropriate physical barriers at entry and exit points, for example a double-door entry-exit system;
- b. openings of the building are *vector* screened with mesh of appropriate gauge;
- c. *vector surveillance* and *vector* control within and around the building;
- d. measures to limit or eliminate breeding sites for *vectors* in vicinity of the *quarantine station*;
- e. Standard Operating Procedures for operation of the *quarantine station* and for transport of suids to the place of *loading*.

2) During transportation

When transporting unvaccinated suids through countries or *zones* infected with JEV, *Veterinary Authorities* should require that strategies to protect suids from culicine mosquito bites are in place, considering the local ecology of the *vector*.

a. Transport by road

Potential *risk management* strategies include a combination of:

8.10.8._2	Category (change): Proposed amended text: ~~Potential~~ <i>risk management</i> strategies <u>should</u> include ~~a combination of~~ . Rationale: The wording should be strengthened. A risk management strategy should be in place and all points are relevant.	Agreed

- i. treating animals with an *approved* repellent to prevent bites prior to and during transportation, in *vehicles disinfected* and disinfected with an *approved* insecticide;
- ii. *loading*, transporting and *unloading* animals at times of low *vector* activity;
- iii. ensuring *vehicles* do not stop en route during dawn or dusk, or overnight, unless the *vehicle* is insect proof;

8.10.8._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: ensuring <i>vehicles</i> do not stop en route during dawn or dusk, or overnight, unless the <i>vehicle</i> is insect proof; <u>and</u>	Did not agree as the list using ‘;’ means ‘and’ in the Code.

	Rationale: N/A	
8.10.8._4	Category (addition, deletion): Proposed amended text: iii. ensuring <i>vehicles</i> do not stop en route during dawn or dusk, or overnight, unless the <i>vehicle</i> is insect ~~proof~~ <u>protected</u> ; Rationale: Aligns with WOA's international standards terminology. Supporting evidence: WOA's Terrestrial Animal Health Code – Chapter 8.3: Bluetongue (2023) Section on safe trade outlines requirements such as: "...the animals were kept in a vector-protected establishment for at least 60 days prior to shipment..." WOA's. (2023). Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Chapter 8.3: Bluetongue.	Agreed

- iv. using historical, ongoing or modelling information on JEV and *surveillance* for *vectors* at common stopping and offloading points to identify low risk ports and transport routes.

8.10.8._5	Category (change): Proposed amended text: <u>V. ensuring that vehicle windows and vents are equipped with fine mesh screens to prevent mosquito entry during transportation.</u> Rationale: Japanese encephalitis is an insect-borne infectious disease, mainly transmitted through the bites of Culex mosquitoes. When transporting unvaccinated animals, it is necessary to ensure that there is no risk of mosquito bites during all stages of transportation. In addition to implementing vehicles disinfection and disinsection, ensuring that vehicle windows and vents are equipped with fine mesh screens to prevent mosquito entry during transportation is very important.	Did not agree as this is already covered.

b. Transport by air

Prior to *loading* the suids, *containers* are sprayed with an *approved* insecticide.

Containers in which suids are being transported and the cargo hold of the aircraft should be sprayed with an *approved* insecticide when the doors have been closed and prior to take off. All possible insect harbourage should be treated. The insecticide sprayers should be retained for inspection on arrival.

In addition, during any stopover in countries or *zones* where *infection* with JEV occurs, prior to the opening of any aircraft door and until all doors are closed, netting of appropriate gauge impregnated with an *approved* insecticide should be placed over all *containers*.

Article 8.10.9.

8.10.9._1	Category (general): Member welcomes the inclusion of clinical, syndromic, environmental, and sentinel animal surveillance approaches. However, interpretation of results from incidental hosts (e.g., dogs, poultry) remains unclear. Member proposes including the need to build entomological capacity in vector surveillance, and that countries without JE should focus on passive surveillance and vector mapping. Additionally, Member: • Requests that WOAHA develop guidelines on the interpretation of serological results in incidental hosts commonly found in Africa. • Recommend that WOAHA support regional capacity building and provide technical tools for implementing environmental and sentinel surveillance, including protocols for oronasal fluid sampling in pigs. Many African countries lack established entomological programs; this encourages gradual capacity building without imposing unrealistic expectations.	Noted

Surveillance for infection with Japanese encephalitis virus

The objectives of surveillance of Japanese encephalitis are for the *Veterinary Authority* to coordinate in a timely manner with public health and other relevant *Competent Authorities*, to share information to mitigate *risks* to animal health and human health, and to facilitate safe *international trade*.

Surveillance of Japanese encephalitis should be carried out in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and with the following recommendations.

Clinical and syndromic *surveillance* to detect signs of *infection* with JEV in animal hosts are components of an *early warning system*. However, clinical signs are not pathognomonic and not always present. Suspect *cases* should always be confirmed by laboratory testing, taking into account the epidemiological situation.

8.10.9._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended text:	Did not agree as it is too detailed for the chapter.

	Clinical and syndromic <i>surveillance</i> to detect signs of <i>infection</i> with JEV in animal hosts are components of an <i>early warning system</i>. However, clinical signs are not pathognomonic and not always present <u>or may present at farrowing several weeks after primary infection of sows or gilts</u>. Suspect cases should always be confirmed by laboratory testing, taking into account the epidemiological situation. Rationale: It is important to note that clinical signs may present several weeks following primary infection, as is the case for infection of pregnant sows or gilts that experience reproductive disease caused by JEV infection resulting in mummified or weak live born piglets at farrowing.	In addition, the Code Commission explained that this article does not limit its scope to pig.

Oronasal fluids may be used for *surveillance* of Japanese encephalitis in suids due to their ease of collection and non-invasive nature.

Surveillance for Japanese encephalitis often involves serological monitoring. The use of sentinel animals, which provide early indication of local transmission of JEV, may involve several susceptible animals. This may include not only animal hosts but also incidental hosts such as dogs, cattle, goats and domestic birds.

8.10.9._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: This may include not only animal hosts but also incidental hosts such as <u>equids</u>, dogs, cattle, goats and domestic birds. Rationale: Equids have been noted to be incidental hosts in the Code Commission report. See above Supporting evidence: Mulvey, Peter, et al. "The Ecology and Evolution of Japanese Encephalitis Virus." <i>Pathogens</i>, vol. 10, no. 12, 2021, article 1534. https://doi.org/10.3390/pathogens10121534	Did not agree as sentinel and incidental hosts are different. The Code Commission amended the text for clarity.

In infected countries, the *Veterinary Authority* should develop *early warning systems* to detect Japanese encephalitis epidemic events, so as to promote awareness campaigns to sensitise the owners and keepers of suids and equids, the *veterinarians*, the public health authorities, and other relevant stakeholders to the disease risk. Environmental surveillance may play a role in detecting JEV in areas where animal hosts are present. This may include sampling of natural water sources, *establishments* and *slaughterhouse* or abattoir wastewater.

8.10.9._4	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: , so as to promote awareness campaigns to sensitise the owners and keepers of suids, <u>caprina</u> and equids, the veterinarians, the public	Did not agree, comment addressed above.

	health authorities, and other relevant stakeholders to the disease risk. Rationale: Sheep has been proved as an amplifying host of JEV by developing sufficiently high viremia to infect mosquitoes Supporting evidence: Zhang H, Li D, Jiyang Z, Jingyue B, Zhiliang W, Yafeng Q, et al. Sheep serve as amplifying hosts of Japanese encephalitis virus, increasing the risk of human infection. Sci Adv. 2025;11:eads7441.	

Surveillance for vectors conducted in accordance with Chapter 1.5. may be helpful in identifying vector activity and presence of JEV.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.20._1	Category (general): The Member generally agrees with the newly revised chapter for tularemia including the definition of the occurrence of infection with <i>Francisella tularensis</i> , the condition of a country or zone free from tularemia and recovery of free status, and recommendations for importation of hares from infected countries.	Noted
8.20._2	Category (general): The Member supports this revised chapter.	Noted

CHAPTER 8.20.

INFECTION WITH FRANCISELLA TULARENSIS (TULAREMIA)

Article 8.20.1.

8.20.1._1	Category (addition): Include a statement indicating that tularemia is endemic primarily in the Northern Hemisphere (Europe, Asia, North America), and there is limited or no evidence of its occurrence in sub-Saharan Africa. Member further request that the article clarify the global distribution and risk, explicitly stating that Tularemia is largely confined to the Northern Hemisphere. Africa has limited or no evidence of Tularemia occurrence. This should be reflected to contextualize surveillance expectations and avoid creating undue obligations. This clarification would prevent the unintended application of the chapter to countries with no history of the disease and guide proportionate surveillance and reporting expectations	Did not agree as this information should be included in the corresponding chapter of the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i> . The last sentence of this article provides this reference.

General provisions

The aim of this chapter is to mitigate the animal health and public health risks posed by tularemia. A wide variety of mammals, including humans, and some birds have been reported to be infected, but tularemia is primarily a disease of the orders Lagomorpha and Rodentia.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, tularemia is defined as an *infection* of lagomorphs and rodents (hereafter 'animal hosts') with *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *tularensis* or *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *holarctica*.

Hereafter '*Francisella tularensis*' is used to collectively refer to both *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *tularensis* and *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *holarctica*.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection with Francisella tularensis*:

- 1) *Francisella tularensis* has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or
- 2) nucleic acid or antigen specific to *Francisella tularensis* has been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection with Francisella tularensis*; or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case or a human infected with *Francisella tularensis*, or giving cause for suspicion of association or contact with *Francisella tularensis*; or
- 3) seroconversion specific to *Francisella tularensis* has been detected in an animal host; or
- 4) antibodies specific to *Francisella tularensis* have been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection with Francisella tularensis*, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case or a human infected with *Francisella tularensis*, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with *Francisella tularensis*.

8.20.1._2	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: <u>antibodies specific to <i>Francisella tularensis</i> have been detected at a single time point in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with <i>infection with Francisella tularensis</i>, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case or a human infected with <i>Francisella tularensis</i>, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with <i>Francisella tularensis</i>.</u> Rationale: While the original text is technically accurate, adding “at a single time point” helps make the distinction between Points 3 and 4 more clear, namely that Point 3 is confirming a case based on seroconversion which requires paired negative and positive sera or a 4 fold titer change and Point 4 is confirming a case based on a single time point positive (offering weaker evidence) with additional clinical or epidemiological support.	Did not agree as ‘a sample’ as mentioned in the text implies this is one sample at a single time point.

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, the incubation period for tularemia (in hares, genus *Lepus*) shall be 15 days.

8.20.1._3	Category (addition, deletion and change): Proposed amended text: A efectos del Código Terrestre, el período de incubación de la tularemia ~~(en la liebre del género <i>Lepus</i>) es de 15 días.~~ <u>puede variar hasta los 14 días, siendo que los primeros signos clínicos aparecen regularmente de 3 a 5 días.</u> Rationale: Los primeros signos clínicos aparecen regularmente de 3 a 5 días, pero pueden variar hasta 14 días. Supporting evidence:	Did not agree as this is not within the scope of the current revision. However, the Code Commission agreed to share this comment with subject-matter experts for input and to address it at its future meeting. Refer to item 6.5. of the report.

	http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/tularemia	

Standards for diagnosis ~~diagnostic tests~~, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 8.20.2.

~~Tularemia free country~~ Country or zone free from tularemia

A country or zone may be considered free from tularemia when:

- 1) the infection has been notifiable in the entire country ~~it has been shown that tularemia has not been present for at least the past two years;~~
- 2) for at least the past two years, specific surveillance in accordance with Chapter 1.4. has been in place in the entire country or zone, and there has been no case in the country or zone; ~~and when bacteriological or serological surveys in previously infected zones have given negative results.~~

8.20.2._1	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: 2) <u>for at least the past two years, specific surveillance in accordance with Chapter 1.4. has been in place in the entire country or zone, and there has been no case in the country or zone for at least the past two years;</u> ~~and when bacteriological or serological surveys in previously infected zones have given negative results.~~ Rationale: Wording more consistent with point 1. Italicised 'zone' as it is a glossary term.	Agreed

- 3) appropriate biosecurity and sanitary measures to prevent the introduction of infection have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of animal hosts and other commodities into the country or zone have been carried out in accordance with this chapter or other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';

8.20.2._2	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: <u>appropriate biosecurity and sanitary measures to prevent the introduction of infection have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of animal hosts and other commodities into the country or zone have been carried out in accordance with this chapter and other relevant chapters of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';</u> Rationale: The proposed 'or' rather than 'and', as is usually used in the disease specific chapters, removes the requirement for Member Countries to align with the	Did not agree for consistency with the other chapters recently adopted. The Code Commission noted that Chapter 5.3. is not an appropriate reference to include because the context here is not about bilateral equivalence of sanitary measures.

	relevant trade related measures in the horizontal chapters when the disease specific chapter recommended measures are applied. The change to 'or' means the clause now reads that these wider principles only apply where a country has utilised Chapter 2.1 to develop measures, or potentially depending on how the clause is read, do not need to apply at all. Further, the use of 'or' rather than 'and' also undermines the WOAHA recommended measures for importation that Member Countries have agreed. Utilisation of non-WOAH agreed measures will not be as transparent to forward traded nations. Non-harmonised measures also burdens importing countries to invest in resources and the cost of assessment to consider the robustness of alternative measures, potentially impacting the quality of measures utilised – as not all countries will have the resources for quality risk analysis and not all risk assessments are equivalent. The text 'including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis', is unnecessary as it is already covered by the previous part of the sentence. Should, reference to a Terrestrial Code chapter be retained, we request the clause should refer to Chapter 5.3. and not Chapter 2.1., as Chapter 5.3 outlines considerations for the determination of equivalence, including reference to risk analysis. Whereas Chapter 2.1 is not explicit that measures should be equivalent or higher than those of the Code, meaning that depending how the proposed clause is read, there is the potential that countries could read the proposed change to allow them to use Import Risk Analysis to create measures that are lower than the international standard agreed by Member Countries in the disease specific chapters. This would undermine the purpose of the WOAHA standards. Supporting evidence: President of Scientific Commission presentation at the WOAHA Annual General Session. 28 May 2025. Diagram slide 33.	
8.20.2._3	Category (general): Proposed amended text: The Member supports the retention of the requirement that tularemia be a notifiable disease, as this is fundamental for transparency, early warning, and alignment with WOAHA disease reporting obligations.	For point 1, agreed For point 2, did not agree as Chapter 1.4. is sufficient given that it provides the flexibility to adjust surveillance to the

	However, we recommend the inclusion of specific language clarifying that countries where tularemia has never been reported may be eligible to claim historical freedom under Article 1.4.6. of the Terrestrial Code, and that risk-based surveillance should be permitted in line with local ecological and epidemiological realities. Point 1: Proposed Text Addition to Article 8.20.2: Add a requirement to clarify that “countries where tularemia has never been reported may demonstrate freedom through historical absence and application of Article 1.4.6. (Historical Freedom)”. Rationale: Many African countries have no documented presence or history of <i>Francisella tularensis</i> infection in wildlife or humans. In such settings: • Applying Article 1.4.6. on historical freedom is scientifically justifiable. • Requiring active surveillance in these countries may be unnecessary, burdensome, and inconsistent with a risk-based approach, particularly where there is no known vector-pathogen-host ecology conducive to tularemia. Explicit reference to historical freedom prevents these countries from being penalized for lacking data on a disease that likely does not exist within their borders. Point 2 Include language supporting risk-based surveillance strategies that are appropriate to the epidemiological context, vector distribution, and wildlife ecology of each country or zone. Proposed Text Addition: “Surveillance strategies should be risk-based, taking into account the local epidemiology, ecological factors, and resource availability, and may include passive surveillance in low-risk areas.” Rationale: Tularemia is ecologically restricted, and its risk profile varies considerably across regions. Imposing uniform surveillance expectations without regard for local context: • Strains limited veterinary and laboratory capacity in low-risk regions; • Diverts attention from higher-priority endemic diseases; and	epidemiological situation in the country or zone.

	Undermines the spirit of WOA's emphasis on feasible, proportionate, and science-based standards. Risk-based approaches also align with the progressive pathway to status recognition and support broader goals of inclusive participation in international trade, especially for low- and middle-income countries.	

Article 8.20.2bis.

8.20.2bis._1	Category (general): Recommend flexibility in surveillance approach depending on local vector ecology and available diagnostic capacity. Recommend providing flexibility in the surveillance approach (e.g. using serology or targeted wildlife surveys depending on local ecology). Testing ticks or lagomorphs may not be feasible or relevant in all ecological zones, particularly in Africa where lagomorph populations may be sparse or not systematically monitored. This accommodates varied capacities and supports a risk-based approach aligned with Chapter 1.4. principles.	Did not agree as Chapter 1.4. is sufficient given that it provides the flexibility to adjust surveillance to the epidemiological situation in the country or zone.

Recovery of free status

Should a case of infection with *Francisella tularensis* occur in a previously free country or zone, its status may be recovered one year after the disinfection and disinsection of the last affected establishment, provided that in the entire country or zone, specific surveillance in accordance with Chapter 1.4. has been carried and has demonstrated the absence of infection.

Otherwise, Article 8.20.2. applies.

Article 8.20.3.

8.20.3._1	Category (general): The Member requests that the Code Commission clarify the surveillance requirements outlined in Article 8.20.3. Specifically: - Whether both tick surveillance and serological testing of lagomorphs are mandatory, or whether one may be sufficient for demonstrating freedom from infection with <i>Francisella tularensis</i>; and - Whether either vector surveillance or serological testing of hares/rabbits would be	Addressed by adding the concept of historical freedom in Article 8.20.2. Expert input will be obtained for the development of a surveillance article where such considerations may be discussed.

	considered adequate for regaining freedom, or whether both are required concurrently. Surveillance capacity and ecological conditions vary widely across countries and regions. In some endemic or resource-limited areas: • Skilled personnel for vector (tick) identification and testing are scarce, and laboratory resources for serology may be limited. • Ecological contexts may make vector collection impractical or less informative, while serology of lagomorphs may provide a more feasible and reliable indicator or vice versa. Requiring both methods concurrently could place undue burden on countries with constrained surveillance infrastructure, thereby delaying or obstructing legitimate efforts to recover disease-free status. Member believes providing flexibility while maintaining scientific rigour enables context-specific application of surveillance tools based on available resources, ecological suitability, and epidemiological risk. This approach is consistent with: • The WOAH risk-based framework for disease status determination, • The principles of progressive pathway approaches to disease freedom, and The need to ensure equitable access to international trade for all Members, regardless of surveillance resource levels.	

Tularemia-infected zone Country or zone infected with *Francisella tularensis*

A country or zone should be considered as infected with *Francisella tularensis* when the conditions for freedom from tularemia are not fulfilled, tularemia until:

8.20.3._2	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: <u>Country or zone infected with <i>Francisella tularensis</i></u> <u>~~A country or zone should be considered as infected with <i>Francisella tularensis</i> when the conditions for freedom from tularemia are not fulfilled.~~</u> Rationale: Consistent with other Article that the countries can declare free status or recovery of	Did not agree as this article is not about declaration of infected status, but to clarify what is meant by an infected country or zone.

	free status if they fulfill the requirements. There is no need to declare infection status.	
8.20.3._3	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: A <u>country or zone</u> should be considered as infected with <u><i>Francisella tularensis</i></u> when the conditions for freedom from tularemia are not fulfilled.tularemia until: as of Article 8.20.2. Rationale: -	Did not agree as it is sufficient as written in the current text.

- 4) ~~at least one year has elapsed after the last case has been confirmed;~~
AND
2) ~~a bacteriological survey on ticks within the infected zone has given negative results; or~~
~~regular serological testing of hares and rabbits from that zone have given negative results.~~

Article 8.20.4.

8.20.4._1	Category (addition): Member recommends that Article 8.20.4 explicitly state that trade restrictions apply only to live hares and not to other low-risk or commodities, such as meat, hides, skins, or by-products that have been processed or treated in accordance with WOAHP standards. Additionally, a risk-based justification should be provided to support the restriction on live hare imports from countries considered infected. Proposed amended text: “...The importation of live hares from countries or zones not free from infection with <i>Francisella tularensis</i> should be subject to the conditions described in Article 8.20.5. This restriction does not apply to processed meat, hides, skins, or other hare-derived products that have undergone treatment as per WOAHP guidelines rendering them safe for trade.” Rationale: While restricting the movement of live hares from infected areas is a justified measure due to their potential role as asymptomatic carriers of <i>Francisella tularensis</i> , the same risk does not extend to properly processed animal products, especially where standard inactivation procedures (e.g., heat treatment, salting, curing, tanning) have been applied. Explicitly stating this distinction aligns with the WOAHP's risk-based approach to trade and sanitary measures (as set out in the Terrestrial Code), prevents unjustified trade barriers, ensures consistency with international obligations under the SPS Agreement;	The Code Commission noted that this article is proposed for deletion. Consideration of safe commodities for tularemia will be addressed at a future meeting upon expert input. Refer to item 6.5. of the report. The Code Commission also noted that even if the disease-specific chapter does not provide specific recommendations on the trade of particular commodity, Members could still import said commodity by conducting its own risk assessment in accordance with Chapter 2.1.

	and promotes clarity for importing and exporting countries about what commodities are considered safe. This clarification is particularly important for countries that rely on trade in non-live animal products and ensures proportionate sanitary measures based on actual risk.	

Trade in commodities

~~Veterinary Authorities of tularemia free countries may prohibit importation or transit through their territory, from countries considered infected with tularemia, of live hares.~~

Article 8.20.5.

Recommendations for importation of hares from countries ~~considered~~ infected with Francisella tularensis~~tularemia~~

8.20.5._1	Category (change): Proposed amended text: Recommendations for importation <u>of hares/lagomorphs and rodents</u> from countries ~~considered~~ infected with <u>Francisella tularensis</u>~~tularemia~~ Rationale: Replaced “hares” with “lagomorphs and rodents” to align with the epidemiologically significant species recently updated in Article 8.20.1 above.	Did not agree, as the species described in the trade recommendations do not necessarily have to encompass all the animal hosts as defined in the occurrence of a case. In addition, tularemia is primarily a disease of wildlife and for trade purposes, rodents are not a significant species. Refer to Item 7.5.1. (on animal hosts) of the report.

For live hares

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of tularemia on the day of shipment;
- 2) were not kept in an ~~tularemia~~ infected zone;
- 3) have been treated against ~~ectoparasites~~ arthropod vectors; and

8.20.5._2	Category (deletion): Proposed amended text: have been treated against ~~ectoparasites~~ <u>arthropod vectors 7-14 days before export</u>; and Rationale: Some ectoparasitocides need several hours to a few days to fully kill vectors. A 7-14 days window will allow times to monitor the animal for any adverse reactions, sufficient time	Did not agree, but amended text for clarity.

	to ensure the treatment was effective and enough buffer to apply subsequent treatment if needed. Supporting evidence: doh.wa.gov : Tularemia Reporting and Investigation Guidelines	

- 4) were kept in a *quarantine station* for ~~the~~ at least 15 days prior to shipment.

8.20.5._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: were kept in a <i>quarantine station</i> for ~~the~~ <u>at least</u> 15 days prior to shipment <u>and showed no clinical signs of tularemia during that timeframe.</u> Rationale: Checking for clinical signs of tularemia during a 15-day quarantine period could identify tularemia infection in animals who were exposed but still within the bacterial incubation period prior to entering quarantine.	Agreed with the rationale, but amended differently. In addition, removed point 1 and amended point 2 for clarity.
8.20.5._4	Category (general and addition): Proposed amended text: Support the 15-day quarantine with ectoparasite treatment but suggest clarifying the criteria for vector control and certification of vector-free status as below quarantine should include ectoparasite treatment using internationally or nationally approved acaricides, and verification of vector-free status should be based on observable absence of ectoparasites post-treatment and/or documented inspections by the Veterinary Authority Rationale: Clear definition of vector control measures is essential for consistent application across countries. Given the diversity in national capacities and ecological contexts, recommended methods should be feasible, scalable, and based on practical indicators (e.g. absence of visible ticks or completion of approved treatment protocols). This ensures a balance between scientific rigour and implementation feasibility, particularly in resource-limited settings.	Addressed above.
8.20.5._5	Category (general and addition): Proposed amended text: Point 4	Did not agree as it is already covered by the draft Glossary definition for 'quarantine centre'

	Clarify that “Quarantine may be conducted in officially approved or designated facilities under the supervision of the Veterinary Authority, with regular health monitoring of animals for the duration of the quarantine period” Rationale: This clarification enhances the practicality and enforceability of the recommendation. In many countries, quarantine infrastructure is variable, and flexibility in allowing designated but not necessarily permanent quarantine stations (e.g., temporary but approved holding facilities) is critical. Additionally, explicit mention of health monitoring strengthens early detection of any clinical signs and ensures animal welfare during the quarantine period. This is aligned with core principles of veterinary certification, risk management, and trade facilitation.	

8.20.5._6	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: Article 8.20.6 Surveillance Surveillance for vectors conducted in accordance with Chapter 1.5. may be helpful in identifying vector activity and the presence of <i>Francisella tularensis</i> as part of an early warning system to support both indicators of animal and public health risk and promotion of prevention measures. Rationale: Mechanical vector transmission (and biological transmission in ticks that can be long-term (transstadial)) is recognized in tularemia. Because this chapter aims to mitigate the animal and public health risks of tularemia, vector surveillance should be considered and added as an additional section (i.e. Article 8.20.6). Supporting evidence: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2695023/	Did not agree as this is not within the scope of the current revision and requires expert input. Refer to item 6.5. of the report.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
8.X._1	Category (general): The Member supports the revised definition that clarifies the infection with CCHFV.	Noted
8.X._2	Category (general): The Member thanks the Code Commission for undertaking the review of this important Code chapter and in general supports it provided the comment below is taken into consideration.	Noted

CHAPTER 8.X.

INFECTION WITH CRIMEAN-CONGO HAEMORRHAGIC FEVER VIRUS

Article 8.X.1.

General provisions

Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is a zoonotic disease caused by a tick-borne virus that can infect, in general subclinically, a wide variety of vertebrate animals, some of them playing a significant role in the virus transmission to humans.

8.X.1._1	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is a zoonotic disease caused by a tick-borne virus that can infect, <u>in general subclinically</u> a wide range of vertebrate animals, <u>typically without causing clinical signs.</u> ~~Some of them these~~ <u>animals</u> ~~playing~~ a significant role in the ~~virus~~ <u>transmission to humans amplification and transmission of the virus to humans.</u> Rationale: 1. Reword for sentence clarity and flow and match language used in the rest of the Chapter 2. Addition of “amplification” – to provide consistency of language, matching the rest of the Chapter and acknowledge the role that animals play in virus amplification in addition to transmission Supporting evidence, if relevant	Agreed, amended differently for clarity.

	1. WOA H Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals, Section 3.1, Chapter 1.5, Summary, line 8 ('amplification'), line 9 ('clinical signs') (Rationale 1 & 2 above) Celina, S. S., Italiya, J., Tekkara, A. O. and Černý, J. (2025) 'Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus in ticks, domestic, and wild animals', <i>Frontiers in Veterinary Science</i>, 11, article 1513123. https://doi.org/10.3389/fvets.2024.1513123	
8.X.1._2	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF^V) is a zoonotic disease caused by a tick-borne virus that can infect, in general subclinically, a wide variety of vertebrate animals, some of them playing a significant role in the virus transmission to humans. Rationale: Missing "V" in acronym, edit to match rest of chapter.	Agreed, added acronym (CCHFV) in a different place.
8.X.1._3	Category (addition, deletion and change): Proposed amended text: <u>La fiebre hemorrágica de Crimea-Congo (FHCC) es una enfermedad zoonótica muy extendida causada por un virus (Nairovirus) de la familia Bunyaviridae transmitido por garrapatas. Este virus causa graves brotes de fiebre hemorrágica viral, con una tasa de letalidad del 10%-40%. Que puede infectar, en general de forma subclínica, a una gran variedad de animales vertebrados, algunos de los cuales desempeñan un papel importante en la transmisión del virus a los seres humanos.</u> Rationale: No se define el agente etiológico. Supporting evidence: https://www.who.int/es/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/crimean-congo-haemorrhagic-fever	Agreed, amended differently Refer to comment above (8.X.1._1) The Code Commission reiterated that detailed information on the clinical signs and the epidemiology is covered in the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i>.
8.X.1._4	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: <u>Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is a zoonotic disease caused by a tick-borne virus that can infect, in general subclinically, a wide variety of vertebrate animals, some of them which playing</u>	Agreed, comment addressed above (8.X.1._1)

	a significant role in <u>transmission of the virus transmission to humans.</u> Rationale: Edited for clarity	
8.X.1._5	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: some of them playing a significant role in the transmission to humans <u>through contact with infected animal blood, fluids or tissues during and immediately after slaughter, as well as through tick bites.</u> Rationale: A general contact with vertebrate animals does not necessarily lead to transmission of the CCHF virus. The primary risk of human infection arises from direct contact with infected animal blood, bodily fluids, or tissues particularly from subclinical or acutely infected animals during handling or slaughter. Tick bites are also a known route of transmission. This amendment provides greater clarity on the actual transmission pathways, thereby improving the scientific accuracy of the text and aligning it with known epidemiological evidence. However, it's still detailed in Chap 3.1.5 of the Manual.	Did not agree as this is too detailed for the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>. The Code Commission noted that detailed information on the epidemiology is covered in the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i>.

The aim of this chapter is to mitigate the animal health and public health risks posed by CCHF.

8.X.1._6	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: The aim of this chapter is to mitigate the animal health and public health risks posed by CCHF<u>V</u>. Rationale: Missing "V" in acronym, edit to match rest of chapter.	Did not agree as this refers to the disease, not the virus.
8.X.1._7	Category (addition): Proposed amended text: <u>The aim of this chapter is to mitigate the animal health and public health risks posed by CCHF. While animals typically exhibit no or mild symptoms, human infection can result in severe disease.</u> Rationale: This comment highlights the zoonotic risk and underlines why animal health surveillance is crucial, even if animals don't show symptoms of	Did not agree as this is already covered by the first paragraph where additional detail on severity of human disease was added.

	CCHF. It strengthens the rationale for the chapter by explaining why a disease that may be mild in animals still poses a serious threat and why that matters. Supporting evidence: Jakimovski, D., Poposki, K., Dimzova, M., Cvetanovska, M., Cana, F., Bogdan, I....Kemenesi, G. (2025). Two Human Infections with Diverse Europe-1 Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever Virus Strains, North Macedonia, 2024. <i>Emerging Infectious Diseases</i>, 31(2), 313-317. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid3102.241249. Al-Zadjali M, Al-Hashim H, Al-Ghilani M, Balkhiar A. A case of crimean-congo hemorrhagic Fever in oman. <i>Oman Med J</i>. 2013 May;28(3):210-2. doi: 10.5001/omj.2013.57. PMID: 23772290; PMCID: PMC3680643. Bacary Djilocalisse Sadio, Dethié Ngom, Bocar Sow, Cheikh Tidiane Diagne, Aboubacry Gaye, Aliou Khoulé, Ousseynou Sène, Elisabeth Faye, Moufid Mhamadi, Diogop Camara, Cherif Nehma Sylla, Fatoumata Goundo Diaby, Mahfouz Traoré, Oumar Ndiaye, Khalifa Ababacar Mbaye, Khady Cissé, Boly Diop, El Hadji Mamadou Ndiaye, Yoro Sall, Alassane Mbengue, Abdourahmane Sow, Amadou Alpha Sall, Oumar Faye, Martin Faye, Ndongo Dia, Mawlouth Diallo, Moussa Moise Diagne, Gamou Fall, Diawo Diallo, Re-emergence of Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus in Kedougou, south-eastern Senegal in 2023: Epidemiological and zoological investigations of the first symptomatic human case, One Health, Volume 20, 2025, 101040, ISSN 2352-7714, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.onehlt.2025.101040. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S235277142500076X)	
8.X.1._8	Category (deletion): The Member suggests to delete the paragraphs above. However, in view of similar comments not being taken on board in the past, the Member invites the Code Commission to consider the Member comments in the User's guide on the 'case	The Code Commission noted that this article defines the occurrence of the disease which Members are obliged to notify to WOA. The Commission will consider this comment in the discussion of User's Guide.

	definition' and on clarifying the terms "for the purpose of the Terrestrial Code". The Member agrees with the approach proposed by the Code Commission but fears that a lack of clarity in Article 1 of the disease specific chapters could lead to confusion, especially as regards the species included in the notification obligation.	

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, **Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF)** is defined as an *infection* of ruminants, dromedary camels and ostriches (hereafter 'animal hosts') with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV).

8.X.1._9	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: For the purposes of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>, CCHFV is defined as an <i>infection</i> of ruminants, dromedary camels and ostriches (hereafter 'animal hosts') with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV). Rationale: Missing "V" in acronym, edit to match rest of chapter.	Did not agree as this refers to the disease, not the virus.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with CCHFV:

- 1) CCHFV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or
- 2) nucleic acid specific to CCHFV has been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association **or contact** with **or exposure to** CCHFV; or

8.X.1._10	Category (change): Proposed amended text: 2) nucleic acid or antigen specific to CCHFV has been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with or exposure to CCHFV; or Rationale: At present, antigen detection methods for CCHF are available, with commercialized test kits already on the market. Antigen detection can significantly improve the early diagnosis rate. Therefore, it is recommended to supplement	Did not agree The Code Commission considered this comment taking into account the opinion of the Biological Standards Commission. The Commission explained that the current <i>Terrestrial Manual</i> chapter on CCHF does not include the diagnosis on antigen and agreed not to include this diagnosis at this stage.

	antigen detection on the basis of the existing nucleic acid detection as the basis for laboratory diagnosis. Supporting evidence: Shrivastava N, Kumar J, Yadav P, Shete A, Jain R, Shrivastava A, Dash P. Development of double antibody sandwich ELISA as potential diagnostic tool for rapid detection of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus. Sci Rep. 2021;11(1):14699.	
8.X.1._11	Category (editorial): Proposed amended text: Retain "or contact with" in criterion 2 to ensure comprehensive coverage of transmission risk factors. The following defines the occurrence of <i>infection</i> with CCHFV 2) nucleic acid specific to CCHFV has been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association ~~or contact~~ with <u>or exposure to</u> CCHFV; or Rationale: The term "contact" should be reinstated in criterion 2 to ensure clarity and epidemiological accuracy in defining CCHF virus (CCHFV) infection in animals. While "association with" and "exposure to" imply potential pathways of transmission, they do not explicitly account for direct or indirect contact which is a critical determinant of infection. CCHFV spreads through tick vectors, infected tissues, or bodily fluids, necessitating a clear link between the animal host and the virus via contact. Omitting this term could lead to ambiguity in case classification, particularly in scenarios where epidemiological evidence points to contact (e.g., shared grazing areas, handling of infected animals) without confirmed exposure routes. Reinstating "contact" reinforces a precautionary approach to surveillance. Given the zoonotic risk of CCHFV, precise terminology is essential to trigger appropriate veterinary and public health responses. The proposed revision strengthens the definition while maintaining consistency with existing frameworks.	Did not agree because exposure better highlight the meaning than 'contact', which can be considered only as 'direct contact'

- 3) antibodies specific to CCHFV have been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with CCHFV.

8.X.1._12	Category (change): Proposed amended text: antibodies specific to CCHFV have been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association ~~or contact~~ with <u>or exposure to</u> CCHFV. Rationale: Exposure has a broader meaning than contact. This could include both direct and indirect contact, as well as entry of the organism into an organism via different routes (oral, inhalation, dermal). In this context, it could be exposure via tick bite, iatrogenic transmission or other rare means of exposure. Contact or association alone may not lead to an infection thereby eliciting antibodies. Exposure leading to an infection would elicit antibody production. Supporting evidence: Yildirmak, T., Tulek, N., & Bulut, C. (2016). Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever: transmission to visitors and healthcare workers. <i>Infection</i>, 44, 687-689. The suggested change is also consisted with the similar text proposed by the Code Commission in the Japanese encephalitis chapter.	Agreed
8.X.1._13	Category: Editorial Proposed amended text: point 3) 3) antibodies specific to CCHFV have been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association ~~or contact~~ with <u>or exposure to</u> CCHFV. Rationale: For consistency with the amendment made to point 2)	Agreed, comment addressed above

Standards for diagnosis and information on the epidemiology are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Reference	Comment	TAHSC response
10.X_1	Category (general): The Member agrees with the newly revised definition of infection with avian metapneumovirus, in relation to the new glossary term 'seroconversion'.	Noted
10.X._2	Category (general): The Member in general supports this draft new chapter provided the comments below are addressed.	Noted

CHAPTER 10.X.

INFECTION WITH AVIAN METAPNEUMOVIRUS (TURKEY RHINOTRACHEITIS AND SWOLLEN HEAD SYNDROME OF CHICKENS)

Article 10.X.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, *infection* with avian metapneumovirus is defined as an *infection* of *poultry* with avian metapneumovirus.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with avian metapneumovirus:

- 1) Avian metapneumovirus, **excluding vaccine strains**, has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from *poultry*; or
- 2) nucleic acid specific to avian metapneumovirus, which is not the consequence of *vaccination*, has been detected in a sample from *poultry* **showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with infection with avian metapneumovirus or is epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case**; or
- 3) seroconversion specific to avian metapneumovirus, **which is not the consequence of vaccination**, has been detected in *poultry*; or

10.X.1._1	Category (general): We would appreciate further clarification on the term "seroconversion" as used in Point 3, as it is a term that is currently under review, to improve consistency.	The Code Commission noted that the new Glossary definition for 'seroconversion', which should be applicable here too, will be proposed for adoption at the General Session in May 2026.
10.X.1._2	Category (deletion): Rationale: The definition of seroconversion, as defined in the Terrestrial Manual, is noted, as well as the draft definition proposed in annex 15 of the report. However this definition in the code is still being submitted for	For 'seroconversion', refer to 10.X.1._1. above.

	comments and has not yet been adopted. This point 3 can be reconsidered once the definition in the Code will be adopted. In addition, point 4 already provides with a better formulation giving more flexibility to the competent authority.	

- 4) antibodies specific to avian metapneumovirus, which are not the consequence of *vaccination*, have been detected in a sample from *poultry* showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with avian metapneumovirus, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case.

10.X.1._3	Category (addition): Proposed amended texts: antibodies specific to avian metapneumovirus, which are not the consequence of <i>vaccination</i>, have been detected <u>at a single time point</u> in a sample from <i>poultry</i> showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with <i>infection</i> with avian metapneumovirus, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case. Rationale: While the original text is technically accurate, adding “at a single time point” helps make the distinction between Points 3 and 4 more clear, namely that Point 3 is confirming a case based on seroconversion which requires paired negative and positive sera or a 4 fold titer change and Point 4 is confirming a case based on a single time point positive (offering weaker evidence) with additional clinical or epidemiological support.	Did not agree as ‘a sample’ as mentioned in the text implies that it is one sample at a single time point.

Standards for diagnosis and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

**WORK PROGRAMME FOR
THE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION**

Chapter	Issues	Summary of the work	Status - September 2025		Priority order *
			Stage of consideration	Remarks (Month when draft text first circulated for comment /# of rounds for comment) or last TAHSC report reference	
General	Wildlife Health	Overarching consideration on how wildlife animal health is addressed in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>	Preliminary discussions	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC report	2
	Commodities	Consideration to determine whether several types of highly processed products (such as blood meal, dried plasma, rendered fats, and hydrolysed protein) have a globally standardised production process and meet criteria to be considered safe commodities as regards specific diseases. Pet-food: Consider the inclusion of 'extruded dry pet food' and 'heat-treated meat products in a hermetically sealed container with an F0 value of 3 or above' in the list of safe commodities of chapters (when revised).	In progress	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC report Noted in Sep 2022 TAHSC report (pet-food commodities)	2
Use of terms	Use of terms: animal health status	- Consider the need to revise definition to incorporate 'herd', and avoid restrictive wording - Possible revision of the Glossary definition - Review use of the terms across the <i>Code</i> for consistency	In progress	Refer to Feb 2020 TAHSC report	1

	Use of terms: notify / notifiable disease / report / reportable disease	Review use of the terms across the <i>Code</i> for consistency. Develop a policy for their use Consider the revision of definitions for 'notification' and 'notifiable disease'	In progress	Refer to Sep 2025 TAHSC report	2
User's guide	Revision of the Users' guide (standing item)	Partial revision - clarification of chapters	In progress	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report	1
Glossary	1. New definition for 'swill', definitions for 'biosecurity' and 'biosecurity plan' 2. New definitions for 'isolation' and 'pathogenic agent', and definition for 'disinfection'	Swill: Review use of the term across the <i>Code</i> . Develop a policy for its use and consider developing a definition. (connected to biosecurity work)	Circulated for comments and proposed for adoption	1. Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2023/4) 2. Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/3)	1
	Definition for 'disinsection'	Develop a new definition	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/2)	1
	1. New definition for 'point of exit' and definitions for 'border post' and 'quarantine station' 2. New definition for 'point of entry' and definitions for 'transit country', 'container' and 'means of transport'	Review as a part of the work to revise Chs 5.4. to 5.7.	Circulated for comments and proposed for adoption	1. Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2023/4) 2. Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/3)	1
	New definition for 'veterinary medical use'	Move the definition from Ch 6.9.	Pending the work of AMRWG	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	3
	Definition of 'poultry'	(Not defined yet, related to revision of chapters in Section 10)	In progress	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report	1
	Definition for 'laboratory'	Revision of definition (in collaboration with BSC)	Circulated for comments	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2025/1)	2
	New definition for 'seroconversion'	Develop a new definition (in coordination with BSC)	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/2)	1

	Definition for 'approved'	Revision of definition (add other Competent Authority)	Circulated for comments	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2025/1)	2
	New definition for 'animal host'	Develop a new definition	In progress	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report	1
	New definition for 'suspected case'	Consider a new definition	Preliminary discussion	Noted in Feb 2024 TAHSC report	2
Section 1					
1.1.	Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information	Revision of relevant articles	In progress	Refer to Sep 2025 TAHSC report	2
1.3.	Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOA	Removal of 'Nairobi sheep disease'	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/2)	1
		Revision of disease names to chapters to be proposed for adoption	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2025/1)	1
1.6.	Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOA	Partial revision: - New article to improve clarity on the ability for Members to hold pathogenic agents within laboratories without affecting their animal health status.	Circulated for comments	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/3)	2
1.7.- 1.12	Status Questionnaires	Deletion of chapters, to move their content to the WOA Website - introduce the possibility to host the questionnaires on the web.	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report	2
Section 3					
3.X	New chapter on emergency management	Develop a new chapter and potentially modify the existing chapters	Circulated for comments	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2025/1)	2

Section 4					
4.4., 4.Y.	Zoning and compartmentalisation and new chapter on implementation of zoning	To address necessary points, as relevant, with the development of new Ch 4.4. and develop a full new chapter (taskforce by SCAD and TAHSC to work on this issue)	Expert consultation	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report	1
4.7.	Collection and processing of bovine, small ruminant and porcine semen	Comprehensive revision of chapter	Expert consultation	Refer to Feb 2025 TAHSC report	1
4.8.	Collection and processing of <i>in vivo</i> derived embryos from livestock and equids	Consider potential amendments as a consequence of the changes in the IETS Manual	Preparatory work	Pending progress of data collection	2
4.9.	Collection and processing of oocytes and <i>in vitro</i> produced embryos from livestock and horses	Consider potential amendments as a consequence of the changes in the IETS Manual	Preparatory work	Pending progress of data collection	2
4.13.	Disposal of dead animals	Consider including all potentially contaminated wastes/products/fomites	Preparatory work	Refer to Feb 2022 TAHSC report	2
4.14.	General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection	Comprehensive revision of chapter Consider question from AHG on biosecurity	Expert consultation	Refer to Sep 2025 TAHSC report	2
4.X.	New chapter on biosecurity	Develop a new chapter	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2023/4)	1
Section 5					
General	Revision of Section 5 Trade measures, import/export procedures and veterinary certification (especially Chs 5.4. to 5.7.)	Comprehensive revision of Chs 5.4., 5.5., 5.6. and 5.7.	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2023/4 for Chs 5.4. and 5.6., Sep 2024/3 for Chs 5.5. and 5.7.)	1

5.X.	Development of introductory chapter	New introductory chapter for Section 5 (task force, TAHSC and AAC)	Expert consultation	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report	2
5.1., 5.2., 5.10. to 5.13.	Certification procedures	Partial revision to review provisions on electronic certification and check model of certificate For Ch 5.12. Update the relevant chapters on equine diseases to take into account proposals made by the AHG on HHP Horses Veterinary Certificates	Expert consultation	Refer to Feb 2025 TAHSC report	2
5.8.	International transfer and laboratory containment of animal pathogenic agents	- Consider impact of holding PA in labs (and research facilities) - Align with corresponding <i>Manual</i> chapter (categories of PA) - Potential link with work with Nagoya protocol	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	2
Section 6					
6.8.	Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes	Inclusion of definitions for monitoring and surveillance, as well as for active and passive surveillance and integrated surveillance	Expert consultation	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report	2
6.12.	Zoonoses transmissible from non-human primates	Consider possible inclusion of SARS-CoV-2 in this chapter, possible inclusion of Macacine Herpesvirus 1 and the revision of test schedule and animal species to be tested for tuberculosis (Origin Member requests)	Not started	Refer to Feb 2022 TAHSC report	4
Section 7					
7.2., 7.3., 7.4.	Transport of animals by land, sea and air	Comprehensive revision of chapters	Expert consultation	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report	1
7.5.	Animal welfare during slaughter	Article 7.5.30. Electrical water-bath stunning for poultry (points under study)	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/2)	2

7.6.	Killing of animals for disease control purposes	- Comprehensive revision of chapter	Expert consultation	Refer to Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2024/2 for Articles 1 to 8, Feb 2025/1 for rest articles)	1
Section 8					
8.4.	Infection with <i>Brucella abortus</i> , <i>B. melitensis</i> and <i>B. suis</i>	Revision of provisions for free status	Not started	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC	3
8.8.	Infection with foot and mouth disease virus	Partial revision: development of an article with provision for safe trade of fetal bovine serum Consider safe commodities (rendered fat)	Expert consultation	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/1)	3
		Partial revision: consideration of recommendations for import of 'horns'	Not start	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC report	3
		Harmonisation of animal health status related articles (recently adopted Chapters on CBPP and AHS)	Circulated for comments and proposed for adoption	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2025/1)	1
8.10.	Japanese encephalitis	Comprehensive revision of chapter (related to works on Chs 8.21., 12.4. and 12.11.)	Circulated for comments and Expert consultation	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/2)	2
8.11.	Infection with <i>Mycobacterium tuberculosis</i> complex	Partial revision - to add recommendations for camelids and goats - to clarify point 1(b) of Article 8.11.4. ,provisions of free status	Not started	Refer to Feb 2022 TAHSC report	3
8.15.	Infection with rabies virus	Partial revision - to add recommendations on wildlife-mediated rabies - revise recovery of free status	Preparatory work	Refer to Sep 2022 TAHSC report	3
8.20.	Tularemia	Partial revision (case definition and to align other articles without altering current contents)	Circulated for comments and Expert consultation	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Feb 2025/2)	2
8.21.	West Nile fever	Comprehensive revision of chapter (related to works on Chs 8.10., 12.4. and 12.11.) including safe commodities	Expert consultation	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC report	2

8.X.	New Chapter on Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever	Develop a new chapter (case definition)	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/3)	2
		Consider need to develop recommendations for prevention	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2024 TAHSC report	3
Section 10					
General	Overall consideration of Section 10 Aves	Consider approach to risk management recommendations for different production sectors, species, commodities, structure of chapter (following latest adopted HAPI) across different diseases.	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	2
10.2.	Avian infectious bronchitis	Review trade articles for clarity. Review safe commodities	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	3
10.3.	Avian infectious laryngotracheitis	Consider amendments to ensure alignment with recently revised <i>Manual</i> chapter	Not started	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	3
10.4.	Infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza virus	Revision of Articles 10.4.1. and 10.4.3. to align with the work on revision of Glossary definition of ‘poultry’	In progress	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report	1
10.5.	Infection with <i>Mycoplasma gallisepticum</i> (Avian mycoplasmosis)	Full update of the chapter (content and structure) based on the recent update of the <i>Manual</i> Chapter. Consider inclusion of <i>M. synoviae</i> into a single chapter (and listed disease).	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	3
10.9.	Infection with Newcastle disease virus	Revision to align with recent revision of Ch 10.4. Provision on recovery of free status Review safe commodities	In progress	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report	2
10.X.	Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chicken)	Develop a new chapter (case definition)	Circulated for comments and propose for adoption	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2024/3)	2

Section 11					
11.9.	Infection with lumpy skin disease virus	Comprehensive revision of chapter in relation to Chapter 14.9. (article on surveillance is still being worked on)	Circulated for comments and Expert consultation	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2025/1)	2
11.11.	Trichomonosis	Comprehensive revision of chapter	Not started	Refer to Feb 2022 TAHSC report (Sep 2020/2)	4
11.X.	New Chapter on Infection with bovine pestivirus (bovine viral diarrhoea)	Develop a new chapter (case definition)	Expert consultation	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2022/6)	2
Section 12					
12.8.	Infection with equid herpesvirus-1 (Equine rhinopneumonitis)	For consistency of disease name	Preparatory work	Noted in Feb 2024 TAHSC report Manual chapter adopted at the last GS	3
12.11.	Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis	Comprehensive revision of chapter (related to works on Chs 8.10., 8.21. and 12.4.)	Circulated for comments and expert consultation	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2025/1)	2
Section 13					
13.2.	Rabbit haemorrhagic disease	Comprehensive revision of chapter including safe commodities	Preparatory work	Noted in Sep 2023 TAHSC report	3
Section 14					
14.1. and 14.5.	Caprine arthritis/encephalitis and Maedi-visna	Comprehensive revision - include case definition - combine into one chapter	Preparatory work	Noted in Feb 2025 TAHSC report	3

14.7.	Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus	Partial revision: - Reconsider susceptible animals targeted in the chapter (wild animals, pigs) - Review Article 14.7.19. and Article 14.7.25 to remove reference to Chapter 8.8. - New article on recommendations for importation of animals for direct slaughter - Apply new drafting conventions - Harmonisation of animal health status related articles (recently adopted Chapters on CBPP and AHS)	Circulated for comments	Noted in Sep2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2025/1)	1
14.8.	Scrapie	Comprehensive revision of chapter	Pending revision of Manual chapter	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report	3
14.9.	Sheep pox and goat pox	Comprehensive revision of chapter	Circulated for comments	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2025/1)	2
Section 15					
15.2.	Infection with classical swine fever virus	Harmonisation of animal health status related articles (recently adopted Chapters on CBPP and AHS)	Circulated for comments and proposed for adoption	Noted in Sep 2025 TAHSC report (Sep 2025/1)	1

* Description of the consequence of priority order	
1	- <i>active work for the TAHSC</i> - <i>identified as the priority to progress as soon as possible</i> - <i>to be put forward for next meeting agenda</i>
2	- <i>active work for the TAHSC</i> - <i>progression as time and resources allow</i> - <i>to be included in next meeting agenda</i>
3	- <i>not immediate work for the TAHSC</i> - <i>possible progression if time, resources allow</i> - <i>needs to progress before consideration for next meeting agenda</i>
4	- <i>not active</i> - <i>not to be immediately started</i>
List of abbreviations	
AAC	Aquatic Animals Commission
AHG	<i>Ad hoc</i> Group
BSC	Biological Standards Commission
Ch	Chapter
HQ	WOAH Headquarters
IETS	International Embryo Technology Society
SCAD	Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases
TAHSC	Terrestrial Animal Health Standard Commission

GLOSSARY

BIOSECURITY

means a set of management, behavioural and physical measures designed to reduce the likelihood ~~risk~~ of entry of pathogenic agents into a given population and the exposure of animals to these pathogenic agents introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents ~~animal diseases, infections or infestations~~ in order to avoid their establishment and spread within and from and within an animal that population.

BIOSECURITY PLAN

means a plan document or series of documents that identifies potential sources and pathways and factors for entry of pathogenic agents into a given population, and the exposure of animals and factors for the transmission of these pathogenic agents the introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents ~~disease in a zone or compartment~~, and that describes the corresponding biosecurity measures to be implemented and the mechanisms to evaluate its performance and to update the plan ~~it~~ which are being or will be applied to mitigate the disease risks, if applicable, in accordance with the recommendations in the *Terrestrial Code*.

BORDER INSPECTION POST

means any airport, or any port, railway station or road check point international point of entry for commodities open to international trade of commodities, and associated facilities, where import ~~veterinary~~ official inspections can be is performed by Veterinary Services.

CONTAINER

means a non-self-propelled receptacle or other rigid structure for holding animals to carry hold commodities during transportation ~~a journey by one or several means of transport~~.

DISINFECTION

means an action the application, after thorough cleansing, of procedures intended to inactivate or destroy pathogenic agents on potentially contaminated objects and surfaces, ~~the infectious or parasitic agents of animal diseases, including zoonoses; this applies to premises, vehicles and different objects which may have been directly or indirectly contaminated~~.

DISINSECTION

means an action intended to kill or eliminate arthropods from establishments, means of transport, slaughterhouses or any other premises or equipment used for animals.

ISOLATION

means the placement physical separation of an animal or a group of animals separated from other animals under appropriate adequate biosecurity.

PATHOGENIC AGENT

means a biological agent that causes, or contributes to, the development of a disease in animals.

POINT OF ENTRY

means any point-specific location at which *commodities* enter the territory of a country.

POINT OF EXIT

means any point-specific location from where *commodities* leave the territory of a country ~~the exporting country.~~

QUARANTINE-STATION CENTRE

means an *establishment* under the control of the *Veterinary Authority* where *animals* are maintained in isolation for observation, and if appropriate testing and treatment, during a specified length of time under **appropriate adequate biosecurity** to prevent ~~with no direct or indirect ensure no contact with other animals and vectors when relevant, to ensure so that there is no transmission~~ entry of specified pathogenic agents ~~from entering outside into nor escape escaping out of the establishment while the animals are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and, if appropriate, testing or treatment.~~

SEROCONVERSION

means either the change from a seronegative to a seropositive **state condition** of an *animal*, **demonstrated by a serological test specific for the antigen**, or a four-fold or more rise in antibody titre in paired sera of an animal, sampled at an appropriate interval, **demonstrated by an ordinal test specific for the antigen.**

SWILL

means food scraps or food waste, that contain or have been in contact with *animal products*, and ~~which may be used as feed.~~

TRANSIT COUNTRY

means a country through which *commodities* destined for another country ~~an importing country~~ are transported or in which they make a stopover ~~is made at a border post.~~

VEHICLE/VESSEL MEANS OF TRANSPORT

means ~~any means of conveyance including any land vehicle, a train, truck, trailer, aircraft or ship~~ vessel that is used for ~~carrying transporting animals~~ commodities.

CHAPTER 1.3.

DISEASES, INFECTIONS AND INFESTATIONS LISTED BY WOA

[...]

Article 1.3.1.

The following are included within the category of diseases, *infections* and *infestations* of multiple species:

- Anthrax
- ~~Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever~~
- Heartwater
- Infection with Aujeszky's disease virus
- Infection with bluetongue virus
- Infection with *Brucella abortus*, *Brucella melitensis* and *Brucella suis*
- Infection with *Coxiella burnetii* (Q fever)
- Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
- Infection with *Echinococcus granulosus*
- Infection with *Echinococcus multilocularis*
- Infection with epizootic hemorrhagic disease virus
- Infection with foot and mouth disease virus
- Infection with *Leishmania* spp. (Leishmaniosis)
- Infection with *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* complex
- Infection with Nipah virus
- Infection with rabies virus
- Infection with Rift Valley fever virus
- Infection with rinderpest virus
- Infection with *Trichinella* spp.
- Infection with *Trypanosoma brucei*, *Trypanosoma congolense*, *Trypanosoma simiae* and *Trypanosoma vivax*
- Infection with *Trypanosoma evansi* (Surra)
- Infestation with *Chrysomya bezziana* (Old World screwworm)

- Infestation with *Cochliomyia hominivorax* (New World screwworm)
- Japanese encephalitis
- Paratuberculosis
- Tularemia
- West Nile fever.

[...]

Article 1.3.3.

The following are included within the category of diseases and *infections* of aves:

- Avian chlamydiosis
- Avian infectious bronchitis
- Avian infectious laryngotracheitis
- Duck virus hepatitis
- Fowl typhoid
- Infection of birds other than *poultry*, including *wild* birds, with influenza A viruses of high pathogenicity
- Infection of domestic and *captive wild* birds with low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses having proven natural transmission to humans associated with severe consequences
- Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens)
- Infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses
- Infection with *Mycoplasma gallisepticum* (Avian mycoplasmosis)
- Infection with *Mycoplasma synoviae* (Avian mycoplasmosis)
- Infection with Newcastle disease virus
- Infectious bursal disease (Gumboro disease)
- Pullorum disease

Turkey rhinotracheitis.

[...]

Article 1.3.7.

The following are included within the category of diseases and *infections* of caprinae:

- Caprine arthritis/encephalitis
- Contagious agalactia
- Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia
- Infection with *Chlamydia abortus* (Enzootic abortion of ewes, ovine chlamydiosis)

-
- Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus
 - Infection with *Theileria lestoquardi*, *Theileria luwenshuni* and *Theileria uilenbergi*
 - Maedi–visna
 - ~~Nairobi sheep disease~~
 - Ovine epididymitis (*Brucella ovis*)
 - Salmonellosis (*S. abortusovis*)
 - Scrapie
 - Sheep pox and goat pox.

[...]

SECTION 4.

DISEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL

CHAPTER 4.X.

BIOSECURITY

Article 4.X.1.

Introduction

Biosecurity is the cornerstone of animal health programmes and as such should be implemented to prevent and control diseases in *populations*. In addition to reducing the risk of disease, the expected benefits of *biosecurity* include a reduced ~~need for use of~~ veterinary medicinal products; reduced *killing of animals* for disease control purposes; reduced economic losses; protection of livelihoods; ~~assurance of sustainability of~~ improved animal production; improved food security and food safety; promotion of animal, human and environmental health; ~~and assurance of~~ safe trade and business continuity.

Article 4.X.2.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles and recommendations to allow for a consistent approach that could be applied to implement *biosecurity* for a *population* or *subpopulation* irrespective of the settings or scale, such as at farm production or non-production establishments, herd/flock, compartment, zone, or country, zone, compartment, herd/flock, farm or non-production establishment level.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to the *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant actors, as described in Article 4.X.4., on the principles, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of *biosecurity* to support disease prevention and control programmes. The chapter applies to *animals*, their gatherings and husbandry systems, to all components of animal keeping, and transport and processing, and to the interface between domesticated *animals*, wildlife, humans ~~and wildlife~~ and the environment.

More specifically, this chapter aims to:

- describe the general guiding principles of *biosecurity*;
- identify the roles and responsibilities of the different actors in *biosecurity*;
- describe the potential sources of pathogenic agents and the pathways involved in their transmission within the population; for entry of pathogenic agents into a population and the exposure of animals and factors for the transmission of pathogenic agents;
- describe the components of *biosecurity*;
- provide guidance on the design, application, monitoring, evaluation and training with regards to *biosecurity* and *biosecurity plans*.

This chapter should be read in conjunction with other relevant chapters in Section 3 'Quality of Veterinary Services', Section 4 'Disease prevention and control' and Section 5 'Trade measures, import/export procedures and veterinary certification'.

The chapter does not apply to laboratories, ~~where a~~ Approaches to laboratory biosecurity are addressed in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 4.X.3.

General guiding principles ~~provisions~~ principles

The specific desired objectives of *biosecurity* should be defined. To achieve ~~the these~~ objectives of *biosecurity*, the following should be considered:

- 1) The *population* for which *biosecurity* is to be implemented, including its management, environmental and epidemiological context and size and its *animal health status*.
- 2) The identification of the ~~hazards~~ pathogenic agents of concern and from where and how they may be introduced, and how they may be ~~the pathogenic agents may be introduced, established and spread within in and spread from the population.~~
- 3) The factors and frequency of events that influence the introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents.
- 4) Scientific evidence to assess the risk.
- 5) ~~and~~ Proportionality of to the measures to manage the risk.
- 6) ~~5) Sustainability, adaptability, and monitoring.~~
- 7) ~~6) Human behaviour to maximise compliance.~~
- 7) ~~Evaluation of compliance built into the day-to-day operations.~~
- 8) Socio-economic impacts of *biosecurity*.
- 9) Impacts on other *populations* and the environment.
- 10) Development of a *biosecurity plan* that supports promotes consistent implementation of *biosecurity*.
- 11) Engagement with, training and awareness of, and communication with, all actors involved in *biosecurity*.

These ~~principles general~~ principles provisions of *biosecurity* apply to any type of activity (intensive, extensive, commercial or non-production); only the measures comprising the *biosecurity* should be adapted to the situation.

Article 4.X.4.

Roles and responsibilities

The roles and responsibilities of different actors in *biosecurity* should be clearly defined and communicated ~~with consideration made and may vary depending on to the~~ population and level of application context (e.g. such as establishment, compartment, zone, or country country, zone, compartment, establishment level), the scale and type of operations and existing potential public-private partnerships. Implementation of *biosecurity* requires adequate financial and human resources, and engagement and collaboration amongst all actors involved.

12) Veterinary Authority or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should be responsible for the development and oversight of ~~policy on and~~ legislative frameworks and general policies for *biosecurity*. These ~~policies~~ should include the relative contribution and roles of *veterinarians* and *veterinary paraprofessionals* in both the private and public sectors, promote and provide guidance for the implementation of *biosecurity*. When required For for international trade ~~purposes~~, the *Veterinary Authority* should have an active role in ~~enforcement, oversight, and verification of~~ *biosecurity and biosecurity plans*.

42) Veterinary Services should execute and implement policies and legislation on *biosecurity* under the supervision of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities*.

23) Veterinarians and veterinary paraprofessionals and other relevant advisors should give advice on *biosecurity* and the *biosecurity plans* to all relevant actors. This advice should be aligned with the policies and legislation, where available.

34) Animal Breeders/breeders, owners, managers, keepers, and transporters; feed producers and other relevant actors are responsible for developing, implementing and monitoring *biosecurity* and the *biosecurity plan* and should seek advice from *veterinarians, veterinary paraprofessionals* or other relevant advisors.

45) Training entities should provide training in *biosecurity* for relevant actors. Coordination between the *Veterinary Authority*, other relevant *Competent Authorities*, the *veterinary statutory body* and veterinary educational institutions may be required to ensure *biosecurity* training delivered to *veterinarians, veterinary paraprofessionals* and other relevant advisors meets relevant standards, especially the recommendations of Article 4.X.9.

56) Farmer associations, veterinary and ~~para-veterinary~~ veterinary paraprofessional associations, and other relevant associations should advocate and promote *biosecurity* among their members, and may become directly involved in leading, and overseeing and providing training for the biosecurity planning and implementation by their members.

Article 4.X.5.

Potential sources of pathogenic agents

Pathogenic agents can ~~be spread through from~~ different sources, which should be identified and considered when implementing *biosecurity* and developing a *biosecurity plan*. ~~The main Potential sources of pathogenic agents to be considered include:~~

- 1) live animals,
- 2) *germinal products*,
- 3) secretions and excretions,
- 4) *animal products*,
- 5) dead *animals* and parts thereof and afterbirth materials,
- 6) arthropods such as mosquitoes, midges, flies, lice, or ticks or beetles,
- 7) fomites such as peoples' clothing, boots/footwear, vehicles means of transport, crates, bedding, or farm equipment,
- 8) *feed* and *feed ingredients* ~~including such as~~ forage, grazing pastures and swill,
- 9) water, soil-and air,
- 10) *biological products*,
- 11) humans.

Article 4.X.6.

Transmission pathways

Transmission of pathogenic agents can occur either through *animal-to-animal* contact without an intermediate (direct transmission), or through an intermediate such as fomites, air, water, *feed, animal products, germinal products, biological products*, vectors, humans and the relevant animal environment (indirect transmission).

Transmission pathways of pathogenic agents should be assessed based on scientific evidence and considered when implementing *biosecurity* or developing a *biosecurity plan*. Transmission pathways are not mutually exclusive and include:

- 1) Vertical transmission from parents to offspring *in ovo*, *in utero* or during birth ("vertical transmission").
- 2) Horizontal transmission from one animal to another that is not vertical.
- 3) Iatrogenic transmission.
- 34) Sexual transmission through reproductive secretions such as semen and vaginal fluids or transmitted directly between surfaces in contact during mating.
- 45) Vector-borne transmission via *vectors* including blood-feeding arthropods such as mosquitoes, flies, ticks, fleas and lice. *Vectors* may be mechanical with no biological association between the *vector* and pathogenic agent or biological where the pathogenic agent undergoes a multiplication or a developmental change within the *vector*, necessary for survival, transmission or host *infection*.
- 56) Droplets or airborne transmission of pathogenic agents through particles suspended in the air. Pathogenic agents may travel in particles of multiple sizes (droplets and droplet nuclei) that remain suspended in the air or deposited on surfaces. Airborne transmission may include short or long distances (which may be referred to as aerosol or wind-borne transmission, respectively).
- 6)7) Transmission through fomites, germinal products, animal products and biological products. Transmission through skin, digestive tract (ingestion) or other mucosa.

The relative importance of the different transmission pathways will vary depending on the epidemiological characteristics of pathogenic agents of concern.

Article 4.X.7.

Components of biosecurity

Biosecurity can be applied to any type of *population*. The components of *biosecurity* focus on reducing the likelihood risk of transmission of pathogenic agents through interactions with elements outside the *population* (external *biosecurity*) and on reducing risk—the likelihood of transmission of pathogenic agents within the *population* (internal *biosecurity*). The components of *biosecurity* aim at avoiding or breaking the transmission pathways described in Article 4.X.6. All relevant components of *biosecurity* should be applied to address all potential sources of pathogenic agents of concern, transmission pathways as well as unexpected events, and may vary according to the *population*.

1. Components of external biosecurity may include the following:
 - a) Introduction of *animals*, *animal products* and *germinal products* into a *population* should be limited to the extent necessary minimised and if undertaken, the *animal health status* of the source *population* should be assessed.
 - b) ~~Whenever~~Before *animals* of unknown or different animal health status are newly introduced into the *population*, they should go through a monitored isolation period of sufficient length, during which measures such as tests or treatments may be implemented to reducemitigate the risk-likelihood of transmission of pathogenic agents.
 - c) Contact between *populations* of unknown or different *animal health status* should be avoided through segregation using managerial measures, physical or natural barriers.
 - d) Human access to the *population* should be controlled. When humans come in contact with *animals*, they should take measures to reducemitigate the risk-likelihood of bi-directional transmission of pathogenic agents, ~~which includes as a minimum wearing dedicated clothing and footwear, and hand hygiene.~~ When humans come in contact sequentially with different *populations* subsequently, the order and timing of the visits should be organised to minimise the likelihood of bi-directional transmission.

- e) Equipment and clothing used to handle or care for *animals* should not be shared between different *populations*. If shared, equipment and clothing should undergo cleaning and *disinfection* at least before each use ~~and after use~~.
- f) ~~Transport vehicles~~ Means of transport in contact with *animals* or ~~their~~ animal products should undergo cleaning and *disinfection* at least before each use ~~and after use~~.
- g) *Animal products*, faeces, manure or other waste materials should be handled in a way to ~~mitigate~~ minimise the spread of pathogenic agents. Special care should be taken to avoid contact with or attraction of other *animals* and arthropods.
- h) Dead *animals* and parts thereof should be handled, stored and disposed of in a way to ~~mitigate~~ minimise the spread of pathogenic agents and to avoid contact with or attraction of other *animals* and arthropods.
- i) *Feed* should be produced in accordance with Chapter 6.4. and should be, stored and transported in dedicated equipment to minimise the contact with potential sources of pathogenic agents. Feeding of untreated swill should be avoided.
- j) Water should originate from low-risk sources or be treated to remove or inactivate pathogenic agents. The safety of the water ~~and feed~~ should be checked regularly.
- k) Contacts between the *population* and other *animals* including pets, birds, rodents, insects, and other *wildlife* as well as arthropods, ~~or pests~~ should be ~~minimised~~ avoided by selecting an appropriate site and through using engineering, mechanical or chemical control.
- l) ~~To~~ prevent ~~minimise~~ airborne transmission of pathogenic agents, sufficient distance or physical barriers between *populations* and ~~possible~~ potential sources of pathogenic agents should be considered. In some circumstances, air treatments might be considered.
- m) When cleaning and *disinfection* or other measures are not feasible or effectiveness is undetermined, an additional period of no contact between potential sources of pathogenic agents (e.g. humans, buildings, ~~vehicles~~ means of transport, equipment, materials, pastures) and the *population* may be applied. The effectiveness of this measure will depend on the specific circumstances and should be verified.

2. Components of internal biosecurity may include the following:

- a) Sick *animals* should be detected, isolated and diagnosed to prevent other *animals* from being exposed. Treatments should be administered in a way that safely ~~to avoid~~ s iatrogenic transmission.
- b) All-in all-out management should be applied, as appropriate, to all *animals* kept in the same space including cleaning and *disinfection* of the space between consecutive groups of *animals*.
- c) Stocking densities that result in impaired health through increased transmission rates, which and may cause higher virulence of pathogenic agents, or increased susceptibility to *infections*, should be avoided.
- d) Within the *population*, *units* with different characteristics impacting disease risk should be kept separately.
- e) When the management of the *population* involves contact with different *units*, the workflow should be organised from the lowest to the highest risk of *infection*, considering transmission of pathogenic agents and susceptibility of the *units*. When moving between the *units*, measures to mitigate transmission of pathogenic agents should be applied.
- f) Cleaning and *disinfection* of the equipment and surfaces should be applied between consecutive groups of *animals*.

Biosecurity plan

~~The aim of a *biosecurity plan* is to organise, structure and document *biosecurity* including its evaluation. A *biosecurity plan* promotes consistent implementation of *biosecurity*. While remaining based on scientific knowledge and field experience, scientifically justifiable, and it should balance the objectives and intended benefits with the practicality, cost, regulatory requirements and should include necessary provisions for its maintenance and continuous improvement. The aim of a *biosecurity plan* is to organise, structure and document *biosecurity* including its evaluation.~~

The *biosecurity plan* should include the following sections:

a) Purpose and scope

This section should provide an overview of the plan, its purpose and scope. In addition, it should outline the goals and objectives of the plan, as well as the *population* characteristics, including animal husbandry systems, and epidemiological context.

b) Roles and responsibilities

Design, implementation, and monitoring is a shared responsibility. Therefore, it is essential to describe the roles and responsibilities of all actors, as well as the chain of command, to ensure for ensuring adherence and compliance with *biosecurity*.

c) Identification of pathogenic agents, sources and transmission pathways

In addition to the identification of the potential pathogenic agents of concern, this section should include their potential sources and transmission pathways.

d) Description of biosecurity

This section should describe the relevant components of *biosecurity* in accordance with Article 4.X.7.

It should also include relevant response procedures for emergencies.

e) Surveillance of pathogenic agents

The *biosecurity plan* should include the procedures for surveillance for early detection ~~to detect the presence of~~ pathogenic agents of concern, in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

f) Communication and reporting

This section should outline the procedures for communicating information about the *biosecurity plan* to all relevant actors. It should also include procedures for reporting incidents and sharing information with relevant authorities.

g) Training and education

This section should outline the training and education needs and identify programmes to ensure all relevant actors are aware of the *biosecurity plan* and clearly understand their roles and responsibilities to implement and maintain the *biosecurity* and the consequences of non-compliance.

h) Supporting documents

This section should outline the standard operating procedures (SOPs), checklists, and record-keeping templates which describe routine management processes and ensure that responsibilities and duties are consistently fulfilled and documented. It should also include relevant training materials for all actors involved in the implementation of the *biosecurity plan*.

i) Evaluation and continuous improvement

This section should describe the procedures for monitoring and evaluation of the *biosecurity plan* and its implementation in accordance with Article 4.X.10. Biosecurity incidents and breaches in *biosecurity*, as well as corrective actions taken, should be documented. The *biosecurity plan* should be reviewed and updated regularly to ensure its relevance and effectiveness.

Article 4.X.9.

Training and awareness

1. Training

Regular training on *biosecurity* should be undertaken according to the needs identified and should include all relevant actors. Training should be provided by those with sufficient qualifications and experience. The training should be in line with legislative and policy frameworks. Such training may include:

- Principles of *biosecurity*,
- Sources of pathogenic agents, transmission pathways and relevant factors to susceptibility,
- Components and implementation of *biosecurity*, including emergency planning and response,
- Monitoring and evaluation of *biosecurity*,
- Purpose, development and implementation of a *biosecurity plan*,
- Competency-based training requirements should be identified and documented for each actor. The training achieved should be recorded and monitored to ensure the required level of competencies are obtained or maintained.

2. Awareness

All relevant actors described in Article 4.X.4. and the general public, when applicable, should be made aware of the importance of *biosecurity* (and the *biosecurity plan* if appropriate) at strategic places (e.g. *border inspection posts*, farm entrances, *markets*) and times (e.g. disease *outbreaks*, changes in the epidemiological situation). Raising awareness may be the responsibility of the *Veterinary Authority*, other relevant *Competent Authorities*, or Veterinary Services, ~~or~~ Producers, ~~or~~ and other relevant actors may also be responsible depending on the context and extent of the *risk*.

Article 4.X.10.

Evaluation and continuous improvement

The implementation of *biosecurity*, the compliance with the *biosecurity plan* and the effectiveness of implemented measures should be subjected to evaluation for continuous improvement.

- 1) The evaluation of implementation should be based on predefined scope and criteria, taking into consideration the expected scale of the operation and the characteristics of the *population* concerned. This will determine at which level of responsibility the evaluation should be conducted, and at which frequency. The frequency should be adapted to changing circumstances such as new *animal health status*, newly identified pathogenic agents or changes in epidemiological situation, previous evaluations, changes in production or changes in plan. The evaluation should determine the level of implementation of *biosecurity*, through collected evidence that may include documentation of procedures, other routine records, monitoring technologies, onsite audits as well as interviews with personnel. Based on these findings, the evaluation may allow the establishment of a risk-based *biosecurity* score as a whole or for each measure.

- 2) Compliance with the *biosecurity plan* should be evaluated routinely or following a change in production type, the epidemiological situation, or other significant change. Documented evidence of compliance should be collected routinely and be provided for any evaluation. The evaluation of compliance with the *biosecurity plan* should be executed preferably by an independent party, in accordance with the policies and legislation, where available.
 - 3) The effectiveness of the *biosecurity plan* should be evaluated routinely or following a change in production type, epidemiological situation, or other significant change, to ensure the *biosecurity plan* is complete, fit for purpose and up to date. The evaluation should be based on animal health or performance data. The outcomes of the evaluations should be communicated to all relevant actors and should inform if the plan needs to be modified, and which risk mitigation or corrective actions are needed so that the *biosecurity plan* can be updated accordingly.
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CHAPTER 5.4.

**MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE IN-
TO THE EXPORTATION OF COMMODITIES**

Article 5.4.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable ~~in to~~ the exportation of *commodities* to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through *international trade of commodities*, without creating unjustified trade restrictions, covering from facilities of origin (such as an establishment, *slaughterhouse/abattoir*, *semen collection centre*) to the *point of exit*.

For the purposes of this chapter, 'operator' means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for export of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter.

For the purposes of this chapter, 'Veterinary Authority' and 'Competent Authorities' refer to the 'Veterinary Authority' and 'Competent Authorities' of the exporting country unless otherwise specified.

This chapter provides *exporting countries* with recommendations on measures and procedures, ~~and the roles and responsibilities of their~~ *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities, ~~and of operators, business operators any natural or legal entity or person responsible for export of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter (hereafter 'operator')~~, in addition to responsibilities that are described in Article 5.1.3. This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and ~~performance~~ implementation of official controls for exportation.

While this ~~This~~ chapter applies to all *commodities*; some recommendations are specifically addressed to certain ~~of these~~ *commodities*.

Article 5.4.2.

General considerations

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~of the exporting country~~ should ensure that make ensure operators are aware of the *importing country* requirements, ~~if they are available to the Veterinary Authority in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. In addition, the Veterinary Authority should make operators aware of the processes required to meet the conditions of the international veterinary certificate including the importing country requirements, including all information required for the agreed international veterinary certificate, in accordance with Article 5.1.1. and Chapter 5.3., are available to exporters.~~

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~of the exporting country~~ should be responsible for the implementation ~~performance~~ of official controls in coordination with other relevant *Competent Authorities* in accordance with *veterinary legislation* to ensure that exported *commodities* ~~can be traded safely and meet the requirements of the importing country requirements. Its~~ Their legal mandate ~~and responsibilities of the Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities, as described in Article 3.4.5. and 3.4.13.,~~ should include the export official controls activities at any step in the export process and the opportunity to request from the operator ~~exporter~~ any necessary information. Where appropriate, the *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant Competent Authorities may delegate certain tasks ~~in accordance with point 2 of Article 3.4.5.~~ Adequate human, technical, physical and financial resources should be available in the *exporting country* for the Veterinary Services to allow those effectively implement official controls ~~to be undertaken effectively~~ and to properly apply the certification obligations and procedures laid down in Chapters 5.1. and 5.2., in accordance with the quality principles ~~described in Article Chapter 3.2.2.~~

The *Veterinary Authority* should cooperate closely with all relevant authorities, including the customs authority and other law enforcement authorities of the *exporting country* dealing with exports to ensure that official controls are implemented~~performed~~ effectively; and to protect ~~to maintain the status compliance~~ of the *commodities* with importing country requirements ~~without creating unjustified barriers to trade~~. This cooperation should also cover actions to prevent and combat fraud or illegal pathways.

The *Veterinary Authority* should have procedures, as applicable, for certification of the *animal health status* of the herd/flock, compartment, zone, or country, ~~zone, compartment, or herd/flock~~ as well as of the disease situation in *establishments* and other premises and communicate with the operator~~exporter~~ regarding any additional documentary evidence that may be required to support such certification.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~in the exporting country~~ should ensure that the applicable certified *animal health status* of the herd/flock, compartment, zone, or country, ~~zone, compartment, or herds/flock or animals~~, is based on appropriate *surveillance* and reporting in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities ~~in the exporting country~~ should have procedures for registration and approval of *establishments* of origin, where applicable, and other facilities used for production and handling of consignments, to comply with the agreed international veterinary certificate. Operators should not hinder access by the *Veterinary Authority* to the *commodities*, the premises where they are located and the *means* ~~by which they are transported~~ of transport. During official controls, operators should assist and cooperate with the *Veterinary Authority Services* and make available all relevant information concerning the consignment.

The *Veterinary Authority* should have procedures for the international veterinary certification of sanitary conditions of individual animals.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~of the exporting country~~ should ensure that appropriate identification of *commodities* is in place to support traceability offer the consignment to comply with its~~the~~ agreed international veterinary certificate. *Animal identification* should be in accordance with Chapter 4.2. and Chapter 4.3.

Upon request from the *Veterinary Authority* of the *importing country* or from the *Veterinary Authority* of a the *transit country*, the *Veterinary Authority* of the exporting country should provide additional information on the process to ensure compliance with the conditions included in the agreed international veterinary certificate, and undertake investigation and reporting, and give reasonable access for audit in case of repeated non-compliant consignments ~~jeopardising the safety of trade~~. The *Veterinary Authority* of the exporting country should take ensure that the appropriate and necessary preventive measures to ensure that the status of the commodities remain compliant ~~is not jeopardised~~ before and during transport to the point of exit. The *exporting country* should suspend the export of a *commodity* when there is reason to believe that it may present a risk to for animal *health* or and public health or that if it does not comply with the agreed international veterinary certificate.

The *Veterinary Authority* of the exporting country should promptly communicate to the *Veterinary Authority* of the *importing country*, and any transit country, any change of or situation, such as a change of the animal health status, that may affect its capacity to fulfil~~certify~~ the conditions of the agreed international veterinary certificate.

The *Veterinary Authority* of the exporting country should also inform without delay the *Veterinary Authority* of the *importing country*, and, where necessary, the *transit country*, in the event that a particular issue such as the occurrence of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements which may affect the compliance status of a *commodity* which has already left the *exporting country*. This information should be part of the relevant emergency response plan developed in accordance with Chapter 4.19.

In case of animals, operators should ensure that animal welfare is maintained throughout the export process in accordance with Section 7 as relevant.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~of the exporting country~~ should carry out collaborative activities with other relevant Competent Authorities, customs, and other law enforcement authorities, and operators, and with *Veterinary Authorities* in other countries, to control the risk posed by the illegal or informal cross-border movement of *commodities*, e.g. i.e. the international movement of *commodities* done in a way that avoids official controls intentionally (illegal) or that may be unregulated but may present risks (informal), to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls.

General principles applicable to procedures for official controls for exportation

1. Preparation for exportation

~~Operators~~Exporters should ~~announce~~ inform the *Veterinary Authority* of their intention to the export to the *Veterinary Authority* sufficiently in advance as to allow for meet these conditions of the *agreed international veterinary certificate* and the administrative requirements of the *exporting, transit and importing countries* to be met.

~~Operators~~Exporters should provide to the *Veterinary Authority* ~~the~~as required details of the consignment. The *Veterinary Authority* should outline to the ~~operator~~exporter the procedures, standards and timeframe for preparation of the consignment, and the documentary evidence required to demonstrate compliance with these requirements. Where relevant, the *Veterinary Authority* should identify eligible bodies or officers for the implementation performance and certification of procedures specified in the *agreed international veterinary certificate*. Operators should also provide information relevant to safe handling of consignment, including any treatments that may pose risks to personnel.

The ~~operator~~exporter and the *Veterinary Authority* should coordinate the implementation, and its documentation, of the conditions of the *agreed-international veterinary certificate*. Implementation of these conditions and its documentation should be in accordance with the procedures and standards communicated by the *Veterinary Authority* of the exporting country and will form the basis upon which the *Official Veterinarian* will issue the *international veterinary certificate* for the consignment.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that the facilities and operational procedures required for isolation of *animals* or processing of products comply with the conditions of the *agreed-international veterinary certificate*, which may including include registration, approval, and inspection, in accordance with ~~Chapters 4.6., 4.7. and 5.7. or other~~ relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*.

Testing of *commodities* required to fulfil the conditions of the *agreed-international veterinary certificate* should be in accordance with Article 3.2.10. and with the *Terrestrial Manual*. The *Veterinary Authority* should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~exporter the procedures for sample collection, identification and submission, the list of ~~approved laboratories~~ and the *approved* diagnostic tests.

The *Veterinary Authority* should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~exporter the procedures for *vaccination* and treatment if required to fulfil the conditions of the *agreed-international veterinary certificate*. The ~~operator~~exporter should arrange for *vaccination* or treatment of *animals* in line with these conditions, noting timeframes relevant to the scheduled date of exportation. *Vaccination* and treatment of *animals* should use *veterinary medicinal products* registered or allowed approved for use in the *exporting country*, in line with the conditions of the agreed international veterinary certificate.

The *Veterinary Authority* should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~exporter the standards and procedures for *disinfection of* and *disinsection* ~~disinsection~~ elimination of arthropod vectors from of vehicles/vessels the means of transport and *containers* in accordance with Chapter 4.14., if required to fulfil the conditions of the *agreed-international veterinary certificate*.

In the case of animals, ~~The~~ ~~operator~~exporter should also be able to provide to the *Veterinary Authority* a journey travel transport plan from the point of exit in the exporting country to the point of unloading in the importing country. In the case of animals, it should be in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. or 7.4. Section 7, and in compliance with the *importing country* requirements as relevant.

2. Procedures of exportation

a) Verification and certification

The ~~operator~~exporter should cooperate with the *Veterinary Authority* to demonstrate that the conditions of the *agreed-international veterinary certificate* have been met and that the consignment is eligible for certification and export. The ~~operator~~exporter should provide all documentary

evidence of compliance with the importing country requirements ~~conditions of the agreed and the international veterinary certificate~~ as required by the *Veterinary Authority*, including an import permit where appropriate. There should be clear traceability and linkage, at every stage of preparation of ~~animals and animal product commodities~~, to the final consignment presented for export, as relevant to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed international veterinary certificate~~.

The *Official Veterinarian* should review the preparation of the export consignment to confirm that ~~commodities animals and animal products~~ have been clearly identified at every stage of their preparation, that the consignment complies with the conditions of the ~~agreed international veterinary certificate~~ and is in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The *Official Veterinarian* should also review ~~all transport arrangements the journey travel plan~~ for the consignments of animals to ensure it they support maintainence compliance with the importing country requirements and relevant national regulations which may include the animal welfare recommendations in Section 7. of the commodity's status and animal welfare.

Once satisfied that preparations and ~~journey travel plan transport arrangements~~ are appropriate and that the consignment is eligible for certification and export, the *Official Veterinarian* should issue the *international veterinary certificate*.

b) Domestic transportation of commodities

The *Veterinary Authority* should collaborate with other relevant authorities and stakeholders to ensure that management of the consignment ~~pre-export before~~ and during transport to the point of exit is consistent with ~~agreed established~~ processes and standards.

The ~~operator exporter~~ should ensure that the assembly, *loading* and crating of animals or other commodities is appropriate to maintain compliance with the importing country requirements preserving the status and animal welfare of the consignment from the *place of shipment*, including adequate *disinfection of* and ~~disinsection disinsection elimination of arthropod vectors of from~~ of the ~~vehicle/vessel means of transport~~ and container.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~in the exporting country~~ may require health and welfare inspection of consignments of *animals* at the *point of exit*, which includes the possibility to deny permission to export if concerns are identified.

Article 5.4.4.

Specific recommendations depending on commodities

1. Animals

~~In the case of animals, the Veterinary Authority should ensure that animal welfare is maintained throughout the whole process of exportation, in accordance with Chapters 7.1., 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4. as relevant.~~

The ~~operator exporter~~ should ensure that ~~vehicles/vessels means of transport~~ used for transportation of *animals* throughout the ~~whole export process of exportation~~ undergo adequate *disinfection*, and that measures are implemented to prevent and control vermin such as rodents or arthropods. These measures should be applied before every *loading of animals*. ~~Vehicles/vessels Means of transport~~ should contain only *animals meeting the same sanitary requirements of the same health status except where effectively adequately separated to prevent disease transmission.*

Containers should be either new or cleansed and disinfected before every *loading of animals*, in accordance with Chapter 4.14., ~~or be for single use~~

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that, before leaving the *exporting country*, consignments of *animals* ~~should be~~ subjected to a visual examination, at an appropriate place and time according to the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country. It should be ensured that, from the time of this visual examination inspection until the time of leaving the *exporting country*, the *animals* in the consignment are not in contact with other *animals* of a different health status.

The *Veterinary Authority* in the ~~exporting country~~ may require welfare inspection of consignments of *animals* at the *point of exit*. Such inspections should be supported by *veterinary legislation*, which should also ascribe authority to deny permission to export if *animal welfare requirements, in accordance with Section 7 concerns* are ~~not met~~ identified.

2. Germinal products

Consignments of *germinal products* should be packed, dispatched, and transported in a way that preserves the viability and integrity of the products.

Consignments of *hatching eggs* should be dispatched from parental *flocks* that meet the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~. *Containers* should be either new or cleaned and disinfected before every use, in accordance with Chapter 4.14.

Cryogenic tanks for semen, oocytes or, embryos should be dispatched from *semen collection centres* or *collection centres* that meet the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~. They should be single-use cryogenic tanks or be cleaned and disinfected before use in accordance with Chapter 4.14. and use new liquid nitrogen.

Consignments of semen, oocytes or, embryos, should be identified in accordance with the relevant recommendations of Chapters 4.6. to 4.11.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that, before leaving the *exporting country*, consignments of *germinal products* ~~be~~ are subjected to a visual examination and documentary check and cryogenic tanks for semen, oocytes or, embryos ~~be~~ are sealed and marked, according to the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed-international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country.

3. Animal products

Containers used for transporting *animal products* should be suitable for the type of product, protect the *animal products* from damage or contamination, and fulfil the conditions of the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed-international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that adequate measures are taken to clean and, where necessary after cleaning, to disinfect before use, *containers* and *means of transportation* in accordance with Chapter 4.14., particularly when conveying or transporting unpacked materials.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that, before leaving the *exporting country*, consignments of *animal products* ~~should be~~ are subjected to a visual examination and documentary check, according to the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed-international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country.

Article 5.4.5.

Emergency pPlanning for unexpected events

The *Veterinary Authority* should develop a plan to address the occurrence within the *exporting country* after the *commodities* have been exported, of a *listed disease* or a disease referred to in the *importing country* requirements, which may have impacted the status of the *exported commodities*. The *Veterinary Authority* should be guided by *importing country* requirements in implementing the plan.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that the ~~operator~~ exporter develops and documents a plan to address ~~emergencies-unexpected events~~ which may impact the compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations in Section 7. ~~being exported, failure of transport arrangements,~~ The plan should address concerns such as deviation from the journey plan for animals, incidents compromising the sanitary conditions or other characteristics of the commodities including those captured in the international veterinary certificate, ~~failure to reach the transit or importing country, or rejection of the consignment by them-transit or importing country.~~ The emergency plan may be generic or specific to each consignment, ~~and should focus on preserving the status of the consignment and animal welfare in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~

The ~~emergency~~ plan should identify responsibility for development and communication of alternative transport arrangements when necessary. The relevant *Competent Authority* in the exporting, transit and importing countries should be consulted as appropriate by the operator regarding revised transport arrangements to assess the implications for the compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations. ~~The Veterinary Authority in the exporting country should be consulted on alternative transport arrangements for consignments of animals to ensure that animal welfare is preserved.~~

~~The emergency plan should include procedures for managing exported consignments that fail to reach the designated transit or importing countries or are rejected by them.~~

CHAPTER 5.5.

MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO
THE TRANSIT OF COMMODITIES

Article 5.5.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through international trade, without creating unjustified trade restrictions, when *commodities* destined for another country are either making a stopover in, or transported through a *transit country*, covering from the *point of entry* to the *point of exit*.

For the purposes of this chapter, 'operator' means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for transit of *commodities* subject to the provisions of this chapter.

For the purposes of this chapter, 'Veterinary Authority' and 'Competent Authorities' refer to the 'Veterinary Authority' and 'Competent Authorities' of the *transit country* unless otherwise specified.

This chapter provides *transit countries* with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of their *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant *Competent Authorities* and of operators ~~any natural or legal entity or person responsible for transit of *commodities* subject to the provisions of this chapter (hereafter 'operator')~~. An international movement of *commodities* may be considered a 'transit' if *commodities* are transported from an *exporting country* through a *transit country* to an *importing country*. The transit period should not exceed the time necessary for transport and logistics, and *commodities* and all relevant conditions as stated in the certificate issued by the *exporting country* should remain unchanged; otherwise the operation should be interpreted as an importation and exportation.

This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and implementation of official controls for transit.

Article 5.5.2.

General considerations

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* ~~of the *transit country*~~ should ensure that *transit country* requirements and procedures, including a list of the *border inspection posts* designated for the transit of *commodities*, are made available to operators and to the *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country*.

A *transit country* may require adequate advance notice or approval regarding the date of entry into and exit from its territory of *commodities*, stating the type of *commodity*, species, quantity, *means of transport* and the *point of entry* or *border inspection post*, route, holding locations and *point of exit* to be used.

Operators should be aware of the *transit country* requirements and procedures before shipment, which may include announcing to the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* of the *transit country* the arrival of consignments at the *point of entry*. Operators should ensure that *commodities* are presented for official controls, including the original official certificates or documents, or digital equivalents, in accordance with *transit country* requirements, and that requirements and procedures defined by the *Competent Authorities* ~~of the *transit country*~~ are met.

Operators should ensure that the *commodities* are separated from any other *commodities* in the *transit country* not meeting the same sanitary requirements, that all relevant conditions as stated in the certification issued by the *exporting country* remain unchanged, and that the *Veterinary Authorities* of the *transit country* and the *importing country* are informed of any unforeseen unloading of *commodities* in the *transit country* ~~is informed to the *Veterinary Authorities* of the *transit country* and the *importing country*~~.

In the case of *animals*, operators should ensure that *animal welfare* is maintained throughout the transit process, in accordance with Section 7 as relevant.

Article 5.5.3.

General principles applicable to procedures for official controls for transit

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should implement official inspection, with appropriate frequency, based on risk and with appropriate frequency to ensure compliance with the *transit country* requirements. By way of derogation, the **The** *Veterinary Authority* may exempt from inspection *safe commodities* or *commodities* posing a negligible risk and for which inspection is not considered necessary.

A *transit country* may refuse not accept the transit of *commodities* not complying with its requirements.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that conditions included in the *international veterinary certificate* at origin are maintained during official controls, stopover, storage and transport, that *biosecurity* is applied to prevent transmission of pathogenic agents throughout the transit process and that unnecessary delays are avoided. They should also ensure *animal welfare* is maintained during *transit* in accordance with Section 7. Original documentation intended for the *importing country* should remain with the consignment.

Article 5.5.4.

Planning for the unexpected events

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that the operator develops and documents a plan to address unexpected events which may compromise the compliance of the transited *commodities* with the requirements of the *transit country* or the *importing country*. The plan may be generic, or specific to each consignment, and should focus on preserving the sanitary conditions of the consignment, and preventing the introduction to the *transit or the importing country* of a *listed disease* or a disease referred to in the *transit or the importing country* requirements, and The plan should also focus on ensuring *animal welfare* recommendations in Section 7 are addressed. The plan should identify responsibilities and include procedures for commodities not complying with the *transit or the importing country* requirements.

Article 5.5.5.

General recommendations on measures to address identified informal or illegal movement of commodities at border inspection posts

To control the *risks* posed by informal or illegal cross-border movement at *border inspection posts*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should coordinate and cooperate with the customs or relevant law enforcement authority as described in Article 5.6.8.

CHAPTER 5.6.

MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE
INTO THE IMPORTATION OF COMMODITIES

Article 5.6.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable to in the importation of commodities to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through *international trade of commodities*, without creating unjustified trade restrictions, covering from the time of arrival at the point of entry border of in the importing country until clearance of *commodities*.

For the purposes of this chapter, 'operator' means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for transitimport of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter.

For the purposes of this chapter, 'Veterinary Authority' and 'Competent Authorities' refer to the 'Veterinary Authority' and 'Competent Authorities' of the importing country unless otherwise specified.

This chapter provides *importing countries* with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of their Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities, and of operators, any natural or legal entity or person responsible for import of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter business operators (hereafter 'operator'), in addition to responsibilities that are described in Article 5.1.2. This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and implementationperformance of official controls for importation. This chapter not only covers legal importation, but also provides general recommendations for illegal or informal entry of commodities.

The animal health status of the importing country or zone is not affected by the presence of disease or infection in imported animals in a quarantine centre or at a border inspection post.

Article 5.6.2.

General considerations

The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country should ensure that the importing country requirements, which may be included in international veterinary certificates, and as well as up-to-date information relevant to the import procedures, including a list of the border inspection posts designated for the import and transit of those commodities, are made available to operators and to the exporting countries. Operators should collaborate to ensure the documentation complies with the importing country's requirements.

The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country should be responsible for the performance implementation of official controls in accordance with *veterinary legislation* to ensure that *imported commodities* can be safely imported. They should also ensure animal welfare is maintained in accordance with Section 7. Its Their legal mandate and responsibilities of the Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities, as described in Articles 3.4.5. and 3.4.13., should include the import official controls activities at any step and the possibility to request from the operator importer any necessary information. Where appropriate, the Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities may delegate certain tasks in accordance with point 2 of Article 3.4.5. Adequate human, technical, physical and financial resources should be available in the importing country for the Veterinary Services to effectively implementperform official controls inspection in accordance with the quality principles described in Article Chapter 3.2.2.

An *importing country* may require adequate advance notice or approval regarding the date of entry of commodities into its territory ~~of commodities~~, stating the type of *commodity*, species, quantity, means of transport and the *border inspection post* to be used.

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities when relevant, should perform~~ Official inspections ~~should be implemented, with appropriate frequency, in accordance with Article 3.2.12. regularly, based on a risk basis and with appropriate frequency to ensure compliance with the importing country requirements.~~ By way of derogation, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities may exempt from the inspection, *safe commodities* or *commodities* posing a negligible risk and for which inspection is not considered necessary.

Biosecurity should be applied to prevent transmission of pathogenic agents from *commodities* throughout the import process.

An *importing country* may prohibit the ~~introduction entry~~ into its territory of a consignment of *commodities* not complying with the *importing country* requirements.

~~Operators/Importers~~ should be aware of the *importing country* requirements and import procedure before the importation and ~~inform~~ announce, in advance, to the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities the arrival of consignments at the *border inspection post*, in accordance with *importing country* requirements. ~~Operators/Importers~~ should ensure that *commodities* are presented for official controls inspection at the *border inspection post*, together with the original ~~official~~ international veterinary certificates or documents, or digital equivalents, which are required to accompany the consignments.

In case of *animals*, ~~operators/importers~~ should ensure that *animal welfare* is maintained throughout the ~~whole import process of importation~~, in accordance with ~~Chapters 7.1., 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~ Section 7 as relevant.

The *Veterinary Authority of the importing country* should carry out collaborative activities with other relevant Competent Authorities, customs, and other law enforcement authorities, and operators, and with *Veterinary Authorities* in other countries, to control the risk posed by ~~the illegal or informal~~ cross-border movement of *commodities*, i.e. e.g. international movement of commodities done in a way that avoids official controls intentionally (illegal) or that may be unregulated but may still present risks (informal). to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls.

Article 5.6.3.

General principles applicable to procedures for import official controls for importation

Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities should ~~take control of~~ the imported *commodities* to ~~decide~~ determine whether ~~or not~~ the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements.

~~Import~~ Official controls should be ~~performed~~ implemented at an appropriate place which might include a *border inspection post*, a point of entry, *quarantine centre*, the place of destination, or premises of the operator responsible for the consignment. The consignment should remain under the control of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities until formal clearance and release.

In case of emergency, ships and aircrafts may be granted access to a port or airport ~~which that~~ are not their intended destination. In those cases, they should be subjected to the animal health and animal welfare measures which the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities may consider necessary based on the potential risk.

1. Official inspection

Where official inspections of *commodities* are ~~performed~~ implemented, they should always include a documentary check and, depending on the risk to human health, and animal health and or animal welfare, should also include identity checks and physical inspection checks. When the *Veterinary Authority* or other Competent Authorities/Services needs to have full access to the consignment for the purpose of identity checks or physical inspection, consignments should be partially or fully unloaded from the means of transport.

a) Documentary check

A documentary check should be ~~implemented~~^{performed} on all consignments presented for official ~~controls inspection~~ to ensure that they meet the *importing country* requirements.

~~A~~ Documentary check should include examination of the *international veterinary certificate*, and possibly of laboratory reports or other documents, including those of a commercial nature, which are required to accompany the consignment.

When ~~implementing~~^{performing} a documentary check, the ~~Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities~~^{Services} should inspect the required documents, in original or their digital equivalents as agreed between the *importing* and *exporting country*, to ensure that:

- i) the *international veterinary certificate* has been issued by the *Official Veterinarian* of the *exporting country*; complies with relevant principles set out in Article 5.2.3. and corresponds ~~as relevant~~ to the model ~~established~~^{established by the *importing country* or agreed between the *exporting and* by the *importing country* for that commodity and intended use, based on Chapters 5.10. to 5.13.; and}
- ii) the information contained in the checked documents complies with the *importing country* requirements.

b) Identity check

~~An~~ identity check should be ~~implemented~~^{performed} upon arrival of ~~the~~ consignment at the point of inspection, as a visual inspection to verify that the content and the labelling of a consignment, including the identification of *commodities*, seals and means of transport, correspond to the information declared in the *international veterinary certificate* and accompanying documents.

The frequency of identity checks, the quantity of *commodities* to be inspected as well as the criteria for ~~sampling-selection for checking~~ should be determined by the *Veterinary Authority* or other ~~relevant~~^{relevant} *Competent Authorities* of the ~~importing country~~ based on *risk assessment*.

c) Physical inspection

To verify compliance with importing country requirements and physical integrity. ~~P~~physical inspection should include, as appropriate:

- i) clinical examination of ~~an~~^{animals} for evidence of ~~transmissible~~ diseases and *animal welfare* issues
- ~~ii) ii) and~~ physical checks of *animal products* and *germinal products*,
- ~~iii) iii) and, as appropriate,~~ checks on packaging, seals, or and labelling,
- ~~iv) iv) the~~ checks on the means of transport, ~~labelling~~ and temperature records,
- ~~v) v) the~~ sampling for analysis, testing or diagnosis, and
- vi) any other checks required by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* to verify compliance with the *importing country* requirements.

The frequency of physical inspection, the quantity of *commodities* to be inspected as well as the criteria for ~~sampling-selection for physical inspection~~ should be determined by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* of the ~~importing country~~ based on *risk assessment*, and considering the following:-

i) For animals

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities of the importing country should determine the number of animals to be clinically examined should be determined in accordance with the overall number of animals in the consignment and the declared purpose of the animals, which it may be increased if the physical checks carried out have not been satisfactory.~~

~~In some cases, such as for animals that are not required to be identified individually and animals considered to be dangerous, clinical examination should could consist of observation of the state of health and behaviour of the entire group or of a representative number of animals.~~

If the clinical examination reveals an anomaly, a more thorough clinical examination may be carried out, including sampling and testing, where appropriate.

ii) Germinal ~~For germinal~~ products

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities should carry out Physical checks of the consignment should be carried out to verify the compliance of labelling and the transport conditions with importing country requirements, including, when relevant, temperature records when relevant and the integrity of the seals, packaging material and cryogenic tanks.~~

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities of the importing country should determine the number of items to be checked, which may be increased if the checks carried out have not been satisfactory.~~

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities may carry out physical checks to verify that the labelling complies with importing country requirements.~~

Physical inspection may include laboratory testing of the *germinal products*.

If the physical checks reveal an anomaly, a more thorough inspection may be carried out.

iii) For Animal products

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities should carry out pPhysical checks of the consignment should be carried out to verify the compliance of labelling and the transport conditions with importing country requirements, including temperature records when relevant and the integrity of the packaging material and seals.~~

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities may carry out physical checks to verify that the labelling complies with importing country requirements.~~

Physical inspection may include sensory examination and laboratory testing of the *animal products*.

If the physical checks reveal an anomaly, a more thorough inspection may be carried out.

2. Sampling and testing

Sampling and testing of imported *commodities* with a view to checking compliance with the health *importing country* requirements laid down in the *international veterinary certificate*, may be ~~implemented~~ performed following a risk-based sampling plan or upon suspicion of non-compliance resulting from the documentary, identity or physical checks of *commodities*, without creating unjustified barriers to trade. Testing should be ~~implemented~~ performed in an ~~approved~~ laboratory.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* may develop a risk-based sampling plan for imported consignments, that should specify the percentage of consignments to be sampled, taking into account the animal health status of the importing and exporting country, the species concerned, the nature and declared purpose of the *commodities*, the number of incoming consignments and the results of previous sampling.

- 3) Facilities for temporarily holding *animals*, with adequate housing or restraint mechanisms, space, light, ventilation and separation as appropriate between consignments, and species or treated and untreated animals.
- 4) Separate facilities to isolate sick animals.
- 5) Facilities and equipment for the management of sick or dead animals, Animal animal waste management for dead animals, discarded feed, solid and liquid waste and used bedding.

Article 5.7.6.

Facilities involved in official inspection other than the border inspection post

When the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authority* defines that official inspection could be implemented at an appropriate place other than a *border inspection post*, the facilities involved should be *approved* following the principles outlined in Articles 5.7.4. and 5.7.5., and the consignment should remain under *biosecurity* and the control of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* until formal clearance.

Article 5.7.7.

Requirements for a quarantine centre

Design and operation of a *quarantine centre* should be based on consideration of the following:

- 1) The disease situation of the country, *zone* or area surrounding the *quarantine centre*.
- 2) Location of facilities at a distance from other *establishments*, sufficient to avoid transmission of diseases of concern, taking into account relevant risk factors.
- 3) Site topography, to minimise disease risks associated with the flow of contaminated water.
- 4) Perimeter security to prevent entry of unauthorised people and *means of transport*, and unwanted animals.
- 5) Controls, including sanitary requirements, for entry and exit of authorised personnel, and the facilities necessary to apply these controls including changing rooms and showers. Controls for exit of authorised personnel may not be necessary for the isolation of *animals* before exportation or clearance.
- 6) Controls, including sanitary requirements, for entry and exit of *means of transport* and equipment, including veterinary instruments and supplies, and the facilities necessary to apply these controls. Controls for exit of means of transport and equipment may not be necessary for the isolation of animals before exportation or clearance.
- 7) Controls for entry of supplies, including the sources, sanitary status and entry process for *feed* and bedding, and facilities necessary to handle and store these supplies.
- 8) Facilities and equipment for cleaning and *disinfection*, and removal of arthropod *vectors* including control of waste and effluent, for *means of transport* and *containers* that have been used in transportation of import consignments of *animals*.
- 9) ~~Waste management~~—In the case of isolation of *animals* after arrival, waste management should be in accordance with a *biosecurity plan* including storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste, including discarded *feed*, rejected consignments, dead *animals* and used bedding, with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste.
- 10) Facilities and equipment for the containment and management of consignments of *animals*, including as appropriate to the animal species separation between consignments, *unloading and loading*, housing, feeding, watering, yards, restraint and handling, isolation, *vector* control, and for undertaking interventions required by *risk analysis* and/or relevant disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including sample collection, testing, *vaccination*, treatment and veterinary inspection.
- 11) Equipment for cleaning, and disinfection and disinsection removal of arthropod vectors—in the facility between consignments of *animals*.

12) SOPs Operational procedures for cleaning and disinfection, management of sick or dead animals, waste management, and control of rodents and potential vectors.

13) Separate facilities to isolate sick animals.

A *quarantine centre* for isolation of *animals* before exportation should be used to address the specific requirements in disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*. Unless specified in those chapters or importing country requirements, isolation of *animals* before exportation may be performed in other approved facilities.

Article 5.7.8.

Planning for unexpected events

The management of consignments at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* that have failed clearance and have thus been refused transit or import is covered in Chapters 5.4. to 5.6.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that plans are available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* that support responses to foreseeable but uncommon events. The plans should address communication, *biosecurity*, health and safety, and *animal welfare* in each instance, and may cover:

- Unexpected arrival of *commodities*.
 - Evidence of a *listed disease* or a disease included in the *transit* or *importing country* requirements in a consignment of imported or transiting *animals* at a *border inspection post* or *quarantine centre*.
 - Veterinary emergency in *animals* at a *border inspection post* or undergoing post-arrival isolation in a *quarantine centre*.
 - Escape of *animals* or unwanted entry of animals.
 - Evidence of *animal products* presenting a risk to animal or public health.
 - Natural disasters and interruption of critical services threatening the operation of the *border inspection post* or *quarantine centre*.
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CHAPTER 5.7.

**BORDER INSPECTION POSTS
AND QUARANTINE CENTRES**

Article 5.7.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides recommendations on *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* to support effective implementation of measures and procedures applicable to the exportation, transit and importation of *commodities*, in order to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through international trade of commodities without creating unjustified trade restrictions.

Quarantine centres may be used for isolation of *animals* either pre-exportation in accordance with disease-specific chapters in the *Terrestrial Code* or post-arrival. The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that the application of *biosecurity* at *quarantine centres* is appropriate to the type of isolation being undertaken, and effectively mitigates risks in accordance with disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* (pre-export isolation) or via *risk analysis* (post-arrival quarantine).

Border inspection posts are meant to keep *commodities* contained under adequate *biosecurity* until inspections are complete and decisions are taken on their destination.

Article 5.7.2.

General considerations

Appropriate legislation should be in place, in accordance with Chapter 3.4., to define the facilities, the resourcing and operation of *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres*, and for their approval.

Material and financial resources should be available at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* as necessary to undertake the relevant functions of the facility while managing official controls, *biosecurity*, health and safety risks and *animal welfare* associated with the type and volume of *commodities* presented for inspection.

Appropriate administration systems should be available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* as necessary for the functions of the facility, including record keeping and information and communication technology, to support decision-making and communication.

Biosecurity consistent with Chapter 4.X. is critical to fulfil the functions of *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres*.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that:

- Operations at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* are supported by sufficient authorised personnel who are operating under the principles of Chapter 3.2., appropriately qualified with access to regular training, consistent with the intended use and the type and quantity of *commodities* presented.
- Operational details for *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* are made available to operators described in Chapters 5.4., 5.5. or 5.6., including the intended use and the categories of *commodities* for which they are designated, exact locations, contact details, hours of operation, booking requirements and costs.
- Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* describing the procedures undertaken there. Auditable records documenting the performance of these procedures should be kept, including the maintenance of *biosecurity*. Records

should include the results of official controls, regular *surveillance* and *monitoring* in the facilities and the surrounding areas.

- *Border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* have access to *laboratories* and other *approved* service providers with SOPs as necessary to support the implementation of official controls and the measures described in Chapters 5.4., 5.5. and 5.6. consistent with Article 3.2.6.

Article 5.7.3.

Cooperation with other agencies

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should engage with other governmental authorities with responsibilities at international borders in the design and operation of *border inspection posts and quarantine centres*, to ensure that official inspection and clearance of transit or import consignments is streamlined where possible. Co-use of facilities and equipment at international borders with other authorities could be considered as long as it does not hinder *normal* operations *and measures* described in this chapter. Key principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement should be considered to facilitate importation and transit of *commodities*.

Article 5.7.4.

Requirements for a border inspection post

Design and operation of a *border inspection post* should be based on *risk analysis* and *biosecurity* including the following:

- 1) Separation between public areas and restricted areas for inspection of consignments.
- 2) Perimeter security of restricted areas to prevent entry of unauthorised people and *means of transport*, and unwanted animals, with access control for entry and exit of authorised personnel and *means of transport*.
- 3) Facilities and equipment suitable for the type and volume of *commodities* presented, necessary for implementation of the official control procedures described in Article 5.6.3, including secure unloading and loading, inspection, sampling and storage or detention of *commodities*, including adequate lighting and temperature control with surfaces appropriate for cleaning and *disinfection*.
- 4) Facilities and equipment for cleaning, *and disinfection* and *disinsection elimination of arthropod vectors of means of transport and containers* that have been used in transportation of *commodities*, consistent with Article 5.6.6.
- 5) Waste management for restricted areas with storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste ~~and, including discarded feed~~, rejected consignments, ~~dead animals and used bedding~~, with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste.
- 6) Operational procedures SOPs for cleaning and disinfection, waste management, and control of rodents and potential vectors.

Article 5.7.5.

Additional requirements for a border inspection post for animals

In addition to the principles described in Article 5.7.4., a *border inspection post* for consignments of *animals* should be designed and operate in accordance with *animal welfare* principles in Section 7 and should specifically include the following:

- 1) Separate access to restricted animal inspection areas via road infrastructure, to minimise delays.
- 2) Facilities *and equipment* necessary for the management of consignments of *animals* according to Article 5.6.3, including containment, feeding, watering, restraint and inspection, consistent with the type and number of *animals* presented.

- 3) Facilities for temporarily holding *animals*, with adequate housing or restraint mechanisms, space, light, ventilation and separation as appropriate between consignments, and species or treated and untreated animals.
- 4) Separate facilities to isolate sick animals.
- 5) Facilities and equipment for the management of sick or dead animals, Animal animal waste management for dead animals, discarded feed, solid and liquid waste and used bedding.

Article 5.7.6.

Facilities involved in official inspection other than the border inspection post

When the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authority* defines that official inspection could be implemented at an appropriate place other than a *border inspection post*, the facilities involved should be *approved* following the principles outlined in Articles 5.7.4. and 5.7.5., and the consignment should remain under *biosecurity* and the control of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* until formal clearance.

Article 5.7.7.

Requirements for a quarantine centre

Design and operation of a *quarantine centre* should be based on consideration of the following:

- 1) The disease situation of the country, *zone* or area surrounding the *quarantine centre*.
- 2) Location of facilities at a distance from other *establishments*, sufficient to avoid transmission of diseases of concern, taking into account relevant risk factors.
- 3) Site topography, to minimise disease risks associated with the flow of contaminated water.
- 4) Perimeter security to prevent entry of unauthorised people and *means of transport*, and unwanted animals.
- 5) Controls, including sanitary requirements, for entry and exit of authorised personnel, and the facilities necessary to apply these controls including changing rooms and showers. Controls for exit of authorised personnel may not be necessary for the isolation of *animals* before exportation or clearance.
- 6) Controls, including sanitary requirements, for entry and exit of *means of transport* and equipment, including veterinary instruments and supplies, and the facilities necessary to apply these controls. Controls for exit of means of transport and equipment may not be necessary for the isolation of animals before exportation or clearance.
- 7) Controls for entry of supplies, including the sources, sanitary status and entry process for *feed* and bedding, and facilities necessary to handle and store these supplies.
- 8) Facilities and equipment for cleaning and *disinfection*, and removal of arthropod *vectors* including control of waste and effluent, for *means of transport* and *containers* that have been used in transportation of import consignments of *animals*.
- 9) ~~Waste management.~~ In the case of isolation of *animals* after arrival, waste management should be in accordance with a *biosecurity plan* including storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste, including discarded *feed*, rejected consignments, dead *animals* and used bedding, with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste.
- 10) Facilities and equipment for the containment and management of consignments of *animals*, including as appropriate to the animal species separation between consignments, *unloading and loading*, housing, feeding, watering, yards, restraint and handling, isolation, *vector* control, and for undertaking interventions required by *risk analysis* and/or relevant disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including sample collection, testing, *vaccination*, treatment and veterinary inspection.
- 11) Equipment for cleaning, and disinfection and disinsection removal of arthropod vectors in the facility between consignments of *animals*.

12) SOPs Operational procedures for cleaning and disinfection, management of sick or dead animals, waste management, and control of rodents and potential vectors.

13) Separate facilities to isolate sick animals.

A *quarantine centre* for isolation of *animals* before exportation should be used to address the specific requirements in disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*. Unless specified in those chapters or importing country requirements, isolation of *animals* before exportation may be performed in other approved facilities.

Article 5.7.8.

Planning for unexpected events

The management of consignments at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* that have failed clearance and have thus been refused transit or import is covered in Chapters 5.4. to 5.6.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that plans are available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* that support responses to foreseeable but uncommon events. The plans should address communication, *biosecurity*, health and safety, and *animal welfare* in each instance, and may cover:

- Unexpected arrival of *commodities*.
 - Evidence of a *listed disease* or a disease included in the *transit* or *importing country* requirements in a consignment of imported or transiting *animals* at a *border inspection post* or *quarantine centre*.
 - Veterinary emergency in *animals* at a *border inspection post* or undergoing post-arrival isolation in a *quarantine centre*.
 - Escape of *animals* or unwanted entry of animals.
 - Evidence of *animal products* presenting a risk to animal or public health.
 - Natural disasters and interruption of critical services threatening the operation of the *border inspection post* or *quarantine centre*.
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CHAPTER 7.5.

ANIMAL WELFARE DURING SLAUGHTER

[...]

Article 7.5.30.

Electrical water-bath stunning for poultry1. Animal welfare concerns

In electrical water-bath *stunning* poultry are inverted and shackled by the legs from a shackle line. The bird's head has direct contact with the water-bath, and an electric current is passed from the water through the bird to the leg shackle. *Hazards* that may prevent effective electrical *stunning* are: lack of contact between head and water, differences in individual bird resistance, improper system grounding, pre-stun shocks due to wings contacting water before the head, and the use of inappropriate electrical parameters (low voltage/current or high frequency).

Hazards that increase the likelihood of animals experiencing pre-stun shocks are: poor handling at shackling, inappropriate line speed, physical contact between birds, incorrect angle of entry ramp, entry ramp wetted by charged water, incorrect water-bath height, and shallow immersion.

Factors affecting individual bird resistance include the resistance between the shackle and the leg (leg/shackle interface), shackling on top of a severed foot, shackling by one leg, poor shackle position, incorrect shackle size, dry shackles, scale on the shackle surface, and keratinised skin on the legs (e.g. older birds).

Where insufficient inappropriate electrical *stunning* parameters (intensity, voltage and frequency of current, and exposure time) are used, conscious animals are at risk of being electro-immobilised or paralysed causing *pain* and suffering.

2. Animal-based and other measures

Multiple indicators should be used to determine whether a stun is effective and the animal is unconscious. Animal-based measures of an effective stun are: tonic-clonic seizures; apnoea; and absence of corneal or palpebral reflex.

Animal-based measures of ineffective stun or recovery of consciousness are: vocalisation; spontaneous blinking; righting reflex; presence of corneal or palpebral reflex; rhythmic breathing; spontaneous swallowing; and head shaking.

3. Recommendations

The height of the water-bath stunner should be adjusted so that the birds' heads are completely immersed in the water. Avoid distractions such as people walking under the birds because this can cause birds to pull up.

Personnel should watch for short or stunted birds as these birds will not be able to make contact with the water and will not be stunned. These birds should be stunned in the slaughter line (e.g. penetrative captive bolt) or removed and euthanised.

The rail of the shackle line should run smoothly. Sudden movement such as jolts, drops or sharp curves in the line may cause birds to flap and avoid the stunner.

To minimise any disturbance to birds during shackling, where shackles are wet to improve conductivity, they should be wetted only prior to birds' legs being placed in them.

Pre-stun shocks should be avoided and can be reduced by having a smooth shackle line and entry to the water-bath and by adjusting the water level of the bath to minimise overflow.

In the case of ineffective *stunning* or recovery, animals should be re-stunned using a backup system or be killed immediately. Ineffective *stunning* or return to consciousness should be systematically recorded and the cause of the failure identified and rectified.

Stunning equipment should be used, cleaned, maintained and stored following the manufacturer's recommendations.

Constant current stunners should be preferred to constant voltage stunners because the former ensure that the minimum current is provided to the animals independently from their impedance.

Regular calibration of the equipment according to the manufacturer's procedure is recommended. Effectiveness of the *stunning* should be monitored regularly.

Slaughterhouses/abattoirs should have standard operating procedures that define key operating parameters or follow the manufacturer's recommendations for *stunning*, such as:

- water level, salinity and temperature;
- number of birds in the water-bath;
- contact between water and head, as well as between the legs and the leg shackle;
- electrical parameters (current intensity [A], waveform type [AC and DC], voltage [V] and frequency [Hz]);
- visual or auditory warning system to alert the operator to proper or improper function, such as a device that monitors and displays voltage and applied current.

Ensure an optimum—The combination of intensity, voltage and frequency (for AC and pulsed DC) of current and exposure time during electrical water-bath *stunning* practices, to maximise should ensure the effectiveness of *stunning*. Lower frequencies ensure an effective stunning. Higher frequencies provide the lowest probability of a successful stun even at the highest intensity.

Hazards to *animal welfare* such as inversion of conscious birds, pre-stun shocks, and variability in electrical current delivered to each bird are inherent risks of electrical water-bath *stunning*. Thus, alternative *stunning* systems which avoid these associated *hazards* should be preferred.

4. Species-specific recommendations

Effective electrical parameters should be based on scientific evidence for different species of birds.

Effective electrical parameters should be based on scientific data with field evidence on the welfare outcomes for different types and conditions of animals in accordance with point 5 of Article 7.1.4.

For water-bath *stunning* depending on the frequency, minimum recommended parameters minimum intensities per frequency are recommended for the following and species are:

- For frequency below 200 Hz:
 - 100 mA for chicken,
 - 250 mA for turkeys,
 - 130 mA for ducks and geese,
 - 45 mA for quails.

- For frequency from 200 to 400 Hz:
 - 150 mA for chicken,
 - 400 mA for turkeys.
- For frequency from 400-600 Hz:
 - 200 mA for chicken,
 - 400 mA for turkeys.

Birds should receive the current for at least 4 seconds.

For dDucks, geese and quails should not be stunned at frequencies higher than 200 Hz will not achieve effective stunning and therefore are not recommended. [under study].

For cChicken and turkeys should not be stunned at frequencies higher than 600 Hz will not achieve effective stunning and therefore are not recommended. [under study].

[...]

CHAPTER 8.8.

INFECTION WITH FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE VIRUS

[...]

Article 8.8.3.

Country or zone free from FMD where vaccination is not practised

A country or *zone* may be considered free from FMD where *vaccination* is not practised when the relevant provisions in point 2 of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with, and when within the country or *zone* for at least the past 12 months:

- 1) there has been no *infection* with FMDV;
- 2) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of, and authority over, all *herds* of domestic and *captive wild* susceptible animals in the country or *zone*;
- 3) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of the distribution and habitat of *wild* and *feral* susceptible animals in the country or *zone*;
- 4) appropriate *surveillance* has been implemented in accordance with:
 - a) point 2 b) of Article 1.4.6. where historical freedom can be demonstrated; or
 - b) Articles 8.8.43. to 8.8.45. where historical freedom cannot be demonstrated, which includes the detection of clinical signs of FMD and demonstrates:
 - i) no *infection* with FMDV in unvaccinated animals;
 - ii) no transmission of FMDV in previously vaccinated animals;
- 5) measures to prevent the introduction of the *infection* have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter ~~and/or~~ other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis'. Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, movements of *commodities* within a country between *zones* of different *animal health status* should comply with the same requirements as for importation;
- 6) *vaccination* against FMD is prohibited and the prohibition has been effectively implemented and supervised.

The country or *zone* will be included in the list of countries or *zones* free from FMD, where *vaccination* is not practised in accordance with Chapter 1.6.

Retention on the list requires annual reconfirmation of compliance with all points above and provisions under point 4 of Article 1.4.6. Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for all points above. Any changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be notified to WOA in accordance with Chapter 1.1.

Provided the conditions of point 4 are fulfilled, the status of a country or *zone* will not be affected by applying official emergency *vaccination* to susceptible animals in zoological collections in the face of a FMD threat identified by the *Veterinary Authorities*, provided that the following conditions are met:

- the zoological collection has the primary purpose of exhibiting animals or preserving rare species, has been identified, including the boundaries of the facility, and is included in the country's contingency plan for FMD;
- appropriate *biosecurity* is in place, including effective separation from other susceptible domestic *populations* or *wildlife*;
- the susceptible animals are identified as belonging to the collection and any movements can be traced;
- the vaccine used complies with the standards described in the *Terrestrial Manual*;
- *vaccination* is conducted under the supervision of the *Veterinary Authority*;
- the zoological collection is placed under *surveillance* for at least 12 months after *vaccination*.

A country or *zone* free from FMD where *vaccination* is not practised may maintain its free status despite an incursion of African buffaloes from a neighbouring infected country or *zone* provided that it is demonstrated that the provisions in this article continue to be met and documented evidence has been submitted to and accepted by WOA.

Article 8.8.4.

Country or zone free from FMD where vaccination is practised

A country or *zone* may be considered free from FMD where *vaccination* is practised when the relevant provisions in point 2 of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with, and when within the country or *zone*:

- 1) for at least the past 12 months:
 - a) there has been no transmission of FMDV;
 - b) there has been no *infection* with FMDV;
 - c) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of, and authority over, all *herds* of domestic and *captive wild* susceptible animals in the country or *zone*;
 - d) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of the distribution and habitat of *wild* and *feral* susceptible animals in the country or *zone*;
 - e) compulsory systematic *vaccination* in the target *population* has been carried out to achieve adequate *vaccination* coverage and population immunity; based on the epidemiology of FMD in the country or *zone*, the target *population* should be defined in accordance with Chapter 4.18.;
 - f) *vaccination* has been carried out following appropriate vaccine strain selection;
 - g) measures to prevent the introduction of *infection* have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter ~~and/or~~ other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';
- 2) for the past 24 months:

appropriate *surveillance* has been implemented in accordance with Articles 8.8.43. to 8.8.45. and demonstrates points 1 a) and 1 b) above.

The country or *zone* will be included in the list of countries or *zones* free from FMD where *vaccination* is practised in accordance with Chapter 1.6. Retention on the list requires annual reconfirmation of compliance with all points above and relevant provisions under point 4 of Article 1.4.6. Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for all points above. Any changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be notified to WOA in accordance with Chapter 1.1.

[...]

Article 8.8.8.

Country or zone infected with FMDV

A country or *zone* shall be considered as infected with FMDV when the conditions in points 1 to 6 of Article 8.8.3 or points 1 and 2 of 8.8.4 ~~requirements for acceptance as a country or zone free from FMD either where vaccination is not practised or where vaccination is practised are not fulfilled~~met.

[...]

CHAPTER 15.2.

INFECTION WITH CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER VIRUS

[...]

Article 15.2.3.

Country or zone free from CSF

A country or *zone* may be considered free from CSF when the relevant provisions in point 2 of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with, and when within the proposed free country or *zone* for at least the past 12 months:

- 1) there has been no *case of infection* with CSFV in domestic and *captive wild* pigs;
- 2) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domestic and *captive wild* pig *herds* in the country or *zone*;
- 3) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of the distribution, habitat and indication of disease occurrence through passive *surveillance* of *wild* and *feral* pigs in the country or *zone*;
- 4) appropriate *surveillance* has been implemented in accordance with:
 - a) point 2 b) of Article 1.4.6. where historical freedom can be demonstrated; or
 - b) Articles 15.2.28. to 15.2.33. where historical freedom cannot be demonstrated;
- 5) measures to prevent the introduction of the *infection* have been in place: in particular, the importations or movements of *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter ~~and or~~ other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';
- 6) no *vaccination* against CSF has been carried out in domestic and *captive wild* pigs unless there are means, validated according to Chapter 3.8.3. of the *Terrestrial Manual*, of distinguishing between vaccinated and infected pigs;
- 7) if relevant, the domestic and *captive wild* pig populations have been separated by appropriate *biosecurity*, effectively implemented and supervised, from the *wild* and *feral* pig populations, based on the assessed likelihood of spread of the disease within the *wild* and *feral* pig populations and *surveillance* in accordance with Article 15.2.33.

The country or *zone* will be included in the list of countries or *zones* free from CSF in accordance with Chapter 1.6.

Retention on the list requires annual reconfirmation of compliance with all points above and relevant provisions under point 4 of Article 1.4.6. Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for points 1 to 5 above. Any changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be notified to WOA in accordance with Chapter 1.1.

[...]

Article 15.2.5.

Country or zone infected with CSFV

A country or *zone* is considered as infected with CSFV when the conditions in points 1 to 7 of Article 15.2.3. requirements for acceptance as a free country or *zone* are not fulfilled met.

[...]

CHAPTER 8.X.

INFECTION WITH CRIMEAN-CONGO HAEMORRHAGIC FEVER VIRUS

Article 8.X.1.

General provisions

Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is a zoonotic disease, resulting in severe illness or death in humans. It is caused by a tick-borne virus (CCHFV) that can infect, in general subclinically, a wide variety of vertebrate animals, in general causing no clinical signs in animals.; some ~~Some of them~~ these animals playing a significant role in the amplification and virus-transmission of the virus to humans.

The aim of this chapter is to mitigate the animal health and public health risks posed by CCHF.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, ~~Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever~~ CCHF is defined as an *infection* of ruminants, dromedary camels and ostriches (hereafter 'animal hosts') with ~~Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV).~~

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with CCHFV:

- 1) CCHFV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or
- 2) nucleic acid specific to CCHFV has been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association ~~or contact~~ with or exposure to CCHFV; or
- 3) antibodies specific to CCHFV have been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association ~~or contact~~ with or exposure to CCHFV.

Standards for diagnosis and information on the epidemiology are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

CHAPTER 10.X.

INFECTION WITH AVIAN METAPNEUMOVIRUS (TURKEY RHINOTRACHEITIS AND SWOLLEN HEAD SYNDROME OF CHICKENS)

Article 10.X.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, *infection* with avian metapneumovirus is defined as an *infection* of *poultry* with avian metapneumovirus.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with avian metapneumovirus:

- 1) Avian metapneumovirus, excluding vaccine strains, has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from *poultry*; or
- 2) nucleic acid specific to avian metapneumovirus, which is not the consequence of *vaccination*, has been detected in a sample from *poultry* showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with avian metapneumovirus or is epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case; or
- 3) seroconversion specific to avian metapneumovirus, which is not the consequence of *vaccination*, has been detected in *poultry*; or
- 4) antibodies specific to avian metapneumovirus, which are not the consequence of *vaccination*, have been detected in a sample from *poultry* showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with avian metapneumovirus, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case.

Standards for diagnosis and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

GLOSSARY

APPROVED

means officially approved, accredited or registered by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authority*.

LABORATORY

~~means a properly equipped institution staffed by technically competent personnel under the control of a specialist in veterinary diagnostic methods, who is responsible for the validity of the results. The Veterinary Authority approves and monitors such laboratories with regard to the diagnostic tests required for international trade.~~

means an *approved* facility used for diagnosis, research, or to develop and manufacture *biological products*. Some *laboratories* may manipulate pathogenic agents *in vivo* or *in vitro*, and store and dispose of *biological products* and *pathological material*.

CHAPTER 1.6.

PROCEDURES FOR OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF AN ANIMAL HEALTH STATUS, ENDORSEMENT OF AN OFFICIAL CONTROL PROGRAMME, AND PUBLICATION OF A SELF-DECLARATION OF ANIMAL HEALTH STATUS, BY WOA

Article 1.6.1.

Application for official recognition of an animal health status and endorsement of an official control programme by WOA

A Member Country may request:

- 1) official recognition of an animal health status by WOA of:
 - a) freedom of a country or zone from African horse sickness (AHS);
 - b) risk status of a country or zone with regard to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE);
 - c) freedom of a country or zone from classical swine fever (CSF);
 - d) freedom of a country or zone from contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP);
 - e) freedom of a country or zone from foot and mouth disease (FMD), where vaccination is either practised or not practised;
 - f) freedom of a country or zone from peste des petits ruminants (PPR);
- 2) endorsement by WOA of:
 - a) an official control programme for CBPP;
 - b) an official control programme for FMD;
 - c) an official control programme for PPR;
 - d) an official control programme for dog-mediated rabies.

WOA does not grant official recognition of an animal health status or endorsement of an official control programme for diseases other than those listed under points 1 and 2 above.

The Member Country should present documentation setting out the compliance of their Veterinary Services with the provisions of Chapters 1.1. 'Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information', 1.4. 'Animal health surveillance', 2.1. 'Import risk analysis', 3.2. 'Quality of Veterinary Services', 3.3. 'Evaluation of Veterinary Services' and 4.4. 'Zoning and compartmentalisation' of the Terrestrial Code, when relevant, and with the provisions of the relevant disease-specific chapters in the Terrestrial Code and the Terrestrial Manual.

When requesting official recognition of an animal health status or endorsement by WOA of an *official control programme*, the Member Country should follow the relevant Standard Operating Procedures (available on the WOA website) and submit to WOA a dossier providing the information requested in the following chapters (as appropriate): 1.7. (for AHS), 1.8. (for BSE), 1.9. (for CSF), 1.10. (for CBPP), 1.11. (for FMD) or 1.12. (for PPR).

~~The WOA framework for the official recognition of *animal health status*, the endorsement of *official control programmes*, and their maintenance is described in relevant Resolutions adopted by the World Assembly of WOA Delegates.~~

The country or the *zone* will be included in the relevant lists of official *animal health status* or endorsed *official control programmes* only after the evidence submitted has been assessed by experts and the Resolutions listing the country or the zone have been adopted by the World Assembly of WOA Delegates.

When a Member Country requests official recognition of *animal health status* for a *zone*, the geographical boundaries of the proposed *zone* should be clearly defined. When applying for recognition of a free *zone* that is adjacent to another *zone* of the same status, it should be stated whether the new *zone* is being merged or kept separate. If the proposed *zone* remains separate, details should be provided of the control of the movement of relevant *commodities* between the *zones* in accordance with Chapter 4.4.

The overall objective of the WOA endorsed *official control programmes* is for Member Countries to progressively improve their animal health situation and eventually attain official recognition of *animal health status* or in the case of dog-mediated rabies to make a self-declaration as a free country or *zone*. The *official control programme* should be applicable to the entire country even if certain measures are directed towards defined *zones*.

Article 1.6.2.

Maintenance, suspension and recovery of official recognition of an animal health status and endorsement of an official control programme by WOA

Retention on the lists of countries and *zones* having an official *animal health status* or of countries having an endorsed *official control programme* requires that the information in relevant chapters be re-submitted annually and confirming that the conditions described in the relevant chapters continue to be met – changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events be notified to WOA in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1.

Failure to meetNon-compliance with the requirements-conditions for the maintenance of *animal health status* due to the occurrence of the relevant listed diseases or non-compliance with surveillance or prevention measures, results in the suspension of that status. Within 24 months of suspension, except otherwise stated in the disease-specific chapter, a Member Country may apply for the recovery of a previously recognised status, by submitting evidence that following the provisions for recovery of animal health status of the relevant disease-specific chapter are met or that any other reasons for suspension have been addressed. When the status has not been recovered within the specified period of its suspension, it is withdrawn and the Member Country should reapply following the procedure for the application for official recognition of *animal health status*.

WOA may withdraw theThe endorsement of an *official control programme* may be withdrawn if there is evidence of:

- non-compliance with the timelines or performance indicators of the programme; or
- significant problems with the quality of the *Veterinary Services* as described in Section 3 of the *Terrestrial Code*; or
- an increase in the *incidence* or distribution of the disease that cannot be addressed by the programme.

Article 1.6.3.

Publication by WOA of a self-declaration of animal health status by a Member Country

A Member Country may make a self-declaration of freedom of a country, *zone* or *compartment* from a WOA *listed disease* or another animal disease, *infection* or *infestation*. ~~For listed diseases, The~~ Member Country ~~should~~may inform WOA of the claimed status and request publication by WOA of the self-declaration to inform WOA Member Countries.

A Member Country requesting the publication of a self-declaration should follow the Standard Operating Procedure (available on the WOA website) for submission of a self-declaration of *animal health status* and provide documented information on its compliance with the relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including:

- evidence that the *infection* or *infestation* is a *notifiable disease* in the entire country;
- history of absence or eradication of the *infection* or *infestation* in the country, *zone* or *compartment*;
- *surveillance* including an *early warning system* for all relevant species in the country, *zone* or *compartment*;
- measures implemented to maintain freedom in the country, *zone* or *compartment*.

The self-declaration may be published only after all the information provided has been received and ~~screened administrative and technical screening has been performed by WOA~~. Publication does not imply endorsement of the claim of freedom by WOA ~~and does not reflect the official opinion of WOA~~. Responsibility for the accuracy of the information contained in a self-declaration lies entirely with the WOA Delegate of the Member Country concerned.

Except when otherwise provided for in the *listed disease*-specific chapter, an *outbreak* in a ~~Member Country~~ *country*, a *zone* or a *compartment* having a self-declared free status results in the loss of ~~this the self declared free~~ status. A Member Country wishing to reclaim a lost free status should submit a new self-declaration following the procedure described in this article.

WOA does not publish self-declarations for *listed diseases* in point 1 of Article 1.6.1.

Article 1.6.4.

Specific provisions

The *animal health status* of a *country* or *zone* is not affected by:

- the presence of the pathogenic agent in an *imported animal product* at a *border inspection post*;
- the presence of the disease, *infection*, or *infestation* in imported animals in a *quarantine centre*;
- the importation or the presence of the pathogenic agent, or of *commodities* or organisms carrying the *pathogenic agent*, in a *laboratory* or other *approved facilities* with appropriate laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity in accordance with *Article 5.8.5* and the *Terrestrial Manual*.

This should be supported by evidence of compliance with all relevant standards of the *Terrestrial Code* and *Terrestrial Manual*.

CHAPTER 3.X.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Article 3.X.1.

Introduction

Emergency management is the organisation, coordination, and management of responsibilities and resources to address emergencies. It requires proactive preparedness efforts to ensure capabilities and capacities are in place to prevent emergencies from becoming overwhelming. Emergency management requires regular training, practice through exercises and scenario planning.

Sudden or unexpected events can lead to emergency situations that can affect animal *populations*, negatively impacting animal health, *animal welfare*, livelihoods, economies, food security, and veterinary public health, often with serious societal and economic consequences.

The *Veterinary Authority* and *Veterinary Services* are the main actors of the response to emergencies requiring animal disease prevention, early detection and control, and maintaining or restoring disease freedom, as well as the protection of *animal welfare*. They may also be called upon to support emergency responses led by other authorities for events caused by hazards beyond animal diseases, such as natural disasters.

Whether leading the response or not, the *Veterinary Authority* and *Veterinary Services* should be prepared to act swiftly and coordinate with other sectors and stakeholders, contributing their technical expertise, capabilities and capacities, under a whole-of-government approach. Contributions to responses led by other authorities or agencies should be explored and practiced through being part of relevant exercises. All relevant public and private stakeholders should fulfil key roles in the management of emergencies under a One Health approach.

Emergency management builds resilience by clarifying priorities and strengthening systems. Investing in adaptable capabilities is cost-effective in reducing the overall impact and cost of emergencies and requires sustained and consistent funding and resourcing rather than intermittent or reactive support.

Article 3.X.2.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides recommendations for preparing for and managing emergencies arising from any hazard, whether natural or artificial, accidental or deliberate, that affects animal health, *animal welfare* or veterinary public health. The chapter addresses key components of emergency management, including prevention, preparedness, detection, response and recovery. Its main objectives are to:

- 1) Guide Members in developing emergency management structures, processes and supporting systems within a whole-of-government framework;
- 2) Define essential capacities and capabilities required to respond effectively;
- 3) Emphasise the need for sustainable resourcing to increase the resilience of *Veterinary Services*;
- 4) Advocate for planning, training and simulation exercises to improve readiness for emergencies;
- 5) Encourage a commitment to continuous improvement in emergency management.

This chapter may be applied to all emergencies involving *Veterinary Services* and *animals*, including *wildlife*. This chapter takes an all-hazards approach and can be applied to biological as well as chemical or physical hazards, which may arise from technological, environmental (geological, hydrological, meteorological), or even societal causes.

Article 3.X.3.

Definitions

For the purposes of this chapter, the following definitions apply:

'Event' means the manifestation of a hazard at a particular place and time, which has consequences on the health or welfare of animals.

'Risk' means the likelihood of an event and the likely magnitude of its consequences.

'Emergency' means a state triggered by an event that creates significant disruption, requiring immediate and coordinated extraordinary measures due to its scale, complexity, or likelihood of further impact.

'Whole-of-government approach' means the coordinated and collaborative action of multiple public administrations, institutions, bodies and agencies to address complex cross-cutting issues. This approach may include extraordinary mandates.

'Incident management system' (IMS) means an emergency response coordination mechanism that brings together people, resources, and specific systems and tools, enabling effective collaboration between sectors to support interoperability, situational awareness and efficient decision-making.

Article 3.X.4.

General Principles

Beyond the recommendations of Chapters 3.1. and Chapter 3.2., *Veterinary Authorities* and other *Competent Authorities*, *Veterinary Services* and relevant stakeholders, should follow these principles in the implementation of emergency management:

1. General organisation and framework

The *Veterinary Authority* should provide leadership, advocacy and expertise in the preparedness and response for animal disease emergencies, and for any animal health and *animal welfare* aspects of other emergencies. Legislation on emergency management, consistent with Chapter 3.4., should clearly define lead and supporting agencies, rules for emergency declaration and related extraordinary powers and resourcing to enable effective emergency management actions

Veterinary Services should be integrated within national emergency management plans, resourcing and frameworks, and engage in multisectoral coordination across public and private sectors.

The *Veterinary Authority* should prepare for emergencies where they may be expected to provide a supporting role in a response led by another governmental authority, such as managing the *animal welfare* impacts of major fires, floods, storms or other natural or human made disasters.

Formal networks and partnerships, such as between government agencies, the police or defence, industry, civil society and international organisations should be developed to enhance coordination and collective capacity. Formal agreements, such as memoranda of understanding (MoUs), can support this coordination by defining roles and responsibilities, establishing communication protocols, and promoting joint action prior to, during and after an emergency.

Essential functions of both public and private sectors should be maintained as much as possible for ongoing delivery during emergencies, notably to minimise disruptions. Efforts should be made to engage the private sector in emergency preparedness and response activities during peace time, prior to and during emergencies.

2. Data and information management

Decision-making should be supported by robust data systems, integrating relevant data from animal health, public health, environment and other sectors. *Early warning systems*, supported for animal health by *surveillance* in accordance with Chapter 1.4., and risk indicators are crucial to trigger and adjust

emergency responses. *Establishment* and *animal identification* and traceability databases should be maintained, up-to date and accessible for all actions in emergency management, particularly for the tracing of *animal* locations and movements. Information may be required from other *Competent Authorities* such as data on *wildlife populations* and ecosystems.

3. Effective communication

In order to ensure clear, consistent and timely communication and awareness during and after emergencies, to correctly inform stakeholders, to counter misinformation and disinformation and to promote transparency while maintaining public trust, *Veterinary Authorities* should establish internal and external communication protocols following the principles of Chapter 3.5 on communication.

4. Human, physical and financial resources

Competent Authorities should ensure that trained personnel are available for all components of emergency management. This includes maintaining core staff with defined roles in case of emergency, employing subject matter experts as well as establishing mechanisms for swift mobilisation and surge capacity of personnel, including private sector support e.g. private *veterinarians* or *veterinary paraprofessionals*. The physical and mental wellbeing of emergency management personnel should be prioritised through health, safety and psychosocial support measures, and adequate staff rotations. Consideration should be given to arrangements to mobilise international personnel in emergencies that require additional surge capacity, and the role of relevant International Organisations in this respect.

Veterinary Services should have the capability to access extraordinary financial resources and the necessary physical resources to respond to emergencies. This includes having adequate equipment, such as roadblocks, personal protective equipment or disinfectants pre-purchased, and contingency funding arrangements in place to support operational costs as well as mechanisms for compensation or recovery, as appropriate.

5. Continuous improvement and learning

Emergency management components should be regularly monitored, tested, evaluated and updated through training, simulation exercises and learning from real events. Lessons should be identified through after-action reviews.

Competent Authorities should also learn from approaches in other sectors both at the national and international levels.

6. Accountability

Competent Authorities should maintain records of decisions, actions and resource use to ensure transparency, support emergency-related inquiries and to demonstrate responsibility to stakeholders, financial government agencies, and donors.

Article 3.X.5.

Prevention

While not all emergencies can be prevented, prevention in emergency management aims at avoiding or reducing the likelihood of the occurrence of events that may trigger emergencies, or mitigate their impact so that they do not trigger emergencies.

Routine prevention activities should be integrated into day-to-day operations such as import controls, *biosecurity*, traceability, zoning and compartmentalisation, as well as *vaccination* programmes, as appropriate. Key elements of prevention include, for events caused by animal diseases, the application of the recommendations in Section 4 and Section 5.

In addition, the *Competent Authorities* should take into consideration the following principles:

- 1) Prevention actions and measures are based on risk assessments considering all relevant hazards and sectors. Import risk analysis, such as described in Chapter 2.1., aims to prevent the introduction of diseases into a country, potentially causing animal health emergencies. In this context, risk

communication should be implemented, including through timely messaging with stakeholders across public and private sectors. Raising awareness on *biosecurity*, *surveillance* and the recognition of such diseases contributes to early detection and reduced spread of disease, minimising the scale of the event.

- 2) *Risk analysis* should be supported by foresight and intelligence, where risk factors are monitored and understood as well as emerging trends, to enable the early identification of hazards and the relevant adjustments to prevention strategies, before escalation occurs.
- 3) Prevention activities should be adequately funded, supported and implemented by both public and private sector stakeholders. *Competent Authorities* should encourage the private sector to cooperate and contribute to prevention, e.g. through public-private partnerships.

Article 3.X.6.

Preparedness

Emergency preparedness is the ability of the *Competent Authorities* and relevant stakeholders to anticipate, plan for and implement the best and fastest possible response to emergencies, in order to minimise their scale and impact. It is a continuous cycle of planning, equipping, training, and exercising and should be supported by political commitment, dedicated funding and resourcing as well as inter-institutional coordination mechanisms. Preparedness should be scalable to address a range of hazards. In addition to the relevant recommendations in Chapter 4.19., the following should be considered when applying an all-hazards approach to preparedness for emergencies:

1. Legal framework

Legislation should be developed in accordance with Chapter 3.4, and as part of preparedness efforts, it should:

- a) Define roles and responsibilities of *Competent Authorities* in emergencies, including for emergency declarations, planning and decision making, and of other relevant sectors and stakeholders for implementation and support;
- b) Provide powers to implement necessary and proportionate emergency measures, including declaring the state of emergency, as well as procuring and allocating resources and ensuring compliance through enforcing required measures;
- c) Contain provisions to account for temporary fast-tracking of decision making, policies or procedures during emergencies such as for quarantine, killing, enhanced *surveillance* and testing, emergency registration of vaccine and expedited procurement of resources;
- d) Support intersectoral collaboration such as through MoUs;
- e) Provide legal protection (including safety and protection from potential aggression) for individuals and organisations involved in emergency management;
- f) Ensure funding for emergency management, covering both operational cost and compensation, while facilitating rapid access and use. Compensation of stakeholders for losses can promote both early warning and compliance.

2. Planning

- a) Preparedness planning should be based on *risk analysis* of different scenarios and apply to all components of emergency management. It should:
 - i) Be supported by legislation and operational frameworks;
 - ii) Include the development of written emergency preparedness plans and emergency response plans (also known as 'contingency plans')) that address a range of potential hazards, define animal health or *animal welfare* emergencies and describe what should be done prior to and during an emergency. The plans should be supported by detailed standard operating procedures;

- iii) Ensure that emergency response plans define an IMS, establishing a clear chain of command, at all administrative levels, including decision making persons, communication flows and accountability. All stakeholders should have their roles and responsibilities defined and understood. This should include detailed guidance on interoperability, accountability, and coordination;
 - iv) Recognise the role of the private sector in preparedness and continuity of business;
 - v) Be regularly reviewed and updated, incorporating lessons identified through real events and simulation exercises;
 - vi) Identify the technical expertise necessary to support decision-making during emergencies;
 - vii) Ensure that laboratories are able to scale up when required during an emergency;
 - viii) Describe the deactivation process of emergency response including the scaling down of logistics and decommissioning of facilities, equipment and personnel.
- b) Preparedness planning should also include development of a recovery plan that is integrated into national emergency management arrangements. A recovery plan should:
- i) Clearly define the objectives and timeline for recovery efforts;
 - ii) Establish the chain of command, roles and responsibilities and identify key partners for the delivery of recovery activities;
 - iii) Promote intersectoral communication and coordination throughout the implementation of recovery activities;
 - iv) Describe funding mechanisms and the prioritisation and coordination of recovery resources;
 - v) Define arrangements for community support as appropriate;
 - vi) Incorporate risk mitigation strategies, if relevant, including cautious restocking with *surveillance* and prevention measures.

3. Equipping

Preparedness requires that the *Competent Authority* ensures the availability of appropriate equipment and supplies to implement emergency response plans. Equipping should:

- a) Be based on resource mapping and risk prioritisation for different scenarios;
- b) Include pre-established procurement, contracting and logistics systems adaptable to emergency conditions;
- c) Leverage both public and private capacities and have pre-existing arrangements in place.

4. Training and exercising

A comprehensive training and exercise programme should be in place to ensure personnel have the competencies and capabilities required to respond effectively to emergencies as well as to identify gaps in emergency management efforts. This should include:

- a) Regular, multidisciplinary training involving relevant sectors and stakeholders;
- b) Simulation exercises conducted at appropriate intervals and levels, addressing key priority hazards and crucial aspects of emergency management. Besides emergency response activities, all mechanisms of coordination within or between authorities and sectors, including for *early warning systems*, should be tested in simulation exercises;

- c) Exercises may also involve other Member Countries, regional and international partners;
- d) Evaluation of exercises through after-action reviews and the identification of lessons to inform future preparedness efforts.

Article 3.X.7.

Detection

Detection in the framework of emergency management is the process of the timely identification and analysis of the occurrence of events that might trigger an emergency, requiring action by the *Competent Authorities* and other relevant authorities and stakeholders.

Members should put in place *early warning systems*, as described in Chapter 1.4. and adapted to all types of events and based on early detection, to enable timely decision-making and implementation of control measures to mitigate the impact of the event. *Early warning systems*, should include *surveillance*, intelligence and rapid exchange of information, in order to determine if emergency response is required, based on pre-existing criteria. Detection activities, such as animal health *surveillance* as described in Chapter 1.4., should be a continuous process that maintains a sufficient state of readiness.

The development and maintenance of *early warning systems* are vital for emergency management. The earlier an event is detected and reported to the *Competent Authorities* (and in case of *listed diseases* by the *Veterinary Authorities* in accordance with Chapter 1.1.), the sooner and more effective appropriate actions can be taken, reducing the overall impacts of the event.

Early warning systems should be organised within a whole-of-government approach.

Raising awareness and maintaining a strong reporting chain linking field-level operations to the *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant *Competent Authorities* is critical. *Veterinary Services* should provide continuous education and outreach to enhance recognition of events that could trigger an emergency.

Diagnostic laboratories are a key element of early detection and *early warning systems*. They should have a scalable testing capacity and be able to operate as a network to collectively increase testing capacity by sharing competences and workload. Agreements and protocols for sending samples to another country should be established beforehand (in accordance with Chapter 5.8.).

Some laboratories should also play a role in controlling, approving and registering *veterinary medicinal products*, including vaccines, especially for emergency *vaccination*.

For events that may be detected by a *Competent Authority* other than the *Veterinary Authority*, such as extreme weather events or infrastructure failures, there should be a pre-agreed mechanism for the timely exchange of information.

Article 3.X.8.

Response

Emergency response is the series of coordinated actions taken to manage an event that triggers an emergency. These actions should be described in principle in the emergency response plan, and be adapted to the event's nature, scale and complexity. Depending on the emergency, the *Veterinary Authority* may lead the response or operate under the coordination of another *Competent Authority* or other relevant authorities. The *Veterinary Authority* may also coordinate closely with *Veterinary Authorities* or other *Competent Authorities* of neighbouring countries.

Activation of the response is based on the continuous assessment of risk and the evaluation of the situation. The response plan should identify priorities, decision-making timelines and procedures for maintaining continuity of business. It should remain flexible and be regularly reviewed as new information becomes available.

An emergency response coordination mechanism, such as an IMS, should be activated as appropriate to coordinate the response. This mechanism should be interoperable across *Competent Authorities* and other relevant authorities to support a whole-of-government response. Key components of a coordinated response include:

- 1) Leadership and coordination: A chain of command should be established to ensure decision-making responsibilities are clear at all levels. Emergency operation centres (EOCs) may be set up to collocate dedicated staff and resources, depending on the scale of the emergency, for IMS to operate as effectively as possible. Liaison functions should be set up to maintain coordination between *Competent Authorities* and with other relevant sectors and stakeholders. These functions should allow regularly scheduled briefings and timely information sharing, including for the development of common messaging.
- 2) Planning: The lead *Competent Authority* should continuously collect and analyse data relevant to the emergency to support timely decision making and to guide response activities. This includes rapid risk assessments, situation reports, ongoing epidemiological analysis and real time response planning adapted to the existing generic response plan. This information should be disseminated to relevant stakeholders as appropriate.
- 3) Operations: Operational activities are undertaken as per the strategic and tactical decisions of the response, based on the preparedness plan and the response plan. Field activities should be coordinated and *means of transport* and other operational resources should be secured.
- 4) Logistics: Logistics should be scalable to meet the needs of the emergency response and should be planned, although they always should be adapted to the objectives of the response and the field reality. Consideration should be given to sourcing essential services and materials through partnerships with other sectors, including the private sector.
- 5) Public information: External communication and awareness activities should be coordinated, and if needed unified, across involved sectors to ensure consistency and avoid confusion. Designated spokespersons should be identified and communicate clear, accurate information to stakeholders using appropriate channels. Communications should be rapid and consistent to avoid information voids that can foster misinformation and disinformation.
- 6) Finance and administration: Emergency funding should be easily accessible, and adaptable to the changing scale and scope of response activities. Rapid procurement and contracting systems should be ready to be used under a state of emergency. Arrangements for compensation of stakeholders or other financial support, including insurance contract services, may be necessary depending on the nature of the emergency.

Surveillance: Although focused on response activities, emergency management at the time of emergency requires regular review and updating of detection measures based on reassessed risks. This includes the strengthening of targeted surveillance, the performance of epidemiological investigations and the raising of awareness among relevant stakeholders. These activities should support the adaptation of the response plan including decisions to intensify or reduce certain measures, such as movement restrictions.

Different types of emergencies may require different types of response activities, which may include:

- a) For animal disease emergencies:

Zoning in accordance with Chapter 4.4.;

Stamping-out (including ensuring *animal welfare* at the time of killing, in accordance with Chapter 7.6) and other measures as described in Chapter 4.19.; Law Enforcement Authorities may be required to support enforcement of these measures;

Emergency vaccination in accordance with Chapter 4.18.;

Carcass disposal in accordance with Chapter 4.13.;

Cleansing and *disinfection* of premises, equipment and vehicles in accordance with chapter 4.14.;

Vector control or management of *wildlife* reservoirs, as appropriate and justified;

All these measures should take into account relevant *biosecurity* recommendations in accordance with Chapter 4.X.

- b) For veterinary public health emergencies, such as a food safety emergency, providing relevant support by investigating, tracing and managing any animal food products or animal sources.
 - c) For other types of emergencies, caused by hazards that arise from technological, environmental (geological, hydrological, meteorological), or societal causes, protection of *animal welfare* in accordance with Chapter 7.1., including:
 - Humane euthanasia of badly injured or otherwise suffering animals;
 - Animal rescue and relocation;
 - Provisions of temporary shelters;
 - Ensuring feed, water and veterinary care for displaced animals.
 - d) In case of suspicion of deliberate event:

Engagement of the relevant law enforcement authorities to conduct joint investigations and risk assessments.
- 7) Human resources
- a) Personnel dedicated to response activities should have been trained and briefed on their roles as per the preparedness plan, but on the spot training should be considered, including health, safety and conduct rules, and the nature and impacts of the specific emergency that is managed. During response operations, physical safety of responders as well as producers should be prioritised.
 - b) Mobilisation of personnel should consider the regular activities of *Veterinary Services* and that these have to continue during the response. However, the range of expertise needed across all levels of the response should be made available as per the response plan, including access to subject matter experts. Health, including mental health, well-being and safety of personnel and affected communities should be prioritised.
- 8) Documentation should be maintained throughout the response including records of decisions. A dedicated monitoring and evaluation team should identify lessons during the response and implement real-time improvements if necessary. Records should be also kept to reassess and, if necessary, adapt the preparedness plan for future emergencies. Records are also required for audits and for accountability.
- 9) Response is deactivated when a risk assessment supports it and tasks can be conducted under business as usual. Deactivation should also include the scaling down of logistical operations and reallocation of usable response resources.

Article 3.X.9.

Recovery

Recovery is the set of actions required to support affected communities and animal *populations*, restore livelihoods and habitats and to rebuild infrastructure, and to reduce long-term emergency impacts. It generally begins when emergency response activities cease, however some efforts may start in some areas while response continues in others.

Recovery involves impact assessment, restoring services and rebuilding systems including veterinary infrastructure, if necessary, with the view to return to a level of pre-emergency continuity of business. The lead *Competent Authority* may differ the one in charge of response.

For emergencies caused by outbreaks of *listed diseases*, recovery may include steps to return to the *animal health status* prior to the event. Member Countries seeking official recognition of disease freedom or self-declaration of *animal health status* should follow the relevant provisions of Chapter 1.6. and the disease-specific chapters.

During recovery, the *Competent Authority* should:

- 1) Provide guidance on compensation, where appropriate, available financial assistance and access to counselling and support services.
- 2) Monitor resource availability and assess progress against recovery objectives.
- 3) Define and agree on an endpoint for recovery, based on regular reviews of the situation including availability of resources. Stakeholders should be informed of the recovery timeline.
- 4) Ensure transparency through regular reporting to national, regional and international stakeholders, and to WOA, as appropriate.

An after-action review of the whole event management (prevention, preparedness, detection, response) should be conducted to identify lessons for improving future emergency preparedness and response. A final report should be prepared and disseminated to relevant stakeholders. Where appropriate, *Competent Authorities* should share lessons with other sectors and stakeholders, including at international level.

CHAPTER 8.10.

INFECTION WITH JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS VIRUS
(JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS)

Article 8.10.1.

General provisions

Japanese encephalitis (JE) is a vector-borne disease of significant importance to public health transmitted by bites of culicine mosquitoes. Humans and a wide range of animals are susceptible to JE, however, only suids and wild birds play a significant role in the epidemiology of the disease. Suids are considered amplifying hosts and wild birds are considered to be reservoir and amplifying hosts. Equids are dead-end hosts and therefore, equids and their products do not present a risk of transmission. However, equids are useful sentinels for the early detection of JE Japanese encephalitis to mitigate animal health and public health risks posed by the pathogenic agent.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, JE Japanese encephalitis is defined as an infection of suids, wild birds, and, equids, and wild birds (hereafter 'animal hosts') with Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV).

The following defines the occurrence of infection with JEV:

- 1) JEV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or
- 2) nucleic acid or antigen specific to JEV has been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with JE Japanese encephalitis, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association with or exposure to JEV; or
- 3) seroconversion specific to JEV, which is not the consequence of vaccination, has been detected in an animal host; or
- 4) antibodies specific to JEV, which are not the consequence of vaccination, have been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with JE Japanese encephalitis or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association with or exposure to JEV.

A notification of infection of equids or wild birds with JEV does not affect the Japanese encephalitis status of a country or zone.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *infective period* in suids shall be seven days.

Standards for diagnosis and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology of this disease, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 8.10.2.

Safe commodities

When authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities, Veterinary Authorities should not require any JE Japanese encephalitis-related conditions regardless of the animal health status of the country or zone of origin:

- 1) equids and other equid commodities;
- 2) meat and meat products from suids;

- 3) *protein meal* and rendered fat from suids;
- 4) gelatine and collagen from suids; and
- 5) hides, skins and hair from suids.

Article 8.10.3.

Country or zone free from infection with JEV in suids

A country or *zone* may be considered free from *infection* with JEV in suids when:

- 1) the *infection* has been notifiable in the entire country for at least the past 24 months;
- 2) appropriate *biosecurity* and *sanitary measures* to prevent the introduction of *infection* have been in place; in particular, the importation or movements of suids or captive wild birds and their *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter or other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';
- 3) *vaccination of suids* against JEV of suids was not conducted in the entire country or *zone* for the past 12 months;
- 4) and either:
 - a) the country or *zone* is historically free as described in point 2) b) of Article 1.4.6.; or
 - b) for at least the past 24 months, *surveillance* in accordance with Article 8.10.9. has been in place in the entire country or *zone* and there has been no case in suids in the country or *zone*.

Article 8.10.4.

Compartment free from infection with JEV in suids

The establishment of a *compartment* free from *infection* with JEV in suids should follow the relevant provisions laid down in Article 8.10.3. 1) and 2) and in Chapters 4.4. and 4.5.

Suids in the free *compartment* should be protected from the bites of culicine mosquitoes in accordance with Article 8.10.8.

Article 8.10.4.bis

Country or zone infected with JEV

A country or zone should be considered as infected with JEV when the *infection* occurs in an animal host.

Article 8.10.5.

Recovery of free status

Should a case of JE occur To regain free status when an *infection* of JEV occurs in a previously free country or *zone*, it may be recovered in accordance with Article 8.10.3. applies.

Article 8.10.6.

Recommendations for importation of suids from countries, zones or compartments free from JE Japanese encephalitis in suids

Veterinary Authorities of *importing countries* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of JE Japanese encephalitis on the day of shipment;

- 2) were kept in a country, *zone* or *compartment* free from Japanese encephalitis in suids since birth or for at least the past 14 days prior to shipment;
- 3) either,
 - a) did not transit through an infected *zone* during transportation to the *place of shipment*; or
 - b) were protected from culicine mosquito bites at all times when transiting through an infected *zone* in accordance with Article 8.10.8.

Article 8.10.7.

Recommendations for importation of suids from countries or zones infected with JEV

Veterinary Authorities of *importing countries* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of JE Japanese encephalitis on the day of shipment; and
- 2) either,
 - a) were vaccinated against JEV, and *vaccination* was completed according to the manufacturer's recommendation at least 21 days and no longer than one year prior to shipment; or
 - b) were isolated in a *vector*-protected *quarantine station* centre, which is located in an area of demonstrated low *vector* activity, for at least 14 days prior to shipment, and were protected from culicine mosquito bites at all times during transportation from the *quarantine station* centre to the *place of shipment* in accordance with Article 8.10.8.

Article 8.10.8.

Protecting suids from culicine mosquito bites

- 1) Vector-protected quarantine centre station

The means of protection of the *quarantine centre station* should at least comprise the following:

- a) appropriate physical barriers at entry and exit points, for example a double-door entry-exit system;
- b) openings of the building are *vector* screened with mesh of appropriate gauge;
- c) *vector surveillance* and *vector* control within and around the building;
- d) measures to limit or eliminate breeding sites for *vectors* in the vicinity of the *quarantine centre station*;
- e) Standard Operating Procedures for operation of the *quarantine centre station* and for transport of suids to the *place of loading*.

- 2) During transportation

When transporting unvaccinated suids through countries or *zones* infected with JEV, *Veterinary Authorities* should require that strategies to protect suids from culicine mosquito bites are in place, considering the local ecology of the *vector*.

- a) Transport by road

Potential Risk management strategies should include a combination of:

- i) treating animals with an *approved* repellent to prevent bites prior to and during transportation, in vehicles means of transport disinfected and disinfected with an approved disinfectant and insecticide;

- ii) *loading, transporting and unloading* animals at times of low *vector* activity and avoiding areas of known high vector activity;
 - iii) ensuring vehicles means of transport do not stop en route during dawn or dusk, or overnight, unless the vehicle means of transport is insect-vector protected proof;
 - iv) using historical, ongoing or modelling information on JEV and surveillance for *vectors* at common stopping and offloading points to identify low risk ports and transport routes.
- b) Transport by air

Prior to *loading* the suids, *containers* are sprayed with an *approved* insecticide.

Containers in which suids are being transported and the cargo hold of the aircraft should be sprayed with an *approved* insecticide when the doors have been closed and prior to take off. All possible insect harbourage should be treated. The insecticide sprayers should be retained for inspection on arrival.

In addition, during any stopover in countries or *zones* where *infection* with JEV occurs, prior to the opening of any aircraft door and until all doors are closed, netting of appropriate gauge impregnated with an *approved* insecticide should be placed over all *containers*.

Article 8.10.9.

Surveillance for JEinfection with Japanese encephalitis virus

Surveillance of JE should be carried out in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and with the following recommendations.

- 1) The objectives of surveillance of JEJapanese encephalitis are for the *Veterinary Authority* to coordinate in a timely manner with public health and other relevant *Competent Authorities*, to share information to mitigate *risks* to animal health and human health, and to facilitate safe *international trade*.

Surveillance of Japanese encephalitis should be carried out in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and with the following recommendations.

- 2) Clinical and syndromic *surveillance* to detect signs of *infection* with JEV in animal hosts are components of an *early warning system*. However, clinical signs are not pathognomonic and not always present. Suspect cases should always be confirmed by laboratory testing, taking into account the epidemiological situation.
- 3) Oronasal fluids may be used for *surveillance* of Japanese encephalitis JE in suids due to their ease of collection and non-invasive nature.
- 4) *Surveillance* for Japanese encephalitis often involves serological monitoring. The use of sentinel animals, which provide early indication of local transmission of JEV, may involve several susceptible animals, especially equids. ThisIt may include not only animal hosts but also incidental susceptible animals hosts such as dogs, cattle, goats and domestic birds.
- 5) In infected countries, the *Veterinary Authority* should develop *early warning systems* to detect Japanese encephalitis JE epidemic events, so as to promote awareness campaigns to sensitise the owners and keepers of suids and equids, the *veterinarians*, the public health authorities, and other relevant stakeholders to the disease risk. Environmental surveillance may play a role in detecting JEV in areas where animal hosts are present. This may include sampling of natural water sources, *establishments* and *slaughterhouse* or *abattoir* wastewater.
- 6) *Surveillance* for mosquito *vectors* conducted in accordance with Chapter 1.5. may be helpful in identifying mosquito *vector* activity and presence of JEV.

CHAPTER 8.20.

**INFECTION WITH FRANCISELLA TULARENSIS
(TULAREMIA)**

Article 8.20.1.

General provisions

The aim of this chapter is to mitigate the animal health and public health risks posed by tularemia. A wide variety of mammals, including humans, and some birds have been reported to be infected, but tularemia is primarily a disease of the orders Lagomorpha and Rodentia.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, tularemia is defined as an *infection* of lagomorphs and rodents (hereafter 'animal hosts') with *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *tularensis* or *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *holarctica*.

Hereafter '*Francisella tularensis*' is used to collectively refer to both *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *tularensis* and *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *holarctica*.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with *Francisella tularensis*:

- 1) *Francisella tularensis* has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or
- 2) nucleic acid or antigen specific to *Francisella tularensis* has been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with *Francisella tularensis*; or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case or a human infected with *Francisella tularensis*, or giving cause for suspicion of association or contact with *Francisella tularensis*; or
- 3) seroconversion specific to *Francisella tularensis* has been detected in an animal host; or
- 4) antibodies specific to *Francisella tularensis* have been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with *Francisella tularensis*, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case or a human infected with *Francisella tularensis*, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with *Francisella tularensis*.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *incubation period* for tularemia (in hares, genus *Lepus*) shall be 15 days.

Standards for diagnosis ~~diagnostic tests~~, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 8.20.2.

Tularemia-free country Country or zone free from tularemia

A country or zone may be considered free from tularemia when:

- 1) the *infection* has been notifiable in the entire country ~~it has been shown that tularemia has not been present~~ for at least the past two years;
- 2) either:
 - a) the country or zone is historically free as described in point 2) b) of Article 1.4.6.; or
 - b) for at least the past two years, specific surveillance in accordance with Chapter 1.4. has been in place in the entire country or zone, and there has been no case in the country or zone for at least

the past two years; and when bacteriological or serological surveys in previously infected zones have given negative results.

- 3) appropriate biosecurity and sanitary measures to prevent the introduction of infection have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of animal hosts and other commodities into the country or zone have been carried out in accordance with this chapter or other relevant chapters of the Terrestrial Code, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis'.

Article 8.20.2.bis

Recovery of free status

Should a case of infection with *Francisella tularensis* occur in a previously free country or zone, its status may be recovered one year after the disinfection and disinsection of the last affected establishment, provided that in the entire country or zone, specific surveillance in accordance with Chapter 1.4. has been carried out and has demonstrated the absence of any case of infection with *Francisella tularensis*.

Otherwise, Article 8.20.2. applies.

Article 8.20.3.

Tularemia infected zone-Country or zone infected with *Francisella tularensis*

A country or zone should be considered as infected with *Francisella tularensis* when the conditions for freedom from tularemia are not met fulfilled, tularemia until:

- 1) at least one year has elapsed after the last case has been confirmed;

AND

- 2) a bacteriological survey on ticks within the infected zone has given negative results; or regular serological testing of hares and rabbits from that zone have given negative results.

Article 8.20.4.

Trade in commodities

Veterinary Authorities of tularemia free countries may prohibit importation or transit through their territory, from countries considered infected with tularemia, of live hares.

Article 8.20.54.

Recommendations for importation of hares from countries considered infected with *Francisella tularensis*tularemia

For live hares

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of tularemia on the day of shipment;
- 12) dowere not come from a zone kept in an tularemia-infected with *Francisella tularensis*.zone;
- 23) have been-were treated against ectoparasites arthropod vectors upon entry into the quarantine centre;
and
- 34) were kept in a quarantine station-centre for the at least 15 days prior to shipment and during this period the animals showed no clinical signs of infection with *Francisella tularensis*.

CHAPTER 12.11.

INFECTION WITH I-AB AND I-C VARIANTS OF VENEZUELAN EQUINE ENCEPHALITIS VIRUS (VENEZUELAN EQUINE ENCEPHALOMYELITIS)

Article 12.11.1.

General provisions

Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE) is a *vector*-borne disease of significant importance to public health transmitted by culicine mosquitoes, while sylvatic rodents are the reservoir.

The causal agent of the VEE comprises a complex of six antigenic subtypes (I-VI), each currently considered a separate viral species. Equids are considered amplifying hosts of I-AB and I-C variants of virus, which are the only ones associated with epidemics in equids and humans.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, VEE is defined as an *infection* of equids (hereafter 'animal host') with I-AB or I-C variants of Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (hereafter 'VEEV/IABC').

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with VEEV/IABC:

- 1) VEEV/IABC has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or
- 2) nucleic acid specific to VEEV/IABC has been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with VEE, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association with or exposure to VEEV/IABC.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *incubation period* shall be seven days.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *infective period* shall be seven days.

Standards for diagnosis and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 12.11.2.

Safe commodities

When authorising the importation or transit of the following *commodities*, *Veterinary Authorities* should not require any VEE-related conditions regardless of the *animal health status* of the country or *zone* of origin:

- 1) *meat products*;
- 2) processed hides and skins;
- 3) processed hooves;
- 4) gelatine and collagen;
- 5) *protein meal*;
- 6) extruded dry pet food.

Article 12.11.3.

Country or zone free from VEE

A country or *zone* may be considered free from VEE when:

- 1) the *infection* has been notifiable in the entire country for at least the past 24 months;
- 2) either:
 - a) the historical freedom provisions as described in point 2 b) of Article 1.4.6. are met; or
 - b) *surveillance* in accordance with Article 12.11.10. demonstrated no evidence of *infection* with VEEV/IABC in the country or *zone* for at least the past 24 months;
- 3) appropriate *biosecurity* and *sanitary measures* to prevent the introduction of *infection* have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of animal hosts and their *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter or other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis'.

Article 12.11.4.

Compartment free from VEE

The establishment of a *compartment* free from VEE should follow the relevant provisions laid down in Article 12.11.3. and in Chapters 4.4. and 4.5.

Animal hosts in the free *compartment* should be protected against culicine mosquitoes by the application of an effective *biosecurity* management system, other preventive measures, and measures in accordance with Article 12.11.9.

Article 12.11.5.

Country or zone infected with VEE

A country or *zone* should be considered as infected with VEE when the conditions for freedom from VEE are not met.

Article 12.11.6.

Recovery of free status

Should a case of VEE occur in a previously free country or *zone*, its status may be recovered in accordance with Article 12.11.3.

Article 12.11.7.

Recommendations for importation of equids from countries, zones or compartments free from VEE

Veterinary Authorities of *importing countries* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical signs of VEE on the day of shipment;
- 2) were kept in a country, *zone* or *compartment* free from VEE since birth or for at least the past 90 days prior to shipment.

Recommendations for importation of equids from countries or zones infected with VEE

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical signs consistent with VEE on the day of shipment; and
- 2) either,
 - a) were vaccinated against VEEV at least 60 days prior to shipment; or
 - b) were isolated in a *vector*-protected *quarantine centre* for at least seven days prior to shipment, which is located in an area of demonstrated low *vector* activity, were subjected to a nucleic acid test between two to five days after entry into the *quarantine centre* with negative results, and were protected from culicine mosquito bites at all times during transportation from the *quarantine centre* to the *place of shipment* in accordance with Article 12.11.9.

Protecting equids from culicine mosquito bites

1) Vector-protected quarantine centre

The means of protection of the *quarantine centre* should at least comprise the following:

- a) appropriate physical barriers at entry and exit points, for example a double-door entry-exit system;
- b) openings of the building are *vector* screened with mesh of appropriate gauge;
- c) *vector surveillance* and *vector* control within and around the building;
- d) measures to limit or eliminate larval habitats for *vectors* in the vicinity of the *quarantine centre*, such removal of standing water;
- e) Standard Operating Procedures for operation of the *quarantine centre* and for transport of equids to the place of *loading*.

2) During transportation

When transporting unvaccinated equids through countries or *zones* infected with VEEV/IABC, *Veterinary Authorities* should require that strategies to protect equids from culicine mosquito bites are in place, considering the local ecology of the *vector*.

a) Transport by land

Risk management strategies should include:

- i) treating animals with an *approved* repellent to prevent bites prior to and during transportation, in *means of transport* disinfected and disinfected with *approved* disinfectant and insecticide;
- ii) *loading*, transporting and *unloading* animals at times of low *vector* activity, and avoiding areas of known high *vector* activity;
- iii) ensuring *means of transport* do not stop en route during dawn or dusk, or overnight, unless the *means of transport* is *vector* protected;
- iv) using historical, current or modelling information on VEEV/IABC and *surveillance* for *vectors* at common stopping and offloading points to identify low risk ports and transport routes.

b) Transport by air

Prior to *loading* the equids, *containers* are sprayed with an *approved* insecticide.

Containers in which equids are being transported, and the cargo hold of the aircraft should be sprayed with an *approved* insecticide when the doors have been closed and prior to take off. All possible insect harbourage should be treated. The insecticide sprayers should be retained for inspection on arrival.

In addition, during any stopover in countries or *zones* where *infection* with VEEV/IABC occurs, prior to the opening of any aircraft door and until all doors are closed, netting of appropriate gauge impregnated with an *approved* insecticide should be placed over all *containers*.

Article 12.11.10.

Surveillance for VEE

Surveillance of VEE should be carried out in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and with the following recommendations.

- 1) The primary objective of *surveillance* for VEE, including both epizootic and enzootic variants, is to mitigate animal health and public health *risks* through early detection and rapid response. *Surveillance* enables *Veterinary Authority* to coordinate effectively and in a timely manner with public health and other relevant *Competent Authorities*, facilitating the exchange of information critical to protect both animal health and human health. It also supports the safe *international trade* of equids.
- 2) Equids are amplifying hosts of VEEV/IABC and key sentinel species for the presence of the VEEV epizootic variants. In some cases, they may also act as useful sentinels for enzootic variants providing valuable early warning of virus circulation in endemic regions. As such, they should be targeted by *surveillance*.
- 3) *Early warning systems* for VEE should be capable of identifying epidemic events. *Veterinary Authorities* should promote awareness campaigns to sensitise the owners and keepers of equids, *veterinarians* and the public health authorities of the disease risks.

Clinical and syndromic *surveillance* to detect signs of *infection* with VEEV/IABC in animal hosts are essential components of an *early warning system*. Clinical disease in animal hosts is characterised by fever, anorexia, and severe depression. In severe cases, it can progress to neurological signs and death. Clinical *surveillance* targeted at neurological signs in equids can provide reinforced evidence of the occurrence of an epidemic. However, clinical signs are not pathognomonic per se. Suspect cases should always be confirmed by laboratory testing, that should include sequencing and taking into account the epidemiological situation. Because VEEV mutates rapidly, it is important to monitor molecular and epidemiological data for changes in transmission and genetic diversity, especially in endemic lineages, to detect newly emerging epizootic strains.

- 4) Considering the epidemiological situation in association with prevailing agricultural practices (i.e., rice culture) and weather conditions favouring the emergence of a large population of mosquitoes, an epidemic of VEEV/IABC should be suspected when there is an increased number of equids showing clinical signs consistent with *infection* with VEEV/IABC or reports of infection in humans. This is especially the case for countries or *zones* where *infection* with VEEV/IABC has occurred, or countries or *zones* adjacent to a country or *zone* in which epidemics have been reported. Ecological conditions can be assessed through sharing and analysis of meteorological data, including information access through remote sensing to estimate precipitation and water levels, and especially monitoring of *vector* activity.
- 5) In epidemic situations, *surveillance* should be conducted to define the extent of the epidemic area for the purpose of disease prevention and control.
- 6) *Surveillance* for *vectors* conducted in accordance with Chapter 1.5. may be helpful in identifying *vector* activity and a situation conducive to risk of transmission for VEEV/IABC. However, testing large numbers of mosquitoes to detect VEEV/IABC circulation is of low sensitivity and, therefore, is not recommended as a routine procedure. Rather, *animal-based surveillance* strategies are preferred to detect VEEV/IABC circulation.

CHAPTER 14.7.

INFECTION WITH PESTE DES PETITS RUMINANTS VIRUS

Article 14.7.1.

General provisions

Peste des petits ruminants (PPR) susceptible animals are primarily domestic sheep and goats, ~~although cattle, Bovines, camelids, camels, buffaloes~~ and some *wild* ruminant species can also be infected and may act as sentinels indicating the spill over of peste des petits ruminants virus (PPRV) from domestic small ruminants. ~~Even if some~~ Some *wild* small ruminants can be infective, and as such, should be subjected to sanitary measures. ~~only~~ Only domestic sheep and goats play a significant epidemiological role.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, PPR is defined as an *infection* of domestic sheep and goats (hereafter 'animal hosts') with PPRV.

This chapter deals not only with the occurrence of clinical signs caused by PPRV, but also with the presence of *infection* with PPRV in the absence of clinical signs.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection with* PPRV ~~*infection*~~:

- 1) PPRV, excluding vaccine strains, has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an ~~domestic sheep or goat animal host or a product derived from it;~~ or
- 2) antigen or ~~ribonucleic acid~~ specific to PPRV, excluding vaccine strains, has been ~~identified~~ detected in samples from an animal host ~~domestic sheep or goat~~ showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with PPR, or epidemiologically linked to ~~an outbreak of PPR~~ a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association with or exposure to ~~contact with~~ PPRV; or
- 3) antibodies specific to PPRV ~~antigens~~, which are not the consequence of *vaccination*, have been detected in a sample from an animal host ~~domestic sheep or goat~~ showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with PPR, with either or epidemiologically linked ~~epidemiological links to a confirmed or suspected case, outbreak of PPR or giving cause for suspicion of previous association with or exposure to contact with~~ showing clinical signs consistent with recent infection of PPRV.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *incubation period* for PPR shall be 21 days.

Standards for ~~diagnostic tests~~ diagnosis and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 14.7.2.

Safe commodities

~~When authorising import or transit through their territory of semi-processed hides and skins (limed hides, pickled pelts, and semi-processed leather, e.g. wet blue and crust leather) which have been submitted to the usual chemical and mechanical processes in use in the tanning industry, Veterinary Authorities should not require any PPR-related conditions regardless of PPR status of the exporting country or zone.~~

When authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities, Veterinary Authorities should not require any PPR-related conditions regardless of the animal health status of the country or zone of origin:

- 1) heat-treated meat products in a hermetically sealed container with an F₀ value of 3 or above;

2) Ultra-high temperature (UHT) milk and derivatives thereof;

32) gelatine and collagen;

43) semi-processed hides and skins (limed hides, pickled pelts, and semi-processed leather, e.g. wet blue and crust leather) which have been submitted to the usual chemical and mechanical processes in use in the tanning industry;

54) tallow;

6) protein meal;

7) extruded dry pet food.

Article 14.7.3.

Country or zone free from PPR

A country or *zone* may be considered free from PPR when the relevant provisions in point 2 of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with, and when within the proposed free country or *zone* for at least the past 24 months:

- 1) there has been no *case of infection* with PPRV;
- 2) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domestic sheep and goats in the country or *zone*;
- 3) appropriate *surveillance* has been implemented in accordance with:
 - a) point 2 b) of Article 1.4.6. where historical freedom can be demonstrated; or
 - b) Articles 14.7.275. to 14.7.331. where historical freedom cannot be demonstrated;
- 4) measures to prevent the introduction of the *infection* have been in place: in particular, the importations or movements of *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter ~~and~~ other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';
- 5) no *vaccination* against PPR has been carried out;
- 6) no animals vaccinated against PPR have been introduced since the cessation of *vaccination*.

The country or *zone* will be included in the list of countries or *zones* free from PPR in accordance with Chapter 1.6.

Retention on the list requires annual reconfirmation of compliance with all points above and relevant provisions under point 4 of Article 1.4.6. Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for points 1 to 4 above. Any changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be notified to WOAHA in accordance with Chapter 1.1.

Article 14.7.4.

PPR free compartment free from PPR

~~A PPR free~~ The establishment of a compartment free from PPR can be established in either a PPR free country or *zone* or in an infected country or *zone*. In defining such a *compartment* the principles of Chapters 4.4. and 4.5. should be followed.

Domestic sheep and goats in the PPR free *compartment* should be separated from any other ~~susceptible~~ animals hosts by the effective application of ~~an~~ a biosecurity plan ~~effective biosecurity management system~~.

A Member Country wishing to establish a ~~PPR free~~ compartment free from PPR should:

- 1) have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting and if not ~~PPR~~ free, have an *official control programme* and a *surveillance* system for PPR in place in accordance with Articles 14.7.27~~5~~ to 14.7.33~~1~~, that allows an accurate knowledge of the *prevalence* of PPR in the country or *zone*;
- 2) declare for the ~~PPR~~ free *compartment* that:
 - a) ~~no infection with PPRV has occurred~~there has been no outbreak of PPR during the past 24 months;
 - b) ~~no evidence of PPRV infection has been found during the past 24 months~~;
 - e~~b~~) *vaccination* against PPR is prohibited;
 - e~~c~~) no small ruminant in the *compartment* has been vaccinated against PPR within the past 24 months;
 - e~~d~~) animals, semen and embryos only enter the *compartment* in accordance with relevant articles in this chapter;
 - f~~e~~) documented evidence shows that *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 14.7.27~~5~~ to 14.7.33~~1~~ is in place;
 - g~~f~~) an *animal identification* and *traceability* system in accordance with Chapters 4.2. and 4.3. is in place;
- 3) describe in detail:
 - a) ~~the animal subpopulation in the compartment~~ and
 - b) the *biosecurity plan* to mitigate the risks of infection with ~~for PPRV infection~~.

The *compartment* should be approved by the *Veterinary Authority*.

Article 14.7.5.

PPRV infected ~~e~~Country or zone infected with PPRV

A country or *zone* shall be considered as PPRV infected with PPRV when the conditions in points 1 to 6 of Article 14.7.3 requirements for freedom from acceptance as a PPR free country or *zone* are not met fulfilled.

Article 14.7.6.

Establishment of a containment zone within a ~~PPR free~~ country or zone previously free from PPR

In the event of limited *outbreaks* within a ~~PPR free~~ country or *zone* previously free from PPR, including within a *protection zone*, a *single containment zone*, which includes all epidemiologically linked outbreaks cases, ~~can~~ may be established, ~~for the purposes of in accordance with Article Chapter 4.4.7.,~~ to minimise minimising the impact on the entire rest of the country or zone.

For this to be achieved and for the Member Country to take full advantage of this process, the *Veterinary Authority* should submit as soon as possible to WOAHP, in addition to the requirements of Chapter 4.4., documented evidence as soon as possible to WOAHP that:

- 1) ~~the outbreaks are limited based on the following factors~~:
 - a) ~~immediately on suspicion, a rapid response including notification has been made~~;
 - b) ~~standstill of animal movements has been imposed, and effective controls on the movement of other commodities mentioned in this chapter are in place~~;
 - e) ~~epidemiological investigation (trace back, trace forward) has been completed~~;
 - d) ~~the infection has been confirmed~~;

- e) ~~the primary outbreak has been identified, and investigations on the likely source of the outbreak have been carried out;~~
 - f) ~~all cases have been shown to be epidemiologically linked;~~
 - g) ~~no new cases have been found in the containment zone with a minimum of two incubation periods as defined in Article 14.7.1. after the stamping-out of the last detected case is completed;~~
- 2) ~~a stamping-out policy has been applied;~~
 - 3) ~~the susceptible animal population within the containment zones is clearly identifiable as belonging to the containment zone;~~
 - 4) ~~increased passive and targeted surveillance in accordance with Articles 14.7.27. to 14.7.33. in the rest of the country or zone has not detected any evidence of infection;~~
 - 5) ~~animal health measures that effectively prevent the spread of the PPRV to the rest of the country or zone, taking into consideration physical and geographical barriers, are in place;~~
 - 6) ~~ongoing surveillance is in place in the containment zone.~~
- 1) on suspicion, a standstill has been imposed on the suspected establishments and effective controls on the movement of animals and other commodities are in place in the country or zone;
 - 2) on confirmation, the standstill and movement controls described in point 1 have been reinforced;
 - 3) epidemiological investigations into the likely source of the outbreaks have been carried out;
 - 4) surveillance in accordance with Articles 14.7.25. to 14.7.31. is in place in the containment zone and in the rest of the country or zone;
 - 5) measures that prevent the spread of PPRV to the rest of the country or zone, taking into consideration physical and geographical barriers, are in place.

The free status of the areas outside the *containment zone* is suspended while the *containment zone* is being established. The free status of these areas may be reinstated irrespective of Article 14.7.7., once the *containment zone* has been approved by WOAHP as complying with Chapter 4.4. and is clearly established, by complying with points 1 to 65 above. ~~It should be demonstrated that commodities for international trade have originated outside the containment zone.~~

In the event of recurrence of infection with PPRV in the containment zone, established in accordance with point 4 a) of Article 4.4.7., the approval of the containment zone is withdrawn, and the free status of the whole country or zone is suspended until the relevant requirements of Article 14.7.7. are fulfilled.

In the event of occurrence of infection with PPRV in the outer zone of a containment zone established in accordance with point 4 b) of Article 4.4.7., the approval of the containment zone is withdrawn and the free status of the whole country or zone is suspended until the relevant requirements of Article 14.7.7. are fulfilled.

The recovery of the PPR free status of the *containment zone* should be achieved within 24 months of its approval and follow the provisions of Article 14.7.7., otherwise the status of the rest of the country or zone is suspended.

Article 14.7.7.

Recovery of free status

Should an outbreak case of infection with PPRV occur in a previously free country or zone, its status may be recovered six months after the disinfection of the last affected establishment, provided that:

- 1) a stamping-out policy has been implemented;

- 2) *surveillance* in accordance with Article 14.7.32. has been carried out with negative results.

Otherwise, Article 14.7.3. applies.

The ~~PPR free status of the country or zone~~ will ~~be reinstated~~ regain the status of free country or zone only after the submitted evidence, based on the provisions of Chapter 1.12., has been accepted by WOAH.

Article 14.7.8.

Recommendations for importation of domestic sheep and goats from ~~PPR free countries or zones~~ free from PPR

~~For domestic sheep and goats~~

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of PPR on the day of shipment;
- 2) were kept in a PPR free country or zone since birth or for at least the past 21 days.

Article 14.7.9.

Recommendations for importation of wild ruminant from ~~PPR free countries or zones~~ free from PPR

~~For wild ruminants~~

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign suggestive of PPRV *infection* on the day of shipment;
- 2) come from a PPR free country or zone;
- 3) if the country or zone of origin has a common border with a country considered infected with PPRV:
 - a) were captured at a distance from the border that precludes any contact with animals in an infected country, the distance should be defined in accordance with the biology of the species exported, including home range and long distance movements;

OR

- b) were kept in a *quarantine station* for at least 21 days prior to shipment.

Article 14.7.10.

Recommendations for importation of domestic sheep and goats from countries or zones ~~considered infected with PPRV~~

~~For domestic sheep and goats~~

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign suggestive of PPRV *infection* for at least the 21 days prior to shipment;
- 2) either:
 - a) were kept since birth, or for at least the 21 days prior to shipment, in an *establishment* where no case of PPR was reported during that period, and that the *establishment* was not situated in a PPRV infected zone; or

- b) were kept in a *quarantine station* for at least the 21 days prior to shipment;
- 3) either:
 - a) were not vaccinated against PPR and were submitted to a diagnostic test for PPRV *infection* with negative result no more than 21 days prior to shipment; or
 - b) were vaccinated against PPR with live attenuated PPRV vaccines at least 21 days prior to shipment.

Article 14.7.10bis.

Recommendations for importation of domestic sheep and goats destined for slaughter from a countries or zones infected with PPRV

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign suggestive of a PPRV *infection* for at least the 21 days prior to shipment;
- 2) were not vaccinated against PPR;
- 3) were kept in a *quarantine centre* for at least the 21 days prior to shipment;
- 4) should be transported under the supervision of the *Veterinary Authority* directly from the *quarantine centre* in sealed *vehicles*;
- 5) if transiting an infected *zone*, the animals were not exposed to any source of PPRV during transportation to the *place of shipment*.

Article 14.7.11.

Recommendations for importation of wild ruminants from countries or zones ~~considered~~ infected with PPRV

For wild ruminants

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign suggestive of PPRV *infection* for at least the 21 days prior to shipment;
- 2) were submitted to a diagnostic test for PPRV *infection* with negative results no more than 21 days prior to shipment;
- 3) were kept in a *quarantine station* for at least the 21 days prior to shipment.

Article 14.7.12.

Recommendations for importation of semen of domestic sheep and goats from ~~PPR free~~ countries or zones free from PPR

For semen of domestic sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals showed no clinical sign of PPR on the day of the collection of the semen and during the following 21 days;
- 2) the donor animals were kept in a ~~PPR free~~ country or zone free from PPR for at least the 21 days prior to collection;

3) the semen was collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 14.7.13.

Recommendations for importation of semen of domestic sheep and goats from countries or zones considered infected with PPRV

For semen of domestic sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the donor animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign suggestive of PPRV *infection* for at least the 21 days prior to collection of the semen and during the following 21 days;
- 2) were kept, for at least the 21 days prior to collection, in an *establishment* or *semen collection centre* where no case of PPR was reported during that period, which was not situated in a PPRV infected zone and to which no animals had been added during the 21 days prior to collection;
- 3) were not vaccinated against PPR and were submitted to a diagnostic test for PPRV *infection* with negative results at least 21 days prior to collection of the semen;

OR

- 4) were vaccinated against PPR with live attenuated PPRV vaccines at least 21 days prior to semen collection.

Article 14.7.14.

Recommendations for importation of embryos of domestic sheep and goats and captive wild ruminants from PPR-free countries or zones free from PPR

For embryos of domestic sheep and goats and captive wild ruminants

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals were kept in an *establishment* located in a ~~PPR-free~~ country or zone free from PPR at least 21 days prior to embryo collection;
- 2) the embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8., 4.9. and 4.10., as relevant;
- 3) semen of domestic sheep and goats, used to fertilise the oocytes, complies at least with the requirements in Article 14.7.12. or Article 14.7.13.

Article 14.7.15.

Recommendations for importation of embryos of domestic sheep and goats from countries or zones considered infected with PPRV

For embryos of domestic sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) and all other animals in the *establishment* showed no clinical sign suggestive of PPRV *infection* at the time of collection and during the following 21 days;

- b) were kept, for at least the 21 days prior to collection, in an *establishment* where no *case* of PPR was reported during that period, and to which no susceptible animals had been added during the 21 days prior to collection;
 - c) were not vaccinated against PPR and were subjected to a diagnostic test for PPRV *infection* with negative results at least 21 days prior to collection;
- OR
- d) were vaccinated against PPR with live attenuated PPRV vaccines at least 21 days prior to embryo collection;
- 2) the embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8., 4.9. and 4.10., as relevant;
 - 3) semen of domestic sheep and goats, used to fertilise the oocytes, complies at least with the requirements in Article 14.7.12. or Article 14.7.13.

Article 14.7.16.

Recommendations for importation of embryos of captive wild ruminants from countries or zones considered infected with PPRV

For embryos of captive wild ruminants

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) showed no clinical sign suggestive of *infection* with PPRV for at least the 21 days prior to embryo collection;
 - b) were not vaccinated against PPR and were subjected to a diagnostic test for PPRV *infection* with negative results at least 21 days prior to collection;
 - c) were kept, for at least the 21 days prior to collection, in an *establishment* where no *case* of PPR or of *infection* with PPRV was reported during that period, and to which no susceptible animals had been added during the 21 days prior to collection;
- 2) the embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8., 4.9. and 4.10., as relevant.

Article 14.7.17.

Recommendations for importation of fresh meat and meat products from sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the entire consignment of *meat* comes from animals which:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of PPR within 24 hours before *slaughter*;
- 2) have been slaughtered in an approved *slaughterhouse/abattoir* and have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections with favourable results.

Article 14.7.18.

Recommendations for importation of milk and milk products from sheep and goats from PPR-free countries or zones free from PPR

For milk and milk products from sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that these products come from animals which have been kept in a ~~PPR-free~~ country or zone free from PPR for at least the 21 days prior to milking.

Article 14.7.19.

Recommendations for importation of milk from sheep and goats from countries or zones ~~considered~~ infected with PPRV

For milk from sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the *milk*:
 - a) originates from *flocks* which were not subjected to any restrictions due to PPR at the time of *milk* collection; OR
 - ~~b) has been processed to ensure the destruction of the PPRV in accordance with one of the procedures referred to in Articles 8.8.35. and 8.8.36. has been subjected to a treatment that has been demonstrated to inactivate PPRV in *milk*;~~
- 2) the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the products with any potential source of PPRV.

Article 14.7.20.

Recommendations for importation of milk products from sheep and goats from countries or zones ~~considered~~ infected with PPRV

For milk products from sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) these products are derived from *milk* complying with the requirements of Article 14.7.19.;
- 2) the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the *milk products* with any potential source of PPRV.

Article 14.7.21.

Recommendations for importation of products of sheep and goats, other than milk, fresh meat and their products from ~~PPR-free~~ countries or zones free from PPR

For products of sheep and goats, other than milk, fresh meat and their products

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the products are derived from animals:

- 1) which have been kept in a ~~PPR-free~~ country or zone free from PPR since birth or for at least the past 21 days;
- 2) which have been slaughtered in an approved *slaughterhouse/abattoir* and have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections with favourable results.

~~Article 14.7.22.~~

Recommendations for importation of meal and flour from blood, meat, defatted bones, hooves, claws and horns from sheep and goats from countries or zones considered infected with PPRV

~~For meal and flour from blood, meat, defatted bones, hooves, claws and horns from sheep and goats~~

~~Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:~~

- ~~1) the products were processed using heat treatment to a minimum internal temperature of 70°C for at least 30 minutes;~~
- ~~2) the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the commodities with any potential source of PPRV.~~

Article 14.7.22

Recommendations for importation of animal products (not covered elsewhere in this chapter of sheep, goats and wild ruminants from countries or zones considered infected with PPRV°

~~Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:~~

- ~~1) The products were processed as follows depending on the type of product:~~
 - ~~a) the products were subjected to a heat treatment to a minimum internal temperature of 70°C for at least 30 minutes; or~~
 - ~~b) the products were completely dried and had no trace on them of skin, flesh or tendon and were adequately disinfected.~~
- ~~2) The necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the commodities with any potential source of PPRV.~~

Article 14.7.23.

Recommendations for importation of hooves, claws, bones, horns hunting trophies from sheep, goats and wild ruminants from countries or zones considered infected with PPRV

~~For hooves, claws, bones and horns, hunting trophies and preparations destined for museums from sheep and goats~~

~~Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:~~

- ~~1) the products were completely dried and had no trace on them of skin, flesh or tendon or were adequately disinfected; and~~
- ~~2) the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the commodities with any potential source of PPRV.~~

Article 14.7.24.

Recommendations for importation of wool, hair, raw hides and skins from sheep and goats from countries or zones infected with PPRV

~~For wool, hair, raw hides and skins from sheep and goats~~

~~Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products were processed in accordance with one of the following, in premises controlled and approved by the Veterinary Authority of the exporting country:~~

- ~~1. For wool and hair:~~
 - ~~a) industrial washing, which consists of the immersion of the wool in a series of baths of water, soap and sodium hydroxide (soda) or potassium hydroxide (potash);~~

- b) chemical depilation by means of slaked lime or sodium sulphide;
- c) fumigation with formaldehyde in a hermetically sealed chamber for at least 24 hours;
- d) industrial scouring which consists of the immersion of wool in a water-soluble detergent held at 60-70°C;
- e) storage of wool at 4°C for four months, 18°C for four weeks or 37°C for eight days.

2. For raw hides and skins:

- a) treatment for at least 28 days with salt (NaCl) containing 2% sodium carbonate (Na₂CO₃).

And

The necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the *commodities* with any potential source of PPRV.

~~Article 14.7.25.~~

~~Recommendations for importation from countries or zones considered infected with PPRV~~

~~For products of animal origin from sheep and goats intended for pharmaceutical or surgical use~~

~~Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that these products:~~

- ~~1) come from animals which were slaughtered in an approved slaughterhouse/abattoir and have been subjected to ante and post mortem inspections with favourable results;~~
- ~~2) were processed to ensure the destruction of the PPRV in accordance with one of the procedures referred to in Article 8.8.26. or in Articles 8.8.31. to 8.8.34. as appropriate and in premises controlled and approved by the Veterinary Authority of the exporting country.~~

~~Article 14.7.264.~~

Procedures for the inactivation of the PPRV in casings of sheep and goats

For the inactivation of PPRV in *casings* of sheep and goats, the following procedures should be used: treatment for at least 30 days either with dry salt (NaCl) or with saturated brine ($a_w < 0.80$), or with phosphate supplemented salt containing 86.5% NaCl, 10.7% Na₂HPO₄ and 2.8% Na₃PO₄ (weight/weight/weight), either dry or as a saturated brine ($a_w < 0.80$), and kept at a temperature of 20°C or more during this entire period.

~~Article 14.7.275.~~

Introduction to Principles of surveillance of PPR

Articles 14.7.275. to 14.7.331. define the principles and provide a guide for the *surveillance of* PPR in accordance with Chapter 1.4. applicable to Member Countries seeking recognition of country or zonal freedom from PPR. Guidance is provided for Member Countries seeking reestablishment of freedom following an *outbreak* and for the maintenance of PPR free status.

Surveillance strategies employed for demonstrating freedom from PPR at an acceptable level of confidence should be adapted to the local situation. *Outbreaks* of PPR may vary in severity with differing clinical presentations believed to reflect variations in host resistance and variations in the virulence of the attacking strain. Experience has shown that *surveillance* based on a predefined set of clinical signs (e.g. searching for 'pneumo-enteritis syndrome') increases the sensitivity of the system. In the case of peracute cases the presenting sign may be sudden death. In the case of sub-acute (mild) cases, clinical signs are displayed irregularly and are difficult to detect.

Where they exist, susceptible domestic species, and *feral* populations of these species, should be included in the design of the *surveillance* strategy.

Surveillance for PPR should be in the form of a continuing programme designed to establish that the whole country or *zone* is free from PPRV *infection*.

Article 14.7.286.

General conditions and methods for surveillance

- 1) A *surveillance* system in accordance with Chapter 1.4. should be under the responsibility of the *Veterinary Authority*. A procedure should be in place for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspected *cases* to a *laboratory* for PPR diagnosis.
- 2) The PPR *surveillance* programme should:
 - a) include an *early warning system* throughout the production, marketing and processing chain for reporting suspected *cases*. Farmers and workers who have day-to-day contact with livestock, as well as diagnosticians, should report promptly any suspicion of PPR. They should be supported directly or indirectly (e.g. through private *veterinarians* or *veterinary paraprofessionals*) by government information programmes and the *Veterinary Authority*. All significant epidemiological events consistent with PPR, such as pneumo-enteritis syndrome, should be reported and investigated immediately. Where suspicion cannot be resolved by epidemiological and clinical investigation, samples should be taken and submitted to a *laboratory*. This requires that sampling kits and other equipment be available to those responsible for *surveillance*. Personnel responsible for *surveillance* should be able to call for assistance from a team with expertise in PPR diagnosis and control;
 - b) implement, when relevant, regular and frequent clinical inspection and serological testing of high-risk groups of animals, such as those adjacent to a PPRV infected country.

An effective *surveillance* system will periodically identify animals with signs suggestive of PPR that require follow-up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is PPRV. The rate at which such suspected *cases* are likely to occur will differ between epidemiological situations and cannot therefore be predicted reliably. Applications for freedom from PPRV *infection* should, in consequence, provide details of the occurrence of suspected *cases* and how they were investigated and dealt with. This should include the results of *laboratory* testing and the control measures to which the animals concerned were subjected during the investigation (quarantine, movement stand-still orders, etc.).

Article 14.7.297.

Surveillance strategies

1. Clinical surveillance

Clinical *surveillance* aims to detect clinical signs of PPR by close physical examination. Clinical *surveillance* and epidemiological investigations are the cornerstone of all *surveillance* systems and should be supported by additional strategies such as virological and serological *surveillance*. Clinical *surveillance* may be able to provide a high level of confidence of detection of disease if sufficiently large numbers of clinically susceptible animals are examined. It is essential that clinical *cases* detected be followed up by the collection of appropriate samples such as ocular and nasal swabs, blood or other tissues for virus isolation or virus detection by other means. Sampling units within which suspicious animals are detected should be classified as infected until fully investigated.

Active search for clinical disease can include participatory disease searching, tracing backwards and forwards, and follow-up investigations. Participatory *surveillance* is a form of targeted active *surveillance* based upon methods to capture livestock owners' perceptions on the prevalence and patterns of disease.

The labour requirements and the logistical difficulties involved in conducting clinical examinations should be taken into account.

PPRV isolates may be sent to a WOAHP Reference Laboratory for further characterisation.

2. Virological surveillance

Given that PPR is an acute *infection* with no known carrier state, virological *surveillance* should only be conducted as a follow-up to clinically suspected cases.

3. Serological surveillance

Serological *surveillance* aims to detect antibodies against PPRV. Positive antibody test results can have four possible causes:

- a) natural *infection* with PPRV;
- b) *vaccination* against PPR;
- c) maternal antibodies derived from an immune dam (maternal antibodies in small ruminants can be found only up to six months of age);
- d) heterophile (cross) and other non-specific reactions.

It may be possible to use serum collected for other survey purposes for PPR *surveillance*. However, the principles of survey design described in this chapter and the requirement for a statistically valid survey for the presence of PPRV should not be compromised.

The discovery of clustering of seropositive reactions should be foreseen. It may reflect any of a series of events, including but not limited to the demographics of the population sampled, vaccinal exposure or the presence of field strain *infection*. As clustering may signal field strain *infection*, the investigation of all instances must be incorporated in the survey design.

The results of random or targeted serological surveys are important in providing reliable evidence that PPRV

infection is not present in a country or *zone*. It is therefore essential that the survey be adequately documented.

Article 14.7.3028.

Surveillance in wildlife

Where a population of a susceptible *wildlife* species may act as sentinels indicating the spill over of PPRV from domestic sheep and goats, serosurveillance data should be collected.

Obtaining meaningful data from *surveillance* in *wildlife* can be enhanced by close coordination of activities in a region. Both purposive and opportunistic samplings are used to obtain material for analysis in national or reference *laboratories*. The latter are required because many countries do not have adequate facilities to perform the full testing protocol for detecting antibodies against PPRV in *wildlife* sera.

Targeted sampling is the preferred method to provide *wildlife* data to evaluate the status of *infection* with PPRV. In reality, the capacity to perform *wildlife* sampling is minimal in most countries. However, samples can be obtained from hunted animals, and these may provide useful background information.

Article 14.7.3429.

Additional surveillance requirements for Member Countries applying for WOA recognition of PPR free status

The strategy and design of the *surveillance* programme will depend on the prevailing epidemiological circumstances in and around the country or *zone* and should be planned and implemented in accordance with the conditions for status recognition described in Article 14.7.3. and methods in this chapter, to demonstrate absence of PPRV *infection* during the preceding 24 months. This requires the support of a *laboratory* able to undertake identification of PPRV *infection* through virus, antigen or viral nucleic acid detection and antibody tests.

The target population for *surveillance* aimed at identifying disease and *infection* should cover significant populations within the country or *zone* to be recognised as free from PPRV *infection*.

The strategy employed should be based on an appropriate combination of randomised and targeted sampling requiring *surveillance* consistent with demonstrating the absence of PPRV *infection* at an acceptable level of statistical confidence. The frequency of sampling should be dependent on the epidemiological situation. *Risk*-based approaches (e.g. based on the increased likelihood of *infection* in particular localities or species) may be appropriate to refine the *surveillance* strategy. The Member Country should justify the *surveillance* strategy chosen as adequate to detect the presence of PPRV *infection* in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and the epidemiological situation. It may, for example, be appropriate to target clinical *surveillance* at particular subpopulations likely to exhibit clear clinical signs.

Consideration should be given to the risk factors for the presence of PPRV, including:

- 1) historical disease patterns;
- 2) critical population size, structure and density;
- 3) livestock husbandry and farming systems;
- 4) movement and contact patterns, such as market and other trade-related movements;
- 5) virulence and infectivity of the strain.

The sample size selected for testing should be large enough to detect *infection* if it were to occur at a predetermined minimum rate. The sample size and predetermined minimum disease prevalence determine the level of confidence in the results of the survey. The applicant Member Country should justify the choice of design, minimum prevalence and confidence level based on the objectives of *surveillance* and the epidemiological situation, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Selection of the minimum prevalence in particular should be based on the prevailing or historical epidemiological situation.

Irrespective of the survey design selected, the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests employed are key factors in the design, sample size determination and interpretation of the results obtained.

Irrespective of the testing system employed, *surveillance* design should anticipate the occurrence of false positive reactions. If the characteristics of the testing system are known, the rate at which these false positives are likely to occur can be calculated in advance. There should be an effective procedure for following-up positives to subsequently determine with a high level of confidence, whether they are indicative of *infection* or not. This should involve both supplementary tests and follow-up investigation to collect diagnostic material from the original sampling unit as well as *herds* or *flocks* which may be epidemiologically linked to it.

The principles involved in *surveillance* for disease or *infection* are technically well defined in Chapter 1.4. The design of *surveillance* programmes to demonstrate the absence of PPRV *infection* should be carefully followed to ensure the reliability of results. The design of any *surveillance* programme, therefore, requires inputs from professionals competent and experienced in this field.

Article 14.7.320.

Additional surveillance requirements for recovery of free status

Following an *outbreak* of PPR in a Member Country at any time after recognition of PPR freedom, the origin of the virus strain should be thoroughly investigated. In particular it is important to determine if this is due to the re-introduction of virus or re-emergence from an undetected focus of *infection*. Ideally, the virus should be isolated and compared with historical strains from the same area as well as those representatives of other possible sources.

After elimination of the *outbreak*, a Member Country wishing to regain the free status should undertake *surveillance* in accordance with this chapter to demonstrate the absence of PPRV *infection*.

The use and interpretation of serological tests for serosurveillance of PPR

Serological testing is an appropriate tool to use for PPR *surveillance* where *vaccination* has not been practised. There is only one serotype of virus and the tests will detect antibodies elicited by *infection* with all PPRV but the tests cannot discriminate between antibodies against field *infection* and those from *vaccination* with attenuated vaccines. This fact compromises serosurveillance in vaccinated populations and meaningful serosurveillance can only commence once *vaccination* has ceased for several years. Antibodies against virulent and vaccine strains of PPRV can be detected in small ruminants from about 14 days post *infection* or *vaccination* and peak around 30 to 40 days. Antibodies then persist for many years, possibly for life, although titres decline with time.

It is necessary to demonstrate that positive serological results have been adequately investigated.

WOAH endorsed official control programme for PPR

~~A Member Country may, on a voluntary basis, apply for endorsement of its official control programme for PPR in accordance with Chapter 1.6., when it has implemented measures in accordance with this article.~~

For a Member Country's *official control programme* for PPR to be endorsed by WOA, the Member Country should provide a detailed *official control programme* for the control and eventual eradication of PPR in the country or *zone*. This document should address and provide documented evidence on the following:

- 1) *epidemiology*:
 - a) the detailed epidemiological situation of PPR in the country, highlighting the current knowledge and gaps;
 - b) the main production systems and movement patterns of sheep and goats and their products within and into the country and, where applicable, the specific *zone*;
- 2) *surveillance* and diagnostic capabilities:
 - a) PPR *surveillance* in place, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and Articles 14.7.275. to 14.7. 331.;
 - b) diagnostic capability and procedures, including regular submission of samples to a *laboratory* that performs diagnostic testing and further characterisation of strains;
 - c) serosurveillance conducted in susceptible species, including *wildlife*, to serve as sentinels for PPRV circulation in the country;
- 3) *vaccination*:
 - a) *vaccination* is compulsory in the target population and is practised in accordance with Chapter 4.18.;
 - b) detailed information on *vaccination* campaigns, in particular:
 - i) the strategy that is adopted for the *vaccination* campaign;
 - ii) target *populations* for *vaccination*;
 - iii) target geographical area for *vaccination*;
 - iv) monitoring of *vaccination* coverage, including serological monitoring of population immunity;
 - v) the strategy to identify vaccinated animals;

- vi) technical specification of the vaccines used and description of the vaccine licensing procedures in place;
 - vii) use of vaccines fully compliant with the standards and methods described in the *Terrestrial Manual*;
 - viii) the proposed strategy and work plan including the timeline for transition to the cessation of *vaccination*;
- 4) the measures implemented to prevent the introduction of the pathogenic agent and to ensure the rapid detection of all PPR *outbreaks*;
 - 5) an emergency preparedness plan and an emergency response plan to be implemented in case of PPR *outbreaks*;
 - 6) work plan and timelines of the *official control programme*;
 - 7) performance indicators for assessing the effectiveness of the control measures to be implemented;
 - 8) monitoring, evaluation and review of the *official control programme* to demonstrate the effectiveness of the strategies.

The Member country will be included in the list of countries having a WOAHA endorsed *official control programme* for PPR in accordance with Chapter 1.6.

Retention on the list requires an annual update on the progress of the *official control programme* and information on significant changes concerning the points above.

CHAPTER 14.9.

INFECTION WITH SHEEPPOX VIRUS (SHEEPPOX) AND GOATPOX VIRUS (GOATPOX)

Article 14.9.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, sheeppox or goatpox is defined as an *infection* of domestic sheep or goats, hereafter 'animal hosts' with sheeppox virus (SPPV) or goatpox virus (GTPV), belonging to the genus *Capripoxvirus*.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with SPPV or GTPV:

- 1) SPPV or GTPV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or
- 2) nucleic acid specific to SPPV or GTPV, excluding vaccine strains, has been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with sheeppox or goatpox, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion by previous association with or exposure to SPPV or GTPV; or
- 3) antigens specific to capripoxviruses, which are not the consequence of *vaccination*, has been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with sheeppox or goatpox, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion by previous association or exposure to SPPV or GTPV; or
- 4) antibodies specific to capripoxviruses, which are not the consequence of *vaccination*, have been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with sheeppox or goatpox, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion by previous association or exposure to SPPV or GTPV.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *incubation period* for sheeppox and goatpox shall be 21 days.

Standards for diagnosis and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 14.9.2.

Safe commodities

When authorising the importation or transit of the following *commodities*, *Veterinary Authorities* should not require any sheeppox- and goatpox-related conditions regardless of the *animal health status* of the country or *zone* of origin:

- 1) skeletal muscle *meat* of animals slaughtered in an approved *slaughterhouse/abattoir* and subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.3., with favourable results;
- 2) heat-treated *meat products* in a hermetically sealed container with an F_0 value of 3 or above;
- 3) *protein meal*;

- 4) gelatin and collagen;
- 5) processed hooves and horns;
- 6) extruded dry pet food.

Article 14.9.3.

Country or zone free from sheeppox and goatpox

A country or *zone* may be considered free from sheeppox and goatpox when:

- 1) *infection* with SPPV and GTPV has been a *notifiable disease* in the entire country for at least the past two years;
- 2) for at least the past two years, appropriate *biosecurity* and *sanitary measures* to prevent the introduction of *infection* have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of animal hosts and other *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter or other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';
- 3) *vaccination* is prohibited and no *vaccination* has taken place for at least the past eight months;
- 4) and either:
 - a) the country or *zone* is historically free as described in point 2 b) of Article 1.4.6.; or
 - b) for at least two years, a clinical *surveillance* programme in accordance with Article 14.9.22. has been in place in the entire country or *zone* and there has been no *case* in the country or *zone*; or
 - c) for at least twelve months, a clinical, virological and serological *surveillance* programme in accordance with Article 14.9.22. has been in place in the entire country or *zone* and there has been no *case* in the country or *zone*.

In order to maintain its status, a country or *zone* free from sheeppox and goatpox should:

- 1) comply with points 1), 2) and 3) above;
- 2) conduct *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 14.9.20. and 14.9.21.

Article 14.9.4.

Compartment free from sheeppox and goatpox

The establishment of a *compartment* free from sheeppox and goatpox should follow the relevant provisions laid down in this chapter and in Chapters 4.4. and 4.5.

Animal hosts in the *compartment* should be protected against all potential transmission routes including fomite and *vector*-borne transmission by the application of an effective *biosecurity* management system.

Article 14.9.5.

Country or zone infected with SPPV and GTPV

A country or *zone* should be considered as infected with SPPV and GTPV when the conditions for freedom from sheeppox and goatpox are not met.

Article 14.9.6.

Recovery of free status of the country or zone

Should a *case of infection* with SPPV or GTPV occur in a previously free country or *zone*, its status may be recovered eight months after the cleaning and *disinfection* of the last infected *establishment* or the last *vaccination*, whichever occurred last, provided that;

- 1) a *stamping out policy* has been implemented;
- 2) clinical, virological and serological *surveillance* conducted in accordance with Article 14.9.22. has demonstrated the absence of *infection*.

Otherwise, Article 14.9.3. applies.

Article 14.9.7.

Recommendations for importation of domestic sheep and goats from countries, zones or compartments free from sheepox and goatpox

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of sheepox and goatpox on the day of shipment;
- 2) were kept since birth or at least 21 days prior to shipment in the free country, *zone* or *compartment*.

Article 14.9.8.

Recommendations for importation of domestic sheep and goats from countries or zones infected with SPPV and GTPV

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of sheepox and goatpox on the day of shipment;
- 2) were kept in a *quarantine centre* for the 42 days prior to shipment; and

EITHER

- a) have not been vaccinated against sheepox and goatpox and were subjected to a serological test at least 35 days after entering the *quarantine centre*, with negative results;

OR

- b) were vaccinated using a live attenuated vaccine following manufacturer's guidelines not less than 28 days prior to shipment.

Article 14.9.9.

Recommendations for importation of semen of sheep and goats from countries, zones or compartments free from sheepox and goatpox

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor males:
 - a) showed no clinical sign of sheepox and goatpox on the day of semen collection;
 - b) were kept in a free country, *zone* or *compartment* since birth or at least 21 days prior to semen collection; and
- 2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 14.9.10.

Recommendations for importation of semen of sheep and goats from countries or zones infected with SPPV and GTPV

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor males:
 - a) have been kept for at least 42 days prior to semen collection in a *semen collection centre* where no case of infection with SPPV and GTPV was reported during that period;
 - b) showed no clinical sign of sheepox and goatpox during that period and for the following 21 days; and

EITHER

 - c) were vaccinated using a live attenuated vaccine following manufacturer's guidelines; not less than 28 days prior to the first semen collection; and

OR

 - d) have not been vaccinated against sheepox and goatpox; and
 - i) were subjected to a serological test to detect antibodies specific to capripoxviruses, with negative results, at least every 28 days throughout the collection period and one test 28 days after the final collection for this consignment; OR
 - ii) were subjected to an agent detection test at commencement and conclusion of, and at least every 28 days during semen collection for this consignment, with negative results;
- 2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in a *semen collection centre* in accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 14.9.11.

Recommendations for importation of oocytes or embryos of sheep and goats from countries, zones or compartments free from sheepox and goatpox

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) showed no clinical sign of sheepox and goatpox on the day of collection;
 - b) were kept in a free country, *zone* or *compartment* since birth or at least 21 days prior to collection; and

- 2) the semen used to fertilise the oocytes complied with the conditions referred to in Article 14.9.9. or Article 14.9.10., as relevant;
- 3) the oocytes or embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8. and 4.10., as relevant.

Article 14.9.12.

Recommendations for importation of oocytes or embryos of sheep and goats from countries or zones infected with SPPV and GTPV

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) have been kept for at least 42 days prior to collection, in an *establishment* where no *case of infection* with SPPV and GTPV was reported during that period;
 - b) showed no clinical sign of sheepox and goatpox during that period and for the following 21 days; andEITHER
 - c) were vaccinated using a live attenuated vaccine following manufacturer's guidelines; not less than 28 days prior to the first collection;OR
 - d) have not been vaccinated against SPPV and GTPV and were subjected to a serological test to detect antibodies specific to capripoxviruses, with negative results, on the day of collection and at least 28 days after collection;
- 2) the semen used to fertilise the oocytes complied with the conditions referred to in Article 14.9.9. or Article 14.9.10., as relevant;
- 3) the oocytes or embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8. and 4.10., as relevant.

Article 14.9.13.

Recommendations for importation of fresh meat and meat products except products listed in Article 14.9.2. from countries, zones or compartments free from sheepox and goatpox

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the entire consignment of *meat* comes from animals which:

- 1) were kept since birth or at least 21 days prior to shipment in the free country, *zone* or *compartment*;
- 2) have been slaughtered in an approved *slaughterhouse/abattoir* and have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.3., with favourable results.

Article 14.9.14.

Recommendations for importation of meat products except products listed in Article 14.9.2. from countries or zones infected with SPPV and GTPV

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the entire consignment of *meat products* comes from animals which:
 - a) showed no clinical sign of sheeppox and goatpox within 24 hours before *slaughter*;
 - b) have been slaughtered in an approved *slaughterhouse/abattoir* and have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.3., with favourable results;
- 2) the *meat products* were processed using heat treatment to a minimum internal temperature of 65°C for at least 30 minutes;
- 3) the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the *commodities* with any potential source of SPPV and GTPV.

Article 14.9.15.

Recommendations for importation of milk and milk products from sheep and goats from countries, zones or compartments free from sheeppox and goatpox

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that these products come from animals which have been kept in a country, zone or compartment free from sheeppox and goatpox for at least 21 days prior to milking.

Article 14.9.16.

Recommendations for importation of milk and milk products from sheep and goats from countries or zones infected with SPPV and GTPV

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that these products:

- 1) originated from animals kept in *establishments* that were not subjected to restrictions due to sheeppox and goatpox;
- 2) were subjected to one of the following treatments:
 - a) pasteurisation;
 - b) pH maintained at less than 6 for more than one hour;
 - c) any combination of control measures with equivalent performance.

Article 14.9.17.

Recommendations for importation of skins, wool and hair from sheep and goats from countries, zones or compartments free from sheeppox and goatpox

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that these products originated from animals that:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of sheeppox and goatpox;
- 2) were kept since birth or at least 21 days prior in a free country, zone or compartment.

Article 14.9.18.

Recommendations for importation of wool and hair from sheep and goats from countries or zones infected with SPPV and GTPV

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) these products:
 - a) were derived from animals complying with Article 14.9.8.; or
 - b) have been washed by immersion in a water-soluble detergent with sodium hydroxide or potassium hydroxide held at 60 to 70°C for a minimum of 10 minutes;
- 2) the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the *commodities* with any potential source of SPPV and GTPV.

Article 14.9.19.

Recommendations for importation of skins from sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) these products were derived from *animals* that had been kept in a country or *zone* free from sheep pox and goat pox since birth or for at least the past 42 days;

OR

- 2) these products were:
 - a) derived from *animals* which had undergone ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.3. with favourable results; and
 - b) dry-salted or wet-salted for a period of at least 14 days prior to dispatch; or
 - c) treated for a period of at least seven days in salt (NaCl) with the addition of 2% sodium carbonate (Na₂CO₃); or
 - d) dried for a period of at least 42 days at a temperature of at least 20°C; and
- 3) the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the *commodities* with any potential source of SPPV and GTPV.

Article 14.9.20.

Principles of surveillance for sheeppox and goatpox

Articles 14.9.20. to 14.9.22. define the principles and provide guidance on *surveillance* for sheeppox and goat pox, complementary to Chapter 1.4. and Chapter 1.5.

The purposes of *surveillance* may be the early detection of cases, the measurement and gathering of data for the design of control programmes, monitoring of prevention and control programmes, or for the demonstration of freedom of *infection* in a country, *zone* or *compartment*.

Important components of the epidemiology of sheeppox and goatpox that should be considered when planning *surveillance* programmes are:

- Multiple routes of transmission including direct contact, aerosols, *vector*-borne and via fomites;
- Skin lesions and scabs contain high viral loads which are important sources for transmission;
- The absence of carrier states, subclinical *infection*, or latent *infection*;
- A long *incubation period* of up to 21 days;
- Ability of the virus to potentially survive for months in the environment under appropriate conditions.

Article 14.9.21.

Surveillance for early warning of sheeppox and goatpox

An ongoing *surveillance* programme for sheeppox and goatpox should be in place and be designed to detect the presence of *infection* with SPPV or *infection* with GTPV in the country, *zone* or *compartment* in a timely manner.

The sheeppox and goatpox *surveillance* programme should include the following:

- 1) An *early warning system* for reporting suspected animals, in accordance with Article 1.4.5.;
- 2) Implementation, as relevant, of regular and frequent clinical inspection of animals at risk of sheeppox and goatpox that may, for instance, include animals that were imported from infected countries, animals in high-risk areas adjacent to infected countries or *zones*, or animals in or around *establishments* such as *slaughterhouses/abattoirs* or live animal markets;
- 3) Samples from suspected cases should be sent to a *laboratory* for confirmatory testing.

Veterinary Authority should develop *early warning systems* to detect sheeppox or goatpox, and promote awareness campaigns to sensitise *veterinarians*, owners, keepers, and other stakeholders of the domestic sheep and goat industry.

Article 14.9.22.

Surveillance for demonstrating freedom from sheeppox and goatpox

In addition to the provisions in Article 1.4.6., the following strategies may be used by Member Countries seeking to demonstrate freedom in accordance with Articles 14.9.3. and 14.9.6.

1. Clinical surveillance

Clinical *surveillance* is essential for detecting any *case of infection* with SPPV or GTPV and requires the physical examination of animal hosts. This should be based on a *surveillance* programme that is designed to provide a high level of confidence of detection of disease and requires a sufficient number of clinically susceptible animals to be examined regularly at an appropriate frequency and investigations recorded and quantified.

2. Serological and virological surveillance

As an addition to clinical *surveillance*, serological and virological testing of domestic sheep and goats may be used to detect the presence of *infection* with SPPV and GTPV. The study population should be representative of the target population (population at risk) in the country or *zone*.

Serological and virological *surveillance* programmes should take into account *vaccination* programmes in the region and *vaccine* strains being used. It is not possible to differentiate vaccinated and unvaccinated animals via serological methods and therefore any serological *surveillance* should be restricted to unvaccinated animals.

In some circumstances it is possible to differentiate between wild-type and vaccine strains using nucleic acid identification methods.

Article 14.9.23.

Prevention and control programmes for sheeppox and goatpox

This article describes important components of prevention and control programmes, complementary to Chapter 4.19. Important components of a prevention and control programme for sheeppox and goatpox include a combination of *biosecurity*, *stamping-out policy*, *animal traceability*, movement controls, *vaccination*, *surveillance* and *risk communication*.

Prevention of sheeppox and goatpox relies on *biosecurity*, awareness programmes and movement controls undertaken in accordance with the *sanitary measures* recommended in this chapter. Member Countries may also apply a *vaccination* programme in accordance with Chapter 4.18. in areas of high risk. *Protection zones* in accordance with Article 4.4.6. may be established.

- *Laboratory capacity*: Member Countries are advised to have systems in place for the collection and submission of samples to a *laboratory* that performs diagnostic testing to confirm suspected cases.
- *Biosecurity*: SPPV and GTPV are stable for long periods of time in the environment and on fomites and therefore *biosecurity*, as well as cleaning and *disinfection* and safe disposal of dead animals, by-products and waste are important. *Biosecurity* should apply to all actors in the production chain including service providers like *veterinarians* and shearers.
- *Stamping-out policy*: a *stamping-out policy* including the *killing* of all susceptible animals in the *flock* or *epidemiological unit* is useful for the rapid control of sheeppox and goatpox. Member Countries may choose to implement a *stamping-out policy* that only involves the removal of selected animals such as clinical or in-contact animals which could assist in progressively reducing the prevalence of disease. Zoning and movement controls are important in instances where a *stamping-out policy* is applied. Compensation should be considered to facilitate compliance.
- *Movement controls*: movement controls of animals and *animal products* are important to stop direct and indirect transmission, in particular animals as they present the highest risk of virus transmission. *Animal identification* in accordance with Chapter 4.2. and *animal traceability* should be in place to support the application of movement controls. Movement controls may also be applied as part of zoning in accordance with Chapter 4.4. Attention should be given to management of common grazing and transhumance practices which represent an important route of virus transmission.
- *Vaccination*: *vaccination* may be used to control sheeppox and goatpox in endemic areas, or in a high-risk free zone to prevent the introduction or spread of SPPV and GTPV or as an emergency measure in response to *outbreaks*. Any vaccine used should comply with a *vaccination* strategy as described in Chapter 4.18. Member Countries may consider having in their legal framework the provisions for emergency *vaccination* using live attenuated vaccines. Post-vaccination monitoring should be used to measure the effectiveness of *vaccination* programmes and may be done using approaches like serological methods, epidemiological methods and *vaccination* records.
- *Vector control*: although transmission of SPPV and GTPV by *vectors* is possible, it is not the main transmission route and therefore other measures should be implemented prior to *vector* control measures. *Vector* control may include *vector* protection or applying insect repellents or insecticides to *establishments*.

As with all prevention and control programmes, collaboration with stakeholders is essential and *risk communication* should be designed in accordance with Chapter 2.1.

CHAPTER 14.9.

SHEEP POX AND GOAT POX INFECTION WITH SHEEPPOX VIRUS (SHEEPPOX) AND GOATPOX VIRUS (GOATPOX)

Article 14.9.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, sheeppox or goatpox is defined as an *infection* of domestic sheep or goats, hereafter 'animal hosts' with sheeppox virus (SPPV) or goatpox virus (GTPV), belonging to the genus *Capripoxvirus*.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with SPPV or GTPV:

- 1) SPPV or GTPV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or
- 2) nucleic acid specific to SPPV or GTPV, excluding vaccine strains, has been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with sheeppox or goatpox, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion by previous association with or exposure to SPPV or GTPV; or
- 3) antigens specific to capripoxviruses, which are not the consequence of *vaccination*, has been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with sheeppox or goatpox, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion by previous association or exposure to SPPV or GTPV; or
- 4) antibodies specific to capripoxviruses, which are not the consequence of *vaccination*, have been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with sheeppox or goatpox, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion by previous association or exposure to SPPV or GTPV.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *incubation period* for sheep pox and goat pox shall be 21 days.

Standards for ~~diagnostic tests~~ diagnosis and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 14.9.2.

Safe commodities

When authorising the importation or transit of the following *commodities*, *Veterinary Authorities* should not require any sheeppox- and goatpox-related conditions regardless of the *animal health status* of the country or *zone of origin*:

- 1) skeletal muscle *meat* of animals slaughtered in an approved *slaughterhouse/abattoir* and subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.3., with favourable results;
- 2) heat-treated *meat products* in a hermetically sealed container with an F_0 value of 3 or above;
- 3) *protein meal*;
- 4) gelatin and collagen;

5) processed hooves and horns;

6) extruded dry pet food.

Article 14.9.23.

Country or zone free from sheeppox and goatpox ~~Sheep-pox and goat-pox free country~~

A country may be considered free from sheep-pox and goat-pox when: ~~it has been shown that sheep-pox and goat-pox has not been present for at least the past three years.~~

~~This period shall be six months after the slaughter of the last affected animal for countries in which a stamping-out policy is practised with or without vaccination against sheep-pox and goat-pox.~~

- 1) infection with SPPV and GTPV has been a notifiable disease in the entire country for at least the past two years;
- 2) for at least the past two years, appropriate biosecurity and sanitary measures to prevent the introduction of infection have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of animal hosts and other commodities into the country or zone have been carried out in accordance with this chapter or other relevant chapters of the Terrestrial Code, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';
- 3) vaccination is prohibited and no vaccination has taken place for at least the past eight months;
- 4) and either:
 - a) the country or zone is historically free as described in point 2 b) of Article 1.4.6.; or
 - b) for at least two years, a clinical surveillance programme in accordance with Article 14.9.22. has been in place in the entire country or zone and there has been no case in the country or zone; or
 - c) for at least twelve months, a clinical, virological and serological surveillance programme in accordance with Article 14.9.22. has been in place in the entire country or zone and there has been no case in the country or zone.

In order to maintain its status, a country or zone free from sheeppox and goatpox should:

- 1) comply with points 1, 2 and 3 above;
- 2) conduct surveillance in accordance with Articles 14.9.20. and 14.9.21.

Article 14.9.4.

Compartment free from sheeppox and goatpox

The establishment of a compartment free from sheeppox and goatpox should follow the relevant provisions laid down in this chapter and in Chapters 4.4. and 4.5.

Animal hosts in the compartment should be protected against all potential transmission routes including fomite and vector-borne transmission by the application of an effective biosecurity management system.

Article 14.9.35.

Country or zone infected with SPPV and GTPV ~~Sheep-pox and goat-pox infected zone~~

A country or zone should be considered as infected with SPPV and GTPV when the conditions for freedom from sheeppox and goatpox are not met.

A zone shall be considered as infected with sheep-pox and/or goat-pox until:

1. ~~at least 21 days have elapsed after the confirmation of the last case and the completion of a stamping-out policy and disinfection procedures; or~~
2. ~~six months have elapsed after the clinical recovery or death of the last affected animal if a stamping-out policy was not practised.~~

Article 14.9.6.

Recovery of free status of the country or zone

Should a case of infection with SPPV or GTPV occur in a previously free country or zone, its status may be recovered eight months after the cleaning and disinfection of the last infected establishment or the last vaccination, whichever occurred last, provided that:

- 1) a stamping out policy has been implemented;
- 2) clinical, virological and serological surveillance conducted in accordance with Article 14.9.22. has demonstrated the absence of infection.

Otherwise, Article 14.9.3. applies.

Article 14.9.4.

Trade in commodities

~~Veterinary Authorities of sheep pox and goat pox free countries may prohibit importation or transit through their territory, from countries considered infected with sheep pox and goat pox, of domestic sheep and goats.~~

Article 14.9.57.

Recommendations for importation of domestic sheep and goats from countries, zones or compartments free from sheep-pox and goat-pox free countries

For domestic sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of sheep-pox or and goat-pox on the day of shipment;
- 2) were kept in a sheep pox and goat pox free country since birth or for at least the past 21 days prior to shipment in the free country, zone or compartment.

Article 14.9.68.

Recommendations for importation of domestic sheep and goats from countries or zones considered infected with sheep pox and goat pox SPPV and GTPV

For domestic sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 4) 1) showed no clinical sign of sheep pox or and goat pox on the day of shipment;
- 2) were kept since birth, or for the past 21 days, in an establishment where no case of sheep pox and goat pox was officially reported during that period, and that the establishment was not situated in a sheep pox and goat pox infected zone; or
- 3) 2) were kept in a quarantine station-centre for the 2142 days prior to shipment;

EITHER

- a) ~~4) have not been vaccinated against sheep-pox and goat-pox and were subjected to a serological test at least 35 days after entering the quarantine centre, with negative results;~~

orOR

- b) ~~5) were vaccinated using a live attenuated vaccine complying with the standards described in the Terrestrial Manual following manufacturer's guidelines not less than 28 days 15 days and not more than 4 months prior to shipment (the nature of the vaccine used, whether inactivated or modified live virus, and the virus types and strains included in the vaccine shall also be stated in the certificate).~~

Article 14.9.97.

Recommendations for importation of semen of sheep and goats from countries, zones or compartments free from sheep-pox and goat-pox free countries

For semen of sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that ~~the donor animals:~~

- 1) the donor males:
 - a) ~~showed no clinical sign of sheep-pox or and goat-pox on the day of semen collection;~~
 - b) ~~of the semen and were kept in a free country, zone or compartment since birth or at least for the following 21 days prior to semen collection; and~~
- 2) ~~were kept in a sheep-pox and goat-pox free country~~ the semen was collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 14.9.108.

Recommendations for importation of semen of sheep and goats from countries or zones considered infected with sheep-pox and goat-pox SPPV and GTPV

For semen of sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that ~~the donor animals:~~

- 1) ~~showed no clinical sign of sheep-pox or goat-pox on the day of collection of the semen and for the following 21 days;~~
 - 2) ~~were kept in the exporting country for the 21 days prior to collection, in an establishment or semen collection centre where no case of sheep-pox and goat-pox was officially reported during that period, and that the establishment or semen collection centre was not situated in a sheep-pox and goat-pox infected zone;~~
 - 3) ~~have not been vaccinated against sheep-pox and goat-pox; or~~
 - 4) ~~were vaccinated using a vaccine complying with the standards described in the Terrestrial Manual (the nature of the vaccine used, whether inactivated or modified live virus, and the virus types and strains included in the vaccine shall also be stated in the certificate).~~
- 1) the donor males:
 - a) have been kept for at least 42 days prior to semen collection in a semen collection centre where no case of infection with SPPV and GTPV was reported during that period;

b) showed no clinical sign of sheeppox and goatpox during that period and for the following 21 days; and

EITHER

c) were vaccinated using a live attenuated vaccine following manufacturer's guidelines; not less than 28 days prior to the first semen collection; and

OR

d) have not been vaccinated against sheeppox and goatpox; and

i) were subjected to a serological test to detect antibodies specific to capripoxviruses, with negative results, at least every 28 days throughout the collection period and one test 28 days after the final collection for this consignment; OR

ii) were subjected to an agent detection test at commencement and conclusion of, and at least every 28 days during semen collection for this consignment, with negative results;

2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in a *semen collection centre* in accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 14.9.11.

Recommendations for importation of oocytes or embryos of sheep and goats from countries, zones or compartments free from sheeppox and goatpox

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

1) the donor animals:

a) showed no clinical sign of sheeppox and goatpox on the day of collection;

b) were kept in a free country, *zone* or *compartment* since birth or at least 21 days prior to collection; and

2) the semen used to fertilise the oocytes complied with the conditions referred to in Article 14.9.9. or Article 14.9.10., as relevant;

3) the oocytes or embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8. and 4.10., as relevant.

Article 14.9.12.

Recommendations for importation of oocytes or embryos of sheep and goats from countries or zones infected with SPPV and GTPV

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

1) the donor animals:

a) have been kept for at least 42 days prior to collection, in an *establishment* where no case of infection with SPPV and GTPV was reported during that period;

b) showed no clinical sign of sheeppox and goatpox during that period and for the following 21 days; and

EITHER

c) were vaccinated using a live attenuated vaccine following manufacturer's guidelines; not less than 28 days prior to the first collection;

OR

d) have not been vaccinated against SPPV and GTPV and were subjected to a serological test to detect antibodies specific to capripoxviruses, with negative results, on the day of collection and at least 28 days after collection;

2) the semen used to fertilise the oocytes complied with the conditions referred to in Article 14.9.9. or Article 14.9.10., as relevant;

3) the oocytes or embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8. and 4.10., as relevant.

Article 14.9.13.

Recommendations for importation of fresh meat and meat products except products listed in Article 14.9.2. from countries, zones or compartment free from sheeppox and goatpox

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of meat comes from animals which:

1) were kept since birth or at least 21 days prior to shipment in the free country, zone or compartment;

2) have been slaughtered in an approved slaughterhouse/abattoir and have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.3., with favourable results.

Article 14.9.14.

Recommendations for importation of meat products except products listed in Article 14.9.2. from countries or zones infected with SPPV and GTPV

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

1) the entire consignment of meat products comes from animals which

a) showed no clinical sign of sheeppox and goatpox within 24 hours before slaughter;

b) have been slaughtered in an approved slaughterhouse/abattoir and have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.3., with favourable results;

2) the meat products were processed using heat treatment to a minimum internal temperature of 65°C for at least 30 minutes;

3) the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the commodities with any potential source of SPPV and GTPV.

Article 14.9.15.

Recommendations for importation of milk and milk products from sheep and goats from countries, zones or compartments free from sheeppox and goatpox

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that these products come from animals which have been kept in a country, zone or compartment free from sheeppox and goatpox for at least 21 days prior to milking.

Article 14.9.16.

Recommendations for importation of milk and milk products from sheep and goats from countries or zones infected with SPPV and GTPV

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that these products:

- 1) originated from animals kept in establishments that were not subjected to restrictions due to sheepox and goatpox;
- 2) were subjected to one of the following treatments:
 - a) pasteurisation;
 - b) pH maintained at less than 6 for more than one hour;
 - c) any combination of control measures with equivalent performance.

Article 14.9.17.

Recommendations for importation of skins, wool and hair from sheep and goats from countries, zones or compartments considered infected with free from sheep-pox and goat-pox

For skins, fur, wool and hair (from sheep or goats)

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that these products originated from animals that:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of sheepox and goatpox ~~come from animals which have not been kept in a sheep-pox and goat-pox infected zone; or~~
- 2) were kept since birth or at least 21 days prior in a free country, zone or compartment ~~have been processed to ensure the destruction of the sheep-pox and goat-pox virus, in premises controlled and approved by the Veterinary Authority of the exporting country.~~

Article 14.9.18.

Recommendations for importation of wool and hair from sheep and goats from countries or zones infected with SPPV and GTPV

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) these products:
 - a) were derived from animals complying with Article 14.9.8.; or
 - b) have been washed by immersion in a water-soluble detergent with sodium hydroxide or potassium hydroxide held at 60 to 70°C for a minimum of 10 minutes;
- 2) the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the commodities with any potential source of SPPV and GTPV.

Article 14.9.19.

Recommendations for importation of skins from sheep and goats

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) these products were derived from *animals* that had been kept in a country or *zone* free from sheep pox and goat pox since birth or for at least the past 42 days;

OR

- 2) these products were:
 - a) derived from *animals* which had undergone ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.3. with favourable results; and
 - b) dry-salted or wet-salted for a period of at least 14 days prior to dispatch; or
 - c) treated for a period of at least seven days in salt (NaCl) with the addition of 2% sodium carbonate (Na₂CO₃); or
 - d) dried for a period of at least 42 days at a temperature of at least 20°C; and
- 3) the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the *commodities* with any potential source of SPPV and GTPV.

Article 14.9.20.

Principles of surveillance for sheeppox and goatpox

Articles 14.9.20. to 14.9.22. define the principles and provide guidance on *surveillance* for sheeppox and goat pox, complementary to Chapter 1.4. and Chapter 1.5.

The purposes of *surveillance* may be the early detection of *cases*, the measurement and gathering of data for the design of control programmes, monitoring of prevention and control programmes, or for the demonstration of freedom of *infection* in a country, *zone* or *compartment*.

Important components of the epidemiology of sheeppox and goatpox that should be considered when planning *surveillance* programmes are:

- Multiple routes of transmission including direct contact, aerosols, *vector*-borne and via fomites;
- Skin lesions and scabs contain high viral loads which are important sources for transmission;
- The absence of carrier states, subclinical *infection*, or latent *infection*;
- A long *incubation period* of up to 21 days;
- Ability of the virus to potentially survive for months in the environment under appropriate conditions.

Article 14.9.21.

Surveillance for early warning of sheeppox and goatpox

An ongoing *surveillance* programme for sheeppox and goatpox should be in place and be designed to detect the presence of *infection* with SPPV or *infection* with GTPV in the country, *zone* or *compartment* in a timely manner.

The sheeppox and goatpox *surveillance* programme should include the following:

- 1) An *early warning system* for reporting suspected animals, in accordance with Article 1.4.5.:
- 2) Implementation, as relevant, of regular and frequent clinical inspection of animals at risk of sheeppox and goatpox that may, for instance, include animals that were imported from infected countries, animals in high-risk areas adjacent to infected countries or *zones*, or animals in or around *establishments* such as *slaughterhouses/abattoirs* or live animal markets;

3) Samples from suspected cases should be sent to a *laboratory* for confirmatory testing.

Veterinary Authority should develop *early warning systems* to detect sheeppox or goatpox, and promote awareness campaigns to sensitise *veterinarians*, owners, keepers, and other stakeholders of the domestic sheep and goat industry.

Article 14.9.22.

Surveillance for demonstrating freedom from sheeppox and goatpox

In addition to the provisions in Article 1.4.6., the following strategies may be used by Member Countries seeking to demonstrate freedom in accordance with Articles 14.9.3. and 14.9.6.

1. Clinical surveillance

Clinical *surveillance* is essential for detecting any *case of infection* with SPPV or GTPV and requires the physical examination of animal hosts. This should be based on a *surveillance* programme that is designed to provide a high level of confidence of detection of disease and requires a sufficient number of clinically susceptible animals to be examined regularly at an appropriate frequency and investigations recorded and quantified.

2. Serological and virological surveillance

As an addition to clinical *surveillance*, serological and virological testing of domestic sheep and goats may be used to detect the presence of *infection* with SPPV and GTPV. The study population should be representative of the target population (population at risk) in the country or *zone*.

Serological and virological *surveillance* programmes should take into account *vaccination* programmes in the region and *vaccine* strains being used. It is not possible to differentiate vaccinated and unvaccinated animals via serological methods and therefore any serological *surveillance* should be restricted to unvaccinated animals.

In some circumstances it is possible to differentiate between wild-type and vaccine strains using nucleic acid identification methods.

Article 14.9.23.

Prevention and control programmes for sheeppox and goatpox

This article describes important components of prevention and control programmes, complementary to Chapter 4.19. Important components of a prevention and control programme for sheeppox and goatpox include a combination of *biosecurity*, *stamping-out policy*, *animal traceability*, movement controls, *vaccination*, *surveillance* and *risk communication*.

Prevention of sheeppox and goatpox relies on *biosecurity*, awareness programmes and movement controls undertaken in accordance with the *sanitary measures* recommended in this chapter. Member Countries may also apply a *vaccination* programme in accordance with Chapter 4.18. in areas of high risk. *Protection zones* in accordance with Article 4.4.6. may be established.

- *Laboratory capacity*: Member Countries are advised to have systems in place for the collection and submission of samples to a *laboratory* that performs diagnostic testing to confirm suspected *cases*.
- *Biosecurity*: SPPV and GTPV are stable for long periods of time in the environment and on fomites and therefore *biosecurity*, as well as cleaning and *disinfection* and safe disposal of dead animals, by-products and waste are important. *Biosecurity* should apply to all actors in the production chain including service providers like *veterinarians* and shearers.
- *Stamping-out policy*: a *stamping-out policy* including the *killing* of all susceptible animals in the *flock* or *epidemiological unit* is useful for the rapid control of sheeppox and goatpox. Member Countries may choose to implement a *stamping-out policy* that only involves the removal of selected animals such as clinical or in-contact animals which could assist in progressively reducing the prevalence of disease.

Zoning and movement controls are important in instances where a *stamping-out policy* is applied. Compensation should be considered to facilitate compliance.

- Movement controls: movement controls of animals and *animal products* are important to stop direct and indirect transmission, in particular animals as they present the highest risk of virus transmission. *Animal identification* in accordance with Chapter 4.2. and *animal traceability* should be in place to support the application of movement controls. Movement controls may also be applied as part of zoning in accordance with Chapter 4.4. Attention should be given to management of common grazing and transhumance practices which represent an important route of virus transmission.
- *Vaccination*: vaccination may be used to control sheeppox and goatpox in endemic areas, or in a high-risk free zone to prevent the introduction or spread of SPPV and GTPV or as an emergency measure in response to *outbreaks*. Any vaccine used should comply with a *vaccination* strategy as described in Chapter 4.18. Member Countries may consider having in their legal framework the provisions for emergency *vaccination* using live attenuated vaccines. Post-vaccination monitoring should be used to measure the effectiveness of *vaccination* programmes and may be done using approaches like serological methods, epidemiological methods and *vaccination* records.
- *Vector* control: although transmission of SPPV and GTPV by *vectors* is possible, it is not the main transmission route and therefore other measures should be implemented prior to *vector* control measures. *Vector* control may include *vector* protection or applying insect repellents or insecticides to *establishments*.

As with all prevention and control programmes, collaboration with stakeholders is essential and *risk communication* should be designed in accordance with Chapter 2.1.

CHAPTER 11.9.

INFECTION WITH LUMPY SKIN DISEASE VIRUS

Article 11.9.1.

General provisions

Lumpy skin disease (LSD) virus (LSDV), belonging to the genus Capripoxvirus, may infect ~~susceptible animals are~~ bovines (*Bos indicus* and *B. taurus*) and water buffaloes (*Bubalus bubalis*) and certain wild ruminants, which do not play a significant epidemiological role.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, lumpy skin disease (LSD) is defined as an *infection* of bovines, hereafter 'animal hosts' and water buffaloes with lumpy skin disease virus (LSDV).

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with LSDV:

- 1) LSDV has been isolated from a sample from an animal host ~~bovine or a water buffalo~~; or
- 2) antigen specific to capripoxviruses or nucleic acid specific to LSDV, excluding vaccine strains, has been identified in a sample from a bovine or a water buffalo ~~an animal host~~ showing clinical signs consistent with LSD, or epidemiologically linked to a suspected or confirmed case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association ~~or with or exposure to contact with~~ LSDV; or
- 3) antibodies specific to LSDV-capripoxviruses have been detected in a sample from a bovine or a water buffalo ~~an animal host~~ that either shows clinical signs consistent with LSD, or is epidemiologically linked to a suspected or confirmed case.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *incubation period* for LSD shall be 28 days. Standards for diagnostic tests, ~~and vaccines~~ and information on epidemiology are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 11.9.2.

Safe commodities

When authorising import or transit of the following *commodities*, *Veterinary Authorities* should not require any LSD-related conditions regardless of the status of the animal population of the *exporting country*:

- 1) skeletal muscle meat of animals slaughtered in an approved slaughterhouse/abattoir and subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.3., with favourable results;
- 2) casings;
- 3) gelatine and collagen;
- 4) tallow;
- 5) processed hooves and horns;
- 6) extruded dry pet food;
- 7) protein meal.

Country or zone free from LSD

A country or a *zone* may be considered free from LSD when *infection* with LSDV is notifiable in the entire country, importation of bovines and water buffaloes and their *commodities* is carried out in accordance with this chapter, and either:

- 1) LSD has been a *notifiable disease* in the entire country;
- 2) appropriate *biosecurity* and *sanitary measures* to prevent the introduction of *infection* have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of relevant *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter or other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';
- 3) and either:
 - a) the country or *zone* is historically free as described in Article 1.4.6.; or
 - b) for at least three years, *vaccination* has been prohibited in the country or *zone* and a clinical *surveillance* programme in accordance with Article 11.9.15. has demonstrated no occurrence of *infection* with LSDV; or
 - c) for at least two years, *vaccination* has been prohibited in the country or *zone* and a clinical, virological and serological *surveillance* programme in accordance with Article 11.9.15. has demonstrated no occurrence of *infection* with LSDV.

A country or *zone* free from LSD that is adjacent to an infected country or *zone* should include a *zone* in which *surveillance* is conducted in accordance with Article 11.9.15.

~~A country or *zone* free from LSD will not lose its status as a result of introduction of seropositive or vaccinated bovines or water buffaloes or their *commodities*, provided they were introduced in accordance with this chapter.~~

Recovery of free status

- 1) When a case of LSD occurs in a country or *zone* previously free from LSD, one of the following waiting periods is applicable to regain free status:
 - a) when a *stamping-out policy* has been applied;
 - i) 14 months after the cleaning and *disinfection* of the last infected *establishment* following the *slaughter* or *killing* of the last case, or after the last *vaccination* if emergency *vaccination* has been used, whichever occurred last, and during which period clinical, virological and serological *surveillance* conducted in accordance with Article 11.9.15. has demonstrated no occurrence of *infection* with LSDV;
 - ii) 26 months after the cleaning and *disinfection* of the last infected *establishment* following the *slaughter* or *killing* of the last case, or after the last *vaccination* if emergency *vaccination* has been used, whichever occurred last, and during which period clinical *surveillance* alone conducted in accordance with Article 11.9.15. has demonstrated no occurrence of *infection* with LSDV;
 - b) when a *stamping-out policy* is not applied, Article 11§.9.3. applies.
- 2) When preventive *vaccination* is conducted in a country or *zone* free from LSD, in response to a threat but without the occurrence of a case of LSD, free status may be regained eight months after the last vaccination when clinical, virological and serological *surveillance* conducted in accordance with Article 11.9.15. has demonstrated no occurrence of *infection* with LSDV.

Article 11.9.5.

Recommendations for importation of bovines from countries or zones free from LSD

For bovines and water buffaloes

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of LSD on the day of shipment;
- 2) come from a country or *zone* free from LSD.

Article 11.9.6.

Recommendations for importation of bovines from countries or zones ~~not free from~~ infected with LSDV

For bovines and water buffaloes

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of LSD on the day of shipment;
- 2) were kept since birth, or for the past 60 days prior to shipment, in an *epidemiological unit* where no case of LSD occurred during that period;
- 3) were vaccinated against LSD according to manufacturer's instructions between 60 days and one year prior to shipment;
- 4) ~~were demonstrated to have antibodies at least 30 days after vaccination;~~
- 5) were kept in a ~~quarantine station~~ quarantine centre for the 28 days prior to shipment during which time they were subjected to an agent identification test with negative results.

Article 11.9.7.

Recommendations for importation of semen of bovines from countries or zones free from LSD

For semen of bovines and water buffaloes

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor animals:
 - a) showed no clinical sign of LSD on the day of collection;
 - b) were kept in a free country or *zone* for at least 28 days prior to collection;
- 2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 11.9.8.

Recommendations for importation of semen of bovines from countries or zones ~~not free~~ infected with from LSDV

For semen of bovines and water buffaloes

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 4) 1) the donor males:
- a) showed no clinical sign of LSD on the day of collection and the following 28 days;
 - b) were kept for the 60 days prior to collection in a *semen collection centre* where no case of LSD occurred during that period;
 - c) EITHER:
 - i) were vaccinated regularly against LSD according to manufacturer's instructions, the first *vaccination* being administrated at least 60 days prior to the first semen collection; ~~and or~~
 - ii) ~~were demonstrated to have antibodies against LSDV at least 30 days after vaccination;~~
- OR
- ~~iii ii)~~ were subjected to a serological test to detect antibodies specific to capripoxviruses LSDV, with negative results, at least every 28 days throughout the collection period and one test 21 days after the final collection for this consignment; ~~and or~~
 - ~~iv iii)~~ were subjected to agent detection by PCR conducted on blood samples collected at commencement and conclusion of, and at least every 28 days during, semen collection for this consignment, with negative results;
- ~~2) the semen to be exported was subjected to agent detection by PCR;~~
- 3) 2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.6. and 4.7.

Article 11.9.9.

Recommendations for importation of embryos of bovines from countries or zones free from LSD

For embryos of bovines and water buffaloes

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor females:
 - a) showed no clinical sign of LSD on the day of collection of the embryos;
 - b) kept for at least 28 days prior to collection in a free country or *zone*;
- 2) the embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8., 4.9. and 4.10., as relevant;
- 3) the semen used for the production of the embryos complied with Articles 11.9.7. and 11.9.8., as relevant.

Article 11.9.10.

Recommendations for importation of embryos of bovines from countries or zones not free infected with from LSDV

For embryos of bovines and water buffaloes

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor females:
 - a) showed no clinical sign of LSD on the day of collection and the following 28 days;
 - b) were kept in an *establishment* where no case of LSD occurred during the 60 days prior to collection;
 - c) EITHER:
 - i) were vaccinated regularly against LSD according to manufacturer's instructions, the first *vaccination* being administrated at least 60 days prior to the first collection; ~~and/or~~
 - ii) ~~were demonstrated to have antibodies against LSDV at least 30 days after vaccination; OR~~
 - iii) were subjected to a serological test to detect antibodies specific to capripoxviruses LSDV, with ~~negative~~ results, on the day of collection and at least 21 days after collection;
 - d) ~~were subjected to agent detection by PCR with negative results on a blood sample on the day of collection;~~
- 2) the semen used for the production of the embryos complied with Articles 11.9.7. and 11.9.8., as relevant;
- 3) the embryos were collected, processed and stored in accordance with Chapters 4.8., 4.9. and 4.10.

Article 11.9.11.

Recommendations for the importation of milk and milk products

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the *milk* or the *milk products*:

- ~~1) have been derived from animals in a country or zone free from LSD;~~

OR

- ~~2) were subjected to pasteurisation or any combination of control measures with equivalent performance as described in the Codex Alimentarius Code of Hygienic Practice for Milk and Milk Products.~~
- 1) originated from animals kept in establishments that were not subjected to restrictions due to LSD;
- 2) were subjected to one of the following treatments:
 - a) pasteurisation;
 - b) pH maintained at less than 6 for more than one hour;
 - c) any combination of control measures with equivalent performance.

Article 11.9.12.

Recommendations for importation of meal and flour from blood, meat ~~other than skeletal muscle~~, or bones except products listed in Article 11.9.2. from bovines and water buffaloes

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting:

- 1) that these products were derived from animals in a country or *zone* free from LSD; or
- 2) that
 - a) the products were processed using heat treatment to a minimum internal temperature of 65°C for at least 30 minutes;

- b) the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the *commodities* with any potential source of LSDV.

Article 11.9.13.

Recommendations for importation of hides of bovines and water buffaloes

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) these products were derived from animals that had been kept in a country or *zone* free from LSD since birth or for at least the past 28 days;

OR

- 2) these products were:
 - a) derived from animals which had undergone ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.3. with favourable results; and
 - b) dry-salted or wet-salted for a period of at least 14 days prior to dispatch; or
 - c) treated for a period of at least seven days in salt (NaCl) with the addition of 2% sodium carbonate (Na₂CO₃); or
 - d) dried for a period of at least 42 days at a temperature of at least 20°C; and
- 3) the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the *commodities* with any potential source of LSDV.

Article 11.9.14.

Recommendations for importation of other animal products of animal origin from bovines and water buffaloes

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) these products were derived from animals that have been kept in a country or *zone* free from LSD since birth or for at least the past 28 days; or
- 2) these products were processed to ensure the destruction of the LSDV and the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the *commodities* with any potential source of LSDV.

Article 11.9.15.

Surveillance

1. General principles of surveillance

A Member Country should justify the *surveillance* strategy chosen as being adequate to detect the presence of *infection* with LSDV even in the absence of clinical signs, given the prevailing epidemiological situation in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and Chapter 1.5. and under the responsibility of the *Veterinary Authority*.

The *Veterinary Services* should implement programmes to raise awareness among farmers and workers who have day-to-day contact with livestock, as well as *veterinary paraprofessionals*, *veterinarians* and diagnosticians, who should report promptly any suspicion of LSD.

In particular Member Countries should have in place:

- a) a formal and ongoing system for detecting and investigating cases;

- b) a procedure for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspected *cases* to a *laboratory* for diagnosis;
- c) a system for recording, managing and analysing diagnostic and *surveillance* data.

2. Clinical surveillance

Clinical *surveillance* is essential for detecting *cases* of *infection* with LSDV and requires the physical examination of susceptible animals.

Surveillance based on clinical inspection provides a high level of confidence of detection of disease if a sufficient number of clinically susceptible animals is examined regularly at an appropriate frequency and investigations are recorded and quantified. Clinical examination and *laboratory* testing should be pre-planned and applied using appropriate types of samples to clarify the status of suspected *cases*.

3. Virological and serological surveillance

An active programme of *surveillance* of susceptible populations to detect evidence of *infection* with LSDV is useful to establish the status of a country or *zone*. Serological and molecular testing of bovines and water buffaloes may be used to detect presence of *infection* with LSDV in naturally infected animals.

The study population used for a serological survey should be representative of the target population (population at risk) in the country or *zone* and should be restricted to susceptible unvaccinated animals. Identification of vaccinated animals may minimise interference with serological *surveillance* and assist with recovery of free status.

4. Surveillance in high-risk areas

Disease-specific enhanced surveillance in a free country or zone should be carried out over an appropriate distance from the border with an infected country or zone, based upon geography, climate, history of infection and other relevant factors. The surveillance should be carried out over a distance of at least 20 kilometres from the border with that country or zone, but a lesser distance could be acceptable if there are relevant ecological or geographical features likely to interrupt the transmission of LSDV. A country or zone free from LSD may be protected from an adjacent infected country or zone by a protection zone.
